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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING POLICE SHOOTINGS AND OFFICER SURVIVABILITY:
A CASE STUDY
Amanda Leigh Farrell 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Chair: Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD
Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, the 
department to which they belong and the community at large, yet these events are rarely 
discussed holistically with consideration given to the multiple parties impacted. Given 
the significant impacts, officer survivability and resilience in the aftermath of a shooting 
incident have become a topic with which most modem police agencies are concerned. 
While this number of lethal incidents may seem surprisingly low, there is often a narrow 
focus on the shooting incident itself, with little attention paid to pre-event factors or to the 
long and short term post-event factors. This study utilized a case study of a single 
shooting incident to gain a more broad understanding of police shootings. The case study 
drew from multiple data sources, to include interviews with participants, departmental 
policies, news media, and participant observations. Paying particular attention to 
Goffman’s theoretical concepts of stigma and impression management, thematic analyses 
found five central themes across participant interviews. Also of note are the concepts of 
near trauma and cultural competency, which emerged in various contexts but are rarely 
addressed in the literature.
This work is dedicated to our first responders who run towards trauma and violence when 
everyone else runs away: thank you for your sacrifices and service. Also, to the families 
and friends of those first responders: thank you for your sacrifices and service to your 
community; they are rarely recognized, but no less important.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a police officer and, on a dark evening, when you are thinking of 
your cozy home and warm bed, you come face to face with an armed assailant. In the 
seconds it takes for you to assess the situation and make the decision to use deadly force, 
you unwittingly become a member of an exclusive club to which no one wants 
membership: those who have been placed in a position to take a life in the line of duty. 
You are now marked as one of “them.” There are those who will think your choice makes 
you “cool,” a super cop, a modem day John Wayne or Dirty Harry, and there are others 
who will brand you as an enemy, a murderer. Conversation will stop when you enter the 
room, and people may avoid you because they are unsure what to say. Others may press 
you for details that you neither wish to remember or repeat. You will be questioned, 
interrogated and investigated. Your judgment, both before and after the shooting, will be 
examined. You will have to find a way to cope with this experience and your reactions to 
it, possibly with limited emotional and psychological from your agency and peers. You 
are a police officer—tough and capable. Showing weakness is not an option. Right?
The impact of that single decision to draw and fire your weapon can be far- 
reaching, both personally and professionally, including lasting complications like 
possibly developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or having to decide to pursue 
an entirely different career. Those who surround the officer— his or her family, friends, 
and colleagues—are also caught up in the aftermath of a single shooting, forming the 
members o f a sometimes macabre booster club. Their needs and reactions are often not 
considered in either the extant literature or in departmental policies and responses, and
yet their experience cannot be disentangled from that o f the officer who pulled the 
trigger. Understanding the multiple effects of a police shooting from multiple 
perspectives will aid in addressing these critical incidents holistically, and will 
additionally allow for a focus on both best practice and officer survivability. With 
violent confrontations appearing to be on the rise (NLEOMF 2010, NLEOMF 2011) and 
the training and retention issues associated with a shooting incident (Horn and Solomon 
1989, McElvain and Kposowa 2008), it is imperative that academics and practitioners 
work in conjunction to address these timely and critical issues facing modem police 
agencies. It is from this standpoint, of collaboration between practitioners and academia, 
which the current study seeks to explore officer-involved shootings.
As stated by F. Lee Bailey (2010), when considering the use o f lethal force, no 
law enforcement officer is required to die. Yet, the men and women of law enforcement 
choose to run towards violence, dramatically increasing their risk of victimization and 
exposure to trauma while working within an occupational culture where perceived 
weaknesses have not been tolerated or discussed historically. While they have no 
obligation to die, it is not inconceivable that an officer will be placed in situations where 
there is the potential for serious injury or loss of life, especially in recent times. It is not 
just the actual experiencing of trauma and/or violence that separates the police officer 
from civilians, it is the constant potential for this experience, addressed by Skolnick 
(1966) as the concept of danger. It is also important to remember that, in many situations, 
there is another possible outcome that could have resulted each time a law enforcement 
officer uses deadly force—that officer may have been the one to be shot and either 
injured or killed. This risk is not limited to use of force or use of deadly force situations,
as officers are marked as a symbol of governmental authority, and an accessible target 
upon which some within our society vent their anger and hostility. In short, to be a police 
officer carries an inherent risk of coming face to face with danger, both on and off duty.
The reason it is important to acknowledge this alternate ending is because, while 
approximately 380 citizens are killed in justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers 
per year (FBI 1996, FBI 1997, FBI 1998, FBI 1999, FBI 2000, FBI 2001, FBI 2002, FBI 
2004, FBI 2006, FBI 2007, FBI 2008, FBI 2009, FBI 2010, FBI 201 la, FBI 2012), there 
are many more incidents where police officers may be justified in using lethal force, but 
chose not to do so (Pinizzotto et al. 2012). In 2010, there were 56 law enforcement 
officers feloniously killed in the line of duty and, of these 56, 16 fired their weapons and 
seven attempted to use their weapons (FBI 201 lb). Increases in law enforcement 
fatalities were seen in both 2009 and 2010, with firearms-related officer deaths increasing 
by approximately 24 percent in 2010 and multiple fatality homicides accounting for 20 
percent of all officer firearms-related deaths during 2010 (NLEOMF 2010). Fatalities 
increased again in 2011, by 13 percent, and, for the first time in over a decade, firearms 
fatalities claimed the lives of more officers than motor vehicle accidents (NLEOMF 
2011). While law enforcement officer fatalities are increasing, the number is rather small 
in comparison to both the number of calls for service (CFS) that officers complete each 
year and the approximately 53,500 officers assaulted in the line of duty in 2010 (FBI 
201 lb). It is within this context, very reminiscent of Skolnick’s (1966) description of 
danger as one of the two key variables in defining the police role, that the current study 
proceeds. Although the use of deadly force is both indicative of the ultimate 
manifestation of danger, either to the officer or to someone else, and is rather rare in
4policing, the impact and ramifications of a single incident can be acute and far-reaching. 
Approaching officer-involved shootings from a holistic perspective can aid in 
understanding not only the situational factors that may lead to an officer deciding to draw 
and discharge his or her weapon, but can also inform investigative practices, protocols 
regarding primary and secondary exposure to trauma for officers involved in these 
incidents, and training and retention matters.
Statement of Problem
There are many use of force situations and a wealth of literature available on 
many of these situations, to include the use of tasers (Crow and Adrion 2011, Sousa, 
Ready and Ault 2010, White and Ready 2010), the use o f OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) 
spray (Lumb and Friday 1997, Morabito and Doemer 1997), the use o f K-9 dogs 
(Dorriety 2005, Luxenburg et al. 1994, Mesloh 2006, Sloman 2004), and police pursuits 
(Alpert and Fridell 1992, Homant and Kennedy 1994, MacDonald and Alpert 1998), but 
the current study will focus on deadly force encounters, specifically officer-involved 
shootings (for some examples of work on use of force, please also see Alpert and 
MacDonald 2001, Bazley, Lersch and Mieczkowski 2007, Crawford and Bums 2008, 
Gamer, Maxwell and Heraux 2002, Hickman, Piquero and Gamer 2008a, Hunt 1985, 
Klockars 1980, Lawton 2007, Leinfelt 2005, Lersch et al. 2008, MacDonald et al. 2003, 
McElvain and Kposowa 2004, Paoline III and Terrill 2007, Parker et al. 2005, Petrowski 
2002, Smith 1986, Sun, Payne and Wu 2008, Taylor and Woods 2010, Terrill 2003, 
Terrill and Reisig 2003, Terrill 2005, Terrill, Leinfelt and Kwak 2008, Williams and 
Westall 2003).
5Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, 
the department to which they belong and the community at large, yet these events are 
rarely discussed. Much of the existing literature on police shootings refers to the decision 
to use and factors influencing the use of deadly force (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Belur 
2009, FitzGerald and Bromley 1998, Ho 1997, Klinger 2001, Parent and Verdun-Jones 
1998, Parent and Verdun-Jones 2000, Parent 2006, Perkins and Bourgeois 2006, White 
2002). Literature on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be applied (Brough 2004, 
Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Winwood et al. 
2009), but few studies have examined PTSD in the context of officers who have had to 
use deadly force in the line of duty or the impact of a single critical incident explicitly 
(McCaslin et al. 2006).
Finally, o f the literature available, many of the seminal pieces on police shootings 
were written and published in the early- to mid-1980s (Brown 1984, Doemer and Ho 
1994, Donahue and Horvath 1991, Fyfe and Blumberg 1985, Fyfe 1988, Geller 1985, 
Griswold 1985, Horvath 1987, Stell 1986, US Civil Rights Commission 1981, Waegel 
1984a, Waegel 1984b), before the widespread community-oriented (COP) and problem- 
oriented policing (POP) movements that occurred in the mid-1990s (2009c). COP may 
have significantly altered officer and agency response to these incidents because, under 
this paradigm of policing, there is both an increased level of accountability to the 
community which a police agency serves and an increased role for citizens to participate 
in the policing of their own community. These cooperative partnerships may be 
significantly taxed by officer-involved shootings, leading to an erosion of the very 
foundations of COP. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the broader cultural
development o f a therapeutic society in western countries, where there has been a 
growing influence and acceptance of psychological concepts, such as depression and the 
need for counseling, from the mid-1960s forward (Wright 2010). This greater 
incorporation of psychological concepts into both our medical and cultural awareness 
also includes the labeling and inclusion of posttraumatic stress disorder in the DSM-III in 
1980, specifically highlighting the recognition o f the extreme impact critical incidents 
and massive trauma can have on individuals (Friedman 2007). Previous research related 
to officer-involved shootings has often had a narrow focus on the shooting incident itself, 
with little attention paid to pre-event factors, such as psychological training and 
preparation, or to the long and short term post-event factors, such as value conflicts for 
the officer, PTSD, and changed relationships with colleagues, to name a few.
Another aspect of officer-involved shootings that is not accounted for in the 
extant literature is the multifaceted nature of a single shooting incident. Quantitative 
analyses on this topic are not even able to concur on the frequency of deadly force 
incidents, let alone provide consensus to the range of salient variables involved in 
training for, actions taken during and the post-incident effects of an officer-involved 
shooting. Each shooting is different, so there will be idiosyncratic differences between 
incidents. Yet it is likely that there are also archetypal patterns evidenced in these 
encounters that may be overlooked in traditional quantitative analyses, due either to the 
focus o f data collection or to aggregation errors and biases. There are several 
perspectives that can inform a holistic understanding of police shootings, including those 
of the officer who pulls the trigger, that officer’s friends and family, coworkers, 
supervisors, and the investigators assigned to the case.
7Purpose of the Study
The ability to use deadly force marks the men and women who choose to be 
police officers as agents of the state who can compel citizens to comply with the law, 
with the ultimate tool at their disposal being lethal force. While some of the traumas 
experienced by law enforcement are endemic to most first responders, including 
paramedics and fire fighters, there are unique contours to the relationship between law 
enforcement and trauma that set them apart from their fellow first responders. As noted 
by Rutledge and Sewell (2012), officers may be the source of the trauma or cause 
additional trauma in the course of performing their duties and they often have to address 
the underlying human factors that lead to violence. These are but two of the contextual 
differences that separate police officers from other first responders and, as such, it is 
important to seek a deeper understanding of how officers experience the overall impact of 
both the potential for and the actual experience of job-related trauma and the impact of 
critical incidents on their personal and professional lives.
The current study seeks to understand officer-involved shootings holistically by 
exploring how these incidents impact the officer involved, his or her family and friends, 
colleagues, supervisors, and the detectives investigating the incident through a case study. 
Data will be collected through in depth interviews with individuals involved in this case, 
with triangulation attempted through newspaper articles, court transcripts, and personal 
correspondence contemporary to the shooting.
The impact o f an officer-involved shooting is widespread and the complex nature 
of the interpersonal and professional relationships involved in a single incident, combined 
with informal practices to gloss over these events emotionally, may result in reduced
8efforts to support officers following a shooting. The hope is that this research will aid in 
potentially assisting other officers, other police departments, and other individuals who 
have experienced a similar event better understand and respond to their situation. An 
additional goal of this research is to identify possible areas o f best practice and training, 
with the aim of providing the appropriate response and support in these cases, 
emphasizing officer survivability. McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that officers 
involved in a shooting were fifty percent more likely to be involved in another shooting 
incident and many officers that kill an individual in the line of duty are likely to leave the 
police force within five years of the incident (Horn and Solomon 1989), indicating that 
there are psychological, training and retention issues that cannot be disentangled from 
policy and practice.
Further, this study highlights potential issues of other officers needing support and 
appropriate response in the wake of a shooting incident in terms of secondary trauma or 
victimization. This research is but the first step on the road to understanding the 
inherently complex circumstances and interactions behind these incidents and is but a 
preliminary project in building an empirical foundation for policies that take into account 
all parties involved in an officer-involved shooting.
Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation consists of eight chapters, including the introduction. The 
second chapter will be devoted to discussing the relevant literature on this topic to 
include: defining use of deadly force and the existing legal guidelines that govern such 
incidents; examining available data on officer-involved shootings; a concise summary of 
the gaps in knowledge on the use of deadly force; a discussion of the psychological
considerations impacting the officer, the officer’s family, and other police officers 
involved in the aftermath of a shooting incident; relevant theoretical considerations of 
officer-involved shootings; and using symbolic interactionism, with a particular focus on 
the works of Goffman (1959,1963, 1967), as a theoretical frame for the current study.
The third chapter presents the methodology, results and discussion from a preliminary 
study conducted to contextualize the case to be used in the current study. The fourth 
reviews the methodology and hypotheses driving this research, paying particular attention 
to the epistemological underpinnings o f qualitative research and the influence of various 
methodologies on the current study. Chapter five reports both the data gathered and 
presents a synopsis of the current case. Chapter six is the first of two data analysis 
chapters, composed of a thematic categorical analysis, while the seventh chapter provides 
the other analyses included in the current study, to include policy analysis, media analysis 
and the participant observation portions of this study. Chapter eight reflects upon how 
the overarching patterns found in the current study may apply to other shooting incidents 
with suggestions for best practices and future research.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction: Defining Use of Force and Use of Deadly Force
Before any discussion on use of force can be undertaken, what is meant by the
term force, as well as the parameters that govern its use, must be clearly defined. Bittner
(1970) argued that the central role of the police is not crime control, order maintenance or
law enforcement, but revolves around their ability to use force to compel individuals to
acquiesce to their demands. But what is use of force, and what constitutes use of deadly
force? Some scholars argue that police presence alone is a sign of force, that the police
represent the government’s authority to compel citizens to do things they may not care to
do (Peak 2009). While Bittner (1970) claims that the use of force by the police is
relatively unregulated, Roberg et al (2009:513) provides a concise definition of the use of
force that contains broad parameters or guidelines, noting that it is the most controversial
facet to the role of police in modem society:
“ [use o f  force is] the legal authority to maintain order, demand compliance, 
detain individuals, use weapons, and, i f  necessary, inflict violence. Police are 
granted this authority in order to shield victims from  dangerous felons; to control 
unruly, hostile or physically abusive citizens; and to protect immediate threats to 
human life. ”
As the current study is examining a single officer-involved shooting occurring 
within the jurisdiction of the City, and involving an officer from the same jurisdiction, the 
definitions of use of force, reasonable force, deadly force and serious physical injury 
provided by the Police Department in their General Orders on Special Incidents, Deadly 
Force Incidents and Use of Force (2009b, Norfolk 2009b, Norfolk 2009c) will be used
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throughout this study. These General Orders were obtained through a Freedom of 
Information Act request filed with the Police Department. According to the Police 
Department’s General Order on Special Incidents, OPR-140 (2009b), use of force is 
defined as “any occasion when an officer is required to use a firearm, baton, chemical 
agent, K-9 dog or any other physical means to carry out a law enforcement function or 
restrain a prisoner other than the routine use of handcuffs and/or hands to hold, guide or 
lead a prisoner.” Within this context, General Order OPR-410, related to Deadly Force 
Incidents, states that the use o f force is defined as reasonable if it is “reasonably 
necessary to accomplish legitimate police functions” and deadly force is defined as “the 
application of such reasonable force which is likely to cause death or serious physical 
injury.” Serious physical injury is defined as “a physical injury that creates a substantial 
risk of death, causes serious permanent disfigurement, or results in long-term loss or 
impairment o f the function of any bodily member or organ” in the General Order on Use 
of Force, OPR-120 (Norfolk 2009b). The definitions of these terms are critical to the 
following discussions o f use o f force and use of deadly force, as they not only apply to 
the case in the current study, but are also reflective of and pertinent to the discussions of 
legal guidelines and departmental policies surrounding these incidents in general.
Legal and Policy Considerations
Although Bittner (1970) states that discussions of lawful use o f force are 
relatively meaningless, as there were few tangible limits placed upon police discretion to 
use force, standards and guidelines have been developed since he wrote his seminal 
works on policing. These standards and guidelines, however, are not bright line tests 
(Petrowski 2002). There are two key precedent cases that currently guide use of force,
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and specifically use of deadly force policy: Tennessee v. Garner et al (1985) (hereafter 
referred to as Garner) and Graham v. Connor (1989) (hereafter referred to as Graham).
Contemporary to Bittner’s (1970) writing, a broad use of force guideline called 
the fleeing-felon rule, dating back to the early Middle Ages, was applied to the use of 
deadly force (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This rule held 
that agents of the law were permitted to utilize lethal force to apprehend an individual 
fleeing from the scene of a serious crime. However, in the Middle Ages, most crimes 
were listed as felonies, so this justified a very broad use o f force (Roberg, Novak and 
Cordner 2009). Garner curtailed this broad application of the use of force, instead 
limiting the fleeing felon rule to instances where the suspect poses a threat of serious 
harm to the officer or others, where there must be probable cause to inflict or threaten to 
inflict serious physical harm to prevent escape and, if possible, officers must give the 
suspect a warning of their intent to use deadly force (i.e.; stop, or I’ll shoot!). In essence, 
officers were no longer to shoot unarmed burglary suspects running away from them.
Garner ushered in what most law enforcement agencies refer to as “defense of 
life” shooting policies, meaning that deadly force is only permissible if there is an 
imminent serious threat to the officer or other citizen, or to stop an extremely dangerous 
individual from fleeing (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Geller and Scott 1992, Roberg, Novak 
and Cordner 2009). This standard is reflected in the Police Department’s Use of Force 
policy (Norfolk 2009b) and Firearms policy (Norfolk 2009d), as officers are only 
authorized to use whatever means are necessary to protect themselves or others from 
imminent danger or imminent threat of death, or to apprehend a fleeing felony suspect 
where the felony involves violent physical force used against another person.
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Additionally, the impact of Garner is seen in the Police Department’s General Order on 
Firearms (OPR-110) with regard to when firearms use is specifically not authorized. 
These prohibited incidents include firing warning shots, firing to stop someone who is 
merely suspected of committing a crime or is just fleeing to avoid arrest, firing to halt a 
fleeing misdemeanor suspect or a suspect in a property-related felony, and when firing a 
weapon presents a significant risk to the safety and well-being of innocent persons.
To provide further guidelines regarding appropriate use of force, use-of-force 
continuums were developed for training purposes. Linear models utilize a stair step 
model that officers should progress through when encountering resistance, with force 
being incrementally added from mere police presence to the use of deadly force (Geller 
and Scott 1992, Petrowski 2002, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009, Skolnick Jerome and 
Fyfe 1993). Unfortunately, real life situations do not progress in a linear fashion, and so 
circular models, which allow for variability in response and reaction based on the 
situation and circumstances within which the officer finds him- or herself have been 
created (Peak 2009).
While Garner may have provided more coherent guidelines for the use of deadly 
force, almost all jurisdictions still review any application of the use of deadly force. This 
review is meant to determine if there has been a violation of the suspect’s constitutional 
rights, if the officer will be criminally responsible for any injuries and/or death resulting 
from their actions, as well as to determine if the officer acted within the training, policies 
and procedures decreed by that particular law enforcement agency. This review can 
become rather problematic, as a reviewer’s perceptions and understanding of an incident 
and the actions taken during a police shooting incident may be vastly different to those of
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the officer on the scene. Graham recognized this discrepancy, noting that split second 
decisions are required in adverse, tense and dangerous conditions that must be 
subjectively assessed by the officer on the scene.
Thus, under Graham, the standard for reviewing the decision to use deadly force 
is one that is “objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances” (Petrowski
2002). In his discussion of both Graham and use of force training, Petrowski (2002) 
states that the use of force models and continuums, originally designed to provide 
guidelines in training that officers can rely on in the field, are contrary to Graham, as 
they are mechanical in application, assuming that each situation is the same, and 
invalidating the pragmatic reasonableness standard. Further, Petrowski (2002) suggests 
that these models may actually place officers in jeopardy since they imply a sequential 
approach that an officer must think through, leading to hesitation in actions that may be 
the difference between whether that officer, or nearby civilians, live or die. Reflective of 
the ambiguity regarding use of force continuums and what amount of force is appropriate 
in any given situation, the Police Department notes, under the subheading of Use of Force 
Continuum in the Use of Force General Order (Norfolk 2009b), that police functions 
should be carried out through the advice, persuasion and warnings, and once all 
reasonable alternatives have been exhausted to gain compliance, reasonable force 
(defined above) may be used. Further, in the General Order on Deadly Force Incidents 
(Norfolk 2009c), it is noted that officers will exhaust all reasonable alternative actions 
before resorting to the use of deadly force.
While not specifically tied to use of force or deadly force, an officer’s Garrity 
rights should be mentioned in this discussion of legal considerations. Garrity rights stem
from the 1967 court case, Garrity v. New Jersey, where several officers suspected to be 
involved in ticket fixing were interrogated, advised that their responses could be used 
against them, but were also told that refusal to answer questions would result in 
termination. As such, it was argued that the officers were coerced to answer, and that, 
when those coerced responses were used against them at trial, it violated the officers’
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As such, Garrity rights state that a public 
official, in this case a police officer working for the government, can be compelled or 
ordered to answer questions, but that any information obtained through this process 
cannot be used against the officer in criminal proceedings as that would violate their right 
to avoid self-incrimination (Kruger 2009, Serpas, Olson and Jones 2003). This case can 
influence the investigation of an officer-involved shooting incident, or any incident where 
legal or criminal penalties might attach to the officer’s actions because the officer is not 
supposed to be placed in a position to choose between keeping their job and invoking 
their right to avoid self-incrimination. Ultimately, the review process is predicated upon 
the officer’s ability to clearly articulate the circumstances he or she faced and the 
reasoning for his or her actions. It is within this complicated and contradictory 
procedural framework that use of deadly force currently resides.
What We Know About Officer-Involved Shootings and Identifying the Holes in Our
Knowledge
Much of the existing literature on police shootings examines these incidents 
within a very narrow and specific frame of reference (Belur 2009, FitzGerald and 
Bromley 1998, Ho 1997, Klinger 2001, Parent and Verdun-Jones 1998, Parent and 
Verdun-Jones 2000, Parent 2006, Perkins and Bourgeois 2006, White 2002).
Additionally, the literature available on this topic also tends to be quite dated, as noted by 
McElvain and Kposowa (2008) and Terrill (2003). Many o f the seminal pieces on police 
shootings were written and published in the early- to mid-1980s (Brown 1984, Doemer 
and Ho 1994, Donahue and Horvath 1991, Fyfe and Blumberg 1985, Fyfe 1988, Geller 
1985, Griswold 1985, Horvath 1987, Stell 1986, US Civil Rights Commission 1981, 
Waegel 1984a, Waegel 1984b). Consequently, these studies temporally precede the 
widespread community-oriented (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) movements 
that occurred in the mid-1990s (2009c, Sun, Payne and Wu 2008), landmark Supreme 
Court decisions (1985, 1989) and landmark brutality and excessive force cases, such as 
the Rodney King case in Los Angeles, as well as the Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo and 
Sean Bell cases in New York. Thus the impact of these changes and events are not 
accounted for in much of the extant literature.
When considering use of force generally, and use o f deadly force specifically, 
there are several findings that must be addressed. First, as Bittner theorized (1970), these 
are rare events (Klinger 2004, Lawton 2007, McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003), 
although Artwohl and Christensen (1997) suggest that social and cultural changes have 
led to more situations where officers are likely to pull their weapons and possibly have to 
shoot at someone or something than previous generations o f police officers. While this 
may be true, officer-involved shootings are still a relatively rare occurrence, but they 
receive a great deal o f public and media attention (Lawton 2007), especially in instances 
where a white police officer shoots a black victim/suspect (McElvain and Kposowa
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2008). It should be mentioned that, although this study focuses on the use of deadly force 
by police in the United States, there is literature available on other cultures that relates to
the frequency and relative acceptance of deadly force by the police (Belur 2009, Belur 
2010, Parent 2006, Waddington et al. 2009) and many o f these statistics and perspectives 
may differ from those seen in this country. In addition to use of force being a rare event, 
academics have gradually moved from understanding use of force as a dichotomous 
outcome to viewing this behavior along a continuum of severity (Lawton 2007, Terrill
2003), with most cases o f force involving behaviors at the lower end of the continuum 
(McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003).
The use of physical force, let alone deadly force, is rare in the context of daily 
police actions (Langan et al. 2001, Lawton 2007, McElvain and Kposowa 2008, 
McLaughlin 1992, Pate, Fridell and Hamilton 1993, Terrill 2001, Terrill and Mastrofski 
2002, Terrill 2003), yet researchers have sought to understand the determinants that lead 
to or influence officer behaviors and decisions to use force. This is particularly salient, as 
the average officer-involved shooting lasts approximately three seconds, with officers 
having only a fraction of a second to decide to use deadly force preceding the incident 
(Klinger 2004, Tracy 2010). There has been a noted concentration on the influence of 
individual officer characteristics, such as age, education, gender and experience 
(McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Sun, Payne and Wu 2008, Terrill and Reisig 2003) and 
the situational or transactional nature of police-citizen encounters that lead to a use of 
force incident (McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003, Terrill and Reisig 2003,
White 2002), with the effects of neighborhood being mentioned less frequently. Sun, 
Payne and Wu (2008) suggest that police behavior can be explained in terms of 
neighborhood demographics and institutional characteristics. Lawton (2007) notes that,
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to better understand use o f force, we need both a better accounting and measurement 
system for these incidents and a theoretical perspective from which to examine them.
Adler (2007) notes that scholars have conducted very little research on the history 
of police shootings in the United States, a critical lack that Ho (1997) and Alpert and 
Fridell (1992) attribute to the scarcity o f the opportunity to observe these incidents in the 
field and FitzGerald and Bromley (1998) indicate is due to the rarity of these events and 
their sensitive nature. Klinger and Brunson (2009) further note that the general 
knowledge about police shootings overlooks the plethora of factors that may impact how 
a “reasonable police officer” views a situation that may require the use of deadly force. 
Whatever the reason, empirical research into police shootings is not common.
Another significant impediment to research on police shootings is the absence of 
access to sound data sources, which leads to measurement errors and, inevitably, to 
studies that cannot be compared. While there are significant data issues that are 
associated with determining the frequency of deadly force incidents, both Wecht, Lee, 
Van Blaricom and Tucker (2011) and Alpert and Fridell (1992) note that the numbers of 
citizens killed by police officers decreased in the early 1980s (as compared to a decade 
earlier), although Alpert and Fridell (1992) suggest this decrease may be associated with 
a marked decrease in the number of officers killed in the line of duty and Wecht et al 
(2011) indicate this may be related to the adoption of defense of life shooting policies. 
Sherman and Langworthy (1979) note that there are three basic types o f data sources 
from which to draw information about police shootings: death certificates, police 
department internal affairs files, and newspaper accounts, and each is subject to 
methodological flaws.
The CDC’s Vital Statistics, which will be presented later, have the opportunities 
for subjective human error to bias the counts from the initial completion of the form, 
through registering the death to inputting the data in the system. Additionally, Sherman 
and Langworthy (1979), Alpert and Fridell (1992), and Geller and Scott (1992) cite 
several studies that indicate that the CDC significantly underreports the prevalence of 
death by legal intervention cases, making the use of this data problematic at best. Geller 
and Scott (1992) also suggest using the UCR’s justifiable homicide by law enforcement 
category, found within the Supplemental Homicide Reports since 2005 (FBI 2006, FBI 
2007, FBI 2008, FBI 2009, FBI 2010, FBI 201 la , FBI 2012), but cautions that this data 
source does not require mandatory reporting and, much like the CDC, probably 
significantly underestimates the number of deaths attributable to police use o f deadly 
force.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) also has the Deaths in Custody Reporting 
Program (DCRP) (2013b, Burch 2011, Mumola 2007), which previously mandated that 
states who sought federal corrections funding must report information on all deaths that 
occurred during arrest, in local jails and in prisons. While this program appeared to 
address the mandatory reporting issue suffered by the UCR, vague definitions of what it 
means to be “in the process of arrest,” the BJS stating that the arrest-related deaths 
reporting was not mandatory, variations in data collection strategies employed by State 
Reporting Coordinators, and the expiration of the legislation that created this program 
and mandated reporting present limits to this data (Burch 2011). In fact, Burch (2011) 
states that “arrest-related deaths are under-reported. BJS did not attempt to estimate for 
partial or non-responding jurisdictions. Data are more representative o f the nature of
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arrest-related deaths than the volume at which they occur. Due to variation in reporting, 
caution should be used in comparing counts from year to year.” This indicates that even 
with fiduciary incentives tied to supposed mandatory reporting, it is still very likely there 
is a large dark figure of arrest-related deaths, suggesting that the dark figure related to 
non-fatal incidents may be staggering.
The second major data source is police records. Unfortunately, unless a 
researcher is affiliated with or working for a research-friendly law enforcement agency, 
these records are exceedingly difficult to access. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) 
suggest that, in addition to the unwillingness of many departments to provide such 
records, there are three other flaws with this data that make it difficult to use to achieve 
an accurate national estimate of the use of force: differences in recordkeeping across 
jurisdictions, differences between reported statistics and what is found in the official 
records, and differing definitions and terminology across jurisdictions. Geller and Scott 
(1992) also note that the records needed to conduct meaningful analysis o f trends, or even 
to identify officers involved in multiple shooting incidents, are often impossible due to 
short term record retention before purging or is limited because linking use o f force 
incidents requires a time-consuming manual review of each individual file. As can be 
seen in the section on police shootings in Virginia, the problem of access to only a few 
years’ worth of data is still a pressing concern.
Despite decades of the Virginia State Police’s (VSP) annual publication, Crime in 
Virginia, being accessible through public libraries and the internet, when asked for 
disaggregated statistics regarding police shootings in the Hampton Roads region, the VSP 
stated that they only record information on fatal outcomes and the limited information
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available only spans the years 2005 to 2010. One of the experiences encountered in the
current study further illustrates the difficulties regarding access to police data, cited by
numerous other researchers. A Freedom of Information Act request for data on police
shootings was submitted to one of the jurisdictions included in the present study. The
department’s official response embodied the lack of cooperation and the unwillingness to
provide information on these incidents, mentioned as problematic in the study of use of
deadly force incidents by Sherman and Langworthy (1979), Geller and Scott (1992), and
Fyfe (2002), as evidenced below:
Your request fo r  statistics... cannot be satisfiedfor a number o f  reasons. The 
Department does not maintain such statistics. The Department's response is that 
the statistical records requested do not exist. Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (B) (4). 
Moreover, the Freedom o f Information Act does not require the public agency to 
create records, and in this instance, does not require the compilation o f  statistics, 
Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (D). I f  we were required to compile statistics, we do not 
believe your request complies with Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (B), in that it does 
not identify the record, or the desired statistics, with “reasonable specificity. ”
You have not described specifically what statistics you want.
The assertion that these statistics do not exist is particularly interesting for two 
reasons. The Incident Based Report (IBR) form, adopted by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in 1994 (2010b) to standardize reporting practices and completed in relation to 
criminal offenses, are entered into the city’s computer system and provides many of the 
relevant statistics and demographics related to police shootings. Further, within the City, 
at least, the Notification of Special Incident report form (PD 539) must be completed for 
every incident involving the use of force (Norfolk 2009b) and a Firearms Use Report (PD 
529) every time an officer discharges his or her firearm unless the officer is on an 
authorized pistol range, provides the remaining data required to explore these incidents.
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Both Alpert and Fridell (1992) and Fyfe (2002) note that agencies that either 
voluntarily comply or are somehow compelled to comply with research requests are 
likely atypical from most law enforcement agencies in the United States, thus generating 
doubts as to the generalizability and validity of the data gleaned from these departments. 
Fyfe (2002) also argues that aggregate studies that do not link jurisdictions with 
corresponding figures overlook a host of factors that can lead to variability in rates and 
characteristics of use of deadly force incidents. It has also been suggested that, in order 
to comprehensively understand the use of deadly force, each of the three possible 
outcomes associated with the decision to shoot—fatality, injury or non-injury— must be 
explored to understand the situational and contextual differences that contribute to 
differential outcomes (Fyfe 2002, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009, White 2006).
Alpert and Fridell (1992) further suggest that decisions not to shoot must be considered in 
analyses o f deadly force encounters to determine how and why these incidents differ 
from those where the officer does fire his/her weapon. It should, however, be mentioned 
that collecting data on injurious and non-injurious uses of lethal force are even more 
challenging than collecting data on police shootings resulting in fatal outcomes. Also of 
interest is that, despite over three decades of vociferous calls for the establishment of a 
national reporting system for both lethal and non-lethal incidents (Engel 2008, Fyfe 2002, 
Geller and Scott 1992, Hickman, Piquero and Gamer 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 
1979, Smith 2008), such a repository is not yet in existence and policy continues to be 
written in absentia o f the guidance and support o f methodologically sound empirical 
evidence.
While less empirical in nature, a preliminary study (Farrell n.d.) to the current 
case study found that police shootings are likely underreported in the Hampton Roads 
region of Virginia. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) did not simply cite police records as 
a source of data on police shootings, they cited police Internal Affairs records. After 
talking with one officer, and revealing one jurisdiction’s assertions, as mentioned earlier, 
that statistics on police shootings do not exist, it was determined that, in at least one 
jurisdiction in the preliminary study the Internal Affairs unit would be the only source for 
any information related to police shootings over time. Within the General Order on Use 
of Force (Norfolk 2009b), the Police Department dictates that the Detective Division will 
maintain investigation files related to the use of force until a final decision has been made 
in relation to prosecution and, if there is a decision to prosecute, the case has been finally 
concluded, and “to the extent Detective Division procedures require further retention of 
files, until such procedures permit disposition.” Internal Affairs Division, under this 
same General Order, must maintain “a separate set of records [to include all facts, 
materials and evidence from the criminal investigation] and prepare cases as required for 
departmental board hearings, grievance panels, and trial board proceedings” (Norfolk 
2009b). There is no mention in this General Order of when it is appropriate for the 
Internal Affairs Division to purge its files. This example is strongly associated with the 
issues Geller and Scott (1992) raised regarding short term retention of information before 
purging, leaving Internal Affairs as the unit that maintains copies of all Special Incident 
Reports and investigations into use of force cases.
The final type of data discussed by Sherman and Langworthy (1979) are 
newspaper articles, which the researchers eliminate from their consideration due to the
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unreliability of news coverage. They assert that newspaper articles may provide the most 
accurate count of homicides, but this will only be the case in areas that deem every 
homicide (or even every serious crime) equally newsworthy and, as that is unlikely 
(Chermak and Chapman 2007, Gruenewald, Chermak and Pizarro 2013, Schildkraut and 
Donley 2012, White and Ready 2009), dismiss newspaper articles as a source of data. 
However, other scholars have shown that media reports can be used as a source of data 
on police behavior, particularly involving use of force (Burch 2011, Ready, White and 
Fisher 2008, White and Ready 2009, White et al. 2012), while others have also shown 
that media depictions of police and police behavior do impact citizen perceptions of 
officer culpability, but do not impact overall perceptions of police (Chermak, McGarrell 
and Gruenewald 2006). In conducting the preliminary study to contextualize this case, 
the author differed significantly in her assessment of the validity of the use o f newspaper 
articles as a data source because, in the absence of officially collected and available data, 
newspapers provide the most information, though not necessarily the most accurate or 
comprehensive information, on officer-involved shootings. While not all homicides are 
treated equally in the media (Gruenewald, Chermak and Pizarro 2013, Schildkraut and 
Donley 2012), use o f force incidents, especially those using deadly force, tend to be 
deemed newsworthy as they are the most sensational or atypical. Further, coverage in the 
news media is likely to also include incidents where citizens have been injured or where 
the police fired their weapons and did not injure anyone, although these nonfatal cases 
may also be overlooked due to having a less impactful headline, providing insight into 
both the lethal and non-lethal outcomes of the use of deadly force. Finally, as it has been 
shown that national statistics are likely to grossly underestimate the prevalence and
frequency of police shootings, and many police agencies are unwilling to provide access 
to departmental records, newspapers become the most available source for information on 
deadly force encounters, particularly at the jurisdictional level. They assert that 
newspaper articles may provide the most accurate count of homicides, but this will only 
be the case in areas that deem every homicide equally newsworthy and, as that is 
unlikely, dismiss newspaper articles as a source of data. Finally, a Public Information 
Officer (PIO) from one o f the jurisdictions included in the preliminary study noted that 
the use of the local newspaper was likely to be a relatively accurate source of 
information, as the Virginian Pilot is known for fact checking with and receiving most of 
its information from local police departments.
As mentioned by McElvain and Kposowa (2008) and Fyfe (1981), there are often 
difficulties accessing data on these incidents, with police departments largely unwilling to 
cooperate or participate in empirical research on such a sensitive topic that may 
potentially leave them vulnerable to civil liability inquiries. Even with the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), there are certain materials exempted and, unless the researcher 
knows the precise wording of what they need to request, gaining access to materials can 
be extremely challenging. These limitations are further compounded by the fact that 
many jurisdictions and agencies do not collect or record detailed data about non-fatal 
police shootings, which means that we are not able to empirically explore the contextual 
and individual differences between misses, injurious and fatal shootings fully.
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The Frequency and Characteristics o f Officer-Involved Shootings
Despite Sherman and Langworthy’s (1979), and Geller and Scott’s (1992), 
concerns regarding officially reported statistics on use o f deadly force, it is important to 
note the frequency of fatal police shootings in the Commonwealth of Virginia found in 
these sources. The UCR provides very little information regarding justifiable homicides 
by law enforcement officer beyond total national counts and type of weapon used. 
According to the FBI, there were 7972 justifiable homicides committed by law 
enforcement officers between 1991 and 2011, with an average of 380 justifiable 
homicides by police officers per year (FBI, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2004, 2006, 2007,2008, 2009,2010,2011, 2012). Between 2007 and 2011, the FBI 
shows an increase in justifiable homicides by law enforcement (N=1980, M=396) (please 
see Appendix A). Although the FBI provides some data on the frequency of fatal officer 
involved shootings, more detailed information can be obtained through both the BJS’s 
DCRP and the CDC’s VitalStats mortality statistics (2010a) (see Appendix A). Figure 1 
presents the discrepancies between the figures published by the UCR and those published 
by the CDC and the BJS, underscoring the argument that there is a lack of agreement and 
accounting for police involved shootings within the United States.
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Figure 1: Comparison of UCR, CDC and BJS Measures of Fatal Police Shootings
The DCRP began collecting the mandated data on deaths that occurred during the 
process of arrest (so not necessarily due to use o f deadly force) in 2003 and the 
legislation that created the DCRP and mandated reporting expired in 2006. However,
BJS has continued to collect data on this topic (2013b). Between January 2003 and 
December 2009, 4,813 arrest-related deaths were reported to the DCRP, with 61% of 
these deaths being attributed to homicides by law enforcement personnel (Burch 2011). 
Of all arrest-related deaths, it was alleged that 45% of decedents had just engaged in 
assaultive behavior prior to the arrest or had been assaultive during the arrest process 
(Burch 2011). Males accounted for 95% of all arrest-related deaths, and over half of all 
arrest-related deaths occurred in individuals between the ages of 25 and 44 (Burch 2011). 
According to the DCRP, between 2003 and 2009, homicide by law enforcement 
personnel, with 73% of these cases being attributed to local police agencies, accounted 
for 62% of the arrest-related deaths among males and 49% of arrest-related deaths among
females, with 75% of all decedents from homicide during arrest having allegedly been 
engaged in violent offenses (Burch 2011). Additionally, of those killed by law 
enforcement during arrest, 61% were classified as White (Non-Hispanic), 32% were 
Black (Non-Hispanic); 20% were Hispanic, 4% were Other (which includes American 
Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, Native Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and those of 
mixed racial origins), and in 3% of cases the decedent’s racial background is listed as 
Unknown. Of the total number of arrest-related deaths reported between 2003 and 2009, 
340 agencies in the state of Virginia reported 113 arrest-related deaths that occurred in 
the Commonwealth. Eighty-five of those deaths, or 75%, were classified as homicide by 
law enforcement officers, representing an average of 9.4 homicides by law enforcement 
during arrest per year (Burch 2011). The BJS does not provide situational or contextual 
information at the state level and does not provide regional level data.
The CDC has a classification of death called “death by legal intervention,” which 
is defined as “injuries inflicted by the police or other law-enforcing agents, including 
military on duty, in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, 
suppressing disturbances, maintaining order, and other legal actions. Excludes injuries 
caused by civil insurrections” (2010a). Examining the available data for the years 1990 
to 2009, there have been a total of 7414 deaths by legal intervention recorded in the 
United States during this time period, with an average of 370.7 deaths of this nature per 
year. Only national aggregated totals are currently available for the years 2008 and 2009, 
but between 1990 and 2007, males, in general, account for the majority o f these deaths 
(96.76%) and Black males accounted for approximately 29 percent o f these deaths. The 
CDC data also permits examination of these cases at the state level. In the
Commonwealth of Virginia, there were 218 deaths by legal intervention between 1990 
and 2007, with an average of 12 such deaths per year. Overwhelmingly, the 
victim/suspects in these cases are male (n = 214), and although still disproportionate 
racially, there is a more even distribution between white victims (n = 119) and Black 
victims (n= 93) than anticipated given the literature on the use of deadly force (please see 
Goldkamp, 1976; Lawton, 2007; McElvain & Kposowa, 2008).
Another source of data for information on police shootings is the Virginia State 
Police’s (VSP) annual Crime in Virginia reports (2010b). While the reports contain very 
limited information on these incidents, a FOIA request was submitted to this agency, 
requesting disaggregated statistics for the Hampton Roads region. Although the 
researcher was originally told that these data were not collected, after further questioning 
the VSP indicated that they only maintain minimal statistics on fatal police shootings and 
provided that information, which included a coded city category, the IBR number and the 
date. According to this additional data, the VSP indicates that there have been 21 fatal 
police shootings in the Hampton Roads region between 2005 and 2010, with ten of those 
fatalities occurring in Norfolk, VA and three occurring in Chesapeake, VA. As these 
data were sent with the city identifiers encoded, attempts to identify each city have been 
made with minimal success. A preliminary study (Farrell n.d.), conducted to determine 
the frequency of shootings in the Hampton Roads region and to contextualize the case 
utilized in the current research, discovered 27 fatal police shootings reported in the media 
within the same time frame, six more than the total provided by the VSP. Thus, it is 
likely that we are underestimating the frequency o f police shootings at the regional, state
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and national levels, with local frequencies not being readily available or accessible to 
criminologists or the general public.
What information is available is conflicting, with the UCR, BJS and CDC 
providing different, and often divergent, gross totals for deaths attributable to police 
shootings each year as displayed in Figure 1 and in Appendices A and B. Although these 
estimates draw from different data sources, they both are seeking to provide a count of 
citizens reasonably or justifiably killed by law enforcement each year. It would be 
expected that, while there may be some discrepancies between the counts, that they 
would be similar and that, overall, the data would display similar trends over time; but 
this is not the case (see Figure 1). As suggested by Geller and Scott (1992) and Sherman 
and Langworthy (1979), these differences are likely due to inherent flaws within the 
reporting systems that generate the totals on an annual basis. It is quite likely that the 
overall totals for justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers in Virginia, collected 
by the Virginia State Police and provided pursuant to a FOLA request, likely suffer from 
similar flaws as the UCR reporting system, specifically non-mandatory reporting, that 
leads to undercounting the total number of fatal police shootings.
Psychological Considerations: The Officer
Causes and consequences of officer stress are o f great concern to scholars of 
modem policing (Blau 1994, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, Lord 2005, Miller 2006, 
Stevens 2005, Stotland and Berberich 1979). As Kirschman (2007) notes, most officers 
will be exposed to more tragedy in their first three years on the job than most other 
people experience over their lifetime, often leading to compassion fatigue and cynicism. 
Further, this is a population recognized for high prevalence rates of several mental health
issues, to include depression, anxiety, anger management problems, substance and/or 
alcohol misuse and abuse, stress, difficulties in interpersonal relationships, and suicide 
(Wester and Lyubelsky 2005). This dissertation is focused on the impacts of an officer- 
involved shooting incident and will focus on critical incident-related stressors and 
reactions; however, it is important to recognize that post trauma reactions may amplify 
other job-related psychological and physiological issues plaguing an officer or that 
chronic stress can be concurrent with critical incident stress. Further, as has been 
suggested at the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat (2009a) and based on data collected by 
this program, the first responder personality may also play a role in critical incident 
reactions and resiliency. WCPR (Kirschman 2012a) has found that many first responders 
may develop the coping skills that make them good officers— ability to dissociate, 
compartmentalize and be calm in a crisis— in childhood as a result of abuse, neglect or 
having an alcoholic parent. Thus, these same traits that make them good officers may 
also be indicators that these officers are at a heightened risk for developing PTSD.
Now that the overall prevalence of shootings has been discussed, the impacts of 
these incidents on the officers must be addressed. While the first urban police 
departments were being established in this country during the 1800s (Peak 2009, Roberg, 
Novak and Cordner 2009), it was not until the late 1970s that the physical, cognitive and 
emotional responses exhibited by officers involved in shooting incidents began to merit 
the attention of researchers (Jones 1989). The definition of a critical incident can be 
broad, but is generally conceptualized as an event that involves a serious threat or loss 
and, while this may be vague, incidents commonly defined as such include line of duty 
deaths or serious injuries, shooting incidents, child deaths, significant injuries, intense
media scrutiny and facing legal charges (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Kamena et 
al. 2011). A traumatic incident can also be defined as any incident whose impact 
overwhelms an individual’s normal coping abilities, often including death, serious injury, 
intense fear, helplessness and horror (Kamena et al. 2011, Kirschman 2007). In fact, it 
has been noted that one of the most stressful experience in a police officer’s career is 
killing someone in the line of duty (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, 
Stevens 2005).
This event may have severe psychological impacts, both in the immediate 
aftermath of the event and in more lasting ways, it is suggested that educating officers as 
to what to expect, physiologically, psychologically, and cognitively, in the aftermath of a 
critical incident may have inoculative effects (Blau 1994, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 
2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Schlitz n.d., Stephens 2005), allowing the 
officer to mentally prepare and know that what they experience is a normal reaction to 
trauma. In other words, Norcross (2011) notes that officers need to develop a warrior’s 
mentality, or the mindset to do what you must do to survive, always ready to do what the 
job requires, and must also develop what he calls a survival retirement account, also 
called an emergency response mental file by Jones (1989). This account allows the 
officer to make “deposits” by gathering and honing mental capabilities, training, physical 
fitness capabilities and proper equipment. If this account or file is developed and 
maintained, making regular deposits in the mental, physical, training and equipment 
categories, there will be an available reserve for the officer to draw upon in the event of a 
crisis (Norcross 2011). By offering training and preparatory classes on the effects of 
critical incident stress, police departments can contribute to the opening and maintenance
of the survival retirement account. Current research is also looking at the impact of prior 
knowledge and the develop of post trauma symptoms, focusing on not only the 
differences in expectations of a shooting incident between officers who have been 
involved in a shooting and those who have not, but also upon both the anticipated and 
unexpected post-event affects experienced by officers who have been involved in 
shooting incidents (Maratea, Posadas and Myers 2011).
One reason that it is critical that departments take a preventative role is that, while 
statistics vary, 50 to 80 percent of officers that kill someone in the line of duty leave the 
force within five years (Kirschman 2007), with Stevens (2005) noting that one in three 
officers involved in a shooting will leave the police department within a year, 
representing a loss o f not only an employee, but also the financial investment the 
department has made in that employee’s training and development. To state it very 
bluntly, “it is likely more expensive to replace an officer than a police car” (Kamena et al. 
2011). Even if the officer does not leave the department, he or she may represent a 
financial loss to the department in terms of decreased productivity, costs associated with 
workers’ compensation, litigation fees, frequent absenteeism, and the list goes continues 
(Honig and Sultan 2004, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). When considering these costs 
for all officers involved in a single shooting incident, these costs can quickly add up to 
several million dollars (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989). Even at just one million 
dollars per shooting, and considering only fatal police shootings, this accounts for annual 
potential costs of at least $375 million dollars. In the current economic climate of 
budgetary cuts and a “do more with less” attitude, these statistics suggest that a cost
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effective approach involves effective training and preparation, as well as swift 
intervention, to avoid officers developing long term symptoms of psychological trauma.
Stress Reactions to a Critical Incident
When discussing reactions to a critical incident, Kirschman (2007) differentiates 
between critical incident stress, which encompasses physical and psychological reactions 
that may persist for two days to one month after the incident, and post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). It is also important to note that there is likely a change in the 
terminology on the horizon—as many in the field suggest that the term PTSD suggests 
that there is something wrong with the individual (“he or she has a disorder”). Several 
scholars and practitioners have suggested that the more appropriate term is post traumatic 
stress injury (PTSI), as this is a more accurate description (Schlitz n.d.). Recently, the 
researcher also heard this referred to as PTS, or post trauma syndrome, on a news 
program. Indeed, the author concurs with this change in terminology, and will 
paraphrase a quote from a study participant that encapsulates the mentality change that 
may accompany this terminology change: if I sprain an ankle chasing a suspect, I will get 
sent to the hospital immediately. Seeing a traumatic event or participating in a critical 
incident can cause just as serious, or an even more serious, an injury—you just cannot see 
it. This sentiment is also echoed by others in the field, as evidenced by comparisons of 
PTSD to broken bones (Schlitz n.d.), or describing it as an “invisible wound” (Nichols 
n.d.).
Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) also differentiate between different post­
trauma responses, noting that there are three typologies of post-incident reactions. The 
first is the transitory period of post-incident psychological distress, which features the
onset o f psychological distress immediately following the incident that decreases over 
time and is usually concluded within one month of the incident (Best, Artwohl and 
Kirschman 2011), very similar to Kirschman’s (2007) definition of critical incident 
stress. The intermediate response is characterized by intermittent symptoms that develop 
during the initial weeks and may last several months (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 
2011). The final typology, severe psychological disability, is when an officer’s daily 
functioning is significantly impacted over a prolonged period of time(Best, Artwohl and 
Kirschman 2011). This third typology is synonymous with PTSD.
PTSD is a mental health disorder, recognized in the DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association and American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV 
2000), that can be either acute or delayed. Violanti (2005) identifies two components that 
are necessary for a PTSD diagnosis, the nature of the incident involved and the 
individual’s responses or symptoms resulting from exposure to that incident. Typically, 
PTSD symptoms last more than a month, cause distress that is intrusive or disruptive, and 
develop within three months of the traumatic incident (Artwohl and Christensen 1997, 
Kirschman 2007). There are three recognized clusters of symptoms associated with 
PTSD and a diagnosis requires that an individual experience one or more symptoms from 
each of the three categories. Table 1, below, summarizes the three clusters o f symptoms, 
as outlined by Kirschman (2007).
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Table 1: Summary o f  PTSD Symptom Clusters, Adaptedfrom Kirschman (2007) 
Reexperiencing the Event Numbing or Avoidance Increased Arousal
Behavior
•  Recurring intrusive and 
distressing recollections 
o f  event
• Recurring and 
distressing dreams o f  the 
event
•  Flashbacks
• Intense distress over 
exposure to stimuli 
associated with the event
• Intense nervous system 
activity when exposed to 
stimuli associated with 
event, as if  threat to 
safety exists/continues
•  Avoids thoughts, 
feelings or conversations 
related to the event
•  Avoids activities, Places 
or people that remind the 
individual o f  the event
•  Inability to recall 
important aspects o f  the 
event
•  Decreased interest in 
participating in 
significant activities
•  Feeling detached or 
estranged from others
•  Inability to express 
feelings
•  Feels like future will be 
cut short
■ Sleep disturbances
•  Irritability or angry 
outbursts
•  Difficulty concentrating
• Hypervigilance
• Exaggerated startle 
response
It has been noted that we cannot predict who will and will not develop severe post 
trauma reactions, such as post traumatic stress disorder, but it is likely that most officers 
involved in a shooting incident will experience some form o f psychological disturbance 
in the aftermath of the event (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Klinger 
2004, Paton 2005, Thomas 2011). Although the focus of the current research is on the 
impact upon and the response to the shooting incident experienced by the officer and 
those personally connected to him, it is important to note that the departmental response 
to the officer in the immediate aftermath of the shooting can impact his or her 
development of long term psychological symptoms (Jones 1989, Kamena et al. 2011). 
Specifically, if  the officer feels abandoned, isolated, emotionally castrated and treated 
like a criminal (IACP 2012b, Jones 1989), then he or she is more likely to experience 
deep and lasting post trauma symptoms.
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Additionally, each officer will experience the trauma differently in terms of the 
symptoms displayed and resilience, including factors such as education, ethnicity, 
previous exposure to traumatic incidents, the severity of the incident, the officer’s 
established coping skills and mechanisms and the presence, number and quality of 
protective factors in the officer’s life (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Hodgins, 
Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005, 
Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Violanti 
2005). The interaction between chronic stress, the experience of little traumas (Heglund 
2009), and/or previous traumatic experiences may lead an individual to be more 
vulnerable to PTSD (Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). This may be 
because, if the individual has not effectively dealt with previous stressful or traumatic 
experiences, then the effects of previous events may compound the effects of the current 
trauma, leading to what Kirschman (2007) calls a double whammy.
Kirschman (2007) further notes that individuals who have experienced prior 
trauma, display poor coping skills and had parents with significant issues may be more 
likely to develop traumatic stress reactions. This increased risk is also linked to greater 
dissociation and emotional distress during the critical incident followed by lacking social 
support in the aftermath o f the incident, as well as personality and intelligence 
(Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005). There are also individual differences in protective 
factors, such as the amount of social support a person has, and a person’s ability to 
exhibit impulse and emotional control, that may reduce a person’s risk of developing a 
troubling reaction to a traumatic incident (Stephens 2005). In short, an officer’s response
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to trauma is likely to be highly individualized, encompassing some combination of 
recognized symptoms.
Phases o f  the Shooting Incident
Jones (1989) provides one of the most clearly detailed analyses of the 
development and unfolding of the shooting trauma, stating that there are four phases of 
Post Officer-involved Shooting Trauma (POST). Other sources suggest a similar 
progression of trauma reactions, moving from immediate effects to long term effects of 
the shooting incident (Trompetter et al. 2011). These phases include the officer’s 
immediate reactions during the shooting trauma (which Paton (2005) divides into the 
alarm and mobilization phase and the response phase), that includes cognitive and 
perceptual distortions such as slowing or acceleration of time, tunnel vision, selective 
attention, and auditory distortions, involuntary urination or defecation, increased 
respiration, increased heart rate, increased perspiration, hallucinations, shock and 
disbelief, detachment, and speech impairment (Alpert, Rivera and Lott 2012, Best, 
Artwohl and Kirschman 201.1, Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, 
Klinger 2004, Miller 2006, Noble and Alpert 2013). Upon arrival, first responders may 
find the officer displaying a variety of reactions, ranging from agitation to being dazed 
and detached. It is suggested that first responders try to calm or ground the officer, 
depending on their state, and assure them that their reactions are normal (Best, Artwohl 
and Kirschman 2011). Often, investigators or other responders may offer the officer a 
cup of coffee or a cigarette, however, this may not be advisable as caffeine and nicotine 
are both stimulants and may exacerbate the officer’s stress reactions (Jones 1989).
The second phase of POST involves the officer’s initial emotional and physical 
reactions to the shooting incident once it has ended, to include, but certainly not limited 
to, anger, elation, nausea and vomiting, crying, disbelief, tremors, and fatigue (Jones 
1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004). During this phase is when departmental response, 
while conducting a professional and thorough investigation of the incident, is critical and 
must strive to balance the needs of the department with the needs of the officer. For 
example, in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policies for 
the investigation of officer involved shootings (IACP 1998) and the post-shooting 
personnel support (IACP 2012a), this desired balance is evidenced in the suggestions to 
provide emotional first aid, discretely relieve the officer o f the weapon used in the 
shooting but replacing it immediately with a comparable weapon to avoid the “stripping 
effect” (Jones 1989), permitting the officer to call his or her family to simply notify them 
there has been an incident and that the officer is physically unharmed, to conduct 
extensive interviews after the officer has had some time to decompress (usually at least 
48 hours) (Bailey 2010, Nichols n.d.), and to ensure that officers are aware that 
suspension with pay and the interrogation are standard operating procedure and in no way 
punitive. While the IACP suggests delaying interviews post-shooting, Alpert, Rivera and 
Lott (2012) and Noble and Alpert (2013) suggest that there is controversy in both the 
research and policy recommendations regarding when to interview officers. As stated 
previously, an agency must balance the needs of multiple interested parties in these 
investigations, and allowing officers time to decompress may appear to accord officers 
special status or treatment (Alpert, Rivera and Lott 2012, Noble and Alpert 2013).
Indeed, the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) recommends interviewing
officers within a few hours of the shooting incident. In an attempt to suggest a flexible 
policy that recognizes both the varied responses to trauma and the gaps in the literature 
on this particular topic, Alpert, Rivera and Lott (2012) suggest that investigators evaluate 
each officer for signs of traumatic stress or shock to determine when to interview the 
officer. Noble and Alpert (Noble and Alpert 2013)recommend utilizing cognitive 
interviewing techniques as an alternative to delayed interviewing, noting that this tactic 
will increase accuracy while also allowing for a degree of emotional venting while telling 
their story. Further, the IACP (IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Tracy 2010), suggests that the 
officer be provided with a companion, preferably a trained peer support team member or 
chaplain with experience in similar situations, immediately following the shooting to aid 
the officer and help them through the process without discussing the incident. This 
support may lessen the feelings of isolation, especially if this companion has experienced 
a similar critical incident.
The afterbum phase (Jones 1989), also called the letdown and reintegration phase 
by Paton (2005), lasting up to three days following the incident, is especially important in 
addressing intervention needs, as most sources cite that this is a critical time for the 
officer (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, IACP 2012a, Jones 1989, Miller 2006, Paton 
2005), who is beginning to come down from the adrenaline rush and will begin 
addressing feelings of vulnerability, helplessness, anxiety, rage, possibly guilt over taking 
a life and a myriad of other emotions and physiological responses (IACP 2012b, Jones 
1989, Klinger 2004). During this period, the officer may experience the impulse to 
resign from the police department and may also crave peer support (Jones 1989). The 
peer support, however, may be lacking or cause the officer to feel more isolated. This is
because most officers have not been involved in a shooting and may either make 
comments, such as “way to go, killer,” that are meant to be supportive (Artwohl and 
Christensen 1997) (also known as Locker Room Shock (Jones 1989)), or feel that the 
officer needs time to deal with the incident—to be left alone— and find it difficult to talk 
to the officer (Jones 1989). Additionally, the officer’s peers may be suffering from their 
own traumatic reactions to the incident, to be discussed in the next section, and may not 
be psychologically capable of providing any emotional support, let alone quality 
emotional support (Paton 2005).
Klinger (2004) found that, during this phase, officers may experience fatigue, 
headaches, loss of appetite, emotional responses, such as elation, sadness, anxiety, and 
numbness, and cognitive symptoms, such as recurrent thoughts, guilt, and fear of 
administrative discipline or possible legal repercussions for their actions. It is 
recommended the officers not be sent home alone during this period (IACP 2012a, Jones 
1989). The officer may also suffer from sleep disturbances during this period, to include 
insomnia and nightmares (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger
2004). In addition to the physiological after effects of adrenalin, these sleep disturbances 
can combine to deepen fatigue, which may impair judgment and processing further 
(Lindsey 2007). The sleep disruptions are also o f concern because, typically, officers 
experience more sleep disturbances than the general population due to work related 
stressors (Kerley 2005, Neylan et al. 2002), meaning they are likely to not be rested 
before the critical incident occurs, and Mohr et al (2003) have found that improvements 
in sleep quality (based on subjective assessments of sleep) may mediate the effects of 
traumatic stress reactions. In order to cope with these sleep disturbances, officers may
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turn to chemical substances and self-medication, including alcohol, prescription 
medications, and other substances, to regulate or escape these sleep disruptions (Jones 
1989, Kirschman 2007).
The final phase o f the POST experience, as identified by Jones (1989), are the 
aftereffects. This phase occurs when the shooting incident is truly over; the 
administrative and criminal investigations are concluded and it is time for the officer, if 
he or she is still with the police department, to return to full duty, if they have not done so 
already. Jones (1989) notes that this phase can be problematic, as the symptoms 
displayed by the officer may be misinterpreted as other issues or may go unrecognized; 
the key factor in this phase is noticing if the officer has changed. This change may be 
related to sleeping and eating patterns, alcohol consumption, concentration, or social 
interaction. Additionally, there are three most dangerous aftereffects are withdrawal, 
from both peers and family; exhibiting a denial response, or trying to convince 
themselves and others that they are not bothered or negatively impacted by the shooting; 
and the discovery of the thrill, which may lead to risky behavior intended to replicate the 
rush experienced during a critical incident (Jones 1989). Some other symptoms the 
officer may display include being unable to tolerate reminders of the shooting incident, 
repressed guilt, being harshly critical o f him-or herself, setting unrealistic standards of 
behavior for him- or herself, being preoccupied with death, being fearful or anxious, 
hesitating or avoiding stressful situations, memory and concentration impairments, and 
decreases in work productivity (Jones 1989). Other symptoms may present in polarized 
fashions; for example, although the officer may be experiencing vivid nightmares, he or 
she may either suffer from insomnia or be sleeping much more than they did prior to the
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shooting. Also, the officer may experience sexual dysfunction, ranging from impotence 
and lack of interest to the development o f what is called “Mistress Syndrome,” 
characterized by hypersexuality and promiscuity (Jones 1989). As stated previously, 
responses to trauma are highly individualized in terms of severity, length and symptoms 
displayed. Table 2, below, displays a synopsis o f the varying symptoms an officer might 
display following a shooting incident (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007).
Table 2: Summary o f  Symptoms o f  a Traumatic Response, Adaptedfrom Jones (1989) 
and Kirschman (2007)
Emotional Signs Physical Signs Behavioral Signs Cognitive Signs
• Irritability • Stomach problems Impulsive • Difficulty
• Anger • Indigestion Reckless making decisions
• Increased • Ulcers Withdrawn • Poor
aggression • Headaches Avoidance concentration
• Chronic tension • Chest pain Sleep disturbance • Memory
• Overreaction to • Difficulty breathing Nightmares difficulties
minor events • High blood pressure Insomnia • Difficulty with
• Underreaction to • Hypertension Change in personal details
provocative events • Elevated startle habits • Confusion
• Lack o f  tolerance response Change in manner • Difficulty with
for emotions • Changes in sex o f dress tasks like math,
• Preoccupation with drive or Change in hygiene writing reports
the event performance Change in work
• Depression • Undiagnosable habits
• Suicide ideation medical issues Change in eating
• Guilt « Dizzy spells habits
• Anxiety • Tremors Change in use of
• Emotional numbing • Profuse sweating drugs/alcohol
• Loss o f  faith in God • Easily fatigued Avoid scene o f
• Unable to  bear • Inability to tolerate shooting
reminders o f noise Self-criticism
shooting Self-punishment
• Fear of future Walking flashbacks
incidents
While the continuance of symptoms in this phase suggests a clinical disorder that 
requires treatment, Kirschman (2007) suggests that critical incidents can have positive 
impacts on the lives of those involved, prompting what she calls posttraumatic growth.
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This process is still based upon change, but instead of disruptive, intrusive or destructive 
changes, the individual may feel more competent and capable, may be more self-reliant, 
and may feel stronger. Additionally, the individual may use the incident to repair or 
deepen existing relationships, have more compassion for others, establish new or 
different priorities in their life, develop a renewed or deepened appreciation for life and 
those people who occupy their life, and an increased focus on spirituality or religion 
(Kirschman 2007). While important, posttraumatic growth does not negate or preclude 
negative post trauma responses and individuals still have to cope with the symptoms 
outlined in the previous sections. There is little to no information in the extant literature 
regarding the difference between officers who take advantage of support services offered 
to them and their families, but Artwohl and Christensen (1997) indicate that officers who 
seek help when they experience post-trauma symptoms are better able to manage and 
overcome these problems.
Intervention and Response
As noted in the preceding sections, there are several critical intervention points 
during the post trauma cycle that may impede the development of long term symptoms. 
Although several intervention strategies have been developed and are implemented in 
agencies across the country, there are obstacles that impede their application and decrease 
their effectiveness. The IACP (IACP 1998, IACP 2012a) recommends placing officers 
involved in a shooting incident on paid administrative leave, with Trompetter, Corey, 
Schmidt, and Tracy (2011) suggesting that the officer be given a minimum of three days 
of leave before being required to complete a use of force or incident report, or returning 
to duty. These three days will allow the officer to begin to cope and stabilize,
physiologically and psychologically, after the shooting incident. Many departments have 
also developed Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) teams (Thomas 2011), or 
peer support teams (Tracy 2010). For the remainder of this discussion, officers engaged 
in peer support and counseling are referred to as CISM team members. It is suggested 
that the companion officers, mentioned earlier, assigned to the officer involved in the 
shooting come from these groups (IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Tracy 2010), which are 
usually comprised of senior officers that have been through similar critical incidents and 
have received specialized training to act in this capacity (Jones 1989, Thomas 2011, 
Tracy 2010). CISM teams are on scene and attempt to intervene as soon as possible after 
the incident. While their purpose is to facilitate debriefings and administer psychological 
first aid, Thomas (2011) notes that these officers are not clinicians and that 
confidentiality does not apply to these sessions. However, as of July 2012, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia signed into law the addition of section 19.2-271.4 to Article 1 
of Chapter 16 of Title 19.2, which confers privileged status to communications between 
an officer involved in a critical incident and members of the CISM team. Tucker (2011) 
notes that, while previous research suggests that officers prefer peer-based counseling to 
clinicians, her research indicated that officers prefer talking to peers about job-related 
trauma, like a shooting incident, and would rather not discuss personal issues with peers.
Most sources recommend that officers be mandated to go through a debrief, either 
group or individual, or an intervention within one week of the incident (Honig and Sultan 
2004, IACP 2012b, Trompetter et al. 2011). There are several critiques to mandated 
interventions, though. First and foremost, police officers are known to be distrustful of 
outsiders (Wester and Lyubelsky 2005, Woody 2005), particularly mental health
professionals (Jones 1989, Thomas 2011, Tucker 2011). Part of this hesitance and 
distrust is tied to historic breaches of confidentiality (Tucker 2011), and because many 
officers believe that, as the police department pays for the service, the agency can limit 
confidentiality (Thomas 2011). Thomas (2011) notes that this fear of agency interference 
relates to the agency’s failure to define the role of the clinician; in best practice, there 
should be two clinicians working with the agency—one that handles only pre­
employment testing, assessments and fitness for duty evaluations, and the other than 
handles therapy and training (IACP 2012a, Thomas 2011). Tucker (2011) suggests that 
accessing services through human resources or the agency results in a conflict of 
interests. Another breach of confidentiality may arise if the officer files a disability 
claim, as this grants access to medical records, including post incident interventions with 
mental health professionals (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). While this is a fear, 
and many officers note that dealing with a department’s worker’s compensation can 
cause an undue amount o f stress and anxiety (Schlitz n.d.), accessing worker’s 
compensation and/or medically retiring from law enforcement for PTSD is becoming a 
more accepted practice (Torres n.d.).
Further, many officers lack confidence in service providers and feel that the 
clinician cannot understand them or their needs (Fay 2012, Fay 2013). This raises the 
issue of cultural competence (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 
2011, Trompetter et al. 2011), or the clinician’s ability to not only recognize that the 
officer is nested within the police culture, but also demonstrates a knowledge and 
understanding of that culture. The IACP (2012a) refers to a clinician with cultural 
competence as a qualified mental health professional (QMHP). In addition, the IACP
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(2012b) and Trompetter, Corey, Schmidt, and Tracy (2011) both state that, when 
encountering an officer-involved shooting, this cultural competence expands to include 
experience with officers who have been involved in shootings. Best, Artwohl, and 
Kirschman (2011) acknowledge that mandatory interventions may not prevent the 
development of PTSD, but that other positive effects, such as demonstrating concern for 
the officer, increasing understanding of the incident and mobilizing peer support often 
result from mandatory interventions. Klinger (2001), however, feels that negative 
outcomes result from forced help, especially with mental health providers that officers 
neither know nor trust. Stephens (2005) also finds the mandatory debrief lacking, stating 
that a single session does not meet the agency’s obligations to the officer and Jones 
(1989) notes that mandated sessions may not be beneficial, as officers may be reluctant to 
talk about the emotions and responses that are most troubling. If officers are ordered to 
attend a face-to-face intervention (IACP 2012a), any participation beyond attendance 
should be voluntary (Trompetter et al. 2011).
Officers may be mandated to attend a single intervention to, at a minimum, 
educate them about what symptoms to expect and provide them with some coping 
mechanisms (Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011), but simply being involved in a 
shooting should not mandate that an officer be subjected to a fitness for duty evaluation 
(Trompetter et al. 2011). In the days and weeks following a shooting incident, as officers 
cope with varying psychological and physiological trauma reactions, they are unlikely to 
utilize stress intervention services, including QMHPs, CISM teams and chaplains (Tucker 
2011). Officers may also underreport symptoms (Honig and Sultan 2004). This 
avoidance or denial can be traced back, in part, to the officer’s fear o f stigma (Tucker
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2011), which is associated with feelings of weakness, being less macho, and being less 
reliable (Tucker 2011). Tucker (2011) also notes that this stigma o f seeking help may 
relate to fears that reaching out will negatively impact the officer in terms of promotions, 
and their overall career, with some officers fearing job loss. With these limitations, the 
onus of reaching out to the officer falls upon the QMHP, the CISM team and the officer’s 
supervisors. It is suggested that both the QMHP and the CISM team contact the officer at 
two weeks from the incident, one month from the incident and one year from the incident 
to screen for problems after the initial interview and remind the officer that help is 
available (IACP 2012b). Another source suggests that the QMHP should follow up with 
the officer either via e-mail or telephone sometime within the first four months following 
the shooting and then again just prior to the one year anniversary (Trompetter et al.
2011). It is also suggested that officers be gradually returned to full duties, preferably to 
the post occupied prior to the shooting (IACP 2012a, Trompetter et al. 2011), and that the 
officer be requalified on his or her weapon and be subjected to shoot/don’t shoot scenario 
exercises (Tracy 2010, Trompetter et al. 2011). Fitness for duty may also be evaluated by 
commanding officers and supervisors (Trompetter et al. 2011).
At this point in time, a large burden is also placed upon the officer’s supervisor 
who, as noted below, may be suffering from secondary victimization following this 
incident. The IACP (2012a) states that the supervisor must be trained to identify post 
shooting trauma symptoms, are responsible for monitoring the behavior of officers for 
post traumatic stress symptoms, and is the individual responsible for making officers in 
his or her unit aware of available support services. The supervisor can also order officers 
to seek help from a QMHP if they believe that the stress symptoms are interfering with or
Other officers involved in the critical incident, either through witnessing, 
investigating or simply through membership in the police culture, can experience 
secondary trauma. In policing, this potential for trauma sustained by other officers is 
rarely discussed and it is assumed that only those officers directly involved in the incident 
will be affected (Thomas 2011). Yet, Thomas (2011) suggests that secondary 
victimization or trauma is not limited to the groups identified by Kirschman (2007) 
above, but that anyone in helping professions that can emphasize with the critical incident 
or stressors involved can be adversely impacted, which may contribute to compassion 
fatigue (Panos 2007) or Emergency Responder Exhaustion Syndrome (ERES) (Fay et al. 
2006).
Paton (2005) also recognizes the possibility of secondary victimization, but 
identifies a more limited population likely to be impacted, much like Kirschman (2007). 
Vulnerability to secondary trauma can be increased in police officers responding to a 
critical incident when the primary victim is another police officer, particularly if the 
responding officers personally know the primary victim (Paton 2005). Although the 
current study focuses on understanding the multiple effects at the individual level, the 
entire department may be impacted by a shooting incident, be that through extensive and 
possibly negative media coverage or through civil litigation. How the department is 
portrayed and their response may also be a source of additional stress for both the 
officer(s) directly involved in the shooting and those suffering vicarious or secondary 
trauma, especially since Bonifacio (1991b) notes that officers are often less impacted by 
their individual low status in the community than they are by their department’s low 
status in the community and city government.
The idea of secondary trauma is not a new concept in discussions o f policing and 
critical incidents; Jones (1989) recognized, over two decades ago, that officers who have 
peripheral involvement in shooting incidents are often overlooked by police departments 
but are vulnerable to having a post-trauma reaction. Even though this problem has been 
recognized, there is very little extant literature available addressing secondary trauma and 
police officers, particularly in the context of shooting incidents. It is not farfetched to 
imagine that officers’ vulnerability to secondary victimization is also impacted by 
personal and situational factors, much like the primary victim. These factors may include 
previous experiences of trauma, severity, length of exposure, and coping strategies.
There is an awkward and brief acknowledgement of the possibility of secondary 
victimization in more modem responses to critical incidents, with Trompetter (2011:30) 
stating that “the well-being of dispatchers, nonswom personnel, and other centrally 
involved in the incident should also be considered.” The IACP (2012a), in the model 
policy for post-shooting personnel support, however, does not address secondary 
victimization. The only mention of other officers in this policy regards making an 
agency briefing as soon as possible after the incident to avoid rumors and to encourage 
personnel to demonstrate their concern for the officer involved in the shooting incident.
Although not directly related to officer-involved shootings, Holt, Wall, Burruss 
and Blevins (2011) have recently studied secondary traumatic stress reactions in 
cybercrime examiners, noting that all types of cases should be considered for secondary 
traumatic stress-related issues because this type of trauma is universal to law enforcement 
officers. In this study, the researchers noted that most agencies had in-house counseling 
or peer support programs, but that most officers did not use these resources, with twenty
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negatively impacting the officer’s job performance (IACP 2012a, Schwartz n.d.). Street 
level supervisors are not that far removed from street officers and may be placed in a 
position where there is psychological distress or additional trauma. The supervisor may 
also distrust outsiders, QMHP and feel that the agency can use the officer’s stress 
reactions against him or her. Yet, if their job mandates that they monitor behavior and 
make appropriate recommendations, they may be caught between the proverbial rock and 
a hard place. To whom do they owe their allegiance, with loyalty being one of the 
critical components of the police culture (Woody 2005)? Contrarily, though, Norcross 
(2011) states that supervisors know their personnel and are capable o f looking for 
deviations, making them important in the recognition and management of the officer’s 
post trauma symptoms.
Psychological Considerations: Other Officers
The police culture creates a sense of solidarity and unity among officers that can,
conversely, also further isolate officers from other cultures or subcultures to which they
might belong (Woody 2005). While we often recognize the existence of, and imply the
effects of, the police culture, it is often overlooked in the response to critical incidents.
Kirschman (2007:87, 90) best identifies this issue, stating:
Behind the primary trauma victim are the nearly invisible family members, friends 
and coworkers whose lives are also deeply affected by the trauma—but fo r  whom 
few  services exist... When a traumatic event occurs, those most intimately 
associated and exposed to it will probably be the most disturbed by it, but those 
on the periphery can be affected as well. People on the periphery—witnesses, 
helpers, bystanders, coroners, evidence technicians, communications dispatchers, 
andfamilies—are most at risk fo r  falling through the cracks and not getting the 
help they need. This occurs because, in police agencies, the officers are on top. 
Civilian employees are often considered second-class citizens, i f  they are 
considered at all, andfamilies frequently don’t even enter the equation.
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percent of respondents feeling that counseling would have a negative impact. Some of 
the issues identified regarding why secondary trauma is not being adequately addressed 
included stigma, failure of the agency to meet the needs o f those suffering from vicarious 
trauma, trauma not being included in departmental wellness programs, peer-to-peer 
counseling being substituted for professional counseling, and professional counselors 
lacking cultural competence (Holt et al. 2011). Suggestions resulting from this study 
seem to also suggest that increased training and awareness of secondary trauma at all 
levels of the agency may have inoculative effects (Blau 1994, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 
2001, Jones 1989), and that secondary trauma should be included in discussions of officer 
safety and wellness (Holt et al. 2011).
Psychological Considerations: Family and Friends
While the impact an officer’s career in policing may have on his family is 
mentioned in several texts (Artwohl and Christensen 1997, Avdija 2011, Best, Artwohl 
and Kirschman 2011, Blau 1994, Bonifacio 1991a, Bonifacio 1991b, Gilmartin 2002, 
Kirschman 2007, Matsakis 2005, Niederhoffer and Niederhoffer 1978, Rutledge and 
Sewell 2012, White and Honig 1995), it is also acknowledged that secondary 
victimization is not limited to other police officers. Family and non-officer friends are 
also overlooked when considering the psychological impact of a critical incident. 
However, generally, the nature and consequences of police work can cause familial and 
interpersonal issues, and especially marital discord, leading to breakdown in 
communication, infidelity, anger, resentment and possibly divorce (Blau 1994, Bonifacio 
1991b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005), and these strains can be exacerbated or magnified 
following a critical incident. Bonifacio (1991b) suggests that significant others will cope
best with the effects of being in a relationship with a police officer if they accept that the 
officer will always be in a three way relationship with both the significant other and the 
job, what Niederhoffer and Niederhoffer (1978) referred to as a menage a trios in the 
emotional sense. Schwartz (n.d.) and Henry (2004) both reference the fallacy that 
officers are able to leave work at work and suggest that, in trying to adhere to this 
expectation and protect his or her family, the officer may default to the “nothing 
syndrome.” This is when a significant other asks what is wrong and the officer’s 
response is nothing, often leading to communication break downs and arguments. Best, 
Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) find the oversight regarding the impact o f policing on the 
family, particularly when considering critical incidents, to be especially troubling, as the 
family can suffer from secondary victimization (White and Honig 1995), limiting the role 
they are able to play in mitigating the effects of critical incident stress upon the officer. 
Kerley (2005) notes that, when considering police officer stress, we often forget that the 
officer is a human being occupying different roles beyond that of a law enforcement 
officer. This means that, quite often, the officer’s family, their needs and coping abilities, 
are given little to no consideration in addressing how officers manage cumulative job- 
related stress, let alone critical incident stress. Although there are no children involved in 
the current study, Uribe (2014) demonstrates how a critical incident, in her example a line 
of duty death, can increase fear and stress in law enforcement families, particularly in 
what she calls line o f duty kids.
Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) note that, initially, the officer’s family will 
fear for the officer’s physical safety upon notification that a critical incident has occurred. 
If it is known that that officer in particular was involved, there may also be concerns for
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the physically safety of the officer’s partner, spouse and/or children, due to possible 
retaliation (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Once the family is assured that the 
officer is physically safe, concerns regarding the officer’s psychological well being are 
likely to arise, particularly related to possible changes in the officer’s personality, 
attitude, ability to work, relationships with relatives, etc.
The family, particularly the spouse or partner, is also likely to experience feelings 
of anger that their lives were interrupted by this incident, anger towards a police 
department that is perceived as abandoning or betraying the officer-partner or spouse, 
fear that they will never again achieve normalcy in their home life, and anxiety that this 
incident will impact the family’s financial security in the form of lost wages and possible 
civil litigation (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Additionally, if the incident is 
highly covered in the press, the family is likely to come under intense public scrutiny and 
may have to witness their loved one being portrayed as a monster in the media (Best, 
Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989). The family may lose their privacy, have 
media attempt to contact them or come to their home, and may experience repetitive 
questioning from others, which may lead the family to withdraw from social contacts 
(Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989). It is likely that this is one of the key 
reasons Tracy (2010) advocates that police departments adopt a 48-hour release policy, 
where the officer’s name and the name of the individual who has been shot are not 
released to the media for 48 hours after the incident. Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 
(2011) also recommend that the police department work with the officer and his or her 
family to prepare them to deal with the media, be it television, newspaper or internet.
While dealing with their own post trauma reactions, the officer may appear to be 
self-absorbed, fixate on the incident, or cling to their peer group (Best, Artwohl and 
Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). Further, the officer may be 
hypervigilant or have an extreme startle response, leading to angry outbursts and/or social 
and emotional withdrawal; as Kirschman (2007:98) observes, “this cycling is often 
unpredictable and hard on the family.” The officer may also try to protect the family by 
not discussing the incident, potentially leading the family to feel shut out, ignored and 
devalued (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). As stated 
above, the family may be experiencing a secondary trauma response or victimization in 
relation to the officer’s shooting. Family members may feel angry or neglected when all 
of the attention is focused on the officer and their contributions and concerns are ignored 
(Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). The incident may 
also intensify the family’s fears regarding the officer’s physical safety at work, or cause 
the family to realize how dangerous the job of a police officer is, possibly leading to the 
family pressuring the officer to leaving the police department and find a less dangerous 
career (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Spouses or partners may also experience 
vicarious traumatization, visualizing the officer’s experience, absorbing or catching the 
officer’s feelings or emotions, and finding it incredulous to think that he or she was likely 
doing something mundane while their partner was involved in a critical incident 
(Kirschman 2007).
Further traumatizing the partner or spouse, and possibly further attenuating 
communication in the relationship, the officer may also be experiencing sexual 
dysfunction and may become physically assaultive or combative towards his or her
partner or spouse during the vivid nightmares often associated with PTSD, which may 
frighten the partner, further strain the relationship and contribute to the partner feeling he 
or she has no choice but to leave the relationship (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). While 
children were not involved with the case examined in the current study, both Kirschman 
(2007) and Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) discuss the impact of critical incidents 
on, and the coping mechanisms commonly utilized by, children of police officers. 
Kirschman (2007) is one of the few sources that acknowledges and addresses a modem 
trend in policing: the dual cop relationship, where both partners in the intimate 
relationship are police officers. This provides yet another perspective and may lead to an 
increased likelihood for secondary victimization, as the spouse may be relating to the 
critical incident as a colleague and as an intimate partner. Communication may suffer 
because, as Kirschman (2007) notes, while a dual police officer relationship may 
facilitate discussing the distressing things seen and experienced on the job, there may still 
be a desire to shield and protect the significant other from particular horrors of the job. 
Further, the dual cop relationship may mean that the significant other not involved in the 
shooting is both expected to be strong and supportive for the officer involved in the 
trauma, as well as answer the questions and receive comments both as a colleague and a 
significant other, magnifying the potential stress placed upon the officer/significant other.
While these potential issues may paint a grim picture of family units or intimate 
relationships doomed to fail, these are not a predestined event. Much like with officers 
being informed of the effects o f critical incident stress as a form of inoculation, so too 
can police families be inoculated against some of the potential strains of loving a law 
enforcement officer and develop effective communication strategies between the police
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officer and his or her partner prior to a critical incident (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). It 
is suggested that the police department educate spouses early in the officer’s academy 
career about the risks of police work, the changes the officer will likely experience and in 
effective stress management techniques. It is also suggested that resources, to include 
post critical incident counseling and support groups, be established by the police 
department and provided for immediate family members (IACP 2012a, Jones 1989, 
Kirschman 2007). With these efforts, it is possible to not only improve the family’s 
coping mechanisms, and thus reduce their likelihood of developing post trauma reactions, 
while also strengthening this vital source of support for officers who have experienced a 
critical incident. Kirschman (2007:136-37, 40-41) provides lists of helpful tips for both 
dealing with a cop in crisis and for how family members can help themselves when their 
officer is in crisis. These include accepting that a trauma will impact the relationship 
with the officer and that this disruption may make the significant other angry, express 
commitment and affection for the officer while also expressing anger appropriately, 
avoiding substance abuse, fighting feeling guilty, considering attending a family 
debriefing, avoiding bottling up emotions and trying to make everything all right, and 
recognizing that, as someone close to the officer, significant others, family and friends 
may also have an emotional response to the trauma (Kirschman 2007).
Theoretical Considerations
Several theoretical approaches have been employed to understand use o f deadly 
force incidents. While this study is exploratory and descriptive in nature, and thus 
limited in its application and testing of theory, it is important to address these 
applications and acknowledge that, should better and more reliable data on these
incidents become available, theoretical testing may be more useful in these types of 
analyses. Social disorganization (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997, Shaw, McKay 
and Hayner 1942) is a theory commonly applied to urban crime and its spatial 
concentration. The underlying principles o f this theoretical orientation, racial or ethnic 
heterogeneity, population mobility, and concentrated poverty, are seen throughout the 
literature on police shootings and use of force. However, it is more appropriate to 
combine this perspective with both Black’s theory of law (1976) as it applies to the police 
(1980) and Klinger’s (1997) ecological theory of police behavior to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of these incidents.
Black (1976, 1980) hypothesized that individuals vary in their abilities to apply 
and use the law, especially with regards to the amount and effectiveness o f the law used; 
when specifically considering the police, use of force is akin to the application of law, 
which is in turn impacted by the quantity and quality of law available. Further, Black 
(1976) indicated that police would show increased aggression and punitiveness towards 
those who exist outside the dominant groups, particularly those who are poor, minorities 
and young, which strongly aligns with Bayley and Mendelsohn’s (1969) argument that 
increased aggression and punitiveness will be displayed in lower class and high crime 
neighborhoods, as well as with White’s (2002) conflict model of police use of force.
The concerns regarding over-policing of minorities were addressed by Goldkamp 
(1976) in a rather controversial way. Goldkamp (1976) asserted that those who are 
concerned with the disproportionate representation of minorities in deadly force 
encounters tend to fall into two theoretically polarized groups: those who believe 
minority crime statistics are reflective of differential policing that is rooted in prejudice
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and discrimination, which also ties strongly to Black’s theory of law (1976, 1980), and 
those who believe that disproportionate crime rates, and involvement in police shootings, 
are attributed to the fact that minorities are disproportionately involved in crime. In his 
discussion o f each position, Goldkamp (1976) links each side of the debate with a 
theoretical underpinning—those who believe law enforcement is used as a categorical 
mechanism of inequality to target and oppress those of lower socioeconomic strata are 
aligned with a quasi-labeling perspective and those who believe that minorities are 
simply committing more crimes are framed as ascribing to a more sub-cultural approach, 
with Goldkamp providing limited evidence in support o f the subcultural position. 
Although controversial, echoes of this dichotomy are still seen today, particularly in 
citizen reactions to news stories on deadly force incidents.
In newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, there appears to be a segment of 
the population that blames the police for harassing and murdering young black males and 
there is a segment of the population that asserts the victim is responsible for his or her 
own death by the choices they have made. This is not to say that those who author these 
responses are representative of the population at large, though, as there may be a self- 
selecting bias for individuals with polarized opinions to respond to such incidents. The 
second perspective commonly expressed, however, incorporates elements of von 
Hentig’s (1940) attribution of blame to victims in his typology, Feather’s (1998) related 
concept of deservingness of victim and Dietz’s (1977) victim-precipitated homicide.
Von Hentig (1940), in his classification o f victim typology, exemplifies this 
tendency to blame the victim: for example the greedy to gain victim, in their desperate 
pursuit of easy cash, is willing to lower his or her inhibitions and put themselves at
increased risk of victimization; and the tormentor is a victim acting as a source of 
constant oppression to the offender, who, under that strain over time, eventually explodes 
into violence (von Hentig 1940). In both of these classifications, it is easy to see that the 
characteristics attributed to the “victim” are less than ideal, deflecting blame away from 
the offender who committed the act, in the context of the current study, the police officer, 
and onto the individual who suffered victimization. Thus, in the course o f understanding 
and analyzing a deadly force encounter, society assesses and categorizes the amount of 
responsibility attributable to each individual involved, in that responsibility refers to 
personal causation and intentionality (Feather 1998). As a result, society may, instead of 
recognizing the victim or the officer as an individual worthy of sympathy, stigmatize the 
individual and assign a label of blame.
Feather (1998) discussed the deservingness o f victims, a concept tied to beliefs of 
fairness and justice and also related to an individual’s perceived responsibility for his or 
her actions and the outcomes of those actions. Barclay et al. (2004) referenced Feather’s 
(1998) work, finding that presence of communal attitudes concerning the deservingness 
of victims not only increases with perceived responsibility o f the victim, but that these 
attitudes are also influenced by factors such as whether or not the victim is liked by the 
person passing judgment, whether the victim is seen to have a strong or a weak character, 
whether or not the victim belonged to the judgment maker’s in-group and whether or not 
the victim belonged to an out-group.
Additionally, Barclay et al (2004) found that these attitudes regarding 
deservingness can aid offenders in avoiding accepting a “criminal” self-label by 
providing the neutralizing justification that their action was not really a crime because
61
many people in the community would agree that the victim deserved what happened to 
them (Barclay et al, 2004). In terms of Goldkamp’s (1976) dichotomous perspectives on 
use of force, deservingness can be applied to both groups, as it can be argued that 
labeling members of the lower classes as less deserving feeds into the racist system that 
oppresses them, while it can also be argued that subcultural groups will hold different 
characteristics and qualities as valuable, leading to differing perspectives of 
deservingness and blameworthiness.
The last component of deservingness and blameworthiness is linked to the actions 
of the suspect or victim. An active victim (as opposed to someone in the wrong place, at 
the wrong time, victimized by an unknown offender), engages in the criminal event; 
crime does not simply just happen to that person. Dietz (1977) and Karmen (2004) both 
discuss the idea of victim-precipitated homicide. In this scenario, the victim is an active 
player in his or her own death, meaning that he or she has somehow provoked the 
offender to act violently against them, possibly in the context of an assault or under the 
influence of alcohol (Nielsen and Martinez 2003). As it relates to the current study, 
suspects who commit crimes, challenge or fail to comply with police commands and/or 
assault police officers can be seen as active participants in bringing about a use of deadly 
force encounter.
From a different and less polarized perspective, Smith (1986) used Black’s (1976) 
theory in the context of variables commonly associated with social disorganization, 
finding that there were significant racial differences in the application of force and 
suggesting that there is an interaction between the individual and place in these incidents, 
as the use o f force increases were seen in minority and racially heterogeneous areas. This
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perspective was supported by the findings of Sun, Payne and Wu (2008), who noted 
increases in coercive behaviors and interactions by police in poor neighborhoods, 
suggesting that, from a social disorganization perspective, the increased use of force may 
stem from the causal chain of increased disorganization leading to increased crime 
leading to increased calls for service and thereby resulting in increased police presence 
and interaction in disadvantaged communities. Yet, Sun, Payne and Wu (2008) also 
acknowledge that these results could simply indicate that minorities and the poor are 
subject to increased coercive police behavior, suggesting a conflict orientation.
There are also conflicting findings regarding the importance of race in these 
incidents. Lawton (2007) found that race was not significant when controlling for 
situational characteristics (severity of the crime, presence of multiple officers, citizen 
behaviors) and individual officer characteristics, particularly a previous use of force 
incident within the past year. Similarly, White (2002) found limited support for racial 
differences, with only encounters between non-white suspects and non-white officers 
demonstrating significant explanatory and predictive effects. White (2002) also found 
strong support for the consideration of situational determinants (type of incident, multiple 
officers present and suspect behavior), finding that, in his sample, although there were a 
disproportionate percentage of black males shot, this was partially a consequence of those 
victims/suspects committing gun assaults against police officers and not due to 
discriminatory police behavior. Yet McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that race and 
gender of the officer do matter in police shootings, with young, white male officers 
significantly more likely to be involved in a shooting incident. However, like Lawton 
(2007), McElvain and Kposowa (2008) also noted strong effects associated with
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individual officer characteristics, particularly previous history of shooting incidents, 
increased education and increased experience as a police officer.
Klinger (1997) suggests that there is an interaction that occurs between the crime 
rate, the seriousness of an offense, and the vigor with which an officer responds, while 
also noting that use of force does not equate to vigor. Instead, Klinger (1997) suggests 
that officers in a given area perceive a normative amount o f deviance for that particular 
area and only react to those transgressions that violate that perceived standard, thus 
formal police work decreases in areas with high rates of deviance. Terrill and Reisig 
(2003) suggest that Klinger’s ecological theory may support the use of neighborhood 
context as an explanatory factor for police use o f force, but caution that Klinger’s work 
utilized police districts, which are much larger than neighborhoods, as the primary unit of 
analysis, thus making application and comparison of this theory at the neighborhood level 
problematic. However, there have been several other studies that suggest an ecological 
or geographic patterning of police behavior. Kania and Mackey (1977) and Fyfe (1980) 
both found significant correlations between measures of community violence and 
violence perpetrated by police. Much like Skolnick’s (1966) symbolic assailant, Terrill 
and Reisig (2003) found that police display an increased use of force in high crime areas, 
suggesting that problem places and increased perception of danger lead to the labeling of 
symbolic neighborhoods. This finding is also supported by Werthman and Piliavin’s 
(1967) concept of ecological contamination, where officers tend to associate 
neighborhoods with the rate at which they encounter potential suspects.
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Theoretical Frame for the Current Study
While the theories mentioned above consider deadly force incidents, they often 
consider the incident in isolation—isolated from the previous experience and 
understandings of the officer involved, isolated from the aftermath of the incident, 
isolated from the impact the incident has on the lives of those close to the officer, and 
isolated from the meanings and symbolism that flow from and through officer-involved 
shootings. When considering the officer’s role and response to these incidents, 
psychological theories, such as psychodynamic theories or transactional analysis, are 
often employed, overlooking that, while the officer’s experience is central to the shooting 
incident, there are multiple effects, experiences and interpretations of any event, critical 
or mundane. As the current study seeks to holistically explore the impact of officer- 
involved shootings on the officers and those close to the officer, the most appropriate 
theoretical frame to use to explore and understand the pre-incident, incident and post­
incident factors of officer-involved shootings from several perspectives is symbolic 
interactionism (SI). SI diverged from the more positivistic and behavioralist approaches 
that were en vogue at the time of its emergence (Lauer and Handel 1977), embracing 
more qualitative methodologies, such as participant observation, ethnography, non­
participant observation, archival research and content analyses (Einstadter and Henry 
2006).
In our daily lives, we attach meaning to everything that surrounds us— objects, 
persons and events—and our lived experiences also shape those meanings. This is no 
less true for an officer involved shooting. To a symbolic interactionist, meaning in the 
world is constructed through the interpretation o f symbols and gestures that are used in
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interactions with other members of a social group (Lemert 1951, Mead 1964, Mead 1982, 
Simmel 1950, Simmel 1959, Tannenbaum 1938, Void, Bernard and Snipes 1998). This 
suggests that, to the various participants involved in a critical incident, as well as those 
involved after the critical incident has occurred, the incident can encompass different 
meanings.
Simmel (1950,1959, 1971) felt that a group or society was incapable of existing 
as objects separate from the individuals, that society only exists in the minds of the 
individuals who were participating in relationships with other individuals. Thus, Pampel 
(2000:137-38) states that social interaction can be defined as the process by which 
“individuals form groups when, as a way to satisfy their needs and desires, they interact 
or associate with and influence one another.” In these interactions, Simmel (1950, 1959, 
1971) believed that individuals need to somehow organize and catalog their social 
experiences, leading to an interpretive process where an individual, through the use of 
contents and social forms, imposes order. Contents, according to Pampel (2000) would 
be whatever is within the individual that leads them to interact socially with others, while 
social forms are the scripts that exist to guide those social interactions.
George Herbert Mead was greatly influenced by Dewey and the Chicago school 
in his work (Pampel, 2000), and believed that individual experiences and behavior had a 
common root in the communication and interaction with other individuals and groups in 
society, which leads to the development o f the social self (Mead 1934, Mead 1964, Mead 
1982). From childhood, individuals are immersed in learning shared meanings o f words, 
symbols and gestures, which all must be constantly examined and redefined, that allow 
them to communicate and interact with others and this became the central focus as
Herbert Blumer continued Mead’s work on what Blumer called “symbolic 
interactionism” (Blumer 1969). Newbum (2009) notes that the development of symbolic 
interactionism was strongly influenced by Mead’s social psychology approach and by the 
sociological approach utilized by Blumer, both o f whom sought to understand the 
meaning of interaction. This influence makes the application of symbolic interactionism 
particularly relevant to the current study because it allows for the recognition o f the 
importance of both the individual as a thinking, creative actor while concurrently 
acknowledging that the individual is shaped and influenced by, and nested within, 
subculture(s) and a larger culture..
Blumer (1969) identifies three foundational premises that form the basis for SI: 
that how we act towards things is dependent upon the meanings we give them; that 
meaning is constructed through social interaction; and meaning is gleaned and altered 
through an interpretive process. One of the primary assumptions underlying SI is that 
humans are active in the construction of their social world, although Mead felt that this 
was a reciprocal creative process where the individual creates social forms and those 
same social forms cause the individual to grow and change (Einstadter and Henry 2006). 
This interpretive process means that behavior is not static, that it is continually subject to 
interpretation, negotiation and reform (Blumer 1969). Evidence of this interpretive 
process of generating, applying and modifying meaning is found throughout the literature 
on police officers and critical incidents. Violanti (2005), for example, notes that 
resilience is related to “ interpretations that people attach to events around them, as well 
as to their own place in the world of experiences,” and the first of Kirschman’s (2007) 
five basic principles of trauma-related stress is that trauma is in the eye of the beholder.
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Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) even suggest that, when defining an incident as 
“critical,” the meaning may attach more to the officer’s reaction to the incident, rather 
than to the incident itself.
Lauer and Handel (1977) identify ten key concepts associated with SI—symbol, 
interaction, attitude, socialization, role, role taking, self, generalized other/reference 
group, and situation—with role taking being particularly important in the interpretive 
process because it allows humans to anticipate and react to the responses o f others.
While we can attempt to understand how others think and act, there is no guarantee that 
we all interpret situations and symbols in the same way (Einstadter and Henry 2006). As 
a result of our ability to anticipate responses, we are also subject to the control of others 
during interactions (Einstadter and Henry 2006). Of great salience to the current study is 
the work of Erving Goffman (1959, 1963), particularly the concepts of impression 
management and stigma. Impression management incorporates the key concepts of role, 
role taking and self, acknowledging that we strive to present ourselves in the best light 
possible to others and hide what we consider to be our true selves during interactions 
(Goffman 1959). Goffman (1959) likened this process to a theatrical performance where 
the individual presents a particular role or character to the audience sitting in the theater, 
but is able to hide their true identity, which is expressed in the back stage area where 
theater patrons are not permitted to go. The concepts of roles and impression 
management are particularly important in addressing the psychological components of 
officer-involved shootings. Officers are known to develop an occupational persona that 
banishes “softer” emotions (Stone n.d.), like fear and uncertainty, to the back stage area, 
primarily due to the fear of losing the respect of one’s peers and appearing weak
(Kirschman 2007, Paton 2005, Staff). In the aftermath of a shooting incident, the post 
trauma reactions the officer experiences may be contrary to his or her projected role of 
the stoic officer, thus impacting his or her self concept, and he or she may continue to 
attempt to play this role in front of peers, supervisors and family members (Cullen and 
Agnew 2011, Jones 1989). This need for impression management may also underlie why 
Tucker (2011) found that officers do not take advantage of stress intervention services: 
they are afraid of appearing weak or less macho; they are afraid of negative career 
impacts, such as failure to promote, impeding ability to testify in court and/or job loss; 
and they are afraid they will be viewed as mentally unstable. Malmin (2012) echoes 
these findings, suggesting that at the organizational level, the stereotypes perpetuated by 
the police subculture are replicated through policies that reflect a lack of understanding of 
trauma, minimal service provision, and a lack of attention to personnel. If treatment for 
or response to officers in the aftermath of a shooting incident can break through these 
barriers built to manage impressions, it can potentially have preventative effects, 
particularly in the areas of future use o f force incidents, maladjustment issues, the 
development o f post traumatic stress reactions and possibly even future deadly force 
incidents. Yet, officers are often presented with subculturally proscribed behaviors and 
attitudes when they are at their most vulnerable, facing sarcasm and ridicule for showing 
weakness instead of compassion and support (Malmin 2012).
The second concept from Goffman (1963) that is particularly relevant to the 
current study is stigma, defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified 
from full social acceptance.” With stigma, there is a great reliance on perceptions of the 
stereotype associated with the stigma, while the reality of the individual may diverge
greatly from this depiction. A stigma can be based upon something that is physically 
visible, such as a physical handicap or deformity, or it can be based on something 
internalized that, once known by those with whom an individual is interacting, causes the 
recognized others to turn away from or have a different perception of the individual 
(Goffman 1963). This can be evidenced in the discussion of Locker Room Shock (Jones 
1989) and similar feelings of being different from other officers who have not been 
involved in a shooting incident, leading to possibly deepened feelings of isolation (Jones 
1989, Kirschman 2007, Tucker 2011). Many of the reactions Goffman (1963) noted the 
stigmatized individual might experience—not feeling accepted, feeling numb, 
awkwardness when dealing with “normal” individuals, suspicion, depression, hostility, 
anxiety, bewilderment, and being unsure of how “normal” people will identify and relate 
to him or her—are reflected in the literature on officer post trauma responses, as 
described in an earlier section. Impression management also becomes key because, in 
anticipating the response of others to his or her stigma, the officer involved in a shooting 
may feel like they are perpetually on stage, hiding his or her true self and reactions from 
all persons. The concepts of impression management and stigma may also be intertwined 
in what can be considered the gendered nature o f police work (Chan, Doran and Marel 
2010, Chan, Devery and Doran 2003, Martin and Jurik 1996/2006, Martin 1999, Morash 
and Haarr 2012, Prokos and Padavic 2002). If police work is indeed a manifestation of 
hegemonic masculinity (Prokos and Padavic 2002) and a means of doing gender (Chan, 
Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr 2012), then appearing weak or giving into 
more “feminine” emotions would be unacceptable for an officer that has been involved in 
a critical incident. This desire to avoid the stigma of not being a tough, macho man may
lead to efforts to manage impressions so that colleagues and supervisors are not aware of 
maladaptive coping strategies, impeding recognition of a problem and appropriate 
intervention efforts. Similarly, the more positive responses of stigmatized individuals, 
seeing the effect of being stigmatized as a secret blessing and leading to a change in 
perspective (Goffman 1963), may be related to Kirschman’s (2007) concept of 
posttraumatic growth.
Finally, Goffman (1963) acknowledges that “the first set of sympathetic others is 
of course those who share his [or her] stigma,” which explains why the need for peer 
support members who have experience in police shootings is reiterated throughout the 
literature on this topic. While stigma is a theoretically applicable concept when 
discussing officer-involved shootings that may help understand the phenomenon and the 
responses to a given incident, it must be clearly stated that not all officers may be 
stigmatized, or feel stigmatized, in the aftermath of a police shooting. While it is not the 
intent of the author to label these officers as “damaged goods,” for indeed they are no , it 
is the author’s intention to highlight the fact that if the theoretical concepts of impression 
management and stigma are addressed in developing and implementing best practices in 
responding to and treating officers involved in shooting incidents, there is the potential 
for preventative effects, such as decreasing officer maladjustment, preventing increased 
aggression and/or use of force incidents following a shooting incident, decreasing the risk 
for developing PTSD and possibly even preventing future shooting incidents (McElvain 
and Kposowa 2008).
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Conclusion
As demonstrated in this chapter, there are still several questions related to officer- 
involved shootings that are not answered by the extant literature. From ambiguous 
guidelines to uncertainty regarding frequency, many of the essential two-dimensional 
statistics are either lacking or bolstered by insufficient data. Additionally, the post 
trauma responses exhibited by the officer, his or her colleagues, and the officer’s family 
and friends are highly personalized, reflective of that individual’s personal history, 
situational and environmental circumstances. What is known is that most officers will 
experience some form of post trauma response, but are often afraid of the consequences 
of utilizing support services and have little faith in the systems in place meant to serve 
their needs. The issues discussed in this chapter are neither simple nor static and utilizing 
symbolic interactionism as an analytical lens may facilitate understanding the multiple 
roles, perspectives and meanings associated with a single shooting incident. Addressing 
an issue this complex, with so many individuals and groups potentially impacted by a 
single shooting incident, requires flexibility, creativity, and balance.
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CHAPTER III 
PRELIMINARY STUDY
Introduction: A Preliminary Study to Contextualize this Case
As indicated in the previous chapter, to understand the use of deadly force in a 
given city, region, or relationally between adjacent jurisdictions, a comprehensive 
examination of the frequency and factors impacting the use of force must be undertaken. 
But, as noted by Geller and Scott (1992:18), . .enumerating a jurisdiction’s shooting
cases is merely the first step in attempting to understand the causes and control methods 
for police-involved shootings.. .Behind every shooting that is presented as a two- 
dimensional statistic is a complex human story that must be understood if one is to make 
genuine progress in devising feasible systems for safeguarding police and their clientele.” 
While the author agrees with this approach, in an effort to contextualize the complex 
human story behind one police shooting through a case study, it became apparent that the 
critical first step—having valid and reliable statistics that document the frequency and 
characteristics of police shootings—was absent. What is known about police shootings is 
sadly lacking, and quite shocking, especially when considering that highly regarded 
policing scholars have been calling for some sort of basic accounting of these incidents 
for over thirty years (Engel 2008, Fyfe 2002, Geller and Scott 1992, Hickman, Piquero 
and Gamer 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 1979, Smith 2008). In the absence of 
available and accessible two-dimensional statistics that Geller and Scott (1992) suggest 
are but the first step in understanding police shootings, a preliminary study was 
conducted, seeking to explore the use o f deadly force in the seven cities o f the Hampton 
Roads region of Virginia between April of 1990 and September of 2010 in order to
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provide a platform from which to consider and understand police shootings in this area. 
This is important for building the bridge to connect the overarching themes from the case 
study at the heart of the preliminary study by providing the reader with an understanding 
of what police shootings look like in the region and city of study. As much of the 
literature applying to this preliminary study was included in the previous chapter, the 
current chapter will only contain the relevant methodology, results, discussion and 
limitations.
Methods
The data for this study were derived from a content analysis o f newspaper articles 
from the Hampton Roads region of Virginia. As noted previously, there is a lack of 
official, detailed and available data at the national, state and municipal levels related to 
officer-involved shootings, leaving newspaper articles as the most abundant source of 
information on these incidents and making a content analysis an appropriate methodology 
to collect this data. Further, in addition to suffering from significant limitations, the 
official data often does not provide circumstances surrounding fatal and non-fatal police 
shootings; thus, following the example set by White and Ready (2009), this study turned 
to news media reports to gather this data. Original data were collected through keyword 
searches o f the online archives o f the The Virginian Pilot, spanning the time period from 
April 1990 to September 2010. This time period encompasses the oldest articles in the 
Pilot’s archives to the month that the preliminary study began. While it cannot be 
assumed that all police shootings are reported in the media, the Pilot was chosen because, 
as noted by a local Public Information Officer, this newspaper has a reputation for fact 
checking with local police departments before publication o f materials. The archives
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were searched using the terms “police shoot*,” “police shot,” and “police kill.” These 
search terms were utilized to capture information about all lethal and non-lethal police- 
involved shootings in the Hampton Roads region during this time period.
The unit of analysis in the preliminary study is the individual incident; data were 
gathered from initial and follow-up articles, editorials and letters to the editor. Taken 
together, these articles often provided additional information beyond that found in official 
data sources, including a sense of the community’s reaction and response to use of force 
incidents, block addresses of most incidents, the events leading to the shooting, and 
decedent and officer characteristics, that allowed for a more comprehensive 
understanding of individual incidents and will provide multiple avenues for potential 
future research.
During the analysis of the articles obtained in the initial searches, approximately 
26 additional incidents were identified that were not in the results of the initial keyword 
searches. These additional incidents were mentioned in the initial articles found and a 
second search was conducted for those specific incidents, most commonly using the 
victim’s name or the date of the incident as the search term. In turn, these additional 
articles yielded an additional four incidents that required further research. In total, this 
study includes data from 239 newspaper articles regarding 121 officer-involved shooting 
incidents.
In the content analysis, several variables were coded in addition to a brief 
summary of the article, editorial, or letter to the editor. These variables, when reported in 
the press, include: the date the article was published; the page and section of the paper 
where the article was published; the author; the incident date, time and day of the week;
if the article was a follow-up to a previous story and the number of follow-ups per 
incident; the city in which the incident occurred as well as the section of the city in which 
the incident occurred and the address of the incident; the suspect’s name, gender, race, 
and age; whether or not the officer(s) involved were named in the press, and if named, the 
officer’s unit, race, age, and years on the force; whether or not the suspect was armed and 
the type of weapon; if the shooting occurred in the context o f a pursuit, the commission 
of another crime, following a domestic violence incident, or in a hostage or barricade 
environment; whether there was an explicit mention of alcohol use, drug use or 
involvement, or mental health issues by the suspect; whether the suspect threatened to 
harm another civilian or themselves; evidence of possible suicide by cop; if and how the 
suspect was injured or was killed, including designations as fatal, injurious or non- 
injurious incidents; if and how the officer was injured; if the officer was placed on 
administrative duties or leave; any charges filed against the suspect or accomplices; any 
civil litigation mentioned; and general comments about tone and orientation of articles.
Findings
The preliminary study identified 121 police shootings covered in the Virginian 
Pilot between April 1990 and September 2010. One case from March 1990 was 
addressed in follow-up articles thoroughly enough that it was included in the dataset.
Data were first analyzed as an aggregate of all seven cities before each city’s incidents 
were analyzed separately. Table 3 presents the aggregate totals of the variables for the 
Hampton Roads region.
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Table 3: Aggregate Characteristics o f  Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 
1990-2010
V a ria b le F re q u e n c y
Total Shooting Incidents 121
Legitimate Defense o f  Life 92
Total Articles 238
Articles in Front Section o f  Paper 38
Articles in Local Pages 1-3 118
Editorials, Letters to Editor, Commentary Articles 31
Classification o f  Shooting
Fatal 62
Injurious 39
Non-Injurious 7
Animal 10
Suspect’s Weapon
Knife 14
Gun 63
Shotgun 10
Assault Rifle 2
Vehicle 16
Suspect Characteristics
Male 93
Female 8
Age 84 (M =  30.53)
Race 10
Officer Characteristics
Officer Named in Press 43
Officer Age 14 (M =  34.3)
Years on Police Department 19 (M =  6.7)
Officer Race 2
Unit/Assignment
Vice and Narcotics 7
Precinct/Patrol 6
K-9 5
SWAT 4
O ff Duty 4
Bicycle Patrol 3
Metro Tactical 1
Sheriff’s Deputy 1
Airport Police 1
Day o f Week
Monday 13
Tuesday 12
Wednesday 20
Thursday 25
Friday 21
Saturday 12
Sunday 14
Time o f  Day
Morning (6am-12pm) 16
Afternoon (12pm-5pm) 15
Evening (5pm-12am) 50
Night (12am-6am) 30
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Table 3: Aggregate Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued
Context o f  Incident
Foot or Vehicle Pursuit 47
Commission o f  Crime 54
Domestic Disturbance 20
Hostage/Barricade Scenario 24
Mental Health Issue 19
Drug Use o r Involvement 22
Alcohol Use 7
Shots Fired at Officer 29
Threat to Others 40
Threat to Self 7
Possible Suicide by Cop 15
Officer Injured 29
Shot 15
Cut or Stabbed 4
Hit by Car 6
Other 3
Killed 3
Administrative Action Pending Investigation
Administrative Duty 28
Administrative Leave 22
Civil Litigation Mentioned 18
It should be noted that this study is not considered to be a population of shooting 
incidents, as there are several fatal and non-fatal incidents that have occurred within this 
region of which the author is aware that did not appear in the newspaper articles 
examined in this study. It is likely that there is still a significant dark figure (Biderman 
and Reiss 1967, McClintock 1970, Messner 1984, Snortum and Berger 1986) associated 
with police involved shootings that will only be addressed by open access to police 
records, to include all instances when officers discharge their weapons. However, even 
acknowledging the existence of an unknown or unaccounted for number o f police 
shootings, the preliminary study identified 27 fatal police shootings in the Hampton 
Roads area between 2005 and 2010, six more incidents than reported by the Virginia 
State Police. On average, there were six shooting incidents per year, and an average of 
17 incidents per city, covered in this study.
A modified version of White’s (2006) classification of fatal, injurious and non- 
injurious shootings was used, with the addition of the category of animal to cover the 
number of dogs, and the single steer, shot by police that were reported in the Pilot. Using 
this classification system, the outcomes of these use of force incidents were 62 fatalities, 
39 injuries, 7 non-injurious cases, 10 animals, and the remaining cases could not be 
classified. While most incidents included a single victim/offender, there were several 
where multiple offenders were involved. For example, the bank robbery turned pursuit 
turned shootout that occurred in Norfolk on May 29, 1992 involved three suspects—two 
males and one female. One male was killed, one was injured, and while there is no 
mention of an injury to the female, she was later taken to the hospital.
Of the individuals involved, 93 were males and eight were females, with an 
average age of approximately 31 years. The officer or officers involved were publicly 
identified in 43 incidents. It should be noted that in one of the most controversial police 
shootings, the “blue on blue” death of Norfolk Police Officer Seneca Darden, Officer 
Gordon Barry was not initially identified by the Norfolk Police Department, but by 
“sources.” Information regarding the officers, such as their age, race, duty assignment 
and years on the police department were inconsistently reported. The officer’s duty 
assignment was only noted in relation to 35 incidents, with seven incidents involving 
Vice and Narcotics investigators, six incidents involving Patrol officers, five incidents 
involving K-9 officers, four incidents involving SWAT officers, four incidents involving 
off duty officers, three incidents involving Bike Patrol, one incident involving a Sheriff’s 
deputy on duty, and one incident involving a Norfolk International Airport Police officer 
on duty. There were also three incidents where officers were involved in shootings
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outside o f their jurisdiction, including one incident involving an off duty officer. Officer 
ages were provided in only 14 incidents, with an average o f 34.3 years. Years on the 
police department were mentioned in 19 incidents, with an average tenure of almost 
seven years (M  = 6.7 years).
In 93 of the incidents included in the preliminary study, there appears to be clear 
evidence of the need for the officer to defend him- or herself, or to protect a citizen, from 
a suspect brandishing or actively demonstrating the intent to use a weapon. To be clear, 
many comments in editorials and commentaries noted that officers shot “unarmed” 
drivers, but this research considered an automobile, when driven at officers or other 
citizens, to be a weapon. Officers were fired upon in 29 incidents, and officers were shot 
in 16 incidents, with three officers and one K-9 dog being fatally wounded in the 
newspaper articles included in the preliminary study. It should be noted that these 
articles did not include at least three officers who were shot and killed in the line of duty, 
according to the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) sections of 
the Crime in Virginia reports, during the time period examined. Six officers were hit by 
cars and four officers were cut or stabbed, including one officer that was stabbed in the 
neck. One officer was severely beaten with a piece of lumber, one was choked and one 
officer suffered injuries from a motor vehicle accident where the suspect hit the officer’s 
patrol car. In the articles analyzed in the preliminary study, 29 injuries to officers were 
noted in the 20 year period considered. Yet, information derived from disaggregated 
LEOKA information obtained from the VSP through a FOIA request, shows that 
between 2005 and 2009 there were 1931 injuries sustained by officers in the line of duty 
in the Hampton Roads area. This suggests that the media may underreport the frequency
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with which officers are injured in these encounters. Further, only 50 incidents noted 
whether the officer was placed on administrative duties (n = 28) or administrative leave 
(n = 22), pending the departmental and Commonwealth Attorney’s Office investigations 
that follow any officer involved shooting, with administrative leave being frequently 
mentioned in high profile shooting cases. There were 18 civil litigations mentioned in 
the wake of these incidents, several of which involved officers suing the city or civilians 
involved in the incident.
It should also be noted that the race of the offender, officer, or both, was typically 
only mentioned in cases where there was some sort of allegation that the shooting was 
racially motivated. The one exception to this was the initial reporting of one incident 
which described the victim of a fatal police shooting as a white male before his identity 
was released. In total, the offender/victim’s race was identified in ten incidents, with the 
officer’s race only being identified in two incidents, both of which occurred in the same 
jurisdiction. In February 2007, an article was published in the front section of the Pilot 
that examined all officer involved shootings or incidents where officers were shot in the 
city o f Norfolk between 2002 and 2005. While race is often not mentioned in the articles 
on these shootings, this report found that 15 of the 17 individuals shot by police during 
the time period considered were Black.
In terms of situational characteristics, these shooting incidents were found to 
occur more frequently between Wednesday and Friday (n = 66), between the hours of 
5:00pm and 12:00am (n = 50), where the suspect had a gun (n = 63). In 40 incidents, the 
individual shot by the police presented a threat to other citizens, but only posed a 
significant threat to themselves in seven incidents. There were 15 incidents where there
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are indications that the individual may have been looking to commit suicide by cop. 
Suspect drug use or involvement (n = 22) and alcohol use (n = 7) were specified less 
frequently in the news articles than expected.
Also surprising was the fact that the suspect was presented as having mental 
health issues in only 19 incidents, however, these incidents often generated a great deal of 
community response that was unfavorable to the police departments involved, regardless 
of the circumstances of the incident. For example, in August of 1997 Chesapeake Police 
responded to a call regarding a young woman, bloody and wearing little clothing, 
walking down the street holding a bowling pin and a knife. Officers had been to the 
woman’s home earlier in the day and taken her to the hospital, but she had been released 
and returned home. Family members kept telling the police, who were ordering the 
woman to drop the knife, that the young woman was sick. The woman then threatened to 
kill the officers and lunged at them, cutting two officers. A third fired at her and she was 
injured. Community residents immediately vented their anger at the police for shooting 
the woman, noting that she was obviously mentally ill and suggesting the community 
could have handled the situation better themselves, without police involvement.
Forty-seven shooting incidents occurred within the context of a pursuit, either foot 
or vehicle, of the suspect and 54 incidents occurred during the commission of another 
crime, with those crimes ranging from domestic disputes to armed robbery and murder. 
Only 20 incidents occurred within the context of a domestic disturbance or domestic 
violence call for service. There were also 24 incidents that involved a hostage or 
barricaded suspect scenario.
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With respect to the media coverage allotted to these incidents, not all shootings 
are created equal. Of the 239 articles reviewed in this study, only 38 were located in the 
front section of the paper, indicating higher importance. The articles that appeared in the 
front section were often related to highly controversial shootings, such as the blue-on- 
blue shooting of Seneca Darden, the shootings o f both Bruce Quagliato and Bryan Dugan 
in Virginia Beach, and the shooting of Albie Schatzhuber in Chesapeake. Of the 
remaining articles, only 118 appeared within the first three pages of the Local section of 
the paper, with the remaining articles located farther back in local section. There were 16 
articles that displayed a clear pro-police orientation, many of which were published after 
an officer was seriously injured or killed in the line of duty. Additionally, there were 18 
articles that presented clear negative sentiments towards the police, often following an 
incident where there was a suggestion that the shooting was racially motivated or the 
suspect was known to have mental health issues. There were 11 incidents where articles 
explicitly stated that there was a suspicion that the shooting had a racial component 
involved.
While the aggregated regional context is helpful in both furthering and deepening 
our understanding of police involved shootings in Virginia in comparison to national 
trends, it is the differences between the seven cities in the Hampton Roads area that were 
most surprising and provided the most insight. Table 4 below displays the differences 
between the seven cities in the data collected in the preliminary study.
83
Table 4: Characteristics o f  Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, by
City, 1990-2010
C hesapeake H am pton N ew port News
Total Shooting Incidents 22 3 5
Clear Evidence o f Legitimate 17 2 5
Defense o f  Life
Total Articles 43 6 4
Articles in Front Section o f  Paper 2 2 0
Articles in Local Pages 1-3 24 2 4
Editorials, Letters to Editor, Commentary 5 1 0
Articles
White’s Classification
Fatal 10 2 2
Injurious 8 1 0
Non-Injurious 0 0 1
Animal 4 0 0
Suspect Weapon
Knife 4 0 0
Gun 10 1 5
Shot Gun 2 0 2
Assault Rifle 1 0 0
Vehicle 2 1 3
Suspect Characteristics
Male 15 1 3
Female 2 1 0
Age 15 (M =  32.3) 2 (M = 39) 3 (M =  31.7)
Race 1 1 0
Officer Characteristics
Officer Named in Press 7 0 0
Officer Age 3 ( M=  33.3) 0 0
Years on Police Department 1 (M =  5) 0 0
Officer Race 0 0 0
Unit/Assignment 0 0
Vice and Narcotics 1
Precinct/Patrol 1
K-9 0
SWAT 0
O ffD uty 0
Bicycle Patrol 0
Metro Tactical 0
Sheriff’s Deputy 1
Airport Police 0
Day o f  Week
Monday 2 0 0
Tuesday 4 1 0
Wednesday 1 0 0
Thursday 5 1 2
Friday 6 1 2
Saturday 0 0 1
Sunday 3 0 0
Time o f Day
Morning (6am-12pm) 3 1 0
Afternoon (12pm-5pm) 5 0 0
Evening (5pm-12am) 10 1 4
Night (12am-6am) 2 1 1
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Table 4: Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued
Chesapeake H am pton N ew port News
Context o f  Incident
Foot or Vehicle Pursuit 8 2 3
Commission o f  Crime 9 1 0
Domestic Disturbance 3 0 1
Hostage/Barricade Scenario 4 0 1
Mental Health Issue 2 0 1
Drug Use or Involvement 3 0 1
Alcohol Use 1 0 0
Shots Fired at Officer 5 0 2
Threat to Others 9 0 2
Threat to Self 1 0 0
Possible Suicide by Cop 2 0 1
Officer Injured 8 0 2
Shot 4 1
Cut or Stabbed 3 0
Hit by Car 1 3
Other 0 0
Killed 0 0
Administrative Action Pending Investigation
Administrative Duty 4 0 0
Administrative Leave 4 1 2
Civil Litigation Mentioned 0 0 0
Table 4 continued: Characteristics o f  Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, by 
City, 1990-2010________________ ■ ' _________________________________________
N orfolk P ortsm outh Suffolk V irginia Beach
Total Shooting Incidents 45 10 1 35
Clear Evidence o f  Legitimate 36 6 1 25
Defense o f  Life
Total Articles 91 14 3 69
Articles in Front Section o f  Paper 21 1 0 12
Articles in Local Pages 1-3 44 6 3 35
Editorials, Letters to Editor, 11 2 0 10
Commentary Articles
White’s Classification
Fatal 23 5 1 16
Injurious 14 3 0 13
Non-Injurious 3 0 0 3
Animal 3 2 0 1
Suspect Weapon
Knife 2 3 0 5
Gun 27 4 1 18
Shot Gun 3 0 1 2
Assault Rifle 1 0 0 0
Vehicle 4 0 0 6
Suspect Characteristics
Male 33 7 1 33
Female 3 1 0 1
Age 31 (M = 27.19) 4 (M=  46.75) 1 (M=  49) 28 (M =  29.5)
Race 7 0 0 1
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Table 4: Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued
N orfolk Portsm outh Suffolk V irginia Beach
Officer Characteristics
Officer Named in Press IS 3 1 14
Officer Age 2 (M = 38.5) 3 (M=  32.7) 0 6 (M =  34.2)
Years on Police Department 7 (M = 7.29) 2 (M = 11.75) 0 9 ( M =4.8)
Officer Race 2 0 0 0
Unit/Assignment 
Vice and Narcotics 6 0
0
0
Precinct/Patrol 2 0 3
K-9 4 0 1
SWAT 0 1 3
O ff Duty 2 0 2
Bicycle Patrol 2 0 1
Metro Tactical 1 0 0
Sheriff’s Deputy 0 0 0
Airport Police 1 0 0
Day o f W eek
Monday 6 0 0 5
Tuesday 3 0 0 4
Wednesday 8 2 1 8
Thursday 11 2 0 4
Friday 8 1 0 3
Saturday 3 4 0 5
Sunday 5 0 0 6
Time o f  Day
Morning (6am- 12pm) 5 2 0 5
Afternoon (12pm-5pm) 6 2 1 1
Evening (5pm- 12am) 17 4 0 14
Night (12am-6 am) 12 1 0 13
Context o f Incident
Foot or Vehicle Pursuit 18 2 0 14
Commission o f  Crime 27 2 0 15
Domestic Disturbance 6 0 0 10
Hostage/Barricade Scenario 8 5 0 6
Mental Health Issue 4 3 0 9
Drug Use or Involvement 10 0 0 7
Alcohol Use 2 0 0 3
Shots Fired at Officer 14 1 0 7
Threat to Others 16 0 1 12
Threat to Self 1 1 0 4
Possible Suicide by Cop 3 1 0 8
Officer Injured 14 2 0 3
Shot 7 2 1
Cut or Stabbed 1 0 0
Hit by Car 2 0 0
Other 1 0 2
Killed 3 0 1
Administrative Action Pending
Investigation 12 1 0 11
Administrative Duty 5 1 1 8
Administrative Leave
Civil Litigation Mentioned 8 1 0 9
It must be acknowledged that there may be a reporting bias in how these incidents 
are covered, as the main offices for the Pilot are located in Norfolk and considering the 
crime rates across the jurisdictions. In particular, discussing these findings with local 
officers and long term residents led to a common consensus that police shootings in 
Hampton and Newport News were grossly underreported in the Pilot. This discrepancy 
may be attributable to the fact that, even though the Pilot is a regional paper, there is a 
smaller paper, also owned by the Pilot and called the Daily Press, published that focuses 
on news occurring on the Peninsula area of Hampton Roads (particularly Hampton and 
Newport News).
These shooting incidents were not distributed evenly across jurisdictions or years, 
with Norfolk having, by far, the most shooting incidents (n = 45) in the time period 
studied. Virginia Beach and Chesapeake followed Norfolk in terms of frequency of 
police shootings, with 35 and 22 incidents respectively. There was a wide disparity in 
frequency of events between the cities, with Suffolk (n =1), Hampton (n = 3), Newport 
News (n = 5) and Portsmouth (n = 10) having far fewer police shootings covered in the 
newspaper. Additionally, the number of shootings ebb and flow, with multiple 
jurisdictions having multiple incidents some years and other years, like 1993, there being 
no police shootings reported across all seven jurisdictions. Table 5 displays the 
frequency of shooting incidents by year for the seven cities in Hampton Roads.
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Table 5: Number o f  Police Shootings in the Hampton Roads Region by City, 1990-2010 
Chesapeake Hampton Newport Norfolk Portsmouth Suffolk Virginia Total
News Beach
2007
Total by
City
Norfolk also had the most incidents where suspects had guns (n = 27), although 
Virginia Beach had the most incidents where vehicles were used as weapons (n = 6) and 
where the suspect had a knife (n = 5). Virginia Beach had the most incidents involving 
domestic disturbances (n = 10), mentally ill individuals (n = 9) and potential suicide by 
cop incidents (n = 8). Norfolk had the most incidents involving a pursuit (n = 18), police 
shootings in the context o f the commission of a crime (n = 27), the most incidents 
involving drug use or involvement (n = 10), the most females shot by police (n = 3), and 
the most officers injured or killed in the context o f a police shooting incident (n = 14).
The Pilot reported the most animals shot by police in Chesapeake (n = 4) and the 
only jurisdictions where non-injurious shootings were reported in the media were 
Newport News (n = 1), Norfolk (n = 3) and Virginia Beach (n = 3). It was most
frequently suggested that police shootings were racially motivated in Norfolk (n = 7), 
followed by Chesapeake (n = 3), and Hampton (n = 1). Other jurisdictions, specifically 
Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Virginia Beach and Norfolk, were strongly criticized for their 
management of critical incidents involving mentally ill individuals. Portsmouth, for 
example, was strongly criticized in the media for the deaths of Marshall Franklin, Sr., in 
2009, and David Lewis Warren in 2010, both of whom were older with strong 
documented histories of mental illness. The media reports suggested that earlier 
intervention and/or better training in dealing with the mentally ill could have avoided 
both deaths. Civil litigation related to shooting incidents was most common in Norfolk 
(n = 8) and Virginia Beach (n = 9), with only one other jurisdiction, Chesapeake (n = 1) 
having civil litigation mentioned in the newspaper articles reviewed.
Discussion
The preliminary study is but an initial foray into establishing basic statistics 
related to the frequency and context of police shootings in the Hampton Roads region of 
Virginia utilizing the currently available data. One of the key elements to this discussion 
is acknowledging that it was necessary to conduct the present study to obtain these basic, 
two-dimensional statistics (Geller and Scott 1992). The fact that these data were not 
collected or maintained in some fashion, despite 30 years of academics and practitioners 
calling for accountability with regards to police shootings (Fyfe 2002, Geller and Scott 
1992, Hickman, Piquero and Gamer 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 1979, Smith 
2008), is quite startling, given that the use of deadly force is one of the most controversial 
and contested aspects of modem policing. It is also surprising that, given the 
implications and costs associated with shooting incidents, police departments themselves
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do not appear to be more concerned with maintaining accurate and detailed statistics to 
develop and support evidence based policies.
What information is available is conflicting, with the UCR, BJS and CDC 
providing different, and often divergent, gross totals for deaths attributable to police 
shootings each year, as displayed in Figure 1. Although these estimates draw from 
different data sources, they are each seeking to provide a count of citizens reasonably or 
justifiably killed by law enforcement each year. It would be expected that, while there 
may be some discrepancies between the counts, that they would be similar and that, 
overall, the data would display similar trends over time; but this is not necessarily the 
case (see Figure 1). As suggested by Geller and Scott (1992) and Sherman and 
Langworthy (1979), these differences are likely due to inherent flaws within the reporting 
systems that generate the totals on an annual basis. It is quite likely that the overall totals 
for justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers in Virginia, collected by the 
Virginia State Police and provided pursuant to a FOLA request, likely suffer from similar 
flaws as the UCR reporting system, specifically non-mandatory reporting, that leads to 
undercounting the total number of fatal police shootings. These total counts, 
disaggregated to determine a regional statistic, were only available for 2005 to 2009 and 
indicated that there were 21 fatalities within that time period. The preliminary study, 
however, discovered 27 fatal police shootings reported in the media within the same time 
frame, six more than the total provided by the VSP. Thus, it is likely that we are 
underestimating the frequency of police shootings at the regional, state and national 
levels, with local frequencies not being readily available or accessible to police 
administrators, criminologists or the general public.
While newspapers provided the most data regarding local shootings, they by no 
means provide full and complete coverage of all police shootings. As stated previously, 
all police shootings are not equally newsworthy and those that result in death or serious 
injury are much more likely to make the news, meaning that exploring the contextual and 
situational differences between fatal, injurious and non-injurious shootings, as advised by 
Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al (2009), and White (2006), is virtually impossible at this time. 
This also means that there is still a large dark figure associated with police shootings, 
likely composed of not only fatalities, but also o f a large number less serious injurious 
and non-injurious shootings.
In the course of talking with officers in one particular jurisdiction, it became 
apparent where and how information is stored within a given police department may 
significantly impact its availability and accessibility, even under FOIA. Sherman and 
Langworthy (1979) did not simply cite police records as a source of data on police 
shootings, but rather they cited police Internal Affairs records. In at least one jurisdiction 
in the preliminary study the Internal Affairs unit would be the only source for any 
information related to police shootings over time. This is strongly associated with the 
issues Geller and Scott (1992) raise regarding short-term retention of information before 
purging, leaving Internal Affairs as the unit that maintains copies of all Special Incident 
Reports and investigations into use of force cases.
Although the news media also fails to provide a population of shooting incidents 
in equal coverage, it is important to acknowledge that situational and contextual variables 
that may play a role in developing EBP, such as drug or alcohol use, domestic violence, 
pursuits, etc., or the locations of shootings to determine if there are geographic or
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ecological factors that need to be factored into policy development, can be identified in 
many of the cases reported in the media. In terms of identifying situational and 
contextual variables that are not always readily available in official data sources, it was 
anticipated that the controversy over race and its importance in these incidents could be 
explored in the preliminary study, however, race was only specifically mentioned when 
there were allegations that the shooting was somehow racially motivated. Despite the 
controversy over the importance of race in the empirical literature (Lawton 2007, 
McElvain and Kposowa 2008, White 2002), this study indicated, while further 
exploration of basic situational data may cancel out the effects of race, race is most 
definitely important to the media. This is most likely because racial conflict is 
considered newsworthy, especially if it stirs community tensions and sells papers.
In addition to providing more, and disaggregated data, to examine frequencies at 
the local level, using newspaper articles, particularly editorials and letters to the editor, 
allowed for the exploration of public reaction to particular police shootings. The 
assignment o f blameworthiness (Feather 1998), as expected, was most clearly tied to 
instances where the victim’s actions provoked a lethal police response (Dietz 1977). For 
example, letters to the editor explicitly stated that Andrea Nicole Reedy, who refused to 
stop her vehicle and then attempted to drag a police officer trying to remove her from her 
vehicle after colliding with another police cruiser in Hampton in 2001, and Albert 
Michael Schatzhueber, who also failed to pull over for a traffic stop and drove at an 
officer in Chesapeake in 2001, were instrumental in their own deaths. One letter to the 
editor regarding the death of Jamarr Hassell in Norfolk in 2010 suggested that the young 
man’s death should be labeled as a natural death due to his choice to engage in a lifestyle
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of “thuggishness and making a habit o f lawlessness and disrespect for authority.” The 
same editorial regarding Hassell’s death also embodied elements of Goldkamp’s (1976) 
polarized views regarding why Black males are disproportionately represented in police 
shootings, suggesting that if more friends, family, and clergy would chastise young men 
for engaging in violence, there would be far fewer vigils for young Black men.
In February 2007, the Pilot published an article reviewing police shootings and 
officers shot in Norfolk between 2002 and 2006, which mentioned that 15 of the 17 
individuals shot by the Norfolk Police during this time span were Black and also 
mentioning that the Black on Black crime rates may play a role in police shootings within 
this jurisdiction. In letters to the editor published three days after the article ran, one 
citizen, clearly in the group described by Goldkamp (1976) as ascribing to a subcultural 
perspective, noted that maybe the high Black on Black crime rates are why more Blacks 
are shot by police.
Blameworthiness was not only assigned to the suspects or victims in these 
encounters. There were numerous editorials that, despite the existence of defense of life 
policies ushered in by Garner (1985) and the standards set by Graham (1989) that seek to 
avoid applying perfect hindsight to decisions made under extreme duress without the time 
to weigh all lesser options, suggested police should have “shot to wound” the individual 
or used less lethal means of subduing them. These criticisms often accompanied citizens 
minimizing the lethality o f weapons other than guns, such as vehicles and knives. 
However, there were other citizens, sometimes officers or relatives of officers, who noted 
that a vehicle can be a weapon and that knives can be quite dangerous to officers within a 
21 foot radius—the suspect can attack before the officer can draw his or her weapon and
bullet resistant vests are not designed to defend against knife attacks. In a commentary 
written by the uncle of Bryan Dugan, a young man who was shot after he refused to drop 
the knives he was holding and lunged at officers, it was stated that officers are abusive, 
aggressive and escalate situations unnecessarily, even going so far as to suggest that 
officers are proud when they shoot an individual. These viewpoints were further 
exacerbated when the individual shot and/or killed was mentally ill, such as in the cases 
of Carlett Karim in Chesapeake, Mark Jessup in Virginia Beach, and Marshall Franklin, 
Sr. and David Lewis Warren in Portsmouth, or when there was an allegation that the 
shooting was racially motivated, such as in the cases of Carlett Karim in Chesapeake, 
Larry Alfred Greene in Virginia Beach, and Seneca Darden in Norfolk.
When considering the city level statistics (see Appendix B), including the number 
and severity of officer injuries, the number of shootings that occurred within the context 
of other criminal situations, and the number of shootings overall, the situational 
characteristics identified in the preliminary study seem to lend preliminary support to 
ecological theories o f police shootings (Fyfe 1980, Kania and Mackey 1977, Klinger 
1997, Terrill and Reisig 2003, Werthman and Piliavin 1967) and provides an additional 
area for future research. The interaction of the above mentioned factors suggest that 
there may be something occurring in Norfolk that differentiates it from the other 
jurisdictions in the Hampton Roads region. Just as Terrill and Reisig (2003) adopted 
Skolnick’s symbolic assailant (1966) to discuss symbolic neighborhoods, characterized 
by higher crime rates and increased officer perceptions o f danger, Norfolk may be a 
symbolic city a la Skolnick (1966). This finding, however, must be used with caution 
under the same arguments that Terrill and Reisig (2003) applied to Klinger’s (1997)
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analysis: where Klinger analyzed patrol districts, which are larger than neighborhoods 
and may obscure support for the impact of neighborhood or ecological context, this 
exploratory study looks at citywide demographics, possibly further obscuring these 
effects. Yet, using existing data sources, this type of theoretical application and 
exploration would not be possible.
The preliminary study faced several limitations. First, the police shootings 
considered in the preliminary study were identified through media articles, which may be 
subject to reporting biases and subjective determinations of newsworthiness. Due to the 
fact that it is likely police shootings are underreported, particularly those where the 
suspect is not killed, important differences may exist between fatal, injurious and non- 
injurious shootings, as well as between those shootings reported in the Pilot and those 
that were not. However, White and Ready (2009) address a similar potential reporting 
bias in their research on TASER deployments, finding that because there is such a high 
level of interest and controversy surrounding the use of TASERs, it is possible that most, 
if not almost all, incidents are reported in the media. This interest and controversy is also 
found regarding police shootings. Also, similar to White and Ready’s (2009) work on 
TASER deployments, non-fatal shooting incidents may be more newsworthy when there 
is some other “hook” or variable of interest that drives the story, meaning that it is 
possible the preliminary study likely captures shooting incidents that are newsworthy 
because of their characteristics (White and Ready 2009), which resulted in the varied 
outcomes identified by Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al. (2009) and White (2006).
The second limitation that must be addressed is access to information on police 
involved shootings in general. This work serves as yet another voice calling for a
reporting system that will provide for better access to information about these incidents. 
While Sherman and Langworthy (1979) had valid criticisms of the use of news media to 
determine the frequency or prevalence of police shootings, their outright dismissal of this 
source of data was premature, especially given the discrepancies between the limited data 
sources available and the reluctance of police agencies to open their files to researchers. 
With a lack o f access to both quantitative and qualitative empirical information on police 
shootings at the national, regional, state and local levels, newspaper articles have been the 
most abundant and accessible, though by no means the most accurate or complete, source 
of information on police shootings. This is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the 
articles analyzed in the preliminary study accounted for more incidents, and specifically 
more fatal incidents, than the official counts provided by the Virginia State Police. 
Additionally, as noted previously, the Virginian Pilot was chosen because this paper has 
a reputation among law enforcement agencies for thorough fact checking. Similar again 
to White and Ready’s (2009) suggestions that data that were commonly missing—such as 
suspect and officer age and race, drug use and mental illness (which consequently were 
also information that was consistently missing in the preliminary study, unless it was a 
key feature of the incident)— indicate some degree of data consistency across article type.
While Canter and Wentink (2004) note that using published material that is not 
created for the purposes of a particular research project means that biases likely to weight 
the data in favor of the hypotheses are minimized, Kraemer, Lord and Heilbrun (2004) 
note that reliance on popular media as a data source may result in inaccurate case details 
and oversampling of highly publicized cases. Additional limitations related to the use of 
news articles in the preliminary study are related to the nature of police involved
shootings: these incidents are rare and highly controversial, having the potential to 
inflame poor community relations and engender further dislike and distrust of the police. 
As a result, articles tend to focus on fatal police shootings and those that are most 
contentious. Thus, information may not be equally available for each incident or case 
details may be confused in the press, especially if  several incidents are being discussed in 
a single article. In the preliminary study, coding did not allow for speculation on the 
features of the case; variables were absent or present, and multiple articles related to a 
single incident allowed for fact checking and the identification of discrepancies (White 
and Ready 2009).
Further, there is a smaller paper, the Daily Press, which is owned and operated by 
the Pilot, which focuses on news from the Peninsula area of Hampton Roads. A review 
of the archives from the Daily Press suggest that there may be 200 related articles 
published in this paper between April 1990 and September 2010, although these articles 
may include incidents from jurisdictions not included in the preliminary study. However, 
skimming the contents of these articles also reveals that numerous cases included in the 
preliminary study were also included in these additional articles, indicating a great degree 
of overlapping coverage. While the articles from the Daily Press were not included in 
the preliminary study, and may contain additional incidents that would be relevant to this 
research, the presence of overlapping coverage of incidents between the two papers 
minimizes the detrimental effects of not including data from both papers due to time and 
budgetary constraints.
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Conclusion
It is surprising that, in a country known for demanding official accountability and 
governmental transparency, there is little known, empirically, about even the frequency 
of police shootings. These incidents are the manifestation of the ultimate form of 
coercion available to the state: the ability to invoke death to assure compliance. It is not 
the intent of this paper to suggest that there is a malicious or nefarious reason for the 
paucity of information regarding police shootings, but, as Fyfe (2002) noted, the holes in 
our knowledge about these incidents are a great cause for concern. As such, the 
preliminary study seeks to draw attention to a critical oversight in data availability, 
collection, and validity, especially given the emphasis placed upon evidence based 
policing in modem times. This study also demonstrated that newspapers may provide a 
wealth of situational and contextual data at the incident level, although there are 
limitations associated with these data, as well, that may be useful in guiding future 
research and aiding in policy reforms. Future research should include expanding data 
collection to include more recent shooting incidents, as well as attempts to collaborate 
with the jurisdictions included in this study to compare the data from the media reports to 
police data in an effort to address data reliability and validity concerns, similar to the 
approach taken by Ready, White and Fisher (2008). Also, because the newspaper often 
provides the block address for the shooting incidents, this means that spatial analysis of 
these incidents can be conducted. Finally, future research may benefit from the 
application of media distortion analysis.
As citizens, it is understandable to desire accountability from the police regarding 
how often and the contexts in which deadly force is used. As researchers and
practitioners, this lack of information is disturbing, given the serious nature of these 
incidents and the potential ramifications of policies made in the absence of sound 
empirical data. Determining the frequency and most basic trends and situational 
differences of police shootings, the two dimensional statistics, as Geller and Scott (1992) 
call them, are but the first step on the road to understanding the inherently complex 
circumstances and interactions behind these incidents and are but a preliminary project in 
building an empirical foundation for evidence based policies that take into account all 
parties involved in a single shooting incident.
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS
Introduction: Methodological Considerations in the C urren t Study
As stated in the first chapter, the current study seeks to understand officer- 
involved shootings holistically by exploring how these incidents impact the officer 
involved, his or her family and friends, colleagues, supervisors, and the detectives 
investigating the incident through a case study. This is the research question driving the 
current study, as well. This question has been addressed through the use of a case study, 
approaching the incident from the personal dimension. In this case study, the aim was to 
describe and understand the pre-event, event and post-event (both short and long term) 
forces at play in an officer involved shooting from several interrelated perspectives, 
covering a variety of topics, such as: officer preparation and training (physical, 
psychological/emotional), perceptions o f response (of individual, of family and friends, 
o f peers and coworkers, of supervisors, of agency, of community), perceptions of 
personal support, professional support, organizational support, experiences of value 
conflict, the impact of determining whether or not the action was justified (and how this 
judgment then impacts other issues), and officer survivability.
Proposed Methods: A Case Study
This study was a case study, defined by Creswell (2007) as research involving the 
study of one issue, explored through one or more bounded cases, through the use of 
detailed, in-depth data collection that involves multiple information sources, with the 
intent of producing a detailed case description and a thematic analysis of the case. More
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simply stated, Berg (2007) defines a case study as a way to describe an event or series o f 
events in a systematic manner, gathering the information to do so through an individual, 
social setting, event or group. Creswell (2007) defines a category as a “unit of 
information composed of events, happenings and instances,” which, while there is no 
exact definition of a case-based theme drawn from a case study, it is possible that these 
themes can be seen as somewhat similar in nature to the open coding process that 
generates categories in grounded theory research. Punch (1998 in Silverman 2005) 
echoes Creswell’s (2007) definition, adding that the “general objective of a case study is 
as full an understanding of a case as possible,” whether through a holistic analysis of the 
entire case or an embedded analysis of a particular element or issue in the case (Berg 
2007, Creswell 2007).
Stake (1995, 2005 in Berg 2007, Creswell 2007, Silverman 2005, Tight 2010) 
identifies three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. In this 
particular study, a blend of the intrinsic case study approach, where the goal is to better 
understand the case, and instrumental case study, where the goal is to provide insight into 
a particular issue or aspect associated with the case, will be employed. In his review of 
descriptions of what, exactly, case studies are, Tight (2010) summarizes that a case will 
have the following elements:
•  Temporal characteristics which help to define their nature
• Geographical parameters allowing for their definition
• Boundaries which allow for definition
• May be defined by an individual in a particular context, at a point in 
time
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• May be defined by the characteristics of the group
• May be defined by role or function
• May be shaped by organizational or institutional arrangements
The beauty of qualitative research, and a case study in particular, is that it allows
the researcher to capture an event, either admittedly from one facet, or by attempting to 
approach it from multiple angles. Whether a phenomenological approach is used to 
understand how women cope with aging, or a case study of one infant death investigation 
is conducted, there will be individualistic differences intermingled with some sort of 
basic consensus, or themes common to most, if not all, people who experience these 
events. Likewise, if ten people in a room were asked to describe a clown, in one person’s 
reality, that clown may be terrifying, and, while that specific terror may be shared with a 
handful of others, the general experience of terror is shared by many— meaning that 
gaining an understanding of that one person’s fear, reactions and coping mechanisms can 
then be applied to a larger group.
The idea of generalizability is addressed best by Silverman (2005), who notes that 
the goal of generalizability, which is often seen in quantitative research, may not be as 
heavily weighted as an outcome of qualitative research. However, while generalizability 
may not be a foremost concern, Berg (2007) draws attention to the fact that the academy 
rarely embraces results from any single study, qualitative or quantitative, as 
generalizable. Most qualitative research utilizes purposive sampling (Silverman 2005), 
where you have chosen your participants for a reason, such as a particular event they 
have experienced—so it is neither a large, nor a random sample—and that, depending on 
the type of case study (intrinsic, instrumental or collective), the issue being studied and
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your intended outcomes, generalizability may even result from a single case study, or 
may not even matter at all. However, if generalizability is a concern, Silverman (2005) 
suggests using a mixed methods approach, utilizing purposive sampling that is guided by 
time and resources, using theoretical sampling, and using an “analytic model which 
assumes that generalizability is present in the existence of any case.”
Difficulties with generalizability notwithstanding, one reason that it is permissible 
to examine much smaller samples in qualitative research is that these researchers are 
asking different questions that simply cannot be reduced to numbers and large datasets 
analyzed through SPSS, SAS, or STATA. Although there may not be 500 identified 
cases, a qualitative methodology is time-intensive in its execution and a plethora o f data 
may result. This point is made succinctly by Richards (2005), who suggests starting off 
thinking about data, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of scope: collect data that will 
thoroughly answer the question asked and data collection is complete it is felt that that 
goal has been accomplished. While, ideally, this is the case, a number of interviews 
sought or cases to be included may have to be preliminarily identified for numerous 
reasons that include time management, funding, or getting IRB approval. This number, 
however, need not be etched in stone: Richards (2005) also recommends always 
including a “stage of data expansion” within the project design.
Two other common concerns tied to sample size are validity and reliability and 
these issues must be addressed in the research design. Richards (2005) only briefly 
discusses these concerns in a rather dismissive manner—suggesting that multiple data 
sources may not measure the same thing the same way, so triangulation may be pointless, 
and also that consistency is not necessarily expected or desired in qualitative research, so
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reliability is also not an issue. Silverman (2005), however, argues that transparency in the 
research process, to demonstrate reliable methods that lead to valid conclusions, is 
critical. The problem of anecdotalism, as defined by Silverman (2005), is the tendency to 
provide examples or description without giving full criteria as to why this 
comment/image/data was included and why it is representative, thus making the analysis 
appear less valid. Like Richards (2005), Silverman (2005) mentions the use of 
triangulation, in addition to respondent validation, as means of improving data reliability 
and therefore ensuring validity.
However, where Richards (2005) dismisses triangulation because there is no way 
to triangulate something if it is not conceptualized or measured the same across the 
different sources of information, Silverman (2005) suggests that triangulation and 
respondent validation are both flawed in their attempt to achieve validity. As for 
reliability, Silverman (2005) and Richards (2005) again present a similar argument: it 
may be possible that reliability is unattainable due to “mutual interpretations which are 
inherently local and non-standardizable” (Silverman 2005). Despite this mutual penchant 
to dismiss reliability, Silverman (2005) suggests that it can be sought in the use of low- 
inference descriptors, such as providing readers with actual portions of text, rather than 
summaries o f conversations where the researcher has interpreted what occurred and thus 
applied their own inferences. Reliability can also be addressed in terms of consistency in 
coding, which is again addressed by both Richards (2005) and Silverman (2005).
This research examined a single officer-involved shooting that occurred on the 
night o f April 15,2007, in Norfolk, Virginia, paying particular concern to the perceptions 
and understandings of this event as relayed by the officer and those closest to him.
Whether to anonymize this case was a debate that was considered by the research team. 
However, there are contextual factors, particularly the blue-on-blue police shooting that 
occurred in the jurisdiction approximately a year prior to the primary participant’s 
shooting and the Virginia Tech shootings that occurred the day after his shooting, that 
may condition responses and reactions to this particular shooting incident. Sergeant 
Chris Scallon, the primary participant, shall be referred to as “Chris” throughout this 
manuscript; while there may be some concerns as to revealing his identity, he has stated 
that he never intended to remain anonymous and is, in fact, an active member of the 
research team. Further, this study was approved with the understanding that the research 
team would not be generalizing or anonymizing this case. Chris’ shooting garnered local, 
state and national attention, which resulted in him receiving numerous awards for his 
heroic behavior and with this shooting incident being reported in a national police 
publication (Scoville 2011). As this case was not anonymized, there were admitted and 
documented concerns regarding maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of 
individual participants. These potential breaches were acknowledged in both Chris’ letter 
of informed consent and in the general letter of consent provided to other participants 
(See Appendix D).
This case was clearly bounded in time, geography and participants. While the 
specifics of the interactions and meaning constructed by the participants in this research 
may be unique to this particular case, it was also found that the general themes, such as 
coping mechanisms or interpersonal relationships post-incident, may be applicable to 
other cases of officer-involved shootings. This case also lent itself to purposeful 
sampling, as the interviewees were limited to the officer involved in the shooting and
those personally connected to him. The individuals deemed to be personally connected 
included, but were not limited to, his intimate partner, close friends/colleagues— 
especially those who have also been involved in a shooting— and supervisory personnel. 
Figure 2, below, identifies the roles and relationships of participants that were originially 
considered to be approached for interviews, similar to an initial sampling frame in 
quantitative research. As noted in Chapter 5, in the description of the participants, 
several of these individuals did not participate in the current study for a variety of 
reasons. However, there were seven participants that participated in the interview 
process. This research was been approved by Old Dominion University’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB Identifiers 10-009, 11-016 and 12-057, 13-065) (See Appendix C) 
and it should be noted again that this approval included not keeping the current case 
completely anonymous.
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Figure 2: Anticipated Relationships Between and Classifications o f Participants in the 
Current Study
As noted above, a  case study calls for an analysis o f multiple data sources— such 
as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations 
and physical artifacts (Creswell 2007)— to uncover repeated, categorical themes within 
the data. This study used unstructured interviews with participants as the primary means 
o f data collection. While this is a  case study o f Chris’ shooting, and he was the principle 
interviewee, others who are close to him were interviewed because, as noted by Berg 
(2007), “all the aspects o f  an individual’s social life are interconnected and often one o f 
them cannot be adequately understood without consideration of others.” Potential 
interviewees were approached by the researcher and/or Chris and asked if  they were
willing to participate in this research. By this, it is meant that Chris was asked, where 
necessary, to facilitate introductions to interviewees and verbally acknowledge his role 
and support in the research process. Although there are three persons on the research 
team, only one conducted the interviews with participants and only the primary 
researcher and her supervisor have access to the interview recordings, transcripts, signed 
informed consent documents or other identifying information. Chris was not present 
during the interviews, nor does he have access to interview recordings, interview 
transcripts, signed informed consent documents, or other identifying information. 
Informed consent was be obtained at the beginning of each interview and was be affirmed 
when the interviewee reviews the transcript of the interview (see Appendix D for 
Informed Consent Documents).
These interviews were open and unstructured, allowing participants the freedom 
to discuss issues that are most salient to their experience and allowing for flexibility in 
probing or following up on certain topics. This also allowed the interview experience to 
be less formal, more like a conversation, permitting the development of rapport and a 
more natural interaction between the researcher and the participant. However, while 
unstructured, a list o f topical elements was compiled prior to each interview that the 
researcher brought up if the participant did not address them. These topical prompts 
involved issues like previous experiences with violence and changes in the relationship 
with Chris. Further, the interviews with Chris generated additional topical prompts for 
subsequent interviews with other participants, such as asking another participant about a 
specific interaction or event to obtain their perspective of what occurred. It was 
anticipated that each interview would last approximately two hours in length, with some
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interviews running longer and others shorter. It was also anticipated that Chris, as well as 
those closest to him, would require more than one interview session, while others would 
only require one, two-hour interview session.
As this is a case study, the selection of research participants was purposive in that 
only individuals involved with this case were asked to participate. The data collection 
consisted of a series of free-form interviews, beginning with several interviews with 
Chris, before additional participants were interviewed. With Chris, in particular, 
cognitive interviewing techniques were utilized to elicit detailed responses. Appendix E 
contains sample questions regarding topics that were explored during the interviews. As 
these were free-form interviews, a script was not be used and each interview, while 
having some consistent themes discussed, was different. Interviews were tape recorded, 
with the interviewee’s consent, transcribed and then analyzed to extract dominant themes. 
While the transcriptionist is a city employee, she acted in the capacity of a private 
transcriptionist while working on the interviews from the current research and agreed to 
confidentiality before commencing to transcribe any interviews. Being a qualitative 
piece of research that involves purposive sampling, the mention or discussion of 
statistical techniques is not inappropriate in the current study.
As the study focused on the personal impact of this incident, interview questions 
will focus on issues such as the impact of this incident on Chris’ personal relationships, 
both from his perspective and from those close to him who consent to be interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted at the participants’ convenience and at locations they 
indicated were comfortable for them. Attempts were made to meet with participants prior 
to scheduled interviews to build rapport and allow the participant to develop a level of
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comfort with the researcher. All research participants were provided with two copies o f 
an informed consent letter (one for them to keep, and one for the researchers’ files) 
(Appendix D), a letter from Chris supporting this research (Appendix D), and were also 
be informed that Chris would not have direct access to their recorded interview responses 
or the transcripts of their interviews.
To reiterate, both the data collection and data analysis involved two steps. The 
data collection began with a series of interviews with Chris, with the second step 
involving interviews with those individuals classified as predominantly involved in the 
personal dimension of this incident. The data analysis involved an open coding process, 
where dominant themes were extracted from the interview transcripts and, where 
appropriate, bolstered by other sources of data. This thematic analysis involved looking 
for both commonalities in responses, for example, similarities in perceptions, emotional 
responses, and coping mechanisms employed, and distinct differences in responses. The 
second step involved discussing the emergent themes with the research team, to address 
potential meanings, classifications, and implications of these themes. During this second 
step, Chris would have the opportunity to contribute to the thematic analysis of 
aggregated quotes. He still did not have access to the transcripts, but, as he has personal 
experience with witnessing and being involved in a shooting incident and educates other 
officers about these experiences, it is was assumed that he would have a unique 
viewpoint on emerging themes.
Chris also signed a letter of informed consent and was aware that he has the right 
to withdraw his support at any point. Chris wrote an additional letter o f support for this 
research, which is contained in Appendix D. Additionally, as Chris does have a diagnosis
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of PTSD, his therapists, both of whom treated Chris in relation to this incident, were 
consulted prior to commencement of this research. His psychologist, while 
acknowledging that he cannot speak for his psychiatrist, was enthusiastic about this 
research, provided a letter of support (see Appendix F) and agreed to participate in the 
current study as an interviewee. However, this interview was not completed due to 
scheduling conflicts. If any complications arose during the course o f this research, Chris 
agreed to immediately notify both the researcher and his therapists. In the case that this 
research was found in any way detrimental to the health, emotionally or physically, of 
Chris, plans were in place to halt the research immediately.
As Chris is still an active member of the Police Department and one researcher is 
currently an intern with the same police department, a research proposal was submitted 
to, and a letter of support was been requested from, the Police Department. Appendix G 
contains the letter from the City Attorney, noting what materials will and will not be 
provided. The requested General Orders have already been received. Also included in 
Appendix G is a letter from the former Chief. Understandably, the Police Department is 
concerned regarding liability issues and cannot grant a blanket letter of support. Since the 
planning of this research commenced, the former Chief has resigned, an acting Chief has 
come and gone, and the agency has had a new permanent chief of approximately one 
year. This is a transitionary and politically unstable time in the Police Department and led 
to additional complications in the research process. Both Chris and the researcher were 
aware that the stance taken by the agency may limit both the purpose and intent of this 
research and are were to compromise. Any limitations imposed by the agency were
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thoroughly documented when writing up this research and, if necessary, in any 
publications stemming from this research.
Triangulation was be attempted by consulting numerous other sources, including 
the court transcripts from the getaway driver’s trial, audio recording of the 9-1-1 call, all 
news articles related to this case, the text of awards received, the General Orders of the 
Police Department, and photographs and personal correspondence provided by Chris. 
Further, Chris has agreed to sign a Health Information Patient Portability Act (HIPPA) 
waiver allowing the researchers access to his psychological file. The administration of the 
Police Department was asked if they would permit the researchers to view the Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) from the Office of Professional Standards (OPS), the 
Homicide Unit and the Field Forensics Unit, as well as case materials related to Chris’ 
shooting, and discuss the steps involved in investigating such an incident and the toll it 
takes on investigators with personnel from the units specified above. After agreeing to 
support the current study, limited access to data was provided. To strengthen this 
research and indicate its timeliness and utility to the Police Department, letters of support 
(See Appendix F) were solicited from the local chapters of Fraternal Order o f Police and 
International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the Homicide Unit Sergeants and the 
Critical Incident Stress Management Team Coordinator. Table 6, below, provides a list 
and description of the various data sources that the original research methodology 
planned in this case study, including the materials obtained for triangulation purposes.
Table 6: Description o f Proposed Data Sources to be Used in the Current Study
Data Source Specific Details Collection Method Obtained
From
Interviews Chris
Significant Other
Step-Father
Sister
Partner
Roommate
Peer Support
Psychologist
Four different individuals
Each interview will be conducted in an approximate 
two hour time frame. There may be multiple 
interviews with participants. Only the participant and 
Ms. Farrell will be present during the interview. 
Interviews will be recorded digitally and will be 
transcribed by an external transcriptionist.
N/A
Public
Documents
Court Transcript Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Torron Lucas
Obtained copy of transcripts from accomplice’s trial 
and sentencing
CWA
PD General Orders OPR-llO: Firearms 
OPR-120: Use of Force 
OPR-140: Special Incident 
Report
OPR-410: Deadly Force 
Incidents
Freedom of Information Act Request to Police Dept. PD
Awards Commonwealth Attorney’s 
Award of Valor 
Virginia Public Safety 
Medal of Valor
Copy of Award
Press release documenting award
Chris
Governor’s
website
Newspaper Virginian Pilot Seventeen Articles Access News Search N/A
Port Washington News One Article Provided by Chris Chris
Police Magazine Shots Fired Column Online retrieval N/A
http://vvw w .D olicem ag.com /C hannel/Patro l/articles/201
l/01/Shots-Fired-Norfolk-Virainia-04-15-2007.aspx
Table 6: Proposed Data Sources Continued
Other 9-1-1 Call Recording of the 9-1-1 call 
of shooting
Provided by Chris Chris
PD SOPs First, Second and Third 
Patrol Divisions; Detective 
Division; Office of 
Professional Standards
Freedom of Information Act Request to PD (originally 
ignored)
Pending
Psychological Case File Chris to complete HIPPA waiver Psychologist
Contemporary Documents 
Field Notes
Photos, journal entries, etc.
Participant observation 
experiences
Request participants to provide whatever supplemental 
information they can
N/A
Participants
N/A
Finally, there is an element of participant observation that influenced this 
research. These experiences will be more thoroughly explicated in the following 
discussion of reflexivity, but as a source of triangulation, it must also be mentioned here. 
The author has interned with the Police Department for approximately five years and has 
worked in the immediate aftermath of two officer-involved shootings to date. One 
suggestion that has been made by the Homicide Sergeants is that the researcher be called 
in to shadow and observe any subsequent officer-involved shootings to gain insight into 
the investigative process, as well as the emotional and psychological impacts these cases 
have on other officers. Further, the researcher was invited to attend a training seminar on 
Police Officer Stress and Police Suicides designed for Police Peer Support and 
Counseling Teams and Hostage and Crisis Negotiations teams, hosted by the Police 
Benevolence Association in Norfolk, Virginia, in March 2012.
Initial literature searches for this research included an article in the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Law Enforcement Bulletin (Heglund 2009) that discussed a 
program developed in California that sought to aid first responders (EMS, Firefighters 
and Police) suffering from trauma-related disorders. This program, the West Coast Post- 
Trauma Retreat (WCPR), is affiliated with the First Responders Network and is one of 
only two such programs in the world. WCPR provides twelve, one-week retreats for first 
responders and one retreat for significant others and spouses of traumatized first 
responders each year. In addition to providing these retreats, WCPR is the only advanced 
peer counseling class approved by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and 
Training (POST) (Heglund 2009).
After reading about the WCPR, the researcher contacted the program to determine 
if they accept volunteers, and was contacted by WCPR’s clinical director. The clinical 
director informed the researcher that observers and volunteers are rarely permitted to 
attend the retreats, but that he was interested in hearing more about this research and was 
willing to consider making an exception. After providing a vita and references for review, 
the clinical director informed the researcher that she was welcome to attend a WCPR 
session as a volunteer. She attended the WCPR retreat scheduled for July 15 to July 20, 
2012. Attending a WCPR event further developed understandings of the multiple impacts 
of critical incidents, thus enhancing the interviews to be conducted with the participants 
in this case study. This experience allowed the researcher to both observe and converse 
with the clinicians, peer support staff, and traumatized officers to identify potential areas 
that may not be explicitly covered in the literature, due to its confidential and sensitive 
nature. She became more aware of the psychological and sociological components of said 
incidents and be able to translate those concerns into insightful interview questions and 
follow-up questions.
Rationale for Choice of Case
The case studied in this research was chosen for several reasons. First, there was 
an element o f convenience in the selection of this case. This particular officer-involved 
shooting occurred in a local jurisdiction where one researcher already had contacts 
established. Not only was this case easier to access in terms of geography and initial 
contacts, Chris was willing to not only be interviewed extensively, but was also eager to 
be an active collaborator in the research process. Second, this case was well-covered in 
the media and also led to Chris receiving numerous awards and citations for his actions.
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This is considered to be a “good” shooting, which means there is not the stigma of 
controversy that will impede people from talking. Also, due to the amount of attention 
this case received, the amount of materials available for triangulation increased. Third, 
due to the nature of the incident, several of the areas of concern are highlighted, such as 
PTSD and the impact on interpersonal relationships, while other issues, such as the 
involvement of other officers or offenders in the shooting incident, were minimized. 
Several issues that the research seeks to understand were magnified as a result of details 
specific to this case, such as the extended duration of the gun fight with the offender and 
the officer’s willingness to speak openly about the incident and its impact, and therefore 
make this an ideal case for an in depth study.
The Epistemological Debate
While the above discussion would appear to be a rather direct definition of a case 
study, Tight (2010) implies that the use of the term “case study” has taken on an overly 
broad meaning to both encompass and validate any and all close examinations of small 
samples. However, this need to validate or legitimate the use of detailed analyses of small 
samples will never, as Tight (2010) notes, convince those o f the belief that larger, more 
“representative” samples are the only sources of data that merit investigation.
As seen repeatedly throughout history, a single, poignant or heart-wrenching case 
can have a marked impact on society in various ways, such as social recognition of a 
problem and/or a dramatic political response (Gelsthorpe 2007, Maruna and Matravers 
2007), as seen in the wake of cases like the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, the murders of 
Polly Klaas and Megan Kanka, the beating of Rodney King or the Virginia Tech 
massacre. Although high profile cases continue to emerge and impact society, Tight
(2010) suggests that the use of case study methodologies fell out of favor after the 
Second World War and experienced a mild return to favor in the 1980s. Although we do 
not see case studies employed as commonly as other methodologies in contemporary 
research, this methodology is not totally uncommon in criminology, with several seminal 
pieces hailing from this tradition (King and Chambliss 1972, Shaw 1930, Snodgrass 
1982, Steffensmeier 1986). Miller (2001), in his discussion o f Anderson (2001), laments 
that modem sociologists and criminologists seem to have abandoned the case study, a 
tool to “plumb[ing] serious public issues through a single case,” while avoiding “that 
Great Satan.. .the ‘meaning’ that a particular action might carry for the individual in a 
given society” (emphasis in original). Indeed, as suggested by the 2007 special issue of 
Theoretical Criminology dedicated to reanalyzing Shaw’s (1930) classic case study of a 
single individual, there is much to learn from a sample size o f one (Maruna and 
Matravers 2007). The suggestion is that, as the academy has moved towards complex 
analyses o f large datasets, we have effectively removed the narrative, the human story 
and the living individual, from most forms of social science (Maruna and Matravers 
2007, Miller 2001)
This very acknowledgement underscores the epistemological divide that 
characterizes much of the research within the social sciences. If it is assumed that there is 
but one knowable answer, then it is presumed that a large sample will approximate the 
reality for all members of the population under study. However, if one acknowledges the 
possibility of multiple realities, or simply multiple perspectives to every story or 
experience, then sometimes, (and, as a female in a traditionally male-dominated field, this 
is said with a grin and in a tongue-in-cheek manner) size really does not matter. All
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humor aside, this is true. Sometimes, the goal o f the research is not to analyze aggregate 
data with sophisticated statistical models; sometimes the research seeks to understand the 
meanings that people attach to particular events or to focus on the confluence of 
circumstances that led to a particular event, rather than the general causal explanations 
for all similar events (Bachman and Schutt 2011).
Within the social sciences, there are some scientists who see qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies as separate and distinct. Quantitative methods tend 
to focus on explanation, description and evaluation of countable phenomenon, and 
examining numbers or attributes that can ordered and measured through the use of 
surveys, scales and experiments (Bachman and Schutt 2003). Qualitative methods look to 
promote understanding and capture the essence of experience from the participants’ 
perspective, using words to describe and explain phenomenon that are not easily 
quantified (Bachman and Schutt 2003). Bachman and Schutt (2003) suggest that it is the 
underlying research philosophy, not the methodology employed, that is the true source of 
distinction. In fact Harding (in Danner and Landis 1990) differentiates between methods 
(how data are gathered), methodology (theories on research) and epistemology 
(underlying research philosophy). Even Mills (1959) distinguished between methods (or 
rigor) and craft, with a strict adherence to method at the expense of craft being highly 
undesirable.
The philosophy of positivism, often associated with quantitative research, can be 
defined as a belief in a singular, knowable external reality, a  single truth, as it were, with 
measurable causal relationships that can be tested with theory-driven research. This 
definition of positivism may oversimplify the complexities o f the term and, by
association, quantitative research. Indeed, Silverman (2005) defines a positivistic model 
as one which looks to establish a relationship between variables that have been 
operationally defined by the researcher and argues that, while there is often a great divide 
seem between qualitative and quantitative research, this divide is unnecessary and 
perpetuated by such things as critics o f quantitative research calling said researchers 
positivists (Silverman 2006). Becker (1996) concurs that the gap between quantitative 
and qualitative research is not as big, in the classical sense, as is portrayed. Creswell 
(2007) also defines positivism in a more neutral context, noting that it is a scientific 
approach to study that focuses on empirical data collection, causal relationships, and is 
based in theory.
There are multiple philosophies linked to qualitative methodology, including 
interpretivism (Bachman and Schutt 2003), critical and feminist empiricism (Daly and 
Chesney-Lind 1988, Danner and Landis 1990), and critical and feminist standpoint (Daly 
and Chesney-Lind 1988, Danner and Landis 1990). Interpretivism, according to Bachman 
and Schutt (2003), encompasses the belief that there is not a single, knowable reality, but 
that reality is socially constructed, with social science research seeking to decipher the 
meanings attached to reality. Critical and feminist empiricism attempt to highlight the 
flaws in traditional positivistic methodology by utilizing, not rejecting, quantitative 
methods, just using these methods in a better fashion to minimize bias (Danner and 
Landis 1990). Critical and feminist standpoint theories advocate changing the existing 
knowledge base, which requires a new (and non-positivistic) philosophy and 
methodology (Danner and Landis 1990).
120
The Influence of Feminist Methodologies
The research design for the current study also borrowed heavily from both critical 
and feminist criminology in an effort to develop a more comprehensive and honest 
qualitative study. While it is not the contention of this research to argue that officer- 
involved shootings are inherently gendered, as noted in Chapter 2, police work may be 
viewed as a way of doing gender in our society (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Martin 
and Jurik 1996/2006, Morash and Haarr 2012). It is argued that officers involved in such 
incidents can be both difficult to access and vulnerable, making feminist research 
methodologies particularly applicable to this study. Comack (1999) cites Cain’s 
definition of what a standpoint is, noting that it is a “site which its creator and occupier 
has agreed to occupy in order to produce a special kind o f knowledge and practice of 
which he or she is aware in a special, theoretical way.” Feminist standpoint methodology 
also supports the idea of locating the researcher within a research project and addressing 
power differentials in a research process, paying particular care to theoretical reflexivity 
(Comack 1999). In borrowing from these methodologies, this project was not aligned 
with traditional positivistic thought, but plans to acknowledge the roles and viewpoints of 
participants and the researchers.
Power Differentials in the Research Process
Both feminist and critical criminology address power differentials between the 
researcher and the subject; this issue has been of particular concern in designing this 
study. As officer-involved shootings are highly controversial and sensitive topics, those 
involved in this research can be considered vulnerable in a manner similar to those used
by O’Keeffe (2004) and Blagden and Pemberton (2010) in identifying their samples of 
offenders as vulnerable. For example, Blagden and Pemberton (2010) note that sex 
offenders, while often not socially constructed as such, are in reality a vulnerable group 
due to media representations of their crimes which fuel extreme public reactions, and the 
intense public stigma associated with their crimes that is manifested in multiple 
environments. While it is a bit uncomfortable comparing officers who have been 
involved in shooting incidents to sex offenders, there are parallels that would indicate 
these officers, also typically not portrayed as vulnerable, are quite vulnerable in spite of 
assumptions or sometimes outward appearances. There is a great deal of media attention 
that focuses on officer-involved shootings, often fomenting community unrest and anger 
directed at the police in general and the officer in particular following a shooting 
incident. As there are few officers that are involved in this type of incident, there is a 
stigma that is attached to the officer, which will be manifested differently in the work, 
home, social and public environments of the officer. Further, in terms of ethical research, 
Chris’ diagnosis of PTSD also enhances his vulnerability as a research participant. 
Provisions for reporting any adverse psychological effects o f participating in this research 
were made and the IRB was aware of Chris’ psychological history.
It must be acknowledged that this is Chris’ story and that, as someone who has 
experienced this type of incident, as someone who trains others on these incidents, and as 
a frontline supervisor, his contributions and insights to this project went beyond being a 
mere subject or interviewee. After careful consideration and discussions with Chris, it 
was decided that he would serve multiple roles in this research, acting as both an 
interviewee and also as a co-researcher. He did not, however, hold these roles
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simultaneously; his role as an interviewee was fulfilled before he participated in any 
categorical analysis. While some may consider this an unusual and unprecedented 
decision—to empower the subject to the point of designating him or her as a co­
researcher—the author would like to point out that Harry King, the subject of Chambliss’ 
(1972) Box-Man, is listed as first author on this text. This sets a precedent for sharing 
ownership of the data generated between the interviewee and the interviewer and 
acknowledging the subject as an active collaborator in the research.
This decision to list Chris as a co-researcher was also supported by some of the 
ideas expressed in Whiteacre and Pepinsky (2002). Specifically, Whiteacre and Pepinsky 
(2002) note that there is a need to “research with and learn from illicit drug users without 
objectifying or pathologizing them.” While this statement explicitly references drug 
users, it can also be applied to research with police officers to gain a more true 
understanding of their experiences and perspectives. Also, Whiteacre and Pepinsky 
(2002) address the fact that, in research, interviewees can occupy multiple roles, stating 
that
there are a number o f  possible social scientific approaches to knowledge. In one, 
we make our informants subjects. In another, our informants become our teachers 
(Pepinsky, 1991, p. 302). Or they can be our collaborators, where the 
relationship between participant and researcher is more equal. The point is to 
avoid viewing the subject as a source o f  information to be interpreted by the 
professional researcher. Both sides have something to offer the project.
It is from this orientation, as equal collaborators, that this research was conducted.
There are other power differentials that were considered when approaching the 
current study. First, while it is often presumed that the interviewer holds the more 
powerful position in the research process, this research embodied more o f an exchanging
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or ebb and flow of the power dynamic. This results from several intersecting components 
of this particular case study, to include the gender of both the researcher and the 
interviewee, and Chris’ status as an insider with “rank.”
While Bachman and Schutt (2011) note that entering the field is a critical stage in 
participant observations, a point that will be discussed further in the reflexivity section 
below, they also note the importance of developing a trusted insider within the group or 
organization to be studied. They worked at establishing a deep sense of rapport and trust 
with Chris. It should be noted that Chris showed an increased willingness to provide 
entree into situations and interactions that were relevant to this study, as well as assist 
with establishing necessary contacts. Chris was not the only potential participant to 
express willingness for taking part in the current study; his wife and friends indicated that 
they were also prepared to participate in the interview process.
As a member of both organizations, Chris was a liaison between the Union and 
the Fraternal Order o f Police executive boards in the process of securing letters of 
support. Chris conducted several preliminary interviews— not recorded—with the 
researcher, suggesting topics she needed to consider. Chris also assisted the researcher in 
gaining entry to certain venues that increased her understanding of these events, 
specifically attending the Virginia Gang Investigator’s Association Annual Meeting and 
also observing Chris’ lecture on officer survivability at the Police Academy. Attendance 
at these events afforded the researcher the opportunity to hear from several investigators 
who had been involved in shootings, been injured in the line of duty and to observe the 
reactions o f other law enforcement personnel to the related incidents.
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Embracing the Outsider Within Perspective
While general feminist methodologies informed the current study, there were two 
in particular that merit special attention. The first was the concept of the outsider within. 
Collins (1986, 1999) developed this perspective as a means of acknowledging the voice 
and the uniquely situated work of black feminists in sociology who were operating at the 
margins of the discipline but within it. Collins (1986) notes that, from this position, a 
particular way of “seeing reality” is developed, as the outsider within is not fully 
accepted nor embraced by the culture due to membership in a marginalized racial, 
gender, and/or class group, and yet is afforded the intimate cultural knowledge of an 
insider. From this vantage point, the outsider within can see through cultural distortions 
and identify anomalies or problems that those fully immersed within the culture may not 
be able to perceive.
The outsider within standpoint is not limited to black feminists within sociology 
(Clark 1998, Collins 1986, Watts 2006), but may apply to any individual occupying 
marginalized social locations due to a history of unequal power. This research is quite 
unique in that it incorporated a doubly situated outsider within perspective. The 
researcher is a white female partial insider to the police organization. Police 
organizations tend to be male-dominated, patriarchal institutions with a strong sub­
culture. As such, the researcher was an outsider within the police department; she is a 
female, in a female body (Del Busso 2007), in what many consider to be a man’s world. 
The gender o f the researcher may be a double-edged sword: Bachman and Schutt (2011) 
suggest that the gender dynamic involved in females interviewing males may facilitate 
communication and the exchange of information, while Huggins and Glebbeek (2003)
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note that, in policing contexts in particular, male officers may resist sharing things that 
they believe are not appropriate for a woman to hear.
This is further compounded by a perception of police and police cultures as 
secretive, violent and dangerous (Huggins and Glebbeek 2003, Miller and Tewksbury 
2010). Miller and Tewksbury (2010) further explicate this potential barrier in their 
discussion of restricted research settings inhabited by those who are unlikely to disclose 
damaging information to outsiders; this resistance and secrecy may also be related to a 
notion that existing socio-political power arrangements favor these institutions and they 
resist scrutiny in order to protect that privilege of power. Although she has a deep 
understanding and appreciation for the culture and mannerisms of the police, as will be 
further discussed in the following section on reflexivity, the researcher has never been a 
police officer. Thus, she is an outsider within the police agency, understanding it and 
having access, but not truly of it.
The second outsider within perspective contained in this research is that of Chris. 
While he is both a male and a police officer, he also comes from a cultural background 
that differs from that of many of his fellow officers. Chris is a Hispanic male who was 
bom in London, raised in South America, and was naturalized as a United States citizen. 
Being raised as a Catholic by his grandmother in Colombia until he immigrated to the 
United States in the fifth grade has instilled within him values and beliefs that are, at 
times, contradictory to those projected by the dominant police culture. Additionally,
Chris spent the rest of his youth in Brooklyn in a very impoverished area; as he openly 
jests, English is his third language— Spanish and Brooklyneese are his first two. Within 
the police department, there is an informal, yet rather tangible, divide between officers
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who are from northern states and those who hail from southern states. Thus, Chris’ 
background, beliefs and even his willingness to participate in this research and openly 
discuss that which is commonly believed to be held as secret or for insiders only, permits 
his to adopt an outsider within perspective.
Reflexivity
Both Lincoln and Denzin (2003) and Rubin and Rubin (2005) noted that the role 
of die researcher is critical in qualitative research. Indeed, Lincoln and Denzin (2003) 
discussed how knowledge is always “partial, incomplete and situated.. .All writing 
reflects a particular standpoint: that of the inquirer/author.” Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
discussed qualitative interviewing as a conversation, acknowledging that the researcher 
participates and engages with the participant, rather than treating them as devoid of 
humanity, a number, a subject or another response to a Likert scale. Essential to this 
critique of the quest for objectivity is that, as humans, we are inherently unobjective, 
despite positivists’ belief that, if they rigorously adhere to the scientific method, then 
their research will be objective, neutral and emotionally detached (Danner and Landis 
1990). Hahn (2006) summarizes the struggle between the researcher being an active part 
o f the research setting and the positivistic goal o f detached objectivity, stating “you see, I 
am situated inside of me, I see, I hear, taste, smell, and think this from me. When I take 
me out to do fieldwork, me always tags along.”
As researchers and human beings, we have values, beliefs and emotions that 
influence everything from what we choose to study to how we approach any given 
research project. Gelsthorpe (2007) succinctly identifies this influence of self by 
acknowledging that “what scientists bring to scientific discovery unavoidably contributes
to what science discovers.” Becker (1996) noted that we act on values and assumptions 
on a daily basis, yet we rarely inspect what those values and assumptions are, let alone 
how they influence our behavior. The researcher can overlook their role in the story and 
the influence of their past experience on the research setting and subjects (Gelsthorpe 
2007). True objectivity simply may not be achievable and, as many qualitative 
researchers argue, should not be something that is strived for. Instead, researchers are 
encouraged to locate themselves within the research process, acknowledged their biases 
and beliefs, and to make the effort to know the participants in order to get as close as 
possible to their reality, their truth, and their experience. To further this point, Daly and 
Chesney-Lind (1988) noted that so-called objective, empirical systems of knowledge are 
androcentric, and therefore are neither objective nor generalizable to the entire 
population. Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988) also suggested that “...objectivity can serve 
to mask men’s gender loyalties as well as loyalties to other class or race groups.” Thus, 
this so-called objectivity that is achieved through a positivistic approach may actually 
encourage, entrench and replicate forms of social stratification (based upon class, gender 
and racial differences) in what is considered unbiased knowledge.
As the researcher is also a person, the researcher’s underlying values and 
assumptions can influence those interpretations—what and how you observe can be 
influenced by who you are (Becker 1996). While scholars such as Wilson (1983) and 
Laub et al (Laub et al. 1995) have advocated divorcing, or at least separating ideology 
from research, many others in the field acknowledge that the very topics chosen for 
research are influenced by the personal experience and viewpoint o f the researcher 
(Belknap and Potter 2007, Danner and Landis 1990). To further this idea, some scholars
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suggest that a good researcher not only acknowledges these influences, but draws from 
them to strengthen and shape their work, which is why reflexivity is key within this 
research process to confront and manage biases (Irwin 2002, Mills 1959).
In recognizing this need for reflexivity, or the awareness of the researcher and his 
or her experiences as related to the shaping and conduct of research (Gelsthorpe 2007, 
Gilgun 2008, Hahn 2006), the researcher must acknowledge several aspects of her 
personal history that have made this research possible and that impacted the researcher 
while conducting this study. To begin, her father is an active member of the Police 
Department with 34 years of distinguished service to his credit. There are people on the 
PD who have, quite literally, watched the researcher grow up, acting as figurative uncles 
and aunts. These relationships simultaneously provide a modicum of entree, while at the 
same time placing the researcher at a distinct power disadvantage because she may be 
viewed as a child, rather than a trained social scientist.
While a Masters student at the University of Liverpool, the researcher was 
required to conduct at least two full weeks of a placement experience, which was directly 
authorized by a high-ranking department official and carried out with the Detective 
Bureau of the Police Department. The reason it is important to acknowledge this 
departmental official’s role is three-fold. First, the researcher grew up and went to school 
with the official’s children, so there was a personal history involved. Second, the 
researcher later found out that the detectives only knew that she was a psychology 
graduate student and had been sent to them by a member of the command staff when she 
commenced her internship; it was later admitted that they believed she had been placed in 
the Detective Bureau to conduct covert psychological evaluations o f the detectives for the
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command staff. This further compounded the researcher’s position as an outsider and 
presented additional obstacles to overcome early in her internship. Finally, although this 
official had been supportive of the researcher’s educational pursuits, when discussions of 
this particular research project began, this official became a staunch gatekeeper, barring 
access, using bureaucracy as a shield, and suggesting that another area of research be 
pursued.
This internship proved to be critical to the development of the current study. The 
researcher spent two weeks over the Christmas holidays in 2007 and one week of Easter 
break in 2008 working primarily with the Field Forensics Unit. This time spent in the 
field was the initial foundation of several professional relationships and friendships that 
exist to this day. The researcher resumed her internship in March of 2009 and the 
researcher has spent an average of one, eight-hour shift per week working with the 
Detective Bureau and continues to maintain this internship schedule. This time in the 
field has allowed the researcher to, over an extended period of time, gain insider 
knowledge and become what Huggins and Glebbeek (2003) call a partial professional 
insider. Throughout the course of the internship, the researcher has been able to establish 
trust and rapport, and demonstrate that she “has what it takes” to work with the police. 
This includes, but is not limited to, demonstrating her ability to complete job-related 
tasks and apply job-related knowledge, demonstrating that she can “handle” herself and 
cope with the often traumatic experiences involved in police work, and proving that she 
can be useful as an unofficial consultant on several homicide cases. Being asked for her 
opinion and hearing comments like “why don’t you just go through the academy and get 
it over with?” or jests about the member of the unit not receiving a paycheck suggest a
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relative acceptance as a peer. Thus, over the course of the last five years, the researcher’s 
identity has evolved from “his daughter,” to “the intern,” to a whole person and 
colleague, worthy of attention and interest in her own right.
This internship also provided the opportunity for the researcher to meet Chris, 
although at the time of the initial meeting, he was a homicide detective and, unbeknownst 
to the researcher, still greatly struggling to cope with the aftermath of his shooting 
incident. Chris had previously worked with the researcher’s father in Vice and Narcotics 
and was willing to talk to her about using his case as a research project in the fall of 2009. 
At the time, it was anticipated that this would be a rather quick study, resulting in one, 
maybe two, publications. After that initial meeting, both Chris and the researcher realized 
that this study would be a much larger undertaking than either had assumed. This led to 
almost two and a half years of collaborative groundwork, building rapport and trust, and 
eliciting critical support from other primary and secondary gatekeepers.
The researcher has also had the experience of working in the immediate aftermath 
of two shooting incidents, both of which involved fatalities. In the first, she was able to 
experience the resulting tension between the officers and the community, being told by an 
officer while out on the street to “let me know if you see anyone with a gun and, if you 
do, get down and stay down.” In the wake of the second incident, while assisting in the 
location and collection of evidence, the researcher was physically thrown out of the way 
by a detective when the victim’s family swerved their vehicle at the officers when exiting 
a parking lot. These experiences have allowed an immersion in the tensions following an 
incident and provided a unique opportunity to observe and probe the vulnerability and 
fears these incidents evoke in officers. The researcher’s experience and history plays a
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role in the current study, providing a situated and contextual knowledge that influences 
her perceptions and understandings in the research setting.
Limitations
While the positivistic epistemology underlying some quantitative approaches may 
undermine the ability to develop comprehensive or deep understanding of an area of 
inquiry, qualitative methodologies and their underlying philosophies are not without their 
flaws, including suggested issues of validity and reliability, as well as errors in the 
researchers’ interpretations of participants’ realities (Burman, Batchelor and Brown 2001, 
Gadd 2004, Short 2002, Whiteacre and Pepinsky 2002). Becker (1996) refers to the 
instability o f the real world, likening trying research to attempting to obtain meaning for 
a constantly moving target. Lincoln and Denzin (2003) echoed this point in their 
reference to Seale, who, after critiquing numerous frameworks for qualitative 
methodology, suggests that “subtle realism,” or acknowledging that the world as we 
know it is constructed, may be a firm starting ground for approaching research. This 
argument for multiple realities is contradictorily furthered by one of the very flaws of the 
ideologies associated with qualitative methodologies: if there are truly multiple realities 
unfolding concurrently, in research focusing on an actor or actors, there is the chance for 
misinterpretation of the observation (Becker 1996).
Not only must there be concern for misinterpretation by the researcher, but the 
motivated nature of memory (Gadd 2004) must also be recognized. As such, each of us 
attempts to present ourselves favorably, managing impressions and minimizing 
recollections that may be negatively associated with the individual (Goffman 1959, 
Huggins and Glebbeek 2003). To state it in colloquial terms, Chris and the other
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interviewees have a horse in this race, both professionally and personally. While they 
have related their memories and experiences, it is critical to remember that these are 
subjective and may reflect a need to both protect and present a positive self-image. Berg 
(2007) also reminds us that personal documents in and of themselves are incredibly 
subjective, but that this subjectivity can provide insight into the views and perceptions of 
the authors.
As this case was widely publicized, and, as a result o f his actions in this incident, 
Chris has received local, state and national awards, it will be almost impossible to grant 
anonymity to the Police Department in this research. While the current study attempts to 
protect the confidentiality of participants, this will be particularly difficult. As the case is 
identified, and Chris is identified, it may be easy to identify statements from his 
girlfriend, for example, and thus determine the identity o f the individual. All interviews 
were numbered, rather than identifying the participants by name, in an attempt to protect 
the identities o f participants. Another potential impediment to maintaining confidentiality 
is the possible use of a transcriptionist, although to mitigate this risk, the transcriptionist 
was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement.
Conclusion
This is a case study, and, as such, the selection of research participants was 
purposive in that only individuals involved with this case were be asked to participate. 
The data collection consisted of a series of free-form interviews, beginning with several 
interviews with Chris, before proceeding to interview any additional participants. The use 
of cognitive interviewing techniques were utilized in some interviews to elicit detailed 
responses. Interviews were be tape recorded, with the interviewee’s consent, transcribed,
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and then analyzed to extract dominant themes. In an effort to triangulate the data 
collected, as well as to incorporate multiple sources of information, all relevant media, 
any personal correspondences and documents provided by Chris or other interviewees, 
official policies and other official documents were be reviewed and analyzed.
The hope is that this research will aid in potentially assisting other officers, other 
police departments, and other individuals who have experienced a similar event 
understand their situation. An additional goal of this research was to identify possible 
areas of best practice and training, with the aim of providing the appropriate response and 
support in these cases, emphasizing officer survivability. This study seeks to approach the 
issues involved with police shootings holistically, looking at precipitating 
factors/influences, the event itself and post-event factors, across several dimensions, as 
opposed to a narrow approach only examining one dimension in regard to one stage of 
the event.
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS: THE CASE
Introduction: Sources of Data, Life History and Case Description
This chapter will discuss in detail the sources o f data used in this case study 
before delving into the analysis of said data. The analysis is broken into three chapters: 
this chapter, which describes the sources o f data in the current study, provides a 
condensed life history of the primary participant, and a detailed synopsis of the shooting 
incident from April 2007; chapter six, which details the thematic analyses of the 
interview transcripts; and chapter seven, which includes the policy and media analyses 
conducted, as well as the observations gained from the participant observation 
components of the current research.
Sources of Data
The data for the current study come from various sources. There were 11 
interviews completed with seven participants, which accounted for approximately 16.5 
hours of interview time. Participant interviews were purposive, as outlined in Chapter 4, 
and interview sessions ranged in duration from 49:19 to 2:14:45. These interviews 
covered a variety of topics, although certain topics, such as stigma and the police culture, 
were deliberately discussed with each participant. Interviews were conducted in a variety 
of locations, including private residences, university office space, and in various PD 
locations (even including interview/interrogation rooms in the Detective Division that 
were not in use). Some participants asked to have the interviews conducted during their 
working hours and openly told their colleagues that they were participating in this
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research, others asked to meet privately, when they were off duty. Table 7 displays some 
information regarding number of interviews and total hours o f recorded interviews per 
interviewee.
Table 7: Selected Information on Interviews and Interviewees
Participant Number of Interviews Total Interview Time
1 5 498 minutes or 8.3 hours
2 1 127 minutes or 2.1 hours
3 1 133 minutes or 2.2 hours
4 1 53 minutes
5 1 66 minutes, or 1.1 hours
6 1 49 minutes
7 1 65 minutes, or 1.1 hours
The participants were predominantly male (n = 6) and all participants are sworn 
law enforcement officers, with a range of time served ranging from 13 years to 40 years 
(pi = 21.1 years). The average age of participants was 43.7 years and four participants 
self-identified as White, two as African American, and one was Hispanic. Most 
participants self-identified as either Christian or Catholic. Educationally, the participants 
varied from having a high school diploma with some college (n = 2), to having Bachelors 
degrees (n = 3), to having Masters degrees (n = 2), with two participants currently 
pursuing Masters degrees at a local university. Five participants are currently married, 
two are divorced, and five have children. Three participants are military veterans and 
two had served as law enforcement officers at another agency prior to joining their 
current departments. Four participants were Virginia natives, with two being “locals.” 
Three participants had a parent that was a law enforcement officer and one had a 
parent that served in the military. Four participants had some form of upheaval or 
instability in their childhood, due to immigrating to the United States (two participants), 
moving cross country, or being poor in a gang and drug infested neighborhood (two
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participants). All participants had been involved in multiple critical incidents during their 
law enforcement careers, including five who have been involved or present during at least 
one shooting incident, four who have been involved in the investigation of officer 
involved shootings, two who have previously been shot in the line o f duty and six who 
are actively involved as peer counselors with a CISM team. Most participants have 
investigative experience, often specifically related to either violent crimes, vice and 
narcotics or both areas, although only two participants were currently investigators. All 
other participants hold ranks ranging from Sergeant to Captain.
It should also be noted that the interviews varied greatly in terms of quality, with 
some participants being open, honest and engaged in the interviews, and others being 
more aloof, displaying closed body language and providing very brief, terse responses. 
Some participants became quite emotional during these discussions, while others were 
more detached or matter-of-fact in their delivery. During the planning phase of the 
current research, it was anticipated that the number of participants would be greater, 
however, due to scheduling conflicts (n = 3), non-response (n = 3) and lack of current 
contact information or facilitated introduction (n = 8) (see previous chapter for further 
information), there were several interviews that were not conducted. For example, Chris’ 
roommate at the time of the shooting has since retired from the PD and no one seems to 
have valid contact information. Also, subconsciously or consciously, Chris may have 
exhibited efforts to act in a self-protective manner, as three o f the more sensitive 
interviews originally planned—those with two of his immediate relatives and his 
psychologist—were not completed due to Chris’ scheduling conflicts. These particular 
interviews would have required Chris to introduce the parties and, in the case of his
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psychologist, sign documents attesting to his consent to have his doctor discuss protected 
health information. Finally, due to requests from Chris, his mother was not included as a 
potential participant because he feared participation would be traumatic for her and may 
have adverse health effects. As noted previously, the primary participant in this study, 
Sergeant Scallon, is referred to by his first name throughout this manuscript. This is done 
to primarily signify not only the trust and partnership that was required to complete the 
current study, but to also avoid any perceived artificial distance or quasi-positivistic 
influence imposed by the researcher while documenting the results and conducting the 
analyses to follow.
These interviews were considered to be the primary data source, yet there were 
also news media and policy analyses completed, court transcripts examined and field 
notes and recollections of experiences from participant observation were also included. 
Table 8 is a revised version of Table 6 and details supplemental data sources that were 
considered in the current study.
Table 8: Final List of Data Sources Used in the Current Study
Data Source Specific Details Collection Method Obtained From
Interviews Chris
Significant Other 
Partner
Co-workers/Friends Four individuals
Each interview was conducted in an approximate two 
hour time frame. There were multiple interviews with 
some participants. Only the participant and the 
researcher were present during the interview.
Interviews were recorded digitally and were transcribed 
by an external transcriptionist.
Public
Documents
Court Transcript Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Torron Lucas
Obtained copy o f transcripts from accomplice’s trial and 
sentencing
CWA
City Employee Benefits 
Documents
Bon Secours EAP Brochure 
Employee Wellness 
Handbook
Available on www.norfolk.gov Publicly available 
on City Webpage
PD 2012 Annual Report 
Accreditation Standards
Available on www.norfolk.gov/police
PD General Orders ADM-130: News Media 
OPR-110: Firearms 
OPR-120: Use o f Force 
OPR-140: Special Incident 
Report
OPR-410: Deadly Force 
Incidents
OPR-620: Line of Duty 
Deaths
Draft of ADM-435: Peer 
Support Team
FOIA Request to Police Dept./Anonymous PD, Anonymous 
Sources
Awards Commonwealth Attorney’s 
Award of Valor 
Virginia Public Safety 
Medal of Valor
Copy of Award
Press release documenting award
Chris
Governor’s website
Table 8: Final Data Sources Continued
Newspaper Virginian Pilot Seventeen Articles Access News Search N/A
Port Washington News One Article Provided by Chris Chris
Police Magazine Shots Fired Column Online retrieval
http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Patrol/articles/201 
1/0 l/Shots-Fired-Norfolk-Virginia-04-15-2007.aspx
N/A
Other 9-1-1 Call Recording of the 9-1-1 call 
of shooting
Provided by Chris Chris
PD SOPs First, Second and Third 
Patrol Divisions; Detective 
Division; Office of 
Professional Standards, 
Criminal Intelligence Unit, 
Public Information and 
Outreach Division, Vice and 
Narcotics Division
Freedom of Information Act Request to PD (ignored), 
Anonymous Sources
Anonymous Sources
Accreditation Standards 
and Model Policies
CALEA
VLEPSA
Provided by Chris Chris
IACP: Officer-Involved 
Shooting Investigation, Post- 
Shooting Personnel Support, 
& Critical Incident Stress 
Management
Purchased and downloaded from the IACP IACP
Example Policies from 
other Agencies
Field Notes
Copies of policies provided 
by other jurisdictions for 
comparison
Participant observation 
experiences
Agency A (Large West Coast Municipal Police Agency) 
Agency B (Large Consolidated Midwest Police 
Agency)
N/A
Anonymous Sources 
N/A
U>
VO
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Synopsis of the Case and Pertinent Background Information
To fully understand this case, especially given the theoretical framework being 
utilized and the influence of feminist methodologies in this research, it is important to 
examine more than just the shooting incident and its aftermath. It is important to 
understand the officer who pulled the trigger as an individual who is nested within a 
given familial, occupational and cultural setting and that those connections, relationships 
and positions both influenced and were influenced by the shooting incident in this 
particular case. As one participant in this study summarized, “Here's the shooter at the 
epicenter.. .And then you have his family is over here, you have an administration over 
here, you have the investigators that are investigating the incident here. You have his 
other colleagues that were involved but didn't shoot over here. You just got this whole 
web of things going on.”
Life History
Chris was bom on January 25, 1974, in London, UK, while his mother, Judith, 
was traveling. Chris’ mother is Colombian and his father, Miguel, was French 
Argentinean. Chris and his mother lived in the Kensington section o f London for 
approximately one year before returning to the rest of the family in Colombia. In 
Colombia, Chris was a part of an extended familial living situation that included his 
mother and father (Judith and Miguel), his older brother (Antonio), nine aunts, two 
uncles, grandmother and numerous cousins. Due to the number of women in his life and 
the fact that he acknowledges that his grandmother was the primary source of discipline,
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it appears the family had a more matriarchal structure. However, traditional gender roles
are also present, as evidenced in the quotes below:
but you had to take care o f girls. In other words, i f  the girls needed something or 
somebody was bothering them, it was your role to kind o f step in and kind o f  take 
care o f  them and like matriarch grandmother needed something, then you stopped 
everything and you did it...
[On his father] Typical let the younger, let the females or let the younger men 
take care o f raising, provides money, or provides services to get in trade for  
whatever it is, food, whatever we needed, very coarse, very abrupt, not very from  
what I  remember, not very, just wasn't very personable. I  don't know i f  that's the 
right word but not jovial at all, very strict.
The family lived in poverty: there was no running water and most meals were
eaten at the local Catholic church, which was a central feature of life in this environment.
Not only were meals provided by the church, it also served to educate the local children,
supplementing what older family members were teaching their children.
there was a handful o f  male cousins but the majority are all female, so with nine 
aunts and all the other female cousins you would just... they would interact with 
you as fa r  as kind ofpassing down stories and stuff like that, somewhat home 
schooled but the most part was in the church. It was just really, you didn't know 
any better so it wasn't bad and I  don't have any bad memories about it, gathering 
food, cleaning the house, and just daily chores, just very mundane... I  probably 
started school when I  was five, four or five. School was given in the church and 
just family members and stuff like that...
In Colombia went and ate breakfast, lunch, and dinner at the church, beautiful 
church, wood, gold, brass, silver, when you think about everything around it was 
very poor, not poor in a sense ofjust, you know, dilapidated kind o f  stu ff but just 
the running water kind o f stuff but yet the church had everything.
Even though they lived in a rural village, the family was not immune to violence, 
particularly Cartel-related violence—“ a lot of violence with the Cartels going around but 
it was common, several kidnappings and so it was just like living literally in like a Third
142
World nation”—and political violence. In particular, Chris witnessed his father being
shot while on a family outing in Medellin as a small boy, sometime between 1979 and
1981. While discussing this incident, a pattern o f learned familial coping mechanisms—
particularly avoiding or misdirecting attention from a troubling situation or issue— comes
to light and will be discussed further in the thematic analyses. According to Chris, one of
the main factors that motivated his mother to immigrate to the United States was a desire
to escape the violence surrounding them in Colombia.
Chris was quite close to his mother as a child, noting that he was often called
mono (monkey) because of how he clung to her, particularly after the family immigrated
to the United States. Although Chris is still close to his mother, he has gained autonomy
and independence, as noted throughout his personal history, and has taken on a more
protective role as an adult, as noted above. Chris’ mother left Colombia when he was
around eight or nine years old and moved to New York City. She was in New York for
about a year before she had saved up enough money to bring both of her sons to New
York. Chris notes that his father was “already gone at the time,” and so it was just his
mother, his older brother and himself as a family unit. The family initially moved to
Queens, an area Chris remembers as being quite racial ized and segregated, from both the
ethnic enclaves found in the neighborhoods to his initial educational contacts, and the
family was still living in relative poverty:
1 remember it sucked because I  went to the Montessori academy and they really 
didn't have, at the time over in Queens, they really didn't have a good... they 
called it TESL, teaching English as a second language. They really didn't have 
good curriculum... their idea o f  TESL was put all the Hispanics together 
and... some teacher with minimal Spanish skills would talk... And it was horrible 
but growing up in Queens was... my mom worked all the time so I  would leave
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when she left fo r  work. I  would leave and when I  was done with school I  would 
walk back to the apartment...
Queens at the time was very segregated. You had a lot o f Asian, you had a lot o f  
black, and you had a handful o f  Hispanics but it was different. You had a lot o f  
Puerto Ricans. You had Dominicans, handful o f  Colombians. We were the 
minority within the minority. So you kind o f get cliquish with the people you hang 
around with. So he [his brother] wound o f kind o f  going his own way. I  would 
just go to school and come back...
The family did not remain in Queens for very long before moving to Brooklyn in
1981. Chris was still in grade school at the time and remembers his brother having to
walk him to school each day. Also during this time period, his mother met and
subsequently married his stepfather, Richard. Chris did not particularly like this change
in the family dynamic, stating,
I  didn't like him. I  didn't like him being involved. I  remember specifically telling 
him when he said he tried to discipline me or tried to yell at me fo r  something and 
I  said, Well, you’re not my dad, and you can’t tell me what to do kind o f  thing, and 
that was like that for a while and to this day I  don't refer to him as dad. For a 
long time 1 just called him Rich because just I  didn't want him... he wasn't 
replacing anything and I  fo r  all intents and purposes, that's my mom so... I  made 
it known that I  didn't like him at all
After Chris’ mother remarried, he was naturalized as a United States citizen and 
was adopted by his stepfather in 1982. Chris’ mother and stepfather had one miscarriage 
and eventually had a child, Jennifer, bom on May 5, 1983, who is nine years younger 
than Chris.
Although the family had immigrated to the United States as a means of fleeing the
violence in Colombia, they were not immune to violence in Brooklyn. Violence was a
relatively constant feature of their lives, as exemplified in the following quote:
I  remember maybe fifth grade, one o f the kids came in and like he was a grade 
ahead o f  us. One o f the kids came in and shot one o f  the teachers... But you
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figured this was the '80s, maybe somewhere in the '80s. So in New York it was 
just o ff the hook... Like drugs and violence and s tu ff like that. Kind o f  trade ju st a 
warmer climate with a cooler climate with the same kind o f  violence... Stealing 
cars, there was nothing... it was big Latin King population, which my brother was 
involved in, fights, shootings.
While previous experiences o f trauma and violence will be explicated in later 
thematic analyses, it is also important to discuss the murder of Chris’ older brother, 
Antonio, in the context of his background and personal history. Chris’ brother was five 
years his senior and, as mentioned above walked Chris to school every day in Brooklyn. 
Also, as mentioned in the quote above regarding violence in Brooklyn, Chris’ brother 
was an active member of the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (Brotherton and 
Barrios 2004). In 1982, when Chris was around nine years old, he was meeting his 
brother in the courtyard of his building so that his brother could walk him to school. His 
brother was shot and killed in front of him; not only was this a product of gang violence, 
but the family heard that this shooting was related to infighting within the gang and that 
Chris’ brother was likely mistaken for someone else. This homicide was never solved. 
Shortly following his brother’s murder, his mother miscarried. Again, learned coping 
mechanisms that will be discussed in the thematic analyses were also present in the 
discussions of this incident.
Chris’ family moved “out towards Long Island” in 1986, after his brother’s 
murder. Another participant in this study credits his stepfather with helping to provide 
stability and assisting the family in escaping the violence and poverty they had 
experienced in Brooklyn. It has been suggested that Chris was spoiled, and may still be 
spoiled, by his mother. There were many opportunities that Chris was able to participate 
in when he was living on Long Island, to include music lessons and tennis camp. When
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Chris was in high school, he was involved in multiple extracurricular activities, including
being in a band and playing lacrosse. He appears to have been an average student, doing
well in English and Science, but not so well in History; he failed Spanish. It is also
during high school that Chris begins his career in public safety, joining the local fire
department as a volunteer in 1988; as evidenced below, this was something he enjoyed:
Volunteer and what you could... God, 1 don't even... was it 10th or 11th grade? 1 
forget what grade it is, but i f  you were a [volunteer] you could park in the front o f  
the school and i f  there was a fire  or alert went out, you could leave school to go 
to the fire... Which was pretty awesome, not to mention that the fire department 
that 1 belonged that had a bar in it... A lot o f city firemen were there, a lot o f city 
cops, you know, that [volunteered] out there, so it was, we had a very good crew, 
very good crew out there.
Even though he was involved in numerous activities and clearly enjoyed his 
volunteer work with the fire department, Chris attempted suicide towards the end of high 
school. This suicide attempt was fueled by failures in interpersonal relationships and in 
school, because Chris graduated late, as well as alcohol. While Chris admits this was not 
a “serious” attempt, he also acknowledges that he was hospitalized and was taken off of 
the roster at the fire department as a consequence of his actions. After graduating high 
school late, Chris enrolled in Nassau Community College where, much like his high 
school experience, he was more interested in extracurricular activities than his academic 
studies. During this time he was also as a medic working out of Long Island College 
Hospital in Brooklyn. It was also during this time that he “met probably the most one of 
the most significant girls I ever met and dated her for a while in college.. .1 was best 
friends with her family, her brother. It was just a great thing.” Chris left Nassau 
Community College after “a couple of semesters,” and went to speak with a Navy 
recruiter with a friend. He enlisted the same day he spoke with the recruiter.
He stated that his mother was not surprised he had joined the military, but that she 
“just hated it.” Chris was sent to boot camp in Illinois, where he held various leadership 
positions and received the Navy League Award at his graduation from boot camp.
During boot camp, his girlfriend, who had told him she would wait for him, notified him 
that their relationship was not working for her. According to Chris, he was like “oh, man, 
so you kind of just pour into the school or the training.” Immediately following boot 
camp, Chris was sent to Gunner’s Mate A School, also in Illinois, for six months. Just 
before graduating from A School, the night before he was due to pick orders, Chris was 
arrested while out partying with some of his fellow sailors. He was able to pay a fine and 
was released in enough time to get back to base. Because he was told that he “smelled 
like a brewery,” he was almost barred from choosing orders.
While in A School, Chris also met his first wife, Yvette, who was also in the 
Navy. Chris’ orders had him assigned to the USS Nassau, which was deployed in the 
Mediterranean Sea at that point in time. Just before he deployed, Yvette, whom he had 
been dating, informed him that she was pregnant. They were married in 1995 and he was 
sending the majority of each paycheck home to her to get ready for the baby. When 
asked how involved or invested he was in his marriage to Yvette, Chris stated, “oh, that 
was strictly because she lied and said that I got her pregnant. There was no emotion. 
There was an obligation and that is as cold—similarities between the way I acted with my 
first wife, identical to the way my dad treated my mom, identical.” Upon returning from 
deployment, not only was there no wife waiting to greet him, there was no baby and there 
was no money left in their checking account. Several of his friends were able to help him 
find a place to stay and he was able to file for divorce, which was finalized in 1999.
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While in port in Norfolk, Virginia, Chris was in a rather serious motorcycle
accident in 1996 where he went through the rear windshield of a car that had cut him off
going approximately 80 miles per hour. In this accident, Chris broke his hands and ribs,
and did significant damage to his knee. The Virginia State Trooper that responded had
the crew from “Real Stories of the Highway Patrol” with him. Chris ended his active
duty with the Navy when he was assigned to SIMA in the Hampton Roads area of
Virginia. He was applying for police and fire positions in Hampton Roads and in New
York, but he was already dating his second wife, Kathleen, who was a student at a local
university at this point in time. They were married in 2002 and divorced in 2007. He
was hired by the Police Department and began the police academy in January 1998 and
was scheduled to be out of the military (utilizing terminal leave) in February 1998,
although he remained in the reserves until 2002.
Chris became fully immersed in the police culture almost immediately. Although
the impact of police culture will also be explored in the thematic analyses, Chris’
embracing of this culture impacted several other areas of his life, as well interacted with
other themes, such as gender and coping. For example, this is how Chris has described
his experiences in law enforcement:
just immediately just becoming kind of, you know, immersed into police culture 
and out o f  the gate going into narcotics fo r  several years, working undercover, 
plain clothes, working like plain clothes... it was ju st kind o f  growing distant 
because I  was never home. I  was always working. I  probably netted the most 
money on the police department, even more than I  make now, ten times more than 
I  make now, working because we worked nonstop. We worked overtime and 
overtime and overtime, just kind o f  just did that and fo r  the longest time [I] was 
like, that's it. That's all I'm going to do. I  don't want to get promoted, I  don't 
want to do anything. I  want to work narcotics and that's what I  want to do.
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Chris acknowledges that this full commitment to policing contributed to the
collapse of his second marriage and, once it was clear that he and Kathleen were heading
towards divorce, Chris turned to familiar coping mechanisms: alcohol and work.
So it was [only] a matter o f  time before she's like, This ain't working, and I  was 
like, All right. You're right. This ain't working and I  wind up leaving but I  wound 
up — I  think she came — she's like, Probably be good i f  we just separated and it 
was like everybody knew it but no one was talking about it so I  was like, Okay. 
And I  was like, I  tell you what, I'll be gone. We'll take care o f  the divorce. 
Whatever you want, it's yours... So it was very amicable and towards the end 
you're like, Wow — because we went to not talking to each other, not sleeping in 
the same room. I  would sleep downstairs. I  would drink like a case o f  beer and 
then pass out and then wake up and go to work kind o f  thing. Then we started 
getting along like right before the end so it was like, Oh. We were like, No, this is 
the right thing. You know, we'djust be miserable so we wound up separating and 
I  wind up going to live with Tennis until I  got my own place o ff o f  Maple but 
living with Tennis, you know, the bachelor pad again but a little bit more mature 
in where I  was working but still work, work, work, work, and that kind o f  just 
forced me to just continue to keep doing work.
As noted above, Chris went to narcotics very quickly after completing the police 
academy. In his police career, he has worked in narcotics, criminal intelligence, major 
case, homicide, and in patrol, K-9 and central records as a sergeant. Many of these 
assignments can be considered high impact or high stress. Indeed, Chris mentioned 
numerous potentially traumatic incidents that occurred over the course o f his career, to 
include the line of duty death of a close friend from the police academy; confronting 
violent, mentally unstable individuals; nearly losing his hand during a search warrant 
(which was in a large dog’s mouth seconds before another officer shot the dog in an 
attempt to protect Chris); going into high-risk situations; and being present when two 
colleagues were shot in a drug buy gone wrong. In fact, in the situation where the two 
officers were shot, Chris rode in the ambulance with the officer who had received a 
stomach wound and was put in the position to tell this officer’s wife that they were not
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sure her husband was going survive his wounds. Despite being exposed to numerous
traumatic situations, overall, Chris views his career favorably:
Other than that, it's literally it's been I've worked every, every choice assignment 
you could possibly want on the police department fo r  action or fo r  just 
challenging, whether it be narcotics, vice, criminal intel, working out how 
motorcycle clubs, working terrorists organizations, or terrorist threats, working 
homicides, you know, working robberies to working a dog in K-9. I  mean, just a 
hundred miles an hour and it's that fun adrenaline, kind o f always challenging, 
not sitting in an office somewhere.
Chris’ career also brought him into contact with his third wife, a police officer
from another jurisdiction that he met during a narcotics training class. They were friends
for several years, maintaining professional contact and seeing each other at police social
functions. In February o f 2007, they saw each other at a post-Polar Plunge party at an
Irish bar at the Virginia Beach Oceanfront. Chris jokingly asked how her firefighter
boyfriend was doing and she informed him that they had broken up. She asked him how
his wife was and he told her they were separated and divorcing. In fact, Chris had
recently moved out of the home he had shared with his second wife and was living with a
fellow officer in the room above his garage. He describes sleeping on an air mattress and
his possessions/living conditions have been described by others as “sad.” For example,
one participant noted that:
...he was sad that his marriage didn't work out but again, it wasn't — to me it was 
he wasn't broken up, but sad that it didn't work out, i f  that makes any sense. I  
know he lived in Chesapeake and they owned a house or he owned a house. I  
don't know i f  she was on it or not but he pretty much moved out o f  the house and 
gave her the house. Andfrom the looks o f  what he had property wise, gave her 
everything in it... he had like a chair, a blow-up mattress, a dresser, a table, and 
some clothes. That's about it.
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During this time period, Chris was also studying to take the sergeant’s promotional exam. 
When it was revealed that they were both single, Chris informed his future third wife that 
he was going to “stalk her,” and her roommate told her that she though Chris was serious. 
They started dating soon after. Their official first date occurred on April 1,2007, and 
less than three weeks later, they faced a challenge that can cripple couples that have been 
together for years: Chris was involved in a shooting incident.
The Shooting
To preface the details of Chris’s officer-involved shooting incident from April 15, 
2007, it is important to describe how these events were discussed in the interview 
process. The shooting was not discussed until Chris’ third interview. When this 
discussion commenced, Chris was simply asked to “walk me through it,” with no other 
guidance and little to no attempts to interrupt his recollection or clarify any statements he 
made. After he finished telling his story, Chris was instructed to close his eyes and calm 
his breathing. He was led through a meditative exercise to calm him and then he was 
asked if he was prepared to review the incident again, keeping his eyes closed, this time 
utilizing sensory and emotional context reinstatement and a more guided interview. This 
means that, rather than allowing Chris to repeat the same story he commonly uses in 
training or the version of events he has relayed multiple times, he was asked to focus on 
things like visual acuity, smell, touch, and emotional responses to attempt to obtain a 
more detailed and nuanced recollection of the event. For example, at one point he was 
asked what the store smelled like and he was able to recall that he could smell burnt 
popcorn. Having discussed this incident several times prior to this interview and having 
seen Chris present this case at numerous trainings, that is a detail that had never been
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revealed. Also telling were the emotional responses, as documented below, which were 
obtained during the second recounting. This approach yielded a great amount of detail 
and provided a more comprehensive understanding of Chris’ experience.
On April 15, 2007, Chris remembers waking up excited because he was involved 
in the International Tattoo at a large, local entertainment venue and was scheduled to 
practice all day. The day was overcast and cool. Even though he was off duty, Chris 
stopped by the Police Operations Center to take care of something before heading to 
practice. He did not interact with anyone while he was in the office and headed directly 
from the office to the Scope. Rehearsal for the Tattoo lasted between eight and nine 
hours and Chris, along with some of the members of the Royal Canadian Regiment, went 
to a sports bar on Granby Street for their lunch break. Chris describes the rehearsal as 
fun, but exhausting, because it is very repetitive and monotonous, carrying his drum back 
and forth across the arena floor. Rehearsal ended between 9:00pm and 9:30pm. From 
the Scope, he drove directly home, unloaded his gear and then took a shower. After he 
got out of the shower, he called his girlfriend, who was also working in Narcotics for 
another city, and it was decided that he would go see her at her home, about a half an 
hour away. He changed clothes and left the house, headed to get gas and cigarettes 
before he went to his girlfriend’s house. According to Chris, he was only home for 
around 20 minutes before leaving. He left the house wearing a light blue Brooklyn 
Cyclones pullover with white writing, a tee shirt underneath, blue jeans and tennis shoes. 
He had recently cut his long hair off, but had a full beard and weighed between 250 and 
255 pounds. He describes himself as looking visibly fatigued and not like a cop.
152
As he approached the gas station, he was considering where he was going to park 
so that he could get out quickly and go right onto the interstate. As he pulls up, he 
realizes he cannot turn around and park at the pump he wanted to use, because there are 
people outside of the store, so he pulls straight up to another gas pump. Chris said 
something about the three people struck him as odd, but he started to open his door and 
may have even opened his gas cap. But his attention kept reverting to the three 
individuals standing outside the store. He was familiar with the area, had bought drugs 
there as an undercover officer, and said that the odd feeling was enough for him to lift his 
pullover over his weapon, which was holstered. As soon as he displayed his weapon, he 
heard a shout o f “Boom” or “Moon” from his right.
When asked to consider what was so odd, he noted that it must have been the fact 
that, at approximately 10:40pm, the clerks were outside. Typically, the clerks at this gas 
station close and lock the doors, conducting business only through a bank teller-type slot 
in the window, after 10:00pm. Chris described the two clerks—whom he recognized 
from previous trips to that gas station— as Santa Claus (because he was an older 
gentleman with a white beard) and old Crack Lady and stated that they were facing him, 
with a male in a black hoodie, with the hood up, facing them. The male clerk pushed his 
hand out, not aggressively or frantically, and Chris says their facial expressions did not 
indicate that they were afraid. In terms of the man in the hoodie’s body language, he was 
not animated or aggressive. When asked about the lighting in the parking lot, Chris says 
it was “amazing. It’s like— it’s dark out but under there [gas station canopy] it’s like 
being in a stadium.”
When Chris heard the yell off to his right, he did not stop looking at the male in 
the hoodie, who also did not glance to his right, but instead “turns over his left shoulder 
and kind of cants his whole body.” This behavior led Chris to assume the yell was a 
warning. When the man in the hoodie turned, Chris saw that he had a dark bandana high 
up on the bridge of his nose covering the lower half of his face and that his eyes were 
huge—Chris could see a lot o f white and describes it as a “deer in headlights” look.
Chris also noticed that the man’s hands were in front of his stomach in something like 
“interview stance,” holding something. Chris also immediately recognized that the man 
was wearing latex gloves. According to Chris, “no sooner did he turn around and his 
eyes got even bigger, once he focused and saw it was me, because at that point I’m 
pulling my gun, did he turn around and— I don’t know how they got the door open and he 
got them in that fast—but he got them in there. As soon as Chris saw the man, he 
immediately thought the clerks were being robbed and that he had to do something.
After quickly crossing the parking lot from the gas pumps to the store, Chris was 
placed at an immediate tactical disadvantage. Due to the placement of an ice machine 
and the way the door opened outward, Chris was going to have to stand directly in front 
of a glass door and open it to make entry into the store. The view through the glass was 
also obscured by stickers and other items posted on the door, so Chris scanned for a “big 
body part” and tried to enter as quickly as possible after seeing the back of the black 
hoodie approximately four feet in front of the door. Chris entered the store, yelling 
“Police!,” and took two steps into the store when the suspect turned and fired at him. He 
saw the muzzle flash and the bullet struck the doorjamb to Chris’ right; he could feel the
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debris from the impact hitting his right side. At this point, Chris almost immediately
returned fire. When asked what he was thinking or feeling at the time, Chris said
he’s shooting at me... all I  can equate it to and I  want to say I  saw it but I  didn’t. I  
envisioned seeing something, but obviously right there I ’m not daydreaming, i f  
that makes sense. I  saw a green light almost like it was—like that [as I] was 
coming in, i f  he had a gun in his hand... I  could probably shoot—[but] there was 
no question, no doubt about it; there was no hesitation. I  come in, the gun goes 
off. I'm  immediately firing back center mass.. .and hit him. And when he backed 
up, I  figured he was going to fa ll and he didn % then he ran down one o f  the 
aisles. So I  immediately got cover.
When asked to slow down and recall specific sensory details, Chris describes the 
store as smelling “disgusting. Like a greasy—like they had been—something had been 
burnt because they had popcorn. They had rotisserie hot dogs, pickled eggs, but it was 
like a greasy smell. They never cleaned it and just nasty.” He also describes being in the 
mostly glass store like being in a fish tank—people can see in, but you really cannot see 
out. This made him concerned regarding the suspect’s potential partner outside, but 
Chris had to focus all of his attention on the suspect he could see and that presented a 
threat to both Chris and the clerks. Chris’ first shot hit the suspect in the center of his 
chest, near his sternum. Chris noticed that his bandana was still up and that his hoodie 
was partially zipped up, layered over a gray shirt. Chris quickly states that he was able to 
get concealment, rather than cover, as the shelves in the store are not very high and are 
made of a grated material, holding chips and other items typical to a convenience store, 
that you can see through. He remembers seeing the clerks crouched down and telling 
them to get behind the counter. Then he would address the suspect and try to see where 
he was. The suspect would shoot at Chris and Chris would return fire, aiming at center 
mass. Chris states “I could tell [the shots were] hitting him because it’s backing him up
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and he’s making big movements, like a wince, not his face so much, but his shoulder,
shrugging type thing.”
It is important to note at this point that Chris’s shooting lasted for approximately
15 minutes, as opposed to the typical five to seven seconds noted in the literature review.
Due to the physiological and psychological mechanisms enacted in this type of event,
memory encoding is impacted and Chris is unable to recall all events or even all actions
in temporal order. He is able to recall significant turning points or moments in the gun
battle. In fact, the following quote gives some perspective on both the length of the gun
battle and its impacts on Chris; Chris was asked if  he knew how many times he went
back and forth in the aisles with the suspect:
...I tried to remember that forever, I  just, i t ’s one o f  those things that was so—it 
took so long and you ’re like holy smokes, this is never ending. I t ’s not like I ’m 
missing him. I f  I ’m missing him, I ’d be like, all right, it’s understandable to try to 
get away. I  was like no, this—I ’m hitting him, and hitting him, and hitting him, 
and hitting him, and nothing. I ’m like, wow...[I was] very confused, like it wasn’t 
supposed to make sense because I  know when you shoot them you ’re supposed— 
they ’re supposed to go down, whether it be TV or whether it be any other shooting 
we were involved in. People get shot once or twice and this was it and this fight 
was over. This guy was shot multiple times and he wasn’t doing shit and he was 
running and I  remember the entire time, not once whenever he was shot or 
anything, did he ever make a sound. Never made a sound... It d idn’t make sense 
at all. I  was like—and I  knew he wasn’t wearing a bullet—it came in my head a 
second, maybe a fraction o f  a second i f  he was wearing a vest, it was the worst 
vest you could possibly wearing because he was bleeding through it.
Chris also discussed how the floor, already greasy, became very slick with the 
suspect’s blood. He notes that if you tried to run, you would fall and he slipped several 
times, trying to keep his gun out and to stay close to the shelves. The clerks, by this 
point, were huddled behind the counter and Chris remembers hearing the female clerk 
screaming, noting that she was audible but not intelligible. The other sounds he can
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remember are the guns, and the movement of the feet on the floors. One of the distinct
moments in this incident was when Chris became discouraged because the suspect was
not falling down or stopping. He decided to attempt to physically rush and tackle the
suspect. The suspect faked to the right and then went left and Chris’ plan was to
buttonhook around the comer and rush him. According to Chris:
... I  remember being hesitant to just run out because again, the floor right there is 
where the first shot was any way, so there was a lot o f  blood right there. So I  
come around and kind o f cleared it with my head and the gun and he stuck the 
gun and I  remember looking, staring at the barrel o f  the gun as it went off... [it 
looked] like a giant—the gun is probably small as shit but from  that point o f  view 
and as I  remembered, it reminded me o f  like an old cartoon gun, like [when] 
somebody pulls out a little gun and then somebody would take out this huge gun.
I  saw the cylinder, saw the barrel was like a giant hole, like a shotgun kind o f  
barrel. I  knew it wasn’t, but to me that’s how it looked, and then i t ’s real bright 
as I ’m pulling away and I  kind o f  went to buttonhook and then I  just went back the 
other way because it happened and I  was like shit, I ’m not going to—I ’m not— 
h e’s still got bullets. I ’m not going to mess around with that anymore... that was 
the defining moment right there. My plan was to kind o f tackle him but I  
remember the second it happened going, I  can’t tackle. I  may as well just shoot 
myself because h e ’s going to shoot me i f  I  try to—there’s no way I  could gain 
speed. I t ’s like a cat on a slick floor trying to run away, so I  was like, forget that.
At the time Chris attempted to rush the suspect, he believes he had shot the man 
between six and eight times and the man was still an active threat. When asked how he 
felt when he came around the comer and saw the gun, Chris stated that he thought “oh 
shit” and “bad decision,” but also admitted that not once through the entire shooting was 
he scared. This moment during the shooting was a defining moment because, not only 
did Chris come very close to being shot in the head, and it is almost a miracle that he was 
not injured at that point in time, but because it became the moment that Chris made 
another decision. It was at that moment in time that Chris knew he was going to have to
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take a head shot. As with other sections of this event, Chris’ words serve his story better,
so here is how he relayed this portion of the shooting:
...Iremember because my hands always shake. They always shake. They always 
have. So I  remember lining up the sites. I  made the decision. He sticks his head 
up, I'm going to blow it o ff and I  remember picking the gun up, looking over. I  
see him in the corner and I  just tracked him. It was super—I  remember it was like 
a machine was holding the gun because it was so still and it was so smooth.
There was no jerking. It was very relaxed, taking a breath at the same time and 
just (demonstrating) and then firing and hitting him right in the face, and I ’m like, 
Yep... i t ’s very basic. You forget about everything. Like, the lower part o f  your 
body, gone, I  don’t even—you don’t even think about anything other than that, 
sights, just the sight, and you see the back lined up with the front and it was just— 
it was the perfect sight-picture alignment andjust following. When he got to the 
point, take the breath and you point, head cocks back like he got punched in the 
face with a hammer, and I  never lost sight o f  his head, which really bothered me 
because I  figured he’d  go down and I ’d  have to peek around the corner, but he 
just kept on running... I  remember feeling good about that until his head didn’t go 
down, until he didn’t fall. And I  thought, oh, this is—I  was like, it just didn’t make 
sense... He ran all the way up the length o f  the aisle, came up two or three aisles 
and at this point I  didn’t know what to do...so I  was going to go behind the 
counter. For some reason I  thought I ’d  have better coverage from  there andjust 
keep an eye on him. But he never made it past that one aisle and he grabs the— 
he grabs like this rack on the end o f the aisle by the cooler and you can tell he’s 
struggling.
So I  know h e’s hurt and struggling. Then he eventually falls down but his head is 
still up. So his head is still up andfalls down and h e’s not making a fucking  
sound, which is creeping the hell out o f  me, not like scary but ju st sounds silly, but 
you think like a fucking zombie or something or h e ’s dead already. H e’s just like 
fucking superhuman. So you ’re like, fuck. I f  he comes up, I ’m just going to shoot 
him in the head again.
At this point, the male clerk, Santa Claus, was already on the phone with the 9-1-1 
dispatcher. The audio recording of this 9-1-1 call confirms that you cannot hear the 
suspect at all—there are several gunshots exchanged, and Chris is heard intermittently 
challenging the suspect, demanding that he show his hands, and letting the suspect know 
that he had an ambulance coming for him. After the suspect fell, he would hold his hands
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up and drop them back towards his waistband. To Chris, this appeared to be a very
deliberate gesture, rather than appearing as if the suspect could not just hold up his hands.
According to Chris, if the suspect came up with a “shiny Snickers bar,” he would have
shot him again and he wanted to make sure that he had ample space to react if the suspect
came back up again.
At this point, the suspect was on the ground with his hoodie still up, but his
bandana was down around his chin. As Chris was watching the suspect, who was
continuing to raise his hands and drop them towards his waist, he notes that he still did
not say anything and that,
his eyes were open but it looked like—it didn't look like anger. It looked like 
despair and I  remember thinking so much stuff that I  told him, I ’ve got an 
ambulance coming for you, buddy. Like Ife lt badfor him ...I remember his eyes 
clear as day, white, and just in his eyes you could tell there was despair, like he 
was hurting and he wanted help and he knew that I  wasn’t going to help him until 
I  knew it was good to go. I fe lt bad in that instance. Ifelt sorry. Ife lt bad for  
him. Because he wasn‘t this big—I  mean, he was still a threat but he wasn’t as 
scary a threat.
In querying Chris about other sensory perceptions, he noted that by this point in 
the shooting, the smell of gun smoke and cordite was very prominent. The ceiling had 
lowered, impairing vision. He also noted that he could smell the food still, that the 
“fucking hot dogs are pungent as shit,” and that the smell in the store is horrible on its 
own, but that with the blood and gun smoke, it was infinitely worse. Chris states that he 
remembers thinking that the first responding officer would be scared upon seeing the 
blood and all of the smoke in the store, as well as from the scents. At some point, two 
young sailors (as identified on another 9-1-1 call), attempted to enter the store and the 
clerk told them to get out. Chris barely even glanced at the sailors. In his words,
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I  remember not wanting to take—and this is going to sound stupid, I  remember all 
these horror movies that 1 watched where they’re running away from  the bad guy 
and then they just take their eyes o ff o f him. Why would you take your eyes o ff o f  
something that’s been trying to kill you? So I  remember distinctly every second, 
every second, like I  would break loose fo r  one fraction o f a second and then look 
back at him because I  never wanted to take my eyes o ff o f him.
Chris had notified the 9-1-1 dispatcher, when he briefly took the phone from the 
clerk while still keeping the suspect at gunpoint, that he was off duty, in plain clothes and 
that he had his badge displayed. Chris was quite concerned that he would not be 
recognized by the first responding patrol officers, as he had been in narcotics for quite 
some time and did not interact with officers that often and did not “look like anything like 
a police officer.” In fact, he described himself as looking like a “northern thug.” 
According to Chris, he was not going to argue with the first responding officers if they 
challenged him. He noted that he had had officers point their guns at him before and, at 
that point in time, if a fellow officer challenged or charged him, he would put his gun 
down, even if it meant that the suspect would have the opportunity to kill him. Chris 
stated that he was “not going to take the change o f having [the officer] shoot me and 
feeling bad.”
The first responding officer hesitated to enter the store when he arrived. Chris 
was holding his gun with his right hand, keeping his eyes on the suspect, and holding his 
badge where the officer could see it when the officer entered. Chris did not recognize the 
officer and stated that he was “very pale.” Chris said he was trying to “talk to him like 
another police officer and then I just heard him screaming. So it’s almost like I 
understood that he knew who the bad guy was and who the good guy was eventually.” 
After the officer had approached the suspect, Chris came out from behind the counter and
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told the officer to stop and put gloves on before touching the suspect. Chris recalls that
he told the officer to “put some gloves on because all of the blood, I kept thinking, oh,
this guy is going to have fucking AIDS or fucking Hep C and all sorts of nasty shit and I
didn’t want the officer—I was covered. I was like, fuck it. If it goes bad, I can dive on
[the suspect].. .so he holstered and put gloves on.”
Another defining moment for Chris was when the patrol officer put the suspect in
handcuffs, noting that it was like the weight of the world was lifted from his shoulders
and very suddenly it was over. Very quickly, the emotions and fear came crashing down
on Chris, as he noted,
... like the end, boom, so the threat and then it all came down on me. I  went over 
to walk away because at this time all the fear and all the—you know, the nerves 
and everything are starting to catch up with you—almost until 1feel like scary, 
scary and I  rounded the corner and I  saw his gun there and I  realized he didn 7 
have a gun all that time I ’m sitting there yelling at him and I  remember getting 
so—I  had seen the gun. I  was like, hey, I  was pissed that he—this mother fucker 
actually shot at me for that long and he didn 7 say anything about not having a 
gun or just keeping his hands up or anything and I  may have killed him. Because 
I  was considering literally walking up and ju st putting it to his head and shooting 
him and I  was like, no, I  can’t do that unless I  see a gun. So I  got so pissed o ff 
[that] I  kicked the big soda thing over. I  was like, dam it, and the I  looked back 
and I  see the clerks and I ’m thinking to myself, kind o f  get yourself together.
As the shooting dragged on, Chris became very frustrated with the lack of police 
response and felt very much alone. In other conversations, Chris has noted that the call 
was accidentally dispatched on the wrong channel, which is why the response was so 
greatly delayed. The suspect and his accomplice had robbed another Shell gas station 
that evening, and most of the detectives were at that location at the time of Chris’s 
shooting. Chris’s frustration was made evident at several points during this interview, 
making comments like “when the fuck are the police coming? It’s been a while. Like a
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long, long time, [and] I’m thinking where the fuck are these guys coming from? Where
are they? I’m expecting to hear them. This is a shootout.” A bit later in the interview,
his feelings o f frustration surfaced again, stating,
... that was—literally fe lt like— the shootout was very long. That fe lt like, all right. 
This is fucking ridiculous. Someone needs to be here... more frustration than 
anything else and concern that I  want to get some—help this guy, but at the same 
time I  want to get him in custody so this can be over, so we can—you know, all 
right, move on from this. It was kind ofjust a stalemate, just waiting and waiting. 
Like we [were] hung out to dry, like fuck. When you mother fuckers coming?
Another interesting point that came up was Chris’ physiological reactions during 
the shooting. In listening to the 9-1-1 audio, Chris sounds winded, like he has been 
running for a great distance and is also yelling information to the dispatchers. He is 
clearly distracted when speaking to the dispatcher, not answering questions that were 
asked, etc. This is a typical response to a critical incident. Chris also recalls feeling 
numb. He says that his fingertips tingled and he could not feel his lower half. Chris 
believed these symptoms meant that he must have been shot and was just not aware o f it 
yet, noting that he had “been stabbed before and didn’t know it.” After the suspect was 
in custody, Chris noted that “Goddamn, my throat is starting to hurt a little bit, and I 
realize I have been yelling for a good 11, 12,13, 14 minutes, just yelling.” Chris was 
coated in the suspect’s blood and, when a friend and fellow investigator arrived minutes 
after the suspect was in custody, Chris was still unsure if he had been shot. He asked this 
investigator to check him out, and proceeded to pull his shirts up to his neck and spine 
around. The other investigator not only did a visual examination, but he physically 
checked his legs. When Chris was told he was not injured, he was certain he had been
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wounded, due to the numbness. The investigator then quickly removed Chris from the 
store and placed him in the back of the Lieutenant’s car.
Conclusion
This chapter presents an overview of the data sources utilized in this case study, 
as well as presented a condensed life history and a detailed accounting of the shooting 
event from Chris’ perspective. The synopsis and the detailed account o f the shooting 
were presented to familiarize the reader with some of the life events that surfaced in the 
thematic analyses and to contextualize elements o f Chris’ personal and professional life 
at the time his shooting incident occurred. Additionally, there are themes that were seen 
in the shooting incident itself. In short, it was necessary to discuss the past to understand 
what happened in the aftermath of this shooting. The following chapters will provide 
thematic analyses, identifying common ideas that came up repetitively not only in Chris’ 
interviews, but in the interviews conducted with other participants, as well as policy 
analyses, news media analyses and reflections on participant observations obtained 
during the research process.
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CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS: THEMATIC ANALYSES
Introduction: Thematic Analyses
As noted previously, the current study seeks to holistically explore officer- 
involved shootings and their aftermath from the multiple perspectives of the individuals 
impacted by a single shooting incident. Thematic analysis o f interviews suggests that 
there are five distinct, yet often interrelated, patterns emerging, each with sub-themes. 
These themes encompass various elements, from lived experience, to coping 
mechanisms, to cultural influences and the impact on others. Although treated as a 
separate theme, Goffman’s concepts o f impression management (1959) and stigma 
(1963) were interwoven through the other four themes that emerged. These analyses also 
exploited a strength of the current study: the use of a multidisciplinary approach to a 
multifaceted problem. These analyses draw on the disciplines of sociology, psychology, 
criminal justice and criminology to gain a deeper understanding of the thick and rich 
responses provided by participants.
While the current study utilizes a case study methodology with a significant 
influence from feminist methodologies, there are also elements of grounded theory 
research seen in the analysis o f the data. Grounded theory research, as identified by 
Creswell (2007), includes a specific role for theory in the research process; theory’s role 
in this process is significantly different than that traditionally seen in quantitative 
research. Typically, research “grounded” in theory is, not surprisingly, driven by a 
particular theory or theoretical perspective in quantitative research, but in grounded 
theory qualitative research, participants who have all experienced a particular process are
chosen and it is expected that a theory will emerge from the research (Creswell 2007), 
thus moving beyond the idea of qualitative work as merely descriptive or explanatory. 
This emergent theory is not necessarily invented, but may involve the application of an 
“off the shelf’ theory—such as the use of Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work as a theoretical 
frame in the current study—as well as elaboration of an existing theory, or an integrated 
use of multiple theories (Tittle 1995). Case study research alone does not specify a 
specific role for theory. Instead, the researcher conducts an in-depth exploration and 
analysis of a specific issue through the use of one or several bounded cases by collecting 
data from multiple sources and providing both a detailed case description and a thematic 
case analysis (Creswell 2007). Grounded theory research seeks to move beyond 
descriptive analysis by allowing a theory to emerge from the research, while case study 
research seeks a deep understanding and explanation of a particular issue, drawing out 
overarching themes relevant to that issue from multiple data sources. In this particular 
case study, while the aim is to achieve a deep understanding of the issue of officer 
involved shootings; this understanding is achieved with theoretical sensitivity.
Although these approaches are presented as conceptually distinct, there are some 
similarities, as well as differences, seen in the procedures associated with each approach. 
To begin, as previously stated, a case study calls for an analysis of multiple data sources— 
such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant- 
observations and physical artifacts (Creswell 2007:75)—whereas a grounded theory 
approach specifies the need to conduct several interviews, utilizing a zigzag process, in 
the field, with a suggested number of 20 to 30 interviews provided, in order to saturate 
the data into categories (Creswell, 2007). Creswell (2007) defines a category as a “unit
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of information composed of events, happenings and instances,” which, while there is no 
exact definition of a case-based theme drawn from a case study, can be seen as somewhat 
similar in nature to the open coding process that generates categories in grounded theory 
research. It is suggested that, as a part o f the zigzag process, researchers continually 
collect data and then compare it to the emerging categories, known as the constant 
comparative method of data collection (Creswell, 2007), which can also occur in case 
studies, especially if there are multiple sites or cases involved. In particular this 
comparative approach can be used to facilitate the use o f themes between within case 
analysis and cross-case analysis, particularly if similar or comparable information for 
each can be obtained to help with the generation and clarification of those themes.
In the current study, the zigzag approach was used and an open coding (Creswell 
2007) process was conducted to identify recurrent themes that arose in the interviews. 
These themes are topics or ideas that were seen multiple times, as well as typically in 
varied contexts, during the course of the interviews. This study utilized a two-step 
coding process. The full transcripts were reviewed and themes, ideas of interest, 
background information on the case or participants, and discussion or evidence of critical 
incident/PTSD symptoms were all noted using the track changes functions in Microsoft 
Word. Based upon this analysis, there were five distinct, yet often interrelated, themes 
that emerged in the data analysis. Several themes also had emergent sub-themes that 
were also captured and considered. Quotes or excerpts related to themes were then 
copied from the full interview transcripts into separate Word documents for thematic 
analysis. This process of excerpting was also conducted to comply with IRB
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requirements that would allow Chris to provide some insight and input into the data 
analysis.
The emergent themes were then analyzed in light o f the extant literature, 
discussed individually below. These themes were previous experience with violence 
and/or trauma; coping; cultural influences; the impact the incident had on others; and 
evidence of the theoretical frame used in this study (the work of Goffman, particularly as 
it relates to stigma and impression management). Data from participant observations will 
be discussed in a separate section, but it is worth noting that there are also thematic 
connections seen between that data and the participant interview data discussed in this 
section. These thematic analyses seek to incorporate the multiple voices or perspectives 
of those individuals impacted by Chris’ shooting. These analyses seek to incorporate the 
findings from the literature, where appropriate, and identify gaps in the literature, and to 
demonstrate the utility of Goffman’s work as a theoretical frame from which to approach 
this topic.
Theme: Previous Experiences with Violence and/or Trauma
The first theme that emerged was defined as previous experiences with violence 
and/or trauma. As discussed in Chapter 2, previous experience with or exposure to 
previous traumatic experiences may lead an individual to be more vulnerable to PTSD 
(Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). It can be argued that officers, as a 
function o f their career choice, may be a population that is particularly vulnerable to 
PTSD as a result o f the amount of trauma and violence to which they are exposed. This 
may be because, if the individual has not effectively dealt with previous stressful or 
traumatic experiences, then the effects of previous events may compound the effects of
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the current trauma, leading to what Kirschman (2007) calls a double whammy. 
Additionally, WCPR (Kirschman 2012a) has found that many first responders may 
develop the coping skills that make them good officers—ability to dissociate, 
compartmentalize and be calm in a crisis—in childhood as a result of abuse, neglect or 
having an alcoholic parent. Thus, these same traits that make them good officers may 
also be indicators that these officers are at a heightened risk for developing PTSD.
These findings in the literature suggest that awareness of previous exposure to 
violence and trauma may not only shape an officer’s reactions and coping abilities, but 
can also lend another perspective from which research may examine shooting incidents . 
In the current study, it was found that Chris was exposed to numerous traumatic events, 
both as a child and as an adult. While the researcher was somewhat aware of previous 
traumatic incidents prior to completing the interviews with Chris, the number and depth 
of the critical incidents he has experienced were not anticipated. Additionally, much like 
the experience of near trauma discussed in Chapter 7, it was not anticipated how many 
critical incidents the participants of the current study had experienced, both on and off 
duty, as an aggregate and how those lived experiences influenced their thoughts and 
responses during discussions of Chris’ shooting incident. The theme of previous trauma 
or violence was further broken into two categories—those events experienced during 
childhood and those experienced as an adult—to facilitate the exploration of this 
emergent theme.
Sub Theme 1: Childhood Experiences o f Loss/Trauma/Violence
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Chris grew up in Colombia, amidst poverty and 
rampant political and cartel-related violence, until he immigrated to the United States as a
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boy. While in Colombia, he witnessed his father shot in front of him on a family outing. 
Until he was much older, Chris was led to believe that his father died from this shooting 
incident, but relatively recent information suggests that his father is alive and still 
residing somewhere in South America. When asked to describe his father’s shooting, this 
is what Chris said:
We were going to a place called renkitos (phonetic), which is Spanish for  — it's 
like an endearment term fo r jump, like a jumpies, like the best translation is 
jumpies, which is a trampoline place in Colombia, and I  was going with my uncle, 
my cousins, and my father, not rare but wasn't routine, but we were going. We 
were all excited to go over there and drink apple sodas and jum p up and down, 
burp, whatever, and on the way back — however, having said that, my uncle at the 
time was very political in some o f  the local Colombian governments, very 
political, and at that time you're talking mid to late '70s going into the '80s was 
very, very volatile. He had — he did not have children at the time.
As we're walking I'm holding my uncle's hand so and again, this is hindsight, they 
knew my uncle had no children. So my uncle is holding my hand. It was a 
presumption on my part that the individual that they wound up shooting because 
remember — I  remember it specifically, a black car pulling up, people getting out, 
not really focused on anything, but I  remember the car because you didn't see a 
lot of, you know, black shiny cars. You saw a lot o f  dirty, you know, old kind o f  
dilapidated kind ofpickup trucks so this kind o f stood out. A car pulls up, firing  
starts, couple shots, wasn't a lot, and my father goes down... Uncle takes me away 
and kind o f—just kind o f goes vague from  there. I  remember that. I  remember 
almost like taking a snapshot o f  it, just kind o ffits in a frame. What occurred 
after, it's kind o f hard.
In his interviews, Chris discussed how the familiar familial coping mechanisms of 
preoccupation, avoidance and distraction were utilized in the wake of his father’s death. 
He also notes that he was extremely close to his mother after this incident, never wanting 
to be far from her side. When he was asked if his father immigrated with the family, 
Chris’ response was that he was “already gone.” This is a topic about which Chris has 
some difficulties talking, displaying hesitancy to answer or providing somewhat evasive 
answers. This may be an indicator that Chris either has been provided with very little 
information about his father or it could be an artifact of those learned coping
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mechanisms, particularly not talking about an incident, that inhibit conversations about
his father. As another participant observed when discussing the absence of Chris’ father,
Chris has “felt kind of neglected on that end and I know his mother won’t talk about it
with him. She has said very few things and that’s just recently about his father.. .1 think
he’s a little lost [sometimes] when it comes to family.”
As if the traumatic loss of a parent and immigrating to another country was not
significant enough, Chris bore witness to second critical incident before high school: the
murder o f his brother, Antonio. After the family moved to New York City, they
eventually settled in Brooklyn. In Chapter 5, the level of violence and social
disorganization of the neighborhood community was addressed. Due, in part, to some of
these same factors, Chris’ mother had his brother walk him to school each day.
According to Chris:
[I] walked down. There's an open courtyard in the projects over there. I'm 
saying projects, but not like here, talking ten stories up, you know, millions o f 
people. He used to wait in the courtyardfor me to walk up from  the house to the 
school and I  remember walking down and looking over and heard like — heard a 
gunshot. When I  was looking there was a  kid on the swing. The kid like falls o ff 
the swing awkwardly. I'm like, Man, that was weird. I  look over and my brother 
had been shot. I  was like, Oh, no. So I  go over to him, dead, and it was 
one — and then like for weeks after that and you have to understand, he was as 
much a part o f  the family, but he was so distant doing his own thing. He was kind 
ofgoing his own way. That obviously devastated the family but they kind o f  come 
to expect that. We've had enough violence go on in the family or around the 
family that it's not unexpected, but it's shocking when it happens... someone pulled 
me o ff o f him because I  was ju st kind o f  like dumbfounded. Somebody pulled me 
o ff o f  him and it was kind o f  like busy but it's always busy. There's always people 
out and it went from being busy s only a handful ofpeople out in the courtyard 
and stuff like that, so kind o f  like — it was surreal, very --1 can't equate a sound to 
it, no noise, and then I  probably spent like the weeks following that just spending 
a lot o f  time in the house, in the room fo r  obvious reasons, andjust kind o f  
relegated to my block, like not venturing o ff anywhere else but when it got dark, I  
was coming in. There was no questions.
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Chris, as explained in Chapter 5, and his family, believe his brother’s murder was
gang-related and possibly a case of mistaken identity. Chris stated that he was closer to
his brother than others in his family and when asked about his emotional response to his
brother’s murder, particularly if he was angry, he stated that he was
Upset more than anything. You have to understand, i f  you see — I  can't — God, 
whether in Colombia, whether in Queens, whether in Brooklyn, violence just 
is —you become numb to it. I  mean, it affects you obviously, but you become so 
numb to it that I  was sad that it happened to us. I  don't think I  ever became angry 
at any — maybe fo r  a brief moment in time, maybe angry at him but looking back 
fo r some o f  the decisions he made, but mostly just sad, you know, kind o f  like an 
empty kind o f  sad. I  was — that was my man, you know, we kind o f  hung out 
together. He took care o f  me. I f  I  needed like some money he would give me 
money, stuff like that. So it wasn't — but never angry. I  don't 
remember — however, I  did take — I  can see how I  can take that out on my step 
dad because I  was a dick to him.
Also of interest was that, during one interview, Chris drew parallels between his father
and brother, noting their roles as protectors, expression of emotion and their absence in
his life—both before their shootings and after:
You know, ju st the positioning o f  the relationships, both caregivers, both distant, I  
was more dependent or more aligned and open comforted by the women or my 
mom, whereas the relationship I  was — I  will tell you, I  was closer with my 
brother than I  was with my father, hands down. He took a very — my father was 
protective as the father. My brother was protective o f  me i f  that — it's on a 
smaller scale or very smaller scope. Brother gave me a lot more stuff but at the 
same time, my brother was o ff doing his thing. My dad was o ff doing his thing.
So in that aspect, I  know I  could rely on him. I f  I  ever went to my dad and said, 
you know, Hey, something happened, this and this, I  know he could take care o f  it. 
I f  I  went to my brother, I  know he'd do whatever it took to do whatever it is to 
handle it. But both were very absent but not really ...It’s — there's a fine line 
between just an absent person because they're both very much — brother was 
probably a little bit better at showing emotions or how he was feeling. I  can't 
remember my dad being that overt with his emotions.
These two significant traumatic events, the loss of his father and his brother,
resurfaced during the counseling sessions he received after his shooting. However, it
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should be noted that Chris was not the one to bring these previous traumatic events to the
attention o f his therapist; when asked why she thought he was taking the shooting so
hard, Chris’ girlfriend asked his therapist if the amount o f violence and trauma he had
seen growing up may be a factor in his reaction to his own shooting incident. When
Chris reflects back on why he did not disclose his history to his psychologist, he indicated
that, at the time, he did not think it was relevant or related— he was there to talk about the
shooting and the deaths in his family were separate incidents. In fact, it is only after
reflection and learning more about trauma that Chris was able to admit:
I  believe I  recovered from it well, you know, fast forwarding years and years and 
years later, it's one significant piece o f  what probably eventually kind o f  affects 
you kind o f  like one trauma on top o f  another, trauma on top o f  another trauma. 
Then when you kind o f  retrospectively look back on it you're like, Oh, yeah.
Chris also disclosed less severe traumatic experiences, such as being stabbed in a
nightclub (which was only disclosed in passing), being involved in numerous fights, and
his experiences as a volunteer firefighter in high school. Additionally, as was also
mentioned in Chapter 5, Chris attempted suicide in high school. This suicide attempt
may hold more meaning that is superficially evident, as noted in the last line of the
following quote from the transcript:
School was sucking, you know, realizing that I'm not going to graduate with 
everybody. Girl winds up like hooking up with some other guy who I  thought was 
my friend andjust all this — and it became like I  think a lot o f  it culminated and 
came into a very dark place and I  think ju st one night wound up going drinking by 
myself and I  was like, Fuck this place, and I  was like, Oh, I'm going to hurt myself 
and I  remember because I  wound up cutting my wrists which led to a whole — but 
it was just -- it wasn't anything — I  don't want to say it wasn't hesitation, but it 
was like, Oh, I'm going it, but you're not really doing it that much, but it was 
significant but it wasn't — I  could have — they could have — it would have been 
fine. Then they find  out and they put me up in the hospital. I  was taken o ff the
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roster at the fire department and I  remember the day after they had a huge fire.
They took me o ff the roster because obviously fo r  other reasons...
This experience o f being taken off of the roster after his suicide attempt, while 
understandable, may also contribute to perceptions of mental health issues and perceived 
weakness. These messages, if internalized, may have supported negative coping 
mechanisms, such as alcohol use or avoidance, because Chris had experienced what may 
happen if you were in need of help as a first responder— he was unable to work and had 
the stigma of being pulled off of the roster.
Other participants also disclosed traumatic or impactful incidents in their youth, 
although no other participants admitted to witnessing one, let alone two, murders. Yet, 
some participants shared other critical experiences with Chris—one participant was an 
immigrant, moving from Europe to the deep South at a young age, experiencing some of 
the same culture shocks as Chris trying to assimilate; another participant disclosed 
growing up in a gang- and drug-infested community, suggesting that this participant, also 
like Chris, experienced violence and social disorganization as a youth. Finally, as Chris 
lived with his grandmother and his extended family during the year his mother was in 
New York, trying to earn the mother to bring Chris and Antonio to New York with her in 
an effort to escape the violence in Colombia, another participant spent at least a year 
living with a grandmother while his single parent was deployed overseas in the military. 
These shared experiences may also impact the level of empathy or relatedness perceived 
between the other participants and Chris, and may, in turn, increase the potential for the 
experience of secondary or tertiary trauma.
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Sub Theme 2: Adult Experiences o f  Loss/Trauma/Violence
Before discussing the multiple traumas experienced by both Chris and the other 
participants after becoming police officers, it should be noted that three o f the 
participants, including Chris, served in the military before becoming police officers.
Chris served in the Navy, as detailed in Chapter 5. Some secondary traumas were 
disclosed when discussing his time in the service— such as the accidental death of a 
fellow soldier as a result o f a gas leak and explosion and the rape of another soldier—as 
well as more active traumas that included searching for remains from a downed military 
aircraft and determining whether or not to fire upon possible combatants approaching his 
carrier in small boats. The other two participants in the current study with military 
experience served in the Marines and both alluded to traumas that were more traditionally 
associated with military service, those seen in active combat theatres or while engaged in 
operations in foreign countries.
Each of the participants disclosed multiple traumas experienced after becoming 
law enforcement officers, supporting Kirschman’s (2007) statement that officers will 
likely see more trauma in their first three years on the job than most citizens see over 
their entire lives. These traumas varied in terms of intensity and also included primary 
traumas (where the officer was actively involved in the incident) and secondary traumas 
(where the officer was present after the fact, but still impacted), as well as near traumas 
(discussed in Chapter 7). Chris, in particular, disclosed numerous traumas. Some of 
these traumas were relayed in passing, such as mentioning two fellow officers, two 
friends, who committed suicide, when trying to address finding the balance between 
becoming cynical and jaded and enjoying the job. Another participant also discussed one
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of these suicides. Another participant discussed the impact o f a particular civilian suicide 
and another motor vehicle accident, and how these events have “stuck with” this officer 
for years. Other incidents, such as the ones detailed below in Chris’ own words, were 
discussed at length.
Chris discussed two shooting incidents that particularly impacted him. The first 
was the shooting where a female officer that he had worked with was killed. As Chris 
stated,
[She] was a beautiful girl, worked undercover, had annihilated, had she got to go 
would have annihilated, Huntersville, Park Place heroin ring and remembered 
going to — you know, a long time undercover operation, you would have a party. 
So we were having a party. We were having a get-together. We're all having a 
great time. Oh, you did a great job, and then she gets, I  think, a week on the 
street and she gets shot and killed. I  remember going to the — because that was 
the first time I  really knew, knew that I  was present fo r  that. I  really worked 
around, sure, James got killed right away but we're talking a year or two, two, 
three years on the police department, so really still novice, really a beginner or 
just a rookie for lack o f a better term, and there was a reality to it. There was just 
a very sadness to her death that hit me with a baseball bat at the viewing.
I  remember going into the viewing, long hair, beard, you know, we're Narcotics. 
We stuck out like a sore thumb and this beautiful girl walks in, spitting image o f  
[her]. It was her twin sister. Completely, no one had mentioned anything. No 
one had mentioned it and it was one o f those like you thought you were 
having — you're like, Oh, my God, I'm seeing [her] everywhere. It was her twin 
sister. I  became friendly with her since then we did a couple motorcycle rides for  
her benefit, but really struck me seeing her, which is again seeing [her] in front o f  
you again, but realizing that, you know, that's not her. She's gone and that really 
hit hard and there was — you kind o f — and unfortunately like I  said earlier, we 
learn from our mistakes and then time goes on and then we completely dismiss 
them.
So there was that time initially with the months following that you took care. You 
were safety conscious and then you start getting away with it and get complacent, 
complacent. You 're back to your old ways before you know it and then two 
undercover officers get shot in front o f you and the realness creeps up again...
In discussing this officer’s murder, Chris also mentioned two other shootings 
where officers were injured or killed. In referring to James getting killed, he is 
discussing the murder of another officer, his closest friend from the police academy.
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James’ death was a traumatic event that was a secondary or tertiary trauma for Chris, but
two other participants also addressed secondary trauma related to this event. One
participant was a responding supervisor on the scene and addressed having to calm and
focus the other officers on scene, trying to maintain order and remember what he needed
to do to fulfill his role as a supervisor. Another participant discussed working with
another officer that was dramatically impacted by James’ murder because he was on
scene, watched it happen and survived the encounter. This provided an example of
possible tertiary trauma, as this participant said,
I  remember when—I  remember the first one I  really remember having an issue 
with. I  didn ’t know James ...as well as like Chris. Chris and James were good 
friends. So I  didn’t know him that well and I  had only been on the department a 
short time. But I  knew [the officer with James that night] and I  saw what it did to 
[him]. So you kind o f  start internalizing those things.
The second shooting that Chris mentioned above is particularly salient to the 
current study. Chris mentions witnessing two officers getting shot in front of him. These 
two officers were also participants in the current study and served as peer support for 
Chris in the aftermath of his own shooting. One of the two officers shot described the 
incident this way:
A. ... Then in 2004, that was my second one when I  got shot at Military Circle
Mall, [we] were undercover covering UC5 with [another] Investigator at 
the time and we were the cover team in the parking lot and one o f the guys 
in the car had been arrested previously and had saw [the other officer 
who was shot] in our office. So when he saw him close to where they 
were, they panicked thinking we were the police, which we were, and 
when they got arrested in the hotel room they told us to go make the arrest 
and as we approached the car, everybody started shooting and that's how 
I  got shot. I  got shot twice in the stomach and I  shot the guy who shot me 
four times and [another officer], who also was with us at the time, shot 
another guy that was shooting so it was a bunch o f shooting. [Other 
officer shot] got shot in the leg and it was big old chaos that night.
Q. Was Chris there?
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A. He came — he was in — he was working that night but he was at a different
area but he came — he was there like almost immediately because when I  
was laying on the ground he took my watch and my ring. He took my 
personal stuff o ff me and rode in the ambulance with me from the scene to 
the hospital... And held my hand to whole way, all the way down to the 
hospital.
This officer was out of work for almost two years, recovering from injuries that 
nearly killed him. As noted above, Chris was actively involved in this incident. He 
describes that night, stating:
A. I  mean, I  got the bullet out o f  [the officer shot in the stomach] and was
holding onto all their guns and their wedding rings and stu ff like that. It 
fe lt crappy...just thought that he was going to die. I  knew [the other 
officer who was shot] was all right. It sounds horrible but I  saw his leg. I  
was like, All right, it's in his leg. Which you could probably die from but 
[the officer shot in the stomach] because I  rode in the ambulance back 
with him holding onto his stomach and then we get to the hospital and I  
get taken away from him or not taken away, but I  had to back up and [a 
homicide investigator] was like, I'm here to collect the guns and evidence.
I  was like, Here you go.
Q. So anything else stick with you about any o f  them?
A. Having to tell his wife. Because [she] came in and she was like, Tell me
what happened. I  was like, He got shot. I  said, They're working on him 
right now and I  remember because [she] is very — not — to the average 
person, probably extremely intimidating. But given the severity because 
we didn't know i f  [he] was going to make it, the fact that I  had to like tell 
her that we didn't know what was going on, I  said, He was shot in the 
stomach, that's all I  know. I  said, He was talking to me in the car or in the 
ambulance and I  didn't tell her like when he passed out when he lost 
consciousness and (inaudible) come back after shooting that guy and 
winds up and smacks [him] in the face to wake him back up. He wakes up. 
He’s like, Don't fucking fa ll asleep, don't die. [Another investigator on 
scene], because he shot, he had to stay there but he was attending to [the 
officer shot in the leg] but we jumped — I  got [the officer shot in the 
stomach] and the medics and we put him in the bus and hauled ass.
Both of the officers shot in the incident described above discussed the additional traumas 
that stemmed from the departmental response to their shooting incident. Specifically, one 
investigator notes being interrogated by departmental representatives while medicated in
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the hospital. Both officers did not receive pay while they were out o f work recovering 
from their injuries, which was explained to the researcher in this way:
A. Because o f the bad press o f  the shooting, they actually didn't pay me the
whole time I  was out.
Q. What do you mean because o f the bad press? Can you explain that to me?
A. Yeah, at the time [a] Councilman, he was so upset before he even knew
anything that happened. He made a statement in the news that some white 
officers were chasing down some black boys in the mall and shot them up 
in front o f  the mall without no concern for anybody else around.
Q. So you and [the other officer shot] are white now?
A. Yeah, not knowing that me and [the other officer shot] are black, [another
officer involved] is Hispanic, you know, everybody else involved in the 
shooting except for [yet another officer involved], she was the only white 
person. Everyone else was black, you know, when he made that statement, 
which got everybody inflamed. So the City Council was all upset about 
what happened and we didn't find  out until after this happened because I  
thought it was preposterous that they couldn't pay me fo r  being injured in 
the line o f  duty at work, but it's some kind o f  clause in the City Charter 
that they choose — pick and choose which ones to pay out and they chose 
not to pay mine because o f  the bad press. So I  went 22 months with just 
the workmen's compensation check, which is only a third o f  your normal 
paycheck, and everything else was done so that was a big stressor on my 
family.
Q. I  can imagine. I  can imagine. That's a lot o f  anger when you're trying to
recuperate.
A. I'm trying to recuperate, but I'm worried about bills being paid. My wife
working, and I'm getting nothing at all from the City... fo r  what happened 
to me in the line o f  duty. It's not like it was sketchy, what happened. I  
mean, we tried to arrest somebody. They shot at us. It's open and shut as 
that and they did us pretty bad. I  mean, I  think that was the most 
disgusting thing I  ever heard.
The other officer shot also detailed the frustrations related with the workers compensation 
process, providing the following account of his interactions with workers compensation 
in the days following his shooting:
A. You're talking in terms o f  actually officers being injured during a critical
incident. God, you've got to go something about this. This workmen's 
comp thing, this is a bunch o f  bull. I  heard arguing with the girl on 
whether or not it was me involved in the shooting. I  mean, it was my 
picture in the paper, my name in the paper, and you know, I  always told
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her, I  said, you know, I  remember first couple days, Why don't you look in
the paper and tell me what the guy’s name is? His name i s  . Yeah,
who are you talking to? You're talking t o  , yeah, that was me and
trying to figure out i f  it was work-related.
Q. No, it was just fo r  fun.
A. You know, I  went to the City's — one o f  the City's doctors like a day after I
was out o f the hospital. He told me I  could come back to work in like 
three days. Yeah, like told me I  had to come back light duty.
Q. Okay.
A. This was no scam here. I  got a couple bullet holes in me. It's not a scam.
As fa r  as that goes, maybe the department has got to offer some type o f  
support to that officer because it is pretty traumatizing.
These negative experiences related to the PD’s response to this shooting incident 
underscore the relevance of the finding in the literature that indicates quality or nature of 
departmental responses to the officer in the immediate aftermath of a shooting can impact 
his or her development of long term psychological symptoms (Jones 1989, Kamena et al. 
2011). Further, as noted by both officers who were shot, the PD failed to provide a 
timely debrief after this critical incident; instead, it was only after at least one investigator 
broke down emotionally in court while testifying that the PD realized this service had not 
been provided and that the officers involved in this incident were in need of assistance. 
The quotes below demonstrate, in the officers’ own words, the way in which the 
departmental responses, or in this case lackthereof, were viewed.
Q. What kind o f  support did your family receive ?
A. From Narcotics, wonderful support. I  mean, we had a sergeant on the
department, but he was an investigator at the time. He was like one o f  my 
best guys because he would pick the kids up, take them to school, take my 
wife wherever she's needed. They would cut our grass. They would take 
care — they took care o f  us tremendously. The police department on a 
whole didn't do anything.
A. ... I  know the guys involved in my shooting, like my shooting occurred in
June, by November we had our first defendant in court and [an] Officer, 
who was involved in the shooting, he actually broke down on the stand 
testifying about what happened and one o f  the bosses were in the
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audience. O f course, they was like — it struck them, did these guys ever 
talk to anybody? Never talked to anybody. Except fo r  me, [that officer], 
and a couple other guys that were involved in the shooting, they were told 
to come back to work the next day without having any counseling or 
anything. Then months later we in court. Now they're saying, Okay, now 
it's mandatory everybody go to counseling tomorrow and that made a lot 
o f  people mad, like the guys that was with us. I  mean, it was — I  think it 
was like nine people in our unit that day when the shooting happened, and 
they said, Okay, now all you go to counseling tomorrow, five months after 
the incident in court. So it was kind o f bad. I  mean, I  don't think that 
they — I  know they had a policy in place, but they didn't follow the policy 
until it was way too late.
Q. Okay. And it was just probably the nine people that were immediately on 
scene?
A. Right.
Q. So nothing — so somebody like Chris, who was in the ambulance with you 
and that side o f  it?
A. Right, uh-huh.
Q. All right. So in terms they didn't have you see anybody?
A. No.
Q. They were just like, okay, come on back?
A. No, that was — we as a department, we kind o f  drop the ball on that whole
thing.
Q. Okay.
A. Back then.
Q. You had mentioned that. So there was no debrief for everybody who was
involved?
A. No, the debrief only came, like I  said, like months after the shooting and
we were all back to work.
As noted earlier, Chris was very much involved in this shooting incident even 
though he did not fire his weapon. Yet, when asked about who was offered the 
opportunity to participate in the eventual debrief for this shooting, one of the officers shot 
stated that Chris—who most rational individuals would argue was likely traumatized 
while rendering aid to a friend he thought was going to die— was not included among 
those officers. This also speaks to the gap in the literature related to the impact of critical 
incidents upon other officers, those who did not necessarily fire their weapons, but were
somehow involved in the incident. This idea of other officers being secondary victims of
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trauma surfaced in other participant interviews, as well. One participant, when 
discussing his participation in the investigation o f the murder of a fellow officer, became 
quite emotional; when the researcher asked this participant if  anyone had ever asked him 
if he was “okay,” he paused for a moment and, startled, responded “you just did.” In fact 
this was a relatively common response of participants when asked if, outside of critical 
incidents in which they were directly involved, anyone— coworkers, supervisors, 
administrators—had inquired about their well being, the overwhelming response was no.
In addition to the shootings referenced above, there were several other shooting 
incidents disclosed. Chris and the two officers who were involved in the shooting above 
each had been involved in more than two shootings, with both Chris and one of the 
officers disclosing many more incidents than two. Another participant made the 
following disclosure:
A. Yeah, I've been involved in shootouts where police are killed, you know, 
people in the house, vehicles, I've been involved in a lot o f  police 
shootings.
Q. Okay. How many?
A. I f  I  had to guess, I'd probably say 11 or 12.
Q. Okay.
A. And I  would say the majority o f  those, the fa r  majority ended up in death.
Multiple participants discussed being involved in cases where officers had been 
killed, from acting as a liaison to the families, to being an investigator on the case, to 
being a member of the fugitive task force searching for the suspect that killed the officer. 
One participant had been involved in the investigation of at least ten officer-involved 
shootings, three o f which involved the death of a fellow officer and one involving the 
injury of an officer. The death of one officer in 2006, in particular, was mentioned by 
several participants, making comments such as:
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A. ... but -when [he] was killed in 20061 was part o f a --yo u  know, team
assigned to go and look fo r  the fugitive and I  actually responded to the 
scene.
Q. Okay.
A. That's when I  seen him laying there after he got shot.
Q. Okay. So how do those cases impact you?
A. I  mean, it's fucked up.
Q. Fucked up how?
A. It's fucked up it happened. He's got a wife. He's got kids, but let's go get
the scumbag that did it.
. . . I  did know [him] and I  was — you know, I  was knee deep in that investigation 
and just the brutality o f  the investigation, whether he made tactical errors or not 
is not even an issue with me. The brutality o f the shooting made me a hateful, 
hateful person, just because violence can be used as a tool to gain a certain 
objective and sometimes it's necessary but violence ju s t for the sake o f  being 
violent is -- it amazes me how people treat each other. It's ju st depressing.
In addition to the obvious traumas that can be experienced in the course of doing
the job, there are times when events in the officer’s personal life may intersect with
events at work, increasing the impact of the trauma. For example, one participant
recalled the following incident:
When Ifirst got into General Assignment my wife and I, we were trying to have a 
baby and she ended up losing a baby during birth. He had an umbilical cord 
wrapped around his neck. I  stayed at home for about a week over it and sure 
enough the first call that we get when I'm back in the bureau is a baby death.
These experiences of trauma, varied as they are in duration, intensity and degree of 
participation, influenced the officers that participated in the current study in equally 
varied ways. Not only does previous experience of trauma potentially skew the o ffice’s 
perception of subsequent events and possibly inflict psychological damage, in the current 
case, there was a large degree of shared and overlapping trauma between participants. 
These traumatic events, in particular, conditioned other themes that emerged in the
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current study, such as coping responses and the impact Chris’ shooting had upon other 
officers.
Theme: Coping
The second theme that emerged was coping, which can be defined as an 
individual’s ability to handle stress or trauma and the associated methods used to do so.
In the current study, coping was of particular concern, as it is a strong component of both 
officer survivability and resilience. As noted in the literature review, each officer will 
experience the trauma differently in terms of the symptoms displayed and resilience, 
including factors such as education, ethnicity, previous exposure to traumatic incidents, 
the severity of the incident, the officer’s established coping skills and mechanisms and 
the presence, number and quality of protective factors in the officer’s life (Best, Artwohl 
and Kirschman 2011, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 
2012b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 
2008, Pole et al. 2001, Violanti 2005). Participants in this study exhibited a wide array of 
coping strategies, encompassing both positive mechanisms, such as talking with co­
workers and seeking professional assistance, and negative coping approaches, such as 
anger and drinking. In the current study, particular attention was also paid to Chris’ 
learned familial coping mechanisms, as they may have contributed to his reaction to his 
shooting and his eventual PTSD diagnosis. One example of these coping mechanisms, 
seen from two perspectives (Chris’ and another participant’s), shows how Chris learned 
that avoidance of difficult or painful topics is absolute in the aftermath of his brother’s 
murder:
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.. .my mom just completely putting out o f  it. Like just shutting down like, boom, 
move on, not in a bad way kind o f  like to protect herself kind o f  thing. And that 
kind ofjust rubbed o ff and my family is notorious fo r  hiding some shit.
There's some things you don't talk about, and his brother being one o f  
them... There's no pictures o f his brother. Like I  went through a box ofpictures 
when we were trying to get our save the date pictures for my mom to get that 
magnet made and I'm thinking i f  there was a picture o f  his brother, it's got to be 
in this box because it was all old pictures o f  him when he was little.
Some additional examples of these learned coping mechanisms, primarily involving
avoiding addressing the problem and distraction, can be seen in the excerpts below:
(when discussing the time period after his father’s shooting)... You immediately 
get — the only thing that lean  equate it to is when something ever bad happens at 
home, you're immediately inundated with family, aunts, uncles taking care. You 
have to eat, you got to do this, kind o f keeping you preoccupied and it gets to the 
point where you're so preoccupied that you eventually, it works and you start 
forgetting about it.
A. (talking about his mother leaving for New York)... Remember really not 
liking it. I  cried then, hands down. But again, it's the same routine. 
Grandmother starts, you know, making me do busy stuff. Other aunts 
were out there. We always joke, it's like a gaggle o f  witches, ju st kind o f  
like pouncing and just pulling you all different directions and you get so 
caught up in the routine that you eventually —you're upset fo r  a little bit, 
you blow, a temper tantrum, they smack you around like, you know, get 
out o f  it. Oh, you got to do this, this, and this. It kind o f  takes you away 
from everything, which I  don't know, is a general response, like a way that 
they, you know, been ingrained to kind o f  deal with, you know, any kind o f 
stress or, you know, bad stuff happening to immediately misdirect your 
concentration on something else but they seem to do it. They're great at 
avoiding or confronting any type o f  — like i f  something bad happened to 
you, they are never the ones to be like, Let's sit down, let’s discuss this. 
They are going to start telling you, you know what, I  hurt my leg the other 
day, this is ridiculous and just kind o f completely takes you somewhere 
else.
Q. Do you see elements o f  that in yourself?
A. I  would say earlier on but not — I  do, but not to that degree. I  think I'm
more Americanized and more — not to that degree because o f  the 
generational gap but also not to the degree I  was when initially or prior to 
the shooting.
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These learned coping mechanisms would resurface in the wake of Chris’ shooting, as 
noted in the follow excerpts.
Q. Okay. I  was going to say, do you also think that that might have
something to do — we talked about avoidance as a coping tactic that your 
family kind o f instilled.
A. Probably.
Q. Okay.
A. Probably, but there's — like at a level that is just insane. I f  something’s
bad, just don't talk about it.
Q. Okay. So what do you mean about also feelings? How do you avoid
feelings and what were you trying to do?
A. Just feeling sad or feeling upset or anxious. People would try to be nice
and be like other, I f  you need anything. You don't want to hear it so you 
be like, Oh, you blow it o ff like, Oh, that's nothing, and then you change 
the subject or you do something else to try to get going somewhere else.
However, of note is also the fact that these coping mechanisms conditioned the 
interactions between Chris and members of his family. In a way, the coping mechanisms 
he observed and learned as a child support, possibly even mandate, the use of impression 
management to avoid upsetting others. This tendency to protect others, particularly his 
mother and sister, may also be tied to machismo and gender role identification.
Q. Okay. Do you notice whether or not you still avoid the thoughts, feelings,
or conversations occasionally?
A. About the incident or about anything?
Q. About anything.
A. Probably the only people that I  would avoid talking stu ff like that, that's
emotionally charged, would probably be my mom and my sister...
Q. So it more for you or fo r  them that you avoid talking about it?
A. Oh, family, for them.
Q. Okay.
A. It's too hard for them, I  would imagine. I ’m not going to stress them out
over something i f  I  can avoid it.
Chris also demonstrated other forms of avoidance in the aftermath of his shooting, to
include using sick leave, avoiding conversations about his shooting with people,
withdrawing from friends and coworkers, and he even notes that, for a period of time, he
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stopped playing the drums and stopped participating in motorcycle runs, two activities 
that he had greatly enjoyed and engaged in quite frequently before the shooting.
The impact of these learned coping mechanisms were not recognized and acknowledged 
by just Chris, as one participant discussed his avoidance of emotions following the 
shooting:
Q. Okay. So do you think that some o f  these — do you think these kinds o f  
interactions with his family and kind o f this learned behavior o f  how to 
deal with things that are going on have impacted him and how he copes 
with different things?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. How so?
A. I  would think like the avoidance I  think when — I  know we 're getting into
this eventually with his shooting and kind o f  like trying to avoid the
feelings that he would have or being able to talk about it in a healthy way, 
avoidance like I  mean, because i f  you're not allowed to bring certain 
things up fo r  so long... Chris' big thing throughout most o f  like after the 
shooting was I  wish I  would have been hit, then that way I  have like a 
physical scar, like I'm hurt instead o f  I  think he wanted to trade physical - 
pain fo r  emotional pain because it's not always okay to have emotional 
pain fo r  some people. Some people don't believe you can have emotional 
pain and he wanted the physical pain to replace the emotional pain and he 
didn't get shot, thank God, close but didn't get shot, but I  think he fe lt he 
could cope with it better had he been shot.
Another participant also observed Chris’ penchant for avoidance, noting that he 
uses humor as a defense mechanism or a way of avoiding certain conversations. In a 
way, this participant alludes to the use of humor as a tool of impression management, 
noting that:
Well, you know, Chris uses his sense o f humor like a weapon. Chris can hide 
behind a goodjoke and that's one o f  the things that I  noticed that, you know, I  
knew Chris before his shooting, but he also had a lot o f  other interpersonal things 
going on prior to his shooting happening. So he could have been using that same 
sense o f  humor all along to mask other underlying issues that never came upas a 
result o f  law enforcement, but the problem with being in law enforcement is that 
when you're doing that, little interpersonal issues outside o f work are ju st — A,
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they're a big deal to you but they're made worse by the fact that you're going out 
trying to help other people and they turn around and complain that 
administration doesn't have your back, they will do what they need to do in order 
to protect themselves and I  understand that... It is a result o f  what I  have seen 
about myself, is somewhat like Chris does. We will deflect a lot. Things will 
come at us and we with internalize it but publically kind o f deflect it. So I'll play 
it o ff like it doesn't bother me. Chris is always known as a really vibrant 
gregarious and humorous person...It's similar with Chris in that he uses that 
sense o f  humor, again at will, because he's so smart. It's because he's so 
intelligent.
Although Chris and his shooting are the focus of the current study, it is also
important to note that he is not the only participant in the current study that exhibited the
use of avoidance as a coping mechanism, as evidenced in the following quote:
Q. Does that ever come home with you at all?
A. No.
Q. Not at all?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay.
A. The only time it does is every now and again i f  I  ever get the thought into
my head that I  think about my own mortality. Then I 'll be like, Fuck, geez, 
what am I  doing this for? Then it quickly goes away.
Q. Quickly goes away?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So how do you keep with it when you get those thoughts?
A. Just be like, No, fuck it. I've been in tons o f  shit, ain't nothing happening
to me.
Other coping mechanisms were also addressed among the various participants to
include some talking about the use of alcohol (as seen in the following section) and food
as tools to deal with stress, while others attempt to ruthlessly compartmentalize and avoid
discussing troubling topics. As one participant stated:
No, I  don't talk to my wife. I've been in shootings and stuff. I  don't talk to my wife 
about it. It's a personal choice I  made back when I  was in the service. I  don't tell 
my wife about what I  do. That's my professional life. I  don't involve my wife with 
my professional life. That's just the way I  do things. I'm not saying it's the best
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way, best anything. I  mean, she knows Chris, you know, we've hung out and stu ff 
like that. I  told her, you know, he was in a shooting. He was okay and she knows 
that that's pretty much all I'm going to relay about it.
Other participants, also suggesting an attempt to compartmentalize or detach from their
exposure to trauma on the job, stating:
Q. So what have your reactions been to these incidents that you've been
involved in?
A. Gosh, it sounds kind o f  screwed up because that makes me sound screwed
up, but I  guess it's just part o f  the job. I  don't want to say I'm desensitized 
to the violence. I  don't want to say that, but I  guess I  am in a way.
Q. And it's expected at some levels.
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. It is, but it's also interesting that you talked about when you heard about
Chris', thinking about your own shooting. So that shows that it's not quite
as desensitized.
A. Gosh, I  hope not. Make me more screwed up than I  am.
...I mean, we've been at death scenes together. It ju st don't affect me like that. 
Maybe there’s a disconnect but it's kind o f  like, This is my friggin' job. I've got to 
check emotions at the door because i f  I  don't, i f  I'm emotionally doing this, I  could 
mess up. So that's why I  operate the way I  do.
I'm just, you know, I'm an emotional person, I  really am. I  can get emotional and 
stuff like that, but when it comes to just like work stuff, I  don't know. For some 
reason it just don't really get to me.
These learned coping mechanisms for dealing with trauma, when combined with 
many of the other themes that emerged in the current study, such as alcohol, impression 
management, and machismo, created the conditions for a perfect storm of sorts, a 
breeding ground for psychological disturbance and struggle in the wake of Chris’ 
shooting, as noted in the excerpt below. Again, this particular excerpt, while long, 
demonstrates the interconnectedness o f the emergent themes in the current study, 
providing insight into how these issues not only related to each other, but how they feed 
and condition other areas of consideration.
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The shooting put me into a place where I  got so disgusted with myself that I  
self-destructed, you know, self-medicated, whether it be with alcohol initially, you 
know, just the inability to sleep, and then you know, seeking help, then finding 
help, then recognizing that the medication I  was getting to help me fa ll asleep 
worked better i f  I  combined it with the alcohol, which is — I  was getting better but 
at the same time, I  immediately saw that ability, Oh, get some sleep. Combine the 
two and it's almost comical the way like, Oh, my God, you're taking Ambien and 
you take like a 5th o f rum and you're done. You're golden. You're getting 
legitimate sleep and I  started feeling like this is -- that's the solution. It's simple, 
you know, not sleeping. You drink...you wake up, you don't fee l too good. Then I  
get medicine like Lexapro, which doesn’t work right away. It's not like you take a 
pill and, boom, you're better. It's gradual. Whereas the Ambien was an 
immediate response or immediately addressed a major significant symptom, 
which I  thought was the cause o f  the stress—not sleeping, reliving everything.
So fo r  a good period o f  time it was me again and again looking back. I  can see it. 
It was me again using something to suppress it. Then, you know, eventually it 
doesn't become good enough because you're so focused on not sleeping and just 
feeling shitty the whole time that once you start getting into that routine of, okay, 
feel shitty during the day, but I  have my relief when I  go to sleep or when I  take 
the medicine lea n  function enough knowing that I'm — but then it doesn't become 
enough. Then that part doesn't so much bother you as parts not involved in 
sleeping, the day-to-day stuff, the interaction with people, the hair trigger, the just 
being completely miserable and just completely having just a horrible outlook and 
on top o f that there was a — you fee l so sad, like emotionally drained, but you 
suppress that. So now it becomes a battle o f it was the sleep, but it was feeling 
like crap and now it's like you don't want to show weakness. So then it's like, 
well, you know what, maybe I'll self-medicate some more. Maybe I'll try to even 
go further or just kind o f  separate myselffrom everybody. So it's an extreme kind 
o f behavior and eventually gets tiring. I  mean, physically tiring, emotionally 
draining, and it took a lot o f  outside people saying, You know what, you're acting 
like a dick The shooting is bad but you know, fucking suck it up, which I  initially 
took as reinforcing, just keep it down, keep it down, but then I  started, you know, 
because the Lexapro starts to work, you know, at that time because it takes like a 
month or so. So it starts to kind o f  kick in. You start to get a little bit more 
balanced again, not right away, still addressing all the stuff talking about it with 
the professional...
Further, Chris noted the interrelated nature of many of the topics that were discussed
during his interviews, stating:
... again, it bleeds into all the anger, irritability, tolerance, preoccupation. I  
criticize myself. Whereas now, I  understand that some o f that is normal, maybe
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not to the degree that it should be, but it's normal. It was a normal response to a 
very stressful situation, which stressful, it's not all the shooting. The shooting 
creates — it's like throwing a rock in the water. That's the shooting, but then all 
the ripples o f  it, the effects o f  it kind o f branches out and then as it branches out.
It hits another rock and then there's more ripples from that, not as significant as 
the initial rock thrown in but it's not just a linear event. It's events that create 
other events, that create other situations, creates other interpretations o f 
environment o f  people so with all that, initially I  would criticize myself, 
self-criticize. Where I'd be like, Why youfeeling like that? Why would you be so 
upset? Why would you be so angry? This guy is this or, yeah, is that bothering 
you or why are you trying to hold in all this stuff? So you know, ju st man up at 
certain times and at certain times you’re like, don't be such a rigid person. So 
anything I  did was criticized more so by myself than anybody else.
Unfortunately, many of the elements of coping that emerged during the analysis 
of the interview transcripts dealt with negative reactions to and attempts to cope with 
trauma. Two such responses, the use of alcohol and increased anger, were noted not only 
in Chris’ reaction to the shooting, but also featured in the interviews with other 
participants. Several participants recognized these coping mechanisms as ones that they 
also utilized, although some attempted to minimize the role these mechanisms play in 
their lives or tried to suggest that alcohol, in particular, is an accepted part of the police 
culture. The following two sections will specifically discuss these coping strategies and 
their appearance in the current study.
Sub Theme 1: Alcohol
As noted by many scholars, alcohol is a commonly used coping tool in general, 
and has a particularly high occurrence within the police culture (Kirschman 2007, 
Kirschman 2012a, Wester and Lyubelsky 2005). Indeed, alcohol is considered by many 
to be a component of the first responder culture; as one participant noted “ . ..he [Chris] 
drinks a little bit. We all drink a little bit...” Another participant echoed this sentiment,
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saying “No, we were cops, you know, so we all like to drink.” This suggests that the use
of alcohol is normalized and acceptable as a form of coping within the police department;
this mentality is also observed in the following excerpts:
For me I  tell my wife I'm going to get a six pack and watch the hockey game, but 
fo r other people, I  don't know.
...So police officers are supposed to be everything to everyone when the truth is 
they're having a hard enough time just making it some days ju st being themselves, 
and then when they need help, there's nobody that has their back and that's when 
officers start becoming nasty and they start becoming aggressive and mean and 
hateful because all they do is look around and say, Well, you know, who is here to 
help me? I need help. Who is here to help me? And they damn sure aren't going 
to say that out loud. You know, they'll say it to themselves. So that's how they 
find  themselves at the FOP at 2:00 in the morning with a bunch o f  like-minded 
people who are all thinking the same thing, but nobody is going to say it and so 
what they do is they turn on TV and they watch what, cop shows, and make fun  o f  
them using their sense o f humor to make sure o f  what these guys are doing and 
get drunk.
In the current study, alcohol played, and in some ways continues to play, a key role. As
one participant noted,
A. I  think the drinking, obviously it was his first coping mechanism to begin
with so I'm sure —
Q. It’s  a go-to.
A. Right.
Q. All right.
A. It's a go-to but I  mean, I'll get like to the point where I  get my ass on my
shoulders about his drinking and then he won't drink fo r  like, I  don't know, 
like eight, nine days. But then he'll be like, Okay, I  want to drink now. I  
wish he would not, but he does and I'm not his mother.
This notion that alcohol was Chris’ first coping mechanism is supported by statements he 
made about how he had previously coped with stress or other negative experiences by 
turning to alcohol. For example, when discussing his suicide attempt in high school, 
Chris notes that this attempt happened after he “wound up going drinking by myself.”
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Another example involves Chris’ second divorce, where he noted that he “would sleep 
downstairs. I would drink like a case o f beer and then pass out and then wake up and go 
to work kind of thing.” This particular example is telling because it provides almost an 
eerie foreshadowing in the form of a question: given his large investments and 
identification with the police culture and image, and given his penchant to utilize both 
alcohol and distraction/avoidance to cope with negative events, how would he respond to 
a significant negative event that made him feel isolated from his career, his identity as a 
police officer, and even his fellow brothers and sisters in blue?
While Chris had already demonstrated the use of alcohol to cope with personal 
trauma, he also acknowledged that, by the time o f his shooting incident, this was an 
established coping mechanism:
Q. True, true, didn't know i f  you noticed any difference in that, i f  you noticed
any increase in alcohol intake or self-medicating?
A. I  got to tell you something, it was a steady — I  think the adrenaline and all
the rush from doing all that stuff you maintain a level o f  self-medication so 
definitely but when those things happen it's — I  wouldn't say more, I'd just 
say even
So that, when his shooting occurred, Chris immediately turned to his go-to coping 
mechanism, even in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Chris notes that he 
experienced cottonmouth as one of his stress responses and, when another officer asked 
him if he needed anything, he recalls that he “was like, I could use a drink. And I think I 
was meaning like I could use a drink and he was like, ‘what do you want?’ I realized Diet 
Coke or whatever.” Soon after he returned home after his shooting, he was able to get 
the drink he had been referring to:
A. ...I went upstairs to my room and tried to lay down and I  was like, Fuck it.
I  literally laid down fo r  five seconds, got up, went downstairs, made 
myself a big, big drink with almost no coke or anything like that. Then
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just drank, drank, drank. I  just kind o f  chilled. And I  think maybe I  closed 
my eyes but then I  would get up. My phone was ringing o ff the hook so I  
threw that through the fucking window because, you know, ju st people 
wanting to know what happened. So I  eventually just turned it o ff andfor 
the next week it was just the same routine, drink, stay awake, and don't do 
anything, no eating, no nothing...
Q. What are you drinking?
A. Captain, Captain Morgan. Captain with literally no more than a splash o f
soda.
The problem was that, as Chris noted, his turn to alcohol as a coping mechanism
did not involve just that one drink, instead he acknowledges that he was a “heavy, heavy
drinker, heavy drinker, and then after the shooting I became— you couldn’t register the
amount of alcohol I was drinking.” Several of those people close to Chris recognized
that he was drinking quite a bit, although several participants admit that their knowledge
of his drinking was largely secondhand. However, the following observations were made
about his drinking following his shooting:
I  think I  saw him — the next time I  saw him was at the FOP and it was one o f  
those, Hey, brother, how you doing things. And he was, Yeah, I ’m good, you 
know, everything is great, and immediately the conversation turned to, you know, 
who is buying the next round. It quickly turned to that.
... when we were over at his house studying, I  did notice he was drinking a whole 
lot but, you know, everybody deals with things their own way. Personally I  was 
really hoping it wouldn't damage him fo r  life. I  was hoping he would come back 
to work.
... not that I  know by my own knowledge but I  heardfrom someone else that he 
had been drinking a lot and I  was worried about that, too, but when I  talked to 
him he never gave me any feedback o f whether he was drinking too much or not, 
but I  heard from other sources that he may have been drinking a little much.
Q. How would you describe his coping mechanisms?
A. Self-medicating with alcohol a lot.
Q. Okay. So a lot, a lot like —
A. Like a lot. Like too much.
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Q. Okay. And behavioral changes with that, did it impact the anger or did it
just -
A. Yeah, you know, he's not — he was drunk a lot, but he's never been a
violent drunk. So he became — and even before when he drank he was like 
a happy-go-lucky drunk so he went from being a happy-go-lucky drunk to 
just an angry drunk, not a violent drunk, an angry drunk
...I don't think Chris drank during that. I  don't know i f  he did or not. I  never had
a drink with him...
With some of these examples, it is clear that alcohol was not only a form of 
suppressing or avoiding emotions, but also, such as the example with the FOP, was an 
attempt at managing impressions and trying to present that he was still the same happy- 
go-luck guy that was always ready to have a good time. Apparently, he was either 
somewhat successful managing his impression, or, more likely, the participant that 
thought Chris was not drinking during this time period was exhibiting signs of avoidance 
himself through deliberate ignorance.
When discussing whether or not his use of alcohol as a coping mechanism 
impacted other areas of his life or if he was taking professional and personal risks due to 
his drinking, he made the following statements:
Q. When you were going into work like that, were you going in drunk at all?
A. Uh-uh, no.
Q. Hung over?
A. Yeah, like a champ.
Q. Okay.
A. Big time.
Q. How long would you stop drinking before you had to go to work?
A. God, I  definitely stopped at least eight hours, at least. One o f  the things I
didn't want to happen is kind o f  mar the whole issue by like coming in and 
doing something fucked up but I'd be miserable because understand, I  
wasn't eating anything. So I  wouldjust drink and go to sleep and i f  I  
wasn't feeling like I  would go to work or could go to work I'd just let them 
know, Hey, don't even — fuck it, I'm sick today...
Q. All right. So you weren't going to work drunk Were you going anywhere
else?
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A. Going anywhere else?
Q. Were you driving? Were you —
A. Oh, no, I  situated myself. Where I  was is where I stayed.
Q. Okay.
A. Somebody around that time before the shooting or something — Oh, God, 
[another officer] got jammed up fo r  that and had a lot ofpeople get 
jammed up for that, and I  think maybe on a handful o f  occasions that I  
ever tried to make it back to a house, but not after that shooting, no, that 
was — I  was getting rides.
What becomes quite interesting is that this may be an example of impression 
management after the fact, as another participant made these comments:
Q. So other than the drinking, were there any other more self-destructive
behaviors that you were worried about?
A. Drinking and driving.
Q. Okay.
A. Not a big proponent o f  that at all.
Q. No, most people aren't.
A. Right, but I  think — again, I  think he was at the point, I  ju st don't care. He
was at the point, I  just don't care.
Q. Did he drink and drive at any point?
A. Yes.
Q. That you know of?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That's a very different answer than what I  was given. So how
often?
A. Maybe — well, maybe four or five times unless I  caught a case o f  the ass
and ripped into him about it. I  was like, Really, do you want to be on the 
front page o f the paper, you know, because you will be. Is this worth it?
Is your career worth it? Again, I'm not being a hypocrite. I'm not saying 
I've never done it; however, will you be a little smarter? Be smart, right 
now, I  mean, drink at home, don't go nowhere. So, yes, we — it was a few  
times before 1 got a case o f the ass about it.
Q. Okay. After that did it curtail?
A. Oh, yes.
Even though Chris, as he has noted, was able to again manage his drinking, he still uses it
as a coping mechanism:
...I will tell you that it went away and it became manageable and I  would 
only just be social with the stress o f  dealing with other officers and I  didn't
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realize it. [Wife] comes in and says, You're drinking way too much. I  
would literally with dealing with it, not even thinking about it, go home 
and start drinking. I  never get violent, I  never get emotional or anything 
like that. It was one o f  those muscle memory kind o f  things drinking, 
drinking. I  wasn't even me. I  wouldjust drink and fa ll asleep and then 
wake up. That was it, but it was significant.
This continued use of alcohol as a coping mechanism had not escaped the
attention of those close to him, as noted in other participants’ responses. One respondent,
for example, made the following statement about Chris’ drinking:
Chris drinks a lot. I  mean, Chris raises drinking to like an Olympic level, and I'm 
an Irish cop and I'm telling you, I  think that guy drinks a lot, and it's not like he 
drinks just a lot o f  light beer. He drinks rum specifically.
I  think Chris' coping mechanisms, I  think a lot o f  what he uses is — well, you 
know, he drinks a lot. He drinks a shit ton.
Another participant, in discussing both Chris’ drinking and his own, provided a very
perceptive response when asked if Chris’ drinking was a “problem:”
I  think that any o f  us who drink — because I  can tell you, I  drink a lot. I  can drink 
15 pints o f  beer in a single evening and get up and go to work. So we would not 
classify ourselves as having an issue. The problem is, why are you — why does 
15 pints o f  beer seem normal to you when most people are either, A, passed out 
or, B, throwing up? I  have never seen Chris where he could not perform. I  have 
never seen Chris — and believe me, when we've traveled we’ve definitely both 
indulged. I've never seen Chris falling down drunk. I  have never seen him get 
louder than he normally would be. I  have never seen him so bad the next morning 
that he could not get up and function when he needed to. So to categorize that as 
a problem based on observation, I  would say it has not affected his work 
performance that I  could see, but then again, I've never seen him when he has not 
had a drop to drink for a month. Who knows? A t that point he may be a 
superstar, even more productive than he is now, but as it is right now he is still 
someone who you can go to fo r  good ideas to get hard work done when it needs to 
be done, and you can count on Chris when you need to have somebody to count 
on. You can count on him to get things done. So to say would I  categorize it as a 
problem, professionally I  would say no. Personally I  would say that’s probably 
not doing any justice to his liver.
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Again, Chris may be attempting to manage impressions when discussing his 
current alcohol use and intake, and this is particularly evident in the following exchange 
between the researcher and Chris during an interview, seen below. He not only appears 
to attempt to manage the impression he is providing to the researcher, but he also appears 
to attempt to manage the impression he gives to his wife:
A. So since then, like maybe a month or two ago I  stopped so I  don't drink
during the week, maybe have one or two during the weekend. I  literally 
made that change and I  think I  only can make that or have only been able 
to do that because o f  I  know what the result is. I  know it's going to wind 
up being stupid. So it's sort o f self-monitoring; however, I  didn’t 
recognize it right away, which is kind o f  a little bit freaky but 
somebody — and that's the importance ofputting home first. My wife 
goes, Hey, you're drinking way too much. So then I  was like, Okay. And  
then you make the effort to change.
Q. Did that kind o f  scare you at all, especially given some o f  the statistics?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. To be honest with you, no.
Q. Okay.
A. It concerned me that it concerned her.
Q. Okay.
A. To be as honest as you can be. I  said, Okay, you know what, maybe that's
the case. The problem was there was no-overt act. I  don't go out and
drink. I  don't go — i f  I  go out and I  have a drink, somebody else is driving. 
It's just one o f these things where I'm not going to make it 17 years here 
and then just get a DUI and get kicked out. That's ju st ridiculous and I  
wouldn't want to hurt somebody. So it's only at home. I  never go out and 
act stupid, you know, I  never do something crazy at somebody's house, 
standing on the roof. But it was literally one o f  those, Hey, you're 
drinking too much. So that's what made it difficult obviously. You're 
drinking too much. Well, what am I  doing wrong? Nothing, you know,
I'm not really affecting anybody other than health issue. I  did the whole 
during the week, I  don't drink; however, I  had a four-day weekend and I  
have three-day weekends now.
Chris was not the only participant to acknowledge alcohol use as a coping 
mechanism. As noted earlier, one participant stated that “we all drink a little bit,”
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referring to police officers drinking habits and suggesting that this is a normal and
accepted practice. Yet, there were two participants who clearly stated that they either
rarely drink or do not drink at all. Even though the one participant suggested that
drinking is a recognized component o f the police culture, another participant recognized
that there is a very negative side of drinking to escape or avoid the stressors associated
with the job, as this participant discussed his own drinking habits, he became quite
emotional as he made the following admission:
I  don't drink liquor. I  drink a lot — I  love good wine, but you know, I'm not 
opposed to stopping by 7-Eleven on the way home and picking up a case o f  beer 
and ju st sitting totally alone. I  don't — you know, and I  hate this because I  feel 
like it takes away from my ability to be a goodfather. But you just — you know, I  
just want to sit and watch something on TV that is mindless. I  don't have to think, 
you know, have a couple o f drinks and ju s t sit and that's it. You know, I  know — I  
know I  should work out. I  know I  should get some exercise. I  know I  should do 
all these other things and just don't because at the time that I  am involved in that I  
just really don't give a fuck, to be honest with you. That's really what it come 
down to. Ijust don't have anything left. Iju st don't have anything left to give. 
There's no energy left.
This participant was not the only one to recognize the negative impacts of utilizing 
alcohol as a coping tool. In fact, another participant pointed out that, in terms of 
providing peer support or being a good friend to a fellow officer who has been involved 
in a critical incident, drinking should not be encouraged. As astutely stated by this 
participant, “don’t be the first one to suggest like, let’s go to the bar and talk about it. 
That’s probably not a good thing.. .when you know a guy likes to drink, it’s probably not 
a good idea to go like, hey, let’s go drink about what’s really fucking bothering you.”
The emergence of this particular theme was not surprising as it is suggested in the 
literature and has been observed that the use of alcohol is a normative feature o f the 
police culture, used to celebrate achievements and accomplishments as well as to drown
failures and pain. This theme takes on additional weight in the current analysis because 
in my impact and inform how an individual attempts to manage his or her impression.
The use of alcohol as a coping mechanism may impair judgment and functioning at work 
and at home, possibly leading to role frustration as noted by the participant who disclosed 
its impact on his ability to be a good parent and Chris’ discussions of its impact in his 
marriage. Additionally, the use of alcohol may also increase poor decision making and 
risk taking, such as driving drunk, although the officer involved may vehemently deny 
both as a form of impression management. These features, as well as the interplay 
between alcohol and the other themes discussed in the current study, are likely to be of 
particular significance to supervisors, fellow officers, CISM team members and QMHP 
who will need to attempt to intervene and mitigate problematic alcohol use. These 
interventions may be particularly difficult for the men and women operating within the 
police agency, as they too may view the use of alcohol to be an acceptable and normal 
coping strategy, and may possibly utilize this strategy themselves.
Sub Theme 2: Anger/Aggression
While the use of alcohol, and specifically Chris’ use o f alcohol, was a dominant 
theme that emerged across numerous participant interviews another symptom or coping 
mechanism that emerged just as frequently in multiple participants was that of anger. 
Anger, as expressed in many of the comments below, is likely a more acceptable and 
normative response, much like the use o f alcohol, in the police culture. This default to 
anger is likely a form of impression management, employed to mask vulnerability and/or 
feelings of helplessness or impotence, as well as to express emotion in a format that 
receives masculine approval and support. One participant provided a fantastic
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perspective on anger as a coping response in policing and how that anger, unchecked, can
permeate an officer’s personal life.
You know, you go to a domestic violence call where a family member has just had 
the brakes beaten off o f  them and you just got to wonder, you know, you're pissed, 
you're angry, and then you look at this life, you look at the life these people lead. 
There's kids everywhere, you know, it's just like these kids are ju st destinedfor 
failure, you know. How are you going to break this cycle?
Well, then you take that back to your station house or your precinct and you get 
o ff work and you, you know, go home and now you have your spouse who is being 
a bitch or spent money that they weren't supposed to or is giving you a hard time 
or a kid who is being what appears to be disrespectful and chances are, they just 
don't know any better at the time, you know, they're having their own issues 
because you're gone all the damn time. So when you are there and all you want 
to do is sit in silence and not have anybody mess with you, but the insurance 
payment is due, the grass hasn't been cut, nobody took the trash out. Your kid is 
failing a class, you know, you start going into cop mode on your family. Well, 
they don't deal well with that.
In this case, Chris exhibited an anger response in the immediate aftermath of the
shooting, as seen in the two excerpts below. This use o f anger as a mask for vulnerability
is alluded to at the end of the second excerpt, where Chris partially admits to the fear that
would have manifested had he run out of bullets during the shooting incident.
Anger. Well, you know, depending on the first — I  can tell you the exact time that 
I  came into it as a real abrupt emotional response was what, the second they were 
trying to place him in custody and I  walked away from  him, I  was livid that he 
made me do it, clear as day. It was very vivid and I  walked around and I  kicked 
the cooler o f sodas over. I  remember doing that. I  was absolutely out o f  my mind 
angry with the individual for forcing my hand.
Now, then it transitions to obviously going through the various changes, 
emotional stages, but it was such an acute point in the instant, that was the one 
time without a doubt I  went from, you know, just being — just going from survival 
to the threat is gone. The second the threat was gone, immediate anger, 
immediate anger, and then it dissipates a little bit and then obviously going into 
like an irritability or being the hypersensitive and then it takes on all these 
differentforms. So it's not anger o f the thing like, Grrrr. Initially it was that.
Then it was becoming angry at all the various, you know, emotional 
inconsistencies, like having to gauge to how I  responded to somebody so that they 
wouldn't think I  was, you know, too upset or too angry -  or not angry but just 
unsettled, and then you get irritated and it was a natural progression, I  would
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imagine, so would become irritable at certain things and those little things that 
would just make you irritate, you'd hold back a little bit, but by the time it blew up 
it goes into that you're angry at it and then you're angry at people fo r  creating 
like the next chain o f the events that would occur...
Then you realize what's going on and then I  became angry that the people even 
initiated but then it would also be anger at myself fo r  allowing something as 
stupid as that. So it's not just a very linear thing, it's multiple and conceptual.
He was like you've got a job to do. He wasn't there so I  know he's not 
emotionally, you know, influenced by anything. He's like, Well, all right, you 
know, how many times did you shoot? Because he was Car 8 so he had to — he's 
ultimately responsible right now as fa r  as for this investigation getting kicked o ff  
and notification. So I  remember thinking, Man, he's got a lot o f  shit to do, and 
you know, I  caused it, and he's like, How many times did you shoot? And I  
remember I  was still being pissed. I  was still maintaining like, Fuck, I  can't 
believe he made me do that. I  was like, I  don't know, fucking a lot. Like 
very — like that's a dumb question. Not realizing no one was there, no one knew 
how long it was before no one showed up, but I  remember saying — and 
something like I  was like, I  don't know, fucking a lot, and he takes my gun. I  hand 
him my gun. I  unload it, give it to him. He kind o f  looks at the magazine, sees 
there's nothing in there, ejects the round. He goes, Holy shit, you have one round 
left. I  remember thinking flat, Oh, my God, if I  would have shot again that slide 
would have locked back. I  don't know what the fuck  I  would have done.
This tendency towards anger did not dissipate once the initial surge of emotions
passed. Chris noticed this change, finding that he
Q. Did you notice before the shooting that you had any o f  those clearly vivid
anger moment like you talked about or did you see those more after the 
shooting?
A. No, God, that was — maybe three or four times in my entire life I've ever
been like that. Other than that I'd get frustrated, but that was truly — that 
was legitimate anger. I've never — that kind o f  anger maybe three or four  
times in my life. That being the apex o f  it. Other than that, it’s been 
frustration, irritability, and just being a dick.
Another participant also noticed this change in Chris, observing that,
I  mean, he was angry a lot and not so much at me but just at anything, like 
anything that would make him angry. O f course he was angry at work. You 
know, the conditions at work and things that wouldn't make him angry before that
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would be like, Oh, whatever, you know, that was like a big deal and everything.
Everything made him angry. I  don't think there was one thing that didn't make
him angry.
A particular incident involving anger and jealousy was relayed by Chris and his wife, as 
Chris’ reaction was so extreme and marked a significant moment in their relationship. As 
Chris recalled,
A. Irritability or angry outburst. Oh, yeah, definitely, definitely.
Q. Talk to me about it.
A. Definitely I  think the most significant one was almost when me and
[girlfriend] split up. We were out somewhere at Nags Head and some 
guy, she was doing karaoke and some guy came up and hugged her or like 
gave her a kiss on the cheek andfucking lost — I  went from  zero to like 
five-million miles an hour.
Q. What did you do?
A. Well, [a friend] gracefully escorted me out because I  was going to kill the
guy. I  was going to fucking rip his head off. I  was so pissed. And it 
wasn't like a — it wasn't a jealous thing. It was like I  can't believe this 
mother fucker — which was even worse fo r  me because i f  it was a jealousy 
thing, get over it kind o f thing. I  ju st went — that was the one time I  
realized. I  said, Oh, this is an issue. Now I'm sure I ’ve done it — /  
couldn't tell you when, but i f  someone said something I'd  be like, Oh, shut 
the fuck up, or get out o f  my face, but that one was — she's like, We're 
done. You're fucking insane.
Q. Okay.
A. Because it was — people were scared and initially afterwards, I  was
scared.
Q. Tell me what exactly you did.
A. I  think I  said something to [my friend]. I  was like, Do you believe what
this fucking guy — and then he was like, Whoa, whoa, whoa, because we 
were at the Jolly Roger and he’s kind o f like — I  was like, Fuck that. And 
so now everybody is looking at me andfucking[friend] is dragging me out 
and we wound up going outside and I  wound up going back to the — not 
the room but the house or where we were staying at.
Q. Okay.
A. It was ugly.
Q. So tell me about the aftermath.
A. She was no bounds about it. She was like, You need to — you need to do
something because this is crazy.
Q Okay.
A. So that was probably the catalyst. That was the one — that's the one I
remember the best. I  was like, Nope, I  can't do that anymore.
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His wife recalls the incident this way,
A. And we had a little episode, not sure i f  he talked about it.
Q. I'm thinking yes.
A. During my birthday week in Nags Head.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Loved at that time to karaoke. Me and my girlfriend, I  think we sang a 
song together at some rundown — I  think it was a Jolly Rancher in Nags 
Head and some drunk guy, just as nice as he could be, Oh, that's beautiful, 
and you know, just hugged me and maybe kissed me like on the cheek or 
the ear or something, and boom, here comes Chris, Oh, what the fuck, you 
know, just never seen him like that.
Q. Oh, wow.
A. And then I  — you know, he w  like (demonstrating). I'm like, Shut up. I
think, [Chris ’friend] was there. One o f  his friends because [he] was 
dating [my girlfriend] at the time and somehow we wound up outside, and 
I  remember telling him, I  dated you, meaning the jealous type o f  guy, and I  
will not do it again. This is not going to happen, and I  remember asking 
[Chris’friend] that night, I'm like, Is he like this? You know, because 
again, my birthday is in May. The shooting was in April and we hadn't 
dated before. So is this how it is? And [Chris’ friend] was like, I  don't 
know. You know, because guys don't know what to say to guys. Yeah, the 
jealousy kind o f  got bad and me and [her ex] being friends, he was very 
jealous o f  my friendship with [the ex] because [the ex] and I  were 
engaged before.
Additionally, anger may also serve as a tool to facilitate withdrawal and isolation, as
evidenced in the following excerpt.
No one is going to fuck with you after you've just been involved in a shooting. No 
one is going to be like, Hey, shut up, dick But after a while that wears on people 
and they're like, Hey, dick head, you're fucking like yelling at everything. I  was 
like, Fuck you. I  would revert to being like, Oh, you fucking suck, you know, just 
kind o f  over the top, but you really aren't just being subtle about it.
Again, not only is this a form of impression management to avoid displaying 
“softer” emotions, but there was also a degree of impression management that was 
observed as participants explained various ways anger manifested. The researcher noted 
the use of synonymous words, such as frustration, irritability or aggression, and there
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were discussions of how anger is not synonymous with violence, as well as vocal versus 
physical aggression.
A. People would piss me o ff and I  think I  was more vocal with it, but I  think
as being aggressive as a physical act and I...
Q. And not in any other aspect either, no punching walls, that kind o f  stuff?
A. No, no, I've never been like that. Probably because I  mostly vocalize
everything. I  didn't hold anything in and I  had held a lot o f  s tu ff in there 
but not — I  can't pinpoint a part
A. But I  mean, he just -- again, it's a difference between he wasn't violent, he
was angry.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. A lot. He didn't punch shit in here. He didn't — it was — you know how
you have just angry people. He was just angry at that point, not violent. I  
don't think I've ever seen him violent.
In informal conversations, Chris and the researcher have discussed the McElvain 
and Kposowa (2008) finding that officers who have been involved in one shooting 
incident are 50% more likely to be involved in another shooting incident. Theoretically, 
there are several plausible reasons for this finding, to include the ecology of the area or 
beat to which the officer is assigned (Fyfe 1980, Kania and Mackey 1977, Klinger 1997, 
Terrill and Reisig 2003, Werthman and Piliavin 1967). Another potential explanation is 
that several o f the post-trauma symptoms discussed and disclosed in the current research, 
such as hypervigilence, anger, or anxiety, may predispose the officer to get into violent 
altercations. In short, there may be a form of self-fulfilling prophecy operating in that the 
officer is paradoxically so hyperaware of his or her surroundings and afraid o f being in 
another shooting that he or she may be more aggressive or combative, potentially 
escalating situations that may not have resulted in violence previously. These concerns, 
which are theoretically and practically supported, were discussed on numerous occasions 
with Chris, and he disclosed a fear o f freezing or not being able to perform, which may
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result in injury to a colleague. In one interview, he addressed how the increased 
aggression he experienced in the aftermath of his shooting was like a double-edged 
blade...
A. Well, I  think the increased aggression, I  think more than increased
aggression. It was a fear o f an increased aggression because I  remember 
coming back down the search warrant and being concerned that I  would 
be hypervigilant or just completely go beyond like have a hair trigger kind 
o f thing.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So it was a fear but I  didn't see the increased — I  didn't see an increased
aggression. People would piss me o ff and I  think I  was more vocal with it,
but I  think as being aggressive as a physical act and I  —
Q. Okay.
A. I  probably in taking people down afterwards, especially during
search warrants, was probably more forceful, which maybe might 
have been a good thing, but as fa r  as increased aggression but the fear o f  
having that increase.
Although this study focused on Chris and his shooting incident, it is important to 
acknowledge that other participants referenced their own anger in response to a shooting 
incident, as described below.
A. That was fo r  two reasons. Like I  said, I  screwed up and got in an
argument with my corporal. One, I  was trying to save my cushy job  in 
Narcotics.
Q. Okay.
A. Two, I  did realized that maybe some things had changed about me. I  was
a lot angrier than I  usually am.
Q. Okay. So what do you mean you were angrier than you usually are?
A. Well, I'm pretty angry all the time so they call me angry black guy, but I
guess because o f  the things that happened after the shooting, the dealing 
with workmen's comp, trying to get paid, you know, the treatment that I  
kind o f  receivedfrom the department, as fa r  as them trying to kick me out. 
I  took two bullets for this city and then, you know, them proceeding to try 
to kick me out o f  Narcotics, I  voluntarily went and saw somebody, you 
know, try to deal with my anger issues in reference to the shooting.
Q. Did those come home at all? Did you notice you were angry at home,
too?
A. No, no.
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This manifestation of anger and the potential negative career ramifications from being 
hostile, aggressive and insubordinate to an officer of higher rank was also disclosed by 
Chris, where he recalls the incident below. This is important because it highlights how 
supervisors need to be aware of personality and behavior changes in the aftermath of a 
critical incident, as these may be a symptom of a larger problem that requires 
intervention.
... I  can tell you some o f the — he was a lieutenant at the time, said something to 
me like, What, are you just going to just like take off, you know, all the time? And  
fo r  some reason — like blame it on this [anger or irritability] or whatever and I  
was, you know, detective. I  was like, Go fu ck  your — I  didn't go for, Hey, man, 
that ain't cool. I  went from listening to him to yelling at him to where he was like, 
You need to get the fuck out o f my face. I  was like, Well, you go fuck  yourself.
You don't know shit about shit.
Another participant, likely without intent, disclosed two instances o f anger or aggression,
one in relation to the murder of an officer in 2006 and the other related to the frustration
of not being able to close a homicide case:
I  mean, I  knew all three like officers, the last three officers that have been killed 
here, but I  didn't know them well, you know what I  mean, but I  didn't see the 
firs t — but that last one... 1 mean, I  seen him fucking dying on the street, but I  
mean, I  was just more pissed... Like you know, these scum bags in this country, 
you know. It's like just no respect. I  mean, I  was out for, you know, I  wanted to 
go get the dude. I  wanted to be the one to go find  him, you know what I  mean.
A. ... between all these other homicides, you know, I  mean, anybody would be 
crazy to be like this. Oh, man, you've seen some fucked up shit. You've 
got to be fucked up, but the reality is, you know, what really does fuck me 
up about it?
Q. What?
A. Fucking not solving it. That I  would say honestly is what bothers me.
Now, not about this but just talking like a particular case and not having
the answers fo r  that sticks with me.
Q. That I  can definitely understand.
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A. Like that [one] case, that's haunted me since 2008, never left me. Not that
it's — it's just my mind is always like how can I  not fin d  the answers to get 
this guy. That's —see —
Q. I  definitely get that one.
A. Not the whole, but it's just like, you know, this son o f a bitch and
especially, too, because she's a real victim. She's not some shit bag selling 
dope. That is like what really bothers me.
In the course of the current study, it became evident that anger or an anger-like 
response was often a fa?ade for a deeper emotion. Occasionally, the vulnerability or 
softer emotion the participant was afraid to display— be it because of the fear of stigma or 
some other justification for the need to manage impressions— would be exposed, other 
times, it was not as obvious. These reactions also have ties to the thematic exploration of 
gender and machismo seen in this chapter, as this may also proscribe that anger is a more 
accepted response within the police culture. If family, colleagues, supervisors or even 
mental health providers observe increased anger and hostility in an officer that has been 
involved in a critical incident, it may be worth the effort of attempting to peel back the 
emotional response to determine if and what is actually driving the anger. Addressing the 
underlying emotion or concern may help the officer understand, reduce, or at least better 
manage, the anger he or she is experiencing.
Sub Theme 3: Observations o f  Personality or Demeanor Changes
Chapter Four provided the reader with a detailed methodology that was employed 
in the current study. While the interviews conducted with participants were free form in 
nature, many of the interviews followed a very lose structure of speaking specifically to 
Chris’ shooting—the case involved in the study—before broadening the discussion to 
address other traumatic incidents. This allowed the researcher to explore the relationship
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each participant had with Chris prior to the shooting—to include their first impressions of
Chris—as well as explore what changes, both temporary and lasting, they noticed in both
Chris and their relationship with Chris.
First impressions of Chris prior to the shooting were relatively consistent, noting
his engaging and vibrant demeanor, sense of humor and gregarious nature, as evidenced
in the various descriptions provided below. These descriptions also suggest Chris’
commitment to his job, and the police culture, as well as how the nature of police work
can forge strong bonds between colleagues.
He was a goojball. He actually sat next to me. That's probably how I  got to know 
him. There was probably 50 people in the class, all different jurisdictions in the 
class and he was — I  remember him being tattooed and 1 remember thinking 
sitting in the class next to him, we're in an undercover school, and what fool is 
going to buy drugs from him more than once when he has permanent tattoos on 
his arms. That's what I  remember thinking. But he was a cutup, very funny, good 
personality. Again, first impressions. Later I  learned very hard-worker, very 
dedicated to work. He was a nice-looking man obviously. Funny, I  guess funny  
would probably be a cutup...In general like Chris is one o f those people I'm sure 
that people will say this about him as well, he can f i t  in anywhere so he couldfit 
in with scholars, he couldfit in with the homeless. He couldfit in with the 
working class. It doesn't matter where he's at, he couldfit in. So while we had 
one-on-one interaction because he sat next to me, he could have the same 
interaction with the other 48 people in the class, too, and be ju st as comfortable. 
So it was kind o f  a mix o f both... Fun-loving, caring, good guy, easy to talk to, 
makes people laugh, and I  knew that from  the years that I've known him, made me 
laugh, ju st a good guy, and I  knew again from when I  met him to that point that he 
was a very hard worker. I  know he worked a lot. I  knew he didn't have a very 
good marriage at that point...
Chris has a very vibrant, energetic, charismatic way about him and that is a 
typical Aquarium trait and it was not a surprise. His birthday is right before 
mine. So we got along really well, clearly super funny guy, sense o f  humor that 
is — that runs the gamut from absolutely positively offensive to that's just so smart 
I  don't think most people in the room are going to get it. So he has the ability to 
go at will, which is the great thing. It's not an accident. He can go at will 
between those two ends and it went until 2007 when I  got transferred that I  talked 
to him and didn't really talk to him that much anymore because he was in — he
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took my spot in Homicide...But always the same type — always the same type o f  
person, very energetic, very out there, and it seemed very genuine.
A. ...Cool kid. We had a good time together. Initially me and him were on 
the SWAT team initially and then between one or both o f  us getting hurt 
we ended up just going back to Narcotics...And then we stayed in 
Narcotics and got in the same squad... We ju st had a ball, you know, so we 
all just got so tight together, like our squad come in in the morning, 
worked long hours together, loved each other like brothers, you know, and 
that's the way our relationship ju s t grew.
Q. ...So can you describe his demeanor and sort o f  interactions with people? 
A. Yeah, very cool, down to earth. He's not like — like the kind o f  person I  
am, I'm the kind that I  don't judge people. Ijudge the situation and the 
choices they make. So unfortunately our paths happened to cross while 
I'm at work and you're going what you do, so I  got to do my job  and put 
you in ja il the right way. Chris is the same way. I  mean, he doesn't abuse 
his authority. I've never seen him like even though we have old people 
when we arrested them, I  never seen him abuse that, you know, like all the 
guys that I  consider dear friends, all o f us have the same mindset.
So Chris is the same way. 1 mean, he does his job well, doesn't abuse his 
authority. He knows how to relate to people. Me and him together, we're 
so much alike. We grew up in the department together. So we're pretty 
much the same kind o f  people.
What attracted me to him were those tattoos. Gosh, who in the world is this guy 
getting all these tattoos? The name Scallon but I  used to call him scallion for  
onion. It was kind o f  funny because I  called him that one day and he was like,
Oh, God, as i f  I  hadn't heard that before, and o f  course my firs t thought was this 
guy is a dick and then I  thought about and then I  thought, Oh, well, you know, i f  
he's had that name all these years I'm sure he's heard it a thousand times... Then I  
switched up and said, Well, maybe I  was a dick for calling him that... Somewhere 
in there there was a big switch where, you know, some o f us, we were doing real 
narcotic work. We decided that we're going to grow our hair out and we're just 
going to go all in to this thing and it's real funny because at the time I  was 
growing out my locks. Chris was growing his hair, too. So I  mean, we got a little 
bit closer because o f that and we would go to DC together to the police memorial, 
just hanging out and doing narcotic work together. We became really 
tight...From the start I  knew that guy was really smart. You know, I  listened to 
the way he talked to people and saw the way that he interacted with people. I  
knew that he was really smart and i f  he wanted to he could go really far in this 
police department.
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I  had met him way before then but my — he was ju st one o f many, many officers 
on the department who you would see around a lot. You didn't necessarily know 
who they were. I  believe he was assigned to Vice & Narcotics fo r  a lot o f  years. I  
remember he had this real long hair, you know, and I  used to think, you know, 
that's got to get in the way, you know. But I  always knew who he was and he was 
always pleasant. He always went out o f his way to speak, just a very, very 
friendly guy and when he was involved in his shooting incident I  knew who he 
was. I  really didn't know him well.
He's from New York, you know, I'm from New York, too, so he was cool. Funny 
guy, you know, liked to party, you know, hung out, you know, just like one o f  the 
guys. He was like a cop's cop. He wasn't into, you know, the corny stu ff o f  police 
work, you know, writing traffic tickets and stuff like that. He was more into a 
little bit more dangerous, going undercover, you know, we both were, all the 
people we worked with. That was our thing, was we didn’t want to really kind o f  
do that regular stuff. We were exciting but doing the little bit more adventurous 
things...he takes things like, you know, personal, especially i f  you call in to his 
integrity or — because he prides himself on how he does his job  and stu ff like 
that... it's hard to kind o f  gauge Chris because Chris is happy-go-lucky and i f  
there's a good time to be had, he's definitely not going to be Debbie Downer.
This last description of initial impressions o f Chris, much as disclosed by another 
participant noted his use of humor to avoid and deflect, evidence his facility with 
impression management and some of his coping mechanisms in place prior to the 
shooting incident.
Most participants noticed changes in Chris’ behavior and demeanor in the 
aftermath of his shooting incident. Some of these changes were noticed immediately, 
others took time to develop. In terms of length o f time until Chris was “better,” the time 
frame provided ranged from a year and a half to three years. Some changes were easier 
to observe (and, in one participant’s case, rationalize or explain away) because they were 
physical. Other changes were more ephemeral. Many of these observations were 
distressing or caused the participants sadness, and most participants appeared to have
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been very concerned for Chris’ well being at different points during this period. The
collection of excerpts below document those changes observed.
Just distraught, torn up from killing somebody, being involved in that. I  think his 
adrenaline had dumped but he couldn’t rest after that and he was just sad, sad 
and that was hard because I  had not — I  don't think I  had seen him sad. I  don’t 
think I  had seen him sad like that before... I  guess people kept calling him nonstop 
on his cell phone and I  believe at one point he finally just turned it off. He 
didn't — he tried to sleep but maybe he'd sleep fo r  like five minutes and then shake 
andjar awake out o f like a fear. I  guess I  would assume nightmares that he had 
andjust sad... At that point Ijust think he was sad. He was depressed that he had 
killed somebody. Eventually his biggest thing, I  can't believe I  had to kill 
somebody... it eventually got harder but it was hardfor me to see him sad and 
distraught about that and I  wouldn't want to take somebody's life, even i f  they had 
shot at me either... He had a lot o f  guilt about killing another person. ..I think he 
needed like I  got to be with somebody, 1 got to be next to somebody, even though 
I'm not being nice to them, I  got to be with somebody, a lot, let's just say a lot.
... he lost his light. That’s how I  describe it because Chris has a light. His 
personality is very bright and he lost that light, like it was a 200-watt bulb that 
went down to like 20. That's the best way I  can describe it. He lost his light and 
it was very, very dim.
Chris' hands shake all the time and I  asked him specifically i f  that has always 
been something he had and he's like, No, and I  let it go because I  knew — I  could 
pretty much guess where that demarcation line was from, when they didn't until 
where they did. So if  you watch Chris eat you can see that his hands — it's almost 
like an onset o f  Parkinson's when you watch him. He has that shaking, quivering, 
and he can be in a discussion where he seems perfectly level-headed and rational 
and still kind o f enjoying himself and it’s — but you see that and it’s anybody that 
recognizes that in people, that type o f  behavior, you know, it screams like a 
beacon that there's something that caused that because that's not normal.
A. Yeah, initially he had a lot o f  guilt that he had to kill that guy, which is
Chris, you know what I'm saying. He's a good guy, like 90 percent o f cops
don't want to shoot anybody.
Q- And when you saw Chris, did you notice anything about him right after the
shooting?
A. Yeah, he seemed pretty stressed.
Q- So how so?
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A. He was definitely not jovial like he normally is and he was looking a little
sad and I  was hoping he was going to he okay and I  couldn't get to him to 
talk to him like I  wanted to but like I  said, shortly after that is when I  gave 
him that first phone call.
Q. Okay. So you talked about his demeanor. He wasn't as jovial. What
about your first interactions with him when you were firs t able to talk to 
him?
A. When we first face-to-face talked, he teared up a little bit and Ife lt fo r
him, you know, and we just talked about what happened and he was 
feeling so bad and I  just kept trying to push him, you know, he was feeling 
so guilty about what he had to do, and I  kept trying to push to him, You 
don’t have to do this but you could see the pain in his face.
Q. So other than those immediate changes, did you notice any other changes
in his personality, demeanor, behavior?
A. Yeah, he lost a lot o f  weight. He was a little bit bigger than he is now.
But he lost significant amount o f  weight quickly. He had his place but he 
would stay home a lot. Like back in the day we would work hard and then 
go to the FOP, you know, everybody would play pool and drink and play 
cards. He started doing that kind o f  stuff, you know, and he kind ofjust 
like stayed to himself a lot, which initially I  was really worried about him, 
but he then kind o f  — like I  don't think not even initially, he just kind o f  like 
went away from the group a little bit. Because like I  said, we were all so 
close and you know, we would do things on duty all the time, o ff duty all 
the time, things like that... Yeah, like when he started to withdraw a little 
bit seems like next time I  saw him he had lost so much weight. Next time 
he lost even more, and then not that I  know by my own knowledge but I  
heardfrom someone else that he had been drinking a lot and I  was 
worried about that, too
Q. So what about any changes after the shooting? Did you notice anything
with Chris?
A. Personally, no. I  heard that it took him a while to come back to work.
Q. Okay.
A. And that's understandable. Nobody gets on this job, nobody joins the
police department with the intent to kill somebody...Nobody does that and 
Pm sure it was pretty hardfor him... Yeah, I  heard he didn't go back to 
work fo r  a little while. He lost a lot o f weight. I  could tell he lost a lot o f  
weight and I  heard he was maybe drinking a little too much ...I did notice 
he was drinking a whole lot but, you know, everybody deals with things 
their own way. Personally I  was really hoping it wouldn't damage him fo r  
life. I  was hoping he would come back to work.
Q. So when you saw him, did you notice anything?
A. Yeah, yeah, he was in shock.
Q. Okay. Describe that fo r  me.
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A. Well, it's not the first time I've ever dealt with a coworker through military 
and stuff like that, somebody that's been through a traumatic experience 
and stuff like that, he was trying to process it and he was having a hard 
time with it... But he was more transparent and open with it and the thing 
that struck the me about it was that there was absolutely no whiff o f  
bravado about him, which is not typical... I  definitely knew that he had 
been through something and he wasn't cool with it early on. I  knew that 
the first day just by looking at him... so he basically told me that, you 
know, it's not something that he was comfortable with, taking a life... You 
know, which I've never heard anybody — I  know people that have killed 
people before: I  mean, it's not the response people say, whether it be the 
truth or not. I  just thought it was, you know — I  thought it was pretty 
honest, you know, fo r  him to admit that he was having a problem 
processing... So ultimately he's responsible fo r  what happened.
Q. ...So what about his behavior at work? Did you notice any change?
A. Yeah, he had — when he did come back, I  mean, he wasn't working for a
while. When he came back, I  mean, he just seemed like, you know, 
number one, he was determined he wasn't going to stay in Narcotics. He 
was determined he was going to go to Homicide...But I  mean, at first it 
was like, Oh, seems like he's really kind o f  down. Then I  was thinking to 
myself, I  don't know i f  I'd be feeling that way, you know what I  mean, 
regardless o f the situation. Then I  was like, Well, I  don't know how I  can 
say that because I've never been to a gas station, this, that, and the other 
but I  mean, he was going to therapy and then it seemed like he was 
doing — you know, getting a lot better. It was quick. It's not like he was 
like feeling like not himselffor an extended period o f  time. It was just 
issues he was dealing with. He could still laugh, maybe not as much, but 
it was definitely on his mind
Finally, participants were asked if they observed any lasting changes to Chris’
behavior and demeanor following his shooting incident. Many of the responses are
reflective of Kirschman’s (2007) idea of post traumatic growth and participants expressed
a range of positive emotions while discussing.
I  mean, he's gotten a lot better. I  think fo r  Chris it's very therapeutic for him to 
teach about it. So I  think every time he teaches that he's able to incorporate what 
happened to him into any type o f  teaching he does at the academy or outside o f  
the academy, that helps him. So I  think helping share his story helps him. So I  
like that. He's open with it now. He doesn't mind saying — he's gotten more open 
about, I  was an asshole. I  drank a lot. I  wasn't very nice, admitting to others and 
himself that he was that way, I  think, helps him — you know, he '11 never be the 
same guy he was before.
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... When I  work with Chris now, Chris still has that personality. He still has it.
My — so I  know it comes to him naturally ...He is — I  can tell you that currently he 
has a real desire to help other people and he has a real — his attitude towards the 
municipal government, the administration o f  our department, things like that, he 
definitely does not hide where he may have been less likely to be as boisterous 
before or is now, and part o f that is that he seems to take it very personally, how 
officers are treated, that look to be or appear to be or have some type o f mental 
health issue that needs to be addressed and 1 will constantly hear from  Chris that 
the department is very good at just treating specific symptoms but never looking 
at the underlying cause to prevent it from  happening in the future, which is an 
accurate assessment.
Q. Makes sense. All right. So after these incidents, both with Chris and
other people, have you noticed any permanent changes in personality or 
demeanor?
A. With Chris?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. No, he just seems more focused, more grounded.
Q. Okay.
A. No, mature.
Q. Okay. Chris more mature?
A. Well, but I  think a lot has to do with [his wife] and stu ff like that.
Q. Okay.
A. He wasn't really an adult, adult fo r  a long time. I  mean, I  was married
with two kids and I  wasn't an adult, adult, you know, out there acting like 
we were, you know, but he's definitely more grounded and I  think he's 
benefittedfrom it.
Q. How so?
A. Because I  think it was one o f  the major things. I  know he's been through a
lot o f  things in his life, you know. I'm familiar with his personal
background and I  think it was ju st one o f  those one more things that he 
was able to get over. It didn't destroy him. It didn't defeat him and I  think 
it gave him like an air o f  confidence to be confident with who you are as a 
person.
This theme was deliberately included because, while there are clearly links to 
other themes explicated in this chapter, particularly the impact of Chris’ shooting incident 
on others and the manifestation of critical incident stress and PTSD symptoms, this 
section examined observable changes and the interpretation of those changes. As such,
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these observations may suggest different ways and points for intervention efforts, as well 
as highlight how others observing these symptoms and signs might rationalize them, 
leading to a lack of activity and intervention. Further, it is clear in many cases that these 
individuals were impacted by what was happening to Chris, suggesting issues of 
secondary and tertiary trauma. Finally, the manifestation of these symptoms may call 
attention to the behaviors exhibited by other officers who have been involved in a critical 
incident, making others more aware o f the range of behavioral changes that may indicate 
that the officer is struggling and needs help, even if he or she would not admit to needing 
professional assistance.
Sub Theme 4: Critical Incident Stress and PTSD Symptoms
Kirschman (2007) and Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) discuss how stress 
reactions to a critical incident can be viewed in phases or stages, with some symptoms 
appears immediately while others may manifest weeks or months after the critical 
incident concluded. There may be variations in the constellations of symptoms an officer 
experiences or is observed to experience and these symptoms may be more or less 
intense, as well as transitory or long lasting, and are conditioned by a host of factors that 
are internal and external to the individual officer (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, 
Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, LACP 2012b, Jones 1989, 
Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 
2001, Violanti 2005). The current study found that this was also the case, that Chris 
developed symptoms at varying times, o f varying intensities and durations and that those 
symptoms were observed or not observed by others in his life. Additionally, his 
symptoms were impacted by other factors, to include his personality, coping mechanisms,
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position in the police department. This section provides the resultant commentary and
thematic evidence that details Chris’ experience with critical incident stress and PTSD, as
well as how others witnessed and perceived those stress reactions.
Chris displayed several of the perceptual distortions discussed in Chapter 2. For
example, when discussing whether or not he could see the clerks’ faces, Chris stated that,
“Oh, I couldn't see their faces like out of the comer peripheral type stuff,” which suggests
he may have experienced tunnel vision. Another visual distortion, discussed in the
previous chapter, was how the suspect’s gun appeared to Chris—like a cannon or huge
cartoon gun—when he was near the ATM and was almost shot in the face. Chris also
made numerous references that would suggest that he experienced time distortions
throughout the shooting event. These time distortions, however, must be considered in
the context of this shooting in that it was much longer than the average police shooting.
As such, all statements related to how long the event lasted may not be time distortions,
but legitimate concerns over the length of time it took first responders to arrive.
However, the quotes below are more likely indicative of a true perceptual distortion:
No, no. It was almost like — well, it's like being in a — the only way I  can equate 
it to, I  know it was probably out o f  breath and dry mouth and throat sore, but it's 
like in the middle o f  a car crash, like while it's crashing you probably don't know 
how you're feeling but the second it's over you're like, Oh, yeah, oh, yeah, that 
was horrible but this was just like that. Despite the fa c t that it was so prolonged, 
it was still all like i f  you were to take, I  don't know — it's like time freezes so all 
that time, even though it fe lt long, I  knew it was like four seconds
Just it's very basic. You forget about everything. Like the lower part o f  your 
body, gone, I  don't even — you don't even think about anything other than just 
that, sights, just the sight, and you see the back lined up with the front and then it 
was ju st — it was the perfect sight, picture sight alignment and just following. 
When he got to the point, take the breath, and you point, head cocks back like he 
got punched in the face with a hammer
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All I  know is it seemed to me like it was 100 miles an hour, running up and down 
the aisles, turning this way, run up this way, peeking your head up, peeking up. It 
was almost that I  just stopped. 1 was like, you know what, I'm going to stand up 
straight. I'm going get my sight good and I'm going the squeeze and squeeze until 
it goes offjust, a perfect — a perfect procedure and a perfect — the mechanics o f  it 
were just perfect and I  remember thinking, God, my sights aren't even moving 
because normally like imagine holding a gun up fo r  like an hour, your hands start 
to shake. That's what Ife lt like but when I  calmed myself, like an instantaneously 
get ju st a perfect, like you have the sights. They can go up and down like this.
They can go this way. It was perfect and they were all the same piece and I  
remember shooting.
The excerpts above represent both the perceived slowing and acceleration of time.
Other perceptual distortions evidenced during the shooting included increased
respiration and heart rate (as noted in interviews and observed when reviewing the 9-1-1
tape), numbness, tingling in his hands, dry mouth, not being able to feel the lower half of
his body, selective attention (ignoring the potential second offender outside and the two
military personnel that attempted to enter the store mid-shooting), shock and disbelief
(seen repeatedly in the detailed account of the shooting in Chapter 5) and possibly
hallucinations. Statements that suggest there may have been hallucinations or
illogical/magical thinking include:
...but I  remember wanting to make my bullets count. So I  didn 7 want to shoot 
through anything. I  wanted to get a clean shot, which I  don't know. I  thought that 
would be better so I  could literally like you're standing on a shelf, like a metal 
shelf in between us and it's not like the food  is packed over there. So you can see 
through it and so Ijust waitedfor him to — he did like one o f  these, like I'm going 
to go to the right but I'm actually going left, and I  caught him when he was going 
this way and I  was like, I  bet you he's going to do that, kind o f  like you had this 
ESP kind o f  like, Oh, he's going this way.
Oh, fuck, I  hope — because I'm not shot, maybe they're shot. I  was like, Are you 
guys good? Is everybody — I  remember yelling it specifically, You guys good, 
good, good? And whether they said yes or no, i f  they said no I  would have 
remembered it, but they didn't say anything or maybe like, yeah, or okay.
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Something vague, but I  remember being like, Oh, shit, I  hope they're not — I'm 
standing over two dead people but I  didn't. I  got swept up out o f  there. I  don’t 
even remember them leaving the store, to be quite honest. The last time I  saw 
them they were behind the counter.
The final cognitive or perceptual distortion Chris described in his interviews is
detachment. At several points he noted an almost out of body experience— stating at one
point that he was “like a machine,” and at another that he was never scared during the
incident. Even in the immediate aftermath—when he was sitting in a police car waiting
for investigators to arrive, he describes watching the scene as if he were at a drive-in
movie. These symptoms mirror those described by Jones (1989) and Paton (2005) in the
immediate reactionary phase of being involved in a shooting.
After the shooting ends, the second phase of stress response begins. In this case,
that line of demarcation is quite clear, with Chris stating that:
... the second he put that second handcuff on it was like the weight o f  the 
world — like it was over. Like that was — you know, like the end, boom, so the 
threat and then it all came down on me. So I  went over to walk away because at 
this time all the fear and all the —you know, the nerves and everything are 
starting to catch up with you and almost until I  feel like scary, scary and I  
rounded the corner and I  saw his gun there and I  realized he didn't have a gun all 
that time that I'm sitting there yelling at him and I  remember getting so — I  saw 
the gun. I  was like, Hey, I  was pissed that he — this mother fucker actually shot at 
me for that long and he didn't say anything about not having a gun or just keeping 
his hands up or anything and I  may have killed him. Because I  was considering 
literally walking up and just putting it to his head and shooting him and I  was 
like, No, I  can't do that unless I  see a gun. ..So I  got so pissed o ff I  kicked the big 
soda thing over. I  was like, Damn it!
This is consistent with the list of symptoms provided in Chapter 2 (Jones 1989, 
Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004), which noted the officer may be angry. This anger was 
also manifested in his responses to the Lieutenant who checked and secured his firearm, 
as noted in the discussion of anger as a coping mechanism. Chris also experienced
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crying, disbelief, tremors and fatigue, also noted in the literature. Chris specifies three
distinct points when, in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, he broke down
emotionally. These break downs included multiple symptoms, including disbelief and
fatigue. The first occurred when he was walking around the building to complete a
walkthrough with the investigators. According to Chris,
A. ... there's a little alleyway all like — all the commotion kind o f  stops and
it's just like us in the alleyway and I  remember the gravity o f  everything 
just kind o f  hit me at once and that's when I  stopped... Just like a dump, 
like an emotional dump, just download everything, like very heavy and 
somber and scared and frustrated and angry all combined into one and 
just tired, you know, fatigued mentally, physically, and ju st able to just 
kind o f  let everything go...
Q. What's going through your head?
A. That I  almost died...That I  killed somebody. I  thought I  killed him
immediately when they took him. I  was like, He's dying, he's dying. He’s 
going to die. So lfe lt bad about that, but I  also felt like, Damn, I  could 
have got killed. Or you know, I  just wanted cigarettes. That's all I  
wanted.
The second break down started when he walked into the convenience store, but he was
able to maintain his composure until he began exhibiting another symptom of a critical
incident stress reaction—the inability to recall detail:
Then I  remember breaking down because I  remembered thinking what I  was 
going to tell him, how it went down, and I  forgot. I  couldn't understand. I  knew 
the beginning, the middle, and the end, but the stuff in between was just so out o f  
place, seemed like just like a puzzle, just all messed up, but you had the outline 
done. So that's what it felt like, and that got me upset again. So we stopped.
Then I  remember thinking, I  was looking at all the blood. I'm looking at — the 
smoke is going out because they left the door open a little bit. So it was kind o f  
going out, a little bit cooler in the store and just looking at just everything, the 
bullet holes. I  remember looking at the door on the way out thinking, Oh, my 
God. I  was inches away. Looking at the ATM, looking at all the - - 1 think with 
the bullet holes, just like it looked a lot more chaotic than I  remembered. I  was 
like, Oh, my God.
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The third break down came after Chris had been interviewed by those conducting
the criminal investigation into his shooting. Chris remembers asking the investigators at
least ten times how the suspect was doing. He was repeatedly told “we’ll get to that.”
After the interview was completed, Chris says,
...[The investigator] was like, He's dead. And then that was it. It was like 
a goodfive, ten minutes. I  was out o f it. I  was just very emotional, crying.
Q. What were you thinking?
A. I fe lt miserable that I  killed somebody. I  fe lt absolutely miserable like I
did something very, very wrong, but I  know I  wasn't getting in trouble fo r  
it but Iju s t felt like it was wrong, in your soul it was so wrong to your 
core. You were like, Oh.
Q. Any other thoughts going through your head?
A. No, I  was disgusted with myself at that point. I  was like, I  can't believe it.
I'm responsible fo r  that guy's death. Iju st fe lt so miserable. It was 
horrible. That was one o f  the worst feelings.
In the literature, it is also stated that the departmental response in the immediate 
aftermath of a shooting is critical. In this case, it is possible that Chris experienced 
secondary trauma that may have been unnecessary. First, the Lieutenant’s response when 
clearing his weapon may have caused additional trauma. Second, the same Lieutenant, 
after relieving Chris of his firearm, decided to stop at a convenience store on the way 
back to the Police Operations Center. Chris, now feeling decidedly vulnerable and 
unarmed, was placed in a similar location to the gas station where his shooting occurred. 
Also, Chris was kept at the police station until after 0700 the following morning, waiting 
for NowCare to come administer the requisite urinalysis. When a tech had still not 
arrived by 0715, Chris was dismissed by the Commanding Officer of the Detective 
Bureau. Finally, when Chris was dismissed, he realized that his vehicle was still at the 
crime scene and that he still needed gas in his truck. Another officer retrieved his vehicle 
and told him that he had “taken care of him” and put $3.00 of gas in his car. As Chris
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recalled, . .gas was super expensive so that didn't do shit for me and he drove farther 
out. So I was like, Fuck it. So I get in my car.. .Tank's on E and I'm like, Fuck it. I'm 
just going to drive until it runs out. Fortunately I made it to the driveway before it started 
(demonstrating) plucking away, went in there.”
The afterbum or letdown and reintegration phases (Jones 1989, Paton 2005) of an 
officer-involved shooting were also clear in this case. This phase can last up to three 
days after the event and is not only a critical time for the officer, but is also a key 
intervention point (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Jones 
1989, Miller 2006, Paton 2005). There are a plethora of symptoms and feelings that can 
manifest during this time. Chris takes on blame and displayed guilt during the immediate 
aftermath and during this phase, as well. He mentions being the reason everyone was 
woken up in the middle o f the night and he blamed himself for inconveniencing others, 
stating “I remember thinking — I was like, Fuck, this sucks, because it sucks because [the 
investigator] is my friend and [the other investigator] I was friendly with, but it was just 
like, Oh, man, it just sucked. It didn't feel good. It felt like I put them in an awkward 
position.”
Chris admits that he displayed numerous symptoms during the week following the 
shooting. While Jones (1989) states that the officer may crave peer support during this 
period, Chris isolated himself from everyone but his girlfriend. As Chris explains, “I had 
the look of don't fucking ask me nothing. I don't want to talk about anything. I just want 
to sit here and drink and watch whatever is on fucking TV. That's all I wanted to do and 
that's all I did.” In addition, he discussed how he would try to talk to his girlfriend about 
what he was experiencing, but would often become frustrated and angry;
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I  was a dick... Just very distant, just very sorry fo r  myself, kind o f  stupid, trying to 
explain it to her and then getting mad that I  had to explain it and then getting mad 
that I'm explaining it and having to relive it and go over everything. It was all in 
all just a downward cycle into just shittiness and I  was very abrupt with 
everybody.
He experienced a loss of appetite, emotional responses, sadness, anxiety, recurrent 
thoughts and sleep disturbances (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, 
Klinger 2004) and, although the use of alcohol as a coping mechanism is explored 
thematically elsewhere in this chapter, the use of alcohol during this time period in an 
attempt to reduce or regulate the sleep disturbances is also common (Jones 1989). While 
the literature suggests this phase lasts for up to three days, Chris states that, for a week, 
he was
... in a state o f shock and like every 20 or so minutes you start going through 
everything all over again but it's not from beginning to end or it is beginning to 
end but it's beginning and then all sorts o f  jumbled shit, middle, that one shoot, 
the. one shot around the ATM, jumble, last shot, and just going over and over and 
over and over and over. What i f  I  pull up this way, what i f  I  pull up that way, or 
why didn't I  check over here? I  don't know. It was ju st constantly going over it 
and you'djust be sitting there and when you think you're not thinking o f  it, boom, 
you're right in the middle o f thinking o f it again and I  was just like, This is just 
fucking miser able... And then Ijust — because we kind o f wound up going 
(inaudible) ju st hanging out and I  think maybe I'd pass out fo r  like -- fe lt like a 
second, maybe couple minutes, woke up again ju st in a panic, just like, Oh, shit, 
not knowing I  was not in something, but something like I  was like something just 
bad happened, kind o f  wake up.
Many of these symptoms did not dissipate after this initial week. He states that, 
for months, he exhibited a lack of appetite, barely ate and drank alcohol, just trying to 
“maintain.” After the first week, Chris notes that his sleep disturbances continued, 
stating that he was,
Just exhausted, but couldn't go to sleep. You'd close your eyes and then you’d be 
like dropped right in the middle o f  it and that despair and like, Oh, my God, right 
in the middle o f  it but it's different. It's right in the middle o f  it afterwards. So
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like during the shooting you're fine. You're just reacting. But when you're done, 
you put yourself back in that position and — but you introduce all the fear and all 
the anxiety and everything like that. So when you wake up or when you try to go 
to sleep, you wake up, and you're immediately thrust in there where the initial act 
had none o f the emotional shit going on, now you have this emotional shit. So it 
feels like you’re reliving it with all the emotions. It's like going through surgery 
without anesthesia type thing, like the shooting was — 1 was under anesthesia, the 
actual shooting because you're numb, but imagine being worked on during 
surgery without any o f  that and that's — you come up and you're dreadful, you're 
sweating and just scared. You feel nauseous. You don't want to do anything. So 
it got to the point where Ilost so much weight and was becoming physically ill, 
just sicUy that I  needed something to get to sleep, and that's all I  thought. You 
know, i f  I  get some sleep. . . The nightmares didn't start until like several months 
later, like bad, like terror waking up. Prior to that it was you close your eyes and 
you're reliving the whole thing over again, like a loop, just over and over, and i f  
you close your eyes you wake up and take the good like one to two seconds, like, 
okay, I'm not there kind o f thing, very, very vivid stu ff and on the Lexapro it 
started kicking in, whatever, wicked nightmares. I  mean, bad and strange and 
just nonsensical but you'd wake up in a panic.
Chris’ let down phase seems to have bled into his aftereffects stage. As noted in 
Chapter 2, this phase is where PTSD manifestations are noticed, where those who knew 
the officer prior to the shooting begin to notice that he or she has changed. At the time, 
the only mental health or debrief services offered to Chris were rather informal in nature. 
He was sent to another jurisdiction to meet with a Sergeant who “knew what he had been 
through.” When Chris asked this Sergeant and the psychologist that was also present, if 
they had ever been in a shooting incident, and both indicated that they had not, Chris 
became angry and left the appointment. This outburst was reported to Chris’ supervisors 
and he was then asked to go to yet another jurisdiction to meet with and officer who had 
been involved in a shooting where his partner was killed. Chris met with this officer and 
found comfort in talking about everything but the shooting. This officer told Chris that 
he needed help. At some point, due to the extreme weight loss and sleep disturbances,
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Chris went to a NowCare doctor in an attempt to get a prescription for a sleep aid. The
doctor asked Chris if he had experienced anything that triggered these symptoms and
when he said he had been involved in a shooting, Chris was referred to a psychologist.
Chris described many of the symptoms outlined in Chapter 2, to include
continued sleep disturbances, hypervigilence, anger, anxiety, intrusive and recurring
thoughts, the inability to concentrate and mood swings. The quotes below, while large,
illustrate some of the myriad of symptoms experienced and their impact on Chris. This
section does not aim to exhaustively cover these symptoms, but to give the reader an
understanding of the breadth and debilitating impact they can have on an officer. Chris
exhibited most of the symptoms described in Tables 1 and 2, in varying forms and
intensities. Further, Chris experienced two of what Jones (1989) identified as the three
most dangerous aftereffects: withdrawal and denial of impact. When discussing intrusive
thoughts and flashbacks, Chris stated that,
it was like you'd be working on something or focused on something else and 
something like a bottle — like a bottle cap. For example, you'd see a bottle cap 
and immediately take you back to the scene because o f  the grocery store. So 
anything related to that, like whether it be soda, whether it be smells, grease, like 
little things, like obviously I  know why but at the time you just — you look and be 
like, Oh, my God, I  remember that at the store. Or beer or something like — you 
know, ATMs, shit like that...oh, God, I'd preoccupy myself, ha lf an hour. Then it 
would be like another half an hour trying to get yourself down from that. Because 
it's — it's building on each other, playing on each other. So you'd get that one 
thing and be like, Oh, I  remember that and then that reminds you o f  something 
else and you're doing this and you're not doing anything else.
It’s literally out o f  the blue. I  mean, in seeing it you're kind o f  like expect it with 
all the shit that’s happened. You expect that maybe seeing it again or going to a 
store or anything like that, you're going to — is going to come up as a result o f  it, 
but they've gotten so much better than they were initially because initially 
afterwards I  was sitting in the office one day and I  ju st had a get up, had to get up 
and I  had to leave the office, whether it to be outside to get a cigarette or go to 
another office, change o f  venue completely, because I  thought that I  was 
associating any kind o f  venue, it didn't have to do anything with it but i f  I  was in 
someplace and I  started feeling like that, which would last like a couple minutes,
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I'd leave... Just you get there's an anxious — there's not really — there's not like a 
sense o f dread that something is going to happen. It's happening as you speak, 
like while it's happening in the moment. So it's not like anything like — I  never 
really worried about getting those or having them because it was just fo r  some 
reason I  just didn't think that way. So when it happens you ju st kind o f live in it 
and then it's done and there's a relief but there’s like, Oh, geez — like hiccups kind 
o f thing.
Chris also exhibited many of the behaviors discussed at WCPR (Kamena and 
Kirschman 2012, Kirschman 2012a), particularly related to being a compliant patient. 
Once he was prescribed medications— an antidepressant and sleeping pills— he was 
initially resistant to take them as directed. He claimed that the made him lethargic and 
acknowledged that he experienced sexual side effects while on the medication. However, 
after several arguments related to medication between Chris and his girlfriend, he began 
to take the medication as directed. He admits he was on the sleep medication for 
approximately a year. Eventually, with medication and therapy, Chris began to address . 
and process his emotions and saw a reduction in symptoms.
Much like Kirschman’s post traumatic growth, which is addressed in Chapter 2 
and is not mutually exclusive from experiencing negative critical incident and post 
traumatic stress, Chris has had positive change come out of his shooting, such as 
reevaluating the relationships in his life, and placing work secondary to those 
relationships, as well as pursuing a Masters degree in psychology and working to assist 
other officers in crisis. However, while there are elements o f growth, there are long-term 
impacts of the shooting that still persist, as noted in the excerpt below:
Everywhere I  went I  had a gun on, me absolutely anywhere I  went. To the point 
where even in the house i f  I  was — I  have — probably — not probably, I  kept the 
practice. I've got guns everywhere. So no matter where I'm at in the house I  have 
a gun that I  can get to within a couple seconds... I  think as recent as a month or so 
ago I  drove — I  was doing something and I'm like, you know, I'm going to go to
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the store. I  jump in the car. I'm like almost halfway to the store and I  realize I  
don't have my fucking gun on me or I  don't have a gun, fucking turned around 
and, man, I  was like, I  got to get back. I  got to get back to the house. It sounds 
worse than it is but it was — I  was driven to get back to the house. I'm getting 
back to the house and it was one o f  those things I  got it and I  was like all right 
and go on with the day... I  don't walk anywhere. After the shooting I  would avoid 
places or I  wouldn't even go in, but I'm to a point where I  can go in anywhere. I  
can go in any store. I  probably — I  know I  can go into the gas statipn but I  
wouldn't like it, but no matter where I  go now, I  don't care where it is, I'm — I  got 
a plan and i f  something goes down I  know who I'm going to hit first, but that's me 
constantly thinking about it
While the above disclosure may appear quite negative, suggesting hypervigilence and
that the shooting is still impacting Chris’ daily life, there is, as stated above, evidence that
Chris has made some positive changes following his incident. Below are several
excerpts, not only from Chris, but also observations from other participants in the current
study, that demonstrate signs o f post traumatic growth:
Work to me at the time was — I  mean, that's it. Work was the be all, end all. I  
livedfor work. I  didn't work to live. Afterwards you get better perspective o f it, 
albeit not right away, but you get a better perspective that i f  you stopped doing 
the work, it would still be there but i f  you stoppedfocusing on ju st living andjust 
being happy and, you know, making other people happy and interacting with 
people, that's more important. It's more substance to it, where it was more part o f  
the shooting, it was a theory after the shooting. It was more o f  a mantra kind of, 
i f  that makes any sense... after a while I  started seeing the benefit o f  opening up.
I  started seeing the benefit or the release offust anxiety with ju st being able to 
either cry, to be upset. It wasn't just like a sadness, but it was a frustration o f the 
anger to be able to — healthy not to take it out on somebody but that it was okay 
to be angry. It was okay to be sad. It was okay to be just out o f  control, not being 
able to control your emotions within reason. It's one thing to be sad and to be 
upset and it's another thing to be on the floor pounding, like having a temper 
tantrum like a child who didn't get something. So then it's — but it's such a 
gradual transition from suppressing it from years and years o f  learning to do that 
to eventually breaking down, having that bottom, and then building yourself up 
from it.
I  think I  knew he was going to be okay after court... Something happened with [ the 
case], and it finally went to court and the guy wound up getting 38 years maybe. 
Okay. So I  think he was starting to be able to get his closure with it so maybe I
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thought, Okay, this is going to be okay. I'm going to tell you why he broke my 
heart though... the parents, maybe it was the parents o f the dead guy or the parent 
o f the second guy involved... and I  remember him telling me about it and he was 
open about it. He was like, Yeah, his mom called me a murderer and screamed it 
out in court. Broke his heart. You could tell it broke his heart. It broke my heart 
to see his heart broken but I  think that's when I  thought, okay, things are 
going — he's going to be better. He's getting some o f  the closure, getting past it, 
going to Homicide, getting out o f the narcotics-type environment was probably 
goodfor him even though it wasn't really out o f  the — I  don't know. It workedfor 
him, I  think...I mean, he's gotten a lot better. I  think for Chris it's very 
therapeutic for him to teach about it. So I  think every time he teaches that he's 
able to incorporate what happened to him into any type o f teaching he does at the 
academy or outside o f  the academy, that helps him. So I  think helping share his 
story helps him. So I  like that. He's open with it now. He doesn't mind 
saying — he's gotten more open about, I  was an asshole. I  drank a lot. I  wasn't 
very nice, admitting to others and himself that he was that way, I  think, helps 
him — you know, he'll never be the same guy he was before... he has a passion for  
helping people, which I  guess I  really didn't know that before. I  knew he was a 
good person but not that he had a passion for helping people, that I  think he's 
learned to like self-evaluate where he didn't before, probably had no need to 
before. I  don't know but that he can bounce back. Again, not to the same person 
but you can be the best person you can be now because he'll never be that same 
person. It's almost like an innocence lost kind o f  situation.
No, he's just as crazy as ever. I  think I  guess that could be fo r  him and [us], it's 
the importance o f  life. Is a little bit more, you know, value and we actually 
understand, you know, this job  a little bit more than the average person, you  
know, having been involved in a shooting. I  mean, he's smarter than ever. Gosh, 
he is. He is smarter than ever now.
As can be deduced from the comments above, this incident has changed Chris in 
ways that continue to impact his daily life seven years after his shooting incident and 
provides a clear illustration of how an officer can achieve posttraumatic growth while 
still suffering from negative effects of being involved in a critical incident.
Theme: Cultural Influences
The third theme that emerged related to cultural influences. Sociological 
literature suggests that an individual can simultaneously belong to multiple cultures and
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that these various roles and memberships can influence and condition membership in 
other groups. As such, it is expected that there will be considerable overlap among the 
themes discussed in this section of the analysis. However, these themes did emerge from 
multiple participant observations and may provide further insight into officer-involved 
shootings, as well as a more nuanced and holistic understanding of the multiple facets 
associated with a single shooting incident.
Sub Theme 1: Machismo and Gender
Machismo can be seen as an integral component of the police culture, as policing
is a way of doing gender in our society (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr
2012). This means that there is likely a great degree of overlap between what is expected
of a tough, competent male and what is expected o f a tough, competent police officer.
Due to this overlap, which also ties into Erving Goffman’s work on the roles individuals
play and the presentation of self in society, many o f the quotes found in the analyses on
the police culture may display gendered nuances. These cultural thematic analyses, in
particular, highlight the interrelated nature of many of the themes that emerged from the
interviews in the current study. The following two excerpts, one from Chris and one
from another participant, highlight how the role o f gender, policing and, in Chris’ case,
ethnic background and age in the other respondent’s statement, coalesce to inform both
perception and behavior, particularly stigma and impression management:
Now, the shooting, I  think the weeks following, even the months following the 
shooting I  probably made an overt effort to suppress everything because there's 
that engrained machismo that most Latin guys or Latin culture has that you don't 
show a weak side, but at the same time, so Americanized that it's like a conflict, 
like you should. A t the same time I'm dealing with a law enforcement, the public 
safety aspect, whether it be the fire department or the police department, you're a
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tough guy. There's no crying in police work. Which is obviously, i t ’s just insane 
now that you look back on it, but the shooting didn't change it.
Not as much as it used to because when I  was a younger officer, everything was 
macho this, macho that. You know, we’re a bunch o f tough guys. Nothing bothers 
us. We're stoic. You know, I  could walk into a triple homicide and then leave 
there and go have lunch at Spaghetti Warehouse or something like that, you 
know, but I  think as time has gone on and it may be a generational thing, I  think 
it's always affected people the same way but I  think the newer generation, you 
know, the Generation Xers and the Millennials, you know, I  think that they're 
more sensitive to things out there and they're not afraid to express that they really 
do need help. They need the counseling, you know, I  mean, they certainly — we 
go out there and work in the fie ld  and, you know, fight with somebody and get 
skinned up and all that and come in the next day limping because we wouldn't 
report that we were hurt in the line o f  duty, but you know, the newer generation 
doesn't do that... You know, I  mean, they kind o f  give into pain, I  think a little bit 
too easily, but no, I  think the newer generations are much more sensitive to 
emotional trauma.
As exemplified by the quotes above, there is not only a very distinct understanding of 
what it is to be male, suggesting ideals that are very much in line with hegemonic 
masculinity (DeKeseredy 2007, Miller, Forest and Jurik 2007, Prokos and Padavic 2002), 
but also the image o f a police officer as masculine in nature. For example, one 
participant made the following statement: “I mean, some guys handle it easy, some guys 
don't. I don't think it's really got anything to do with the job just as it does your personal 
like who you are, what you're made of really because but, yeah, there's definitely like 
that, you got to be tough,” illustrating this connection between masculinity and policing.
Additionally, these understandings of the relationship between gender and 
violence—that being tough is an asset—may have been particularly present during Chris’ 
formative years. As seen in Chris’ life history, although his family operates more along a 
matrilineal authority structure, there are very clear elements o f machismo that were 
ingrained at a young age, particularly along the lines of protecting females. Another area
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in which these tenets of hegemonic masculinity can be seen are in Chris’ discussions of
being involved in numerous fights as a child:
because you kind o f —you kind o f go into that where — the fights, yes, fights all 
the time, but you never really — i f  you got bullied, I  played it to like prison. I f  you 
fight back you may not always win, but you kind o f  get — there's a respect. All 
right. You know, I  know i f  I  mess with him, he's going to fight back so let me go 
pick on somebody else.
Clearly, violence and the willingness to use violence were sources o f positive stigma or
respect, for a young male in Chris’ socio-cultural strata and it is quite interesting that he
likens school yard fighting to prison, another hypermasculine environment often
perceived to being the opposite of law enforcement (Corcoran 2007). This apparent
value placed on violent action as an expression of gender may also provide an interesting
theoretical perspective from which to consider locker room shock (Jones 1989).
While violence, as a male police officer, may be accepted or even encouraged in
certain contexts, the expression of “softer” emotional responses are often discouraged.
This avoidance of expressing emotion was discussed in the context o f reviewing the
PTSD symptoms Chris had experienced and how those symptoms had manifested. When
the symptom of “inability to express feelings” was addressed, this was Chris’ immediate
response:
A: Inability to express feelings. I  don't know that it was so much an inability
maybe than it was a decision, like internal decision.
Q: How so?
A: Again, the police officer machismo thing. You don't want to — like on
several occasions I  was sitting...either at work or someplace while I  was 
working and you'd start getting emotional and then you'd quickly have to 
like — so it wasn't that I  was unable, but Iforced myself not to.
Q: Okay. What do you mean when you were getting emotional? What would
happen?
A : You're like, Oh, I'm going to cry.
Q: So what would you do ?
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A : Immediately try to think o f  something else. I'd start walking somewhere,
just physical — oh, I  used to pinch the inside o f  my hand, kind o f  like the 
pain kind o f thing. Oh, okay. But, yeah, that's more than inability. It's a 
decision not to... because at the doc's office with [Psychologist], that was 
no problem. All day long that was good.
This avoidance of feminine responses in policing is not only internalized , so that
officers police their own responses in an effort to manage the impression their coworkers
may have and avoid the stigma of being perceived to be weak, but is achieved through
external censure, as well. Malmin (2012) discussed how, when officers are at their most
vulnerable, they may be subject to ridicule for their emotional response to a given
incident or scene. This was evidenced in the current study, with two participants
discussing how, particularly at scenes where other officers have been seriously injured or
killed, they have told other officers on scene to stop crying, that those emotional
responses were not acceptable at the crime scene when they had work to do:
...I don't know. For me, I  had a police shooting where I  got there and two cops 
had just been involved in a shooting. The guy is dead on the street and one o f  
the officers, he was a young guy. He was crying. I  fucking told him, Knock that 
shit off. We '11 do that another day. Right now we got to fucking do what we got 
to do. Everything is going to be all right. Just you got to knock that — don't do 
that out here... So it's just one o f  those things where it’s, Hey, man, you know, 
there's a time and place for it, just like on the battlefield, you know, somebody 
goes down, I  mean, I've seen [a] dead cop[‘s] blood, you know, pouring out in 
the gutter, you know, and 1 went over and told another officer, Man, you got to 
knock that shit off. Ain't no fucking time out here to be crying. Now's the time to 
get to work. We'll do the crying later, but I  mean, and I'm not trying to say that 
to be like I'm tough, because I'm not...
In short, these participants had instructed fellow officers to detach and put the job, rather 
than their emotions first. Also of interest, the same two officers who reprimanded 
colleagues for displaying emotions both also suggested that, while critical incident stress
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and PTSD are real, agencies need to beware of “fakers” or those attempting to use a 
PTSD diagnosis as a crutch or a means of escaping disciplinary matters.
Not only did the idea of male officers following proscribed and normalized 
emotion absent or neutral behavior patterns get addressed in several interviews, one 
participant discussed how these expected behaviors are applied to women. Particularly of 
note was how, when women embrace and replicate these expected behaviors, male 
officers may feel even less “manly” if  they show emotion:
A. ... Females go out there and overcompensate a lot when they really
probably don't have to, but when they get back they really can't because 
they're already labeled as emotional, you know, emotional individuals, 
whereas you may have a female and guy go out at the same time. They 
come back, female is fine, guy is nervous as shit, but then the guy will see 
the female overcompensating and be like, Oh, she's really fucking scared, 
you know what I  mean? So it's just smoke and mirrors, is all it is.
Q. Okay. Do you see that happening though also with like family?
A. Oh, yeah. But it's cultural and the same guy that's a tough guy here, may
be a pussy at the house. I  mean, the wife may run shit. Tough girl out on 
the street in uniform may not be a tough girl at home. Maybe very 
submissive. Hispanic male maybe okay here, but maybe over dominating 
here. So it's cultural and it's changed. There is no set [role].
Everybody's cool here.
However, another participant suggests that women no longer feel the same
overwhelming pressure to adopt the mannerisms and traits associated with hegemonic
masculine models of policing. This participant, instead, suggested that women in
policing may be a part of the reason some of the stigma surrounding admitting to critical
incident stress or other emotional struggles may be lessening. He said,
I  think women coming into the organization has played a role in that as well. I  
remember the first women who came into the department. They tried to be stoic 
as well, but you know, women I  think come into law enforcement, they're much 
more open and sensitive to things. They're not locked into this macho attitude 
where they've got to be tough. They're more inclined to be diplomatic, which is 
something that I  think takes some officers on the street years to learn, you know,
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we want to go out there and be tough guys, and i f  you make an arrest and you tell 
the guy to get in the police car and he doesn't get in there, you start thinking,
Well, I'm going to put him in that police car i f  he's not going to get in there. 
Women come into this organization with a diplomatic skill that it takes us a long 
time to learn, you know, they know how to talk to people. They know how to 
diffuse an aggressive situation from the very beginning.
Even Chris, when discussing how he may be viewed as having an atypical gendered 
response by being willing to participate in the current study and to be so forthcoming 
about his feelings and reactions, indicated that there is a time and a place for emotion, 
stating:
I  think there was a time probably earlier on where you kind o f  suck it up. You 
don't say anything. The events o f  the shooting, I  have taken away that 
there's — what used to be uncomfortable fo r  me to talk about is not uncomfortable 
because really there's a perspective thing. Before any o f this happened I  had no 
real understanding o f — someone tell me, Hey, it's important to express your 
emotions. I  was like, Yeah, whatever. I  mean, I've had major significant events in 
my life and critical incidents and traumatic events but nothing as acute as this, 
nothing as significant and lasting as this. So I  think I  see myself as I'm not afraid 
because I  don't care what other — I  really don't. I  don't care what they think o f  
me, but I  see the benefits o f  having somebody to step up. It's contrary to a lot and 
there's a lot o f  people, a good majority o f  this law enforcement, especially males, 
are very ashamed or hesitant to share emotions, but it's got to be in the right 
context. You can't be in the middle o f  a coffee shop or in the middle o f  7-Eleven 
talking shop and then all o f a sudden, you know, what Ijust don't feel good.
That's something that has to be done with tact and unfortunately, guys in general 
don't have tact, let alone about when they communicate amongst their peers.
The final element of this portion of this section of the thematic analyses finds that 
gender may not only inhibit officers from seeking help to avoid stigma, but may also 
contribute to medication non-compliance, as discussed at WCPR (Kamena and 
Kirschman 2012). The emotional responses and upheaval perceived by some officers to 
be emasculating in and of themselves, can be further compounded by impacting the 
officer’s virility and/or sex drive in a number of ways. As noted in Chapter 2, many
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officers experiencing critical incident stress or PTSD may exhibit either a disinterest in 
sex or may become hypersexualized (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). Sex drive and 
performance may also be impacted by the medications, or by the particular combination 
of medications, prescribed by a doctor to treat the myriad of symptoms associated with 
PTSD. While discussing side effects of medications commonly prescribed to treat PTSD, 
sexual dysfunction was a topic that came up in both Chris and his significant other's 
interviews. At first, it appeared that Chris was going to attempt to manage impressions 
with regards to this topic, making a flip joking statement about being a pervert, but then 
disclosed that he had experienced sexual side effects:
A. Change in sex drive or performance. No, still a perv.
Q. Good to know. Good to know.
A. No, the only thing that changed was the side effect o f  the Lexapro. You're
not complete in anything. You are going and going and going and going, 
which got to the point where people were like — can I  get a second?
Q. Yeah.
A. But that by itself is the only — I  take that back. Week or so after, maybe
even a month I  had no urge to do anything, you know, with anybody, not at 
all. I  think I  attribute that to being preoccupied.
Chris’ disclosure, while surprising, was rather matter o f fact, in that it was a side effect 
that he experienced. His significant other also discussed the sexual side effects o f the 
Lexapro, an antidepressant that Chris was given in conjunction with Ambien, to treat his 
PTSD. She stated that:
A. I'm caring about him, starting to love him, you know. I  could put myself in 
his shoes. What i f  it was me going through this and I'm sure he would be 
there for me, you know. There were some points where you got to stop 
drinking, you've got to stop, and he got prescribed medication. He refused 
to take it. I'm like, You better take it, like it got down to you need to take 
this medicine. You're an asshole, take the medicine. What about the side 
effects? I  don't give a shit about the side effects. Take the medicine. See 
i f  it helps, you know, it calmed him down a little bit like, but then he was
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like, I'm lethargic, it has side effects and you know, blah, blah, blah. I  was 
like, Whatever, just —
Q. He did talk about the side effects o f  the medication. Did you notice any o f
the side effects?
A. Sexual ones, yes.
Q. So how so?
A. That he could not ejaculate.
Q. Okay.
A. And that was one o f  — I  didn't care. I  didn't care. That was — but men are
funny.
Q. It's a huge issue. I  know.
A. Right. Men are funny, but it's like taking their control away.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So but I  didn't care. I  wanted him to take that medication because I
wanted him to feel better, to feel happier. Then he said it made him 
lethargic, one or the other. He started taking it. He stayed with it fo r a 
while.
These disclosures, in conjunction with the discussing of sexual side effects found in the 
participant observation analyses in the following chapter, suggest that this can be of 
concern for officers struggling to cope with PTSD. Indeed, if they internalize 
conventional beliefs about what it means to be a man, negative sexual impacts may 
impact their self-esteem, possibly leading to additional impression management in 
multiple facets of their lives, as well as potentially adding additional strain and stress in 
their interpersonal relationships.
Sub Theme 2: The Police Culture
Ever since Westley (1953) discussed the impact o f the police culture on behavior, 
this has been an accepted area of study and research in the disciplines of sociology, 
criminology and, more recently, criminal justice. When discussing the influence of 
police culture, or as some refer to it, the police subculture (Chappell and Piquero 2004), it 
is important to recognize that there is no singular, universal police culture (Roberg,
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Novak and Cordner 2009). Rather, there are some elements that appear to be
universalistic, such as the value placed on loyalty or the macabre sense of humor, but
each individual agency is going to have its own unique culture that blends these broader
themes with idiosyncratic nuances unique to that jurisdiction. Malmin (2012) indicates
that, in terms of critical incidents, the stereotypes perpetuated by the police subculture are
replicated through policies that reflect a lack of understanding of trauma, minimal service
provision, and a lack of attention to personnel.
In terms of roles, discussed further in the thematic analyses related to the work of
Erving Goffman, it is not uncommon for those in the police culture to adopt their career
as their master status label and, investing greatly in the police culture may lead to reduced
participation in other cultures or subcultures to which the officer may belong (Woody
2005). Chris also displayed another common tendency that is addressed in the literature,
the lifelong desire to be a first responder (Peak 2009), which is a tangent of the debate as
to whether policing attracts a certain type of individual as a career or if becoming a police
officer molds the person in a way (Peak 2009, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This
lifelong interest can be seen in the following excerpts:
Probably the earliest I  can remember even wanting to do any kind o f  work would 
probably be right before 1 left [Colombia], like a fireman or something. The term 
is "public safety" but back then it was ju st fireman or policeman or military... I  
later found out from my mom that my — her grandfather was a bombero. It's a 
fireman, but I  didn't know that.
I  took public safety more seriously than I  took traditional academics and I'll say it 
by this, I  graduated before I  went to college, I  graduated from a Nassau County 
Fire Search Academy. It's the place you get certified to be a fireman, where you 
get certified to do everything that's involved with actual firefighting andjust 
overhauling and rescue work, whether it be breaching doors or doing stuff. The 
fire sciences o f  understanding the fire city tetrahedron, what you needfor a fire to
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exit and all this stuff. To me, very scientific, very, very important so because it 
was more important, I  excelled in it. It was important to me. I  excelled in it.
So that kind o f  went away and Iju st started seeing a theme that I  was more 
focused on the public service stu ff the fire department, the medic stuff...
Q. Okay. So other than it was here and they said yes first, anything else that
led you to pick policing?
A. It was only two choices, either police department or the fire department.
Q Okay.
A. And that was it. I f  the — yeah, i f  I  had gotten called up to New York, I
would have been ther,e first. It literally was one o f those roll the dice.
Q. But why those two?
A. You know, just drawn to it.
Chris also is very honest about immersing himself in the police culture, claiming his 
identity as a police officer as his master status role. For example, the following excerpts 
show that Chris placed more energy, emphasis and priority on his career than on his 
second marriage.
...as I  joined the police department so leaving the military, joining the police 
department, and then just immediately just becoming kind of, you know, immersed 
into police culture and out o f  the gate going into narcotics fo r  several years, 
working undercover, plain clothes, working like plain clothes and I  remember like 
me and my partner were — we were out with our wives for Valentine's Day and 
someone calls up. One o f the guys call up and says, Hey, we've got this amount o f 
dope coming in. We need people, so we're like, boom. All right. Girls, you're 
going to have to, you know, do what you got to do and it was ju st wind o f growing 
distant because I  was never home. I  was always working.
I  probably netted the most money on the police department, even more than I  
make now, ten times more than I  make now working because we worked nonstop. 
We worked overtime and overtime and overtime, ju st kind o f  just did that and fo r  
the longest time was like, that's it. That's all I'm going to do. I  don't want to get 
promoted, I  don't want to do anything. I  want to work narcotics and that's what I  
want to do.
[second wife], as a matter o f  fact her dad was a DC cop. So she understood a 
little bit or at least I  thought she did about the lifestyle o f a police officer kind o f  
stuff, which she understood, but it's a little bit different from hearing about it to 
living it. So that kind o f  — it was — we 're both at fault. I  would venture to say 
that I  probably dismissed a lot o f  the family obligations to do work, but that's
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became long hair, beard, bays drugs, drink, you know, going to bars. It was jm t  
like fun  stuff. So I  would venture to say I  had a great deal to do with it but there 
was stuff on both sides.
Even today, after all of the traumas he has experienced as a police officer, when asked
about his favorite part of the job Chris still displays an affinity for the job, much of which
stems from cultural aspects, such as the camaraderie and the status of the profession.
Q. Okay. Favorite and least favorite aspect o f  the job.
A. The job now?
Q. Uh-huh, or in general.
A. Thrill o f investigation, both narcotic — the thrill o f working undercover
work I've done every — each assignment that I ’ve been to, I've really tried 
to excel in, not forceful. It just came natural to really try to do the good 
job became I  enjoyed it. Narcotics I  wanted to buy as much drugs and as 
much stolen properties, murder fo r  hires, everything. I  did it. I  did every 
aspect o f that and Homicide I  investigated every type o f  homicide, general 
type o f  death investigation whether it be child, whether it be drug, whether 
it be violent, I  was exposed to all that. Police officer none, police officer 
family, police officers family, law enforcement. That was fun. Getting a 
woman to admit to killing her child, as crazy as it sounds, it's invigorating. 
It's CIU, working with all Federal agencies doing dignitary protection. 
With K-9 getting a bite and jm t  working with the dog and with the 
camaraderie that we had there and then finally an administrative job that 
you have like three days off. You're o ff holidays and weekends. That's the 
best part o f  that, but also being in the position to effect change on 
something I'm really passionate about. Those are all — the coolness. 
Whoever invented this job is — you know, cheers to him because that's a 
great job. Having said that, standing next to a widow waiting for a 
meeting with the chief who is in charge o f  the financial aspect o f  a funeral, 
who doesn't show up became he forgot, is a shitty part. Finding that your 
very good friend killed himself, that's a horrible spot, but however, in 
those times, as bad as those are, it's a camaraderie. Then at the same 
time, it’s a lack o f  camaraderie so it's like the good and bad o f  both sides. 
Job is by far fun  but readily I'd walk away from  it tomorrow i f  I  could do 
something else, but I  enjoy it. Plus, it's a cool job.
While the majority of the participants also showed an affinity for the job, due to
the nature o f this research, most also disclosed the negative aspects o f the police culture,
particularly as it related to officer-involved shootings and issues associated with officer
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mental health and well-being. The stigma and cultural expectations associated with both
of these aspects of the police culture begins in the police academy, as well as the
elements of machismo endemic to the police culture, as noted below.
... The one thing in hindsight looking back at what the academy wasn't or 
where it was lacking was clearly the atmosphere that you would feel 
comfortable expressing difficulty with any given situation, whether it be 
loss o f  life and I'm not talking about the touchy feely part, whether [an 
officer] came in or some, you know, mental health professional came in 
and was like, It's okay to talk about it. That doesn't generate or that 
doesn't garner any type of, you know, true response or true understanding. 
It needs to be reinforced and having taught the academy for, I  don't know, 
over 12 years regularly I  try to — I  try to bring that to — like it's okay. 
You're going get made fun  of. Someone’s going the be like, Oh, you're a 
fag, quit being a pussy kind o f  thing, but you know, it’s a defense 
mechanism, but it was blatantly missing from the academy, the structure. 
You know, just general core values that you need are important but the 
tactics involved that I  learned and everything played a great role in 
keeping me alive but it was such a void in knowledge o f  the aftermath, 
whether it be a second after, whether it be two years after, whether it be 
ten years after, it was a distinct and I  look at now knowing what I  know 
now, and it's almost negligent in its structure.
I  am not saying we should sit in a room for six months or however long the 
academy is and hold hands all day long, I'm not saying that, but there 
needs to be a realistic, a legitimate exposure that takes the stigma away 
from being able to express it. What it is, a culture shift that I  think you 
need and again, this is just my experience and what I've seen and how I  
envision it. I  see the shift happen but —
Q. It's very slow.
A. It is ten times slower than the slowest it could possibly be
Q. All right. So when you were in the academy did they give you any formal
training on stress and coping mechanisms and kind o f  the pitfalls o f  the 
career, other than with the mental health person that everybody was like, 
whatever.
A. Yeah, you get some — you know, some real mushy kind o f  like four-hour
block of, you know, talk to somebody. The message, that kind o f  message 
is only — only comes across and is only accepted by people who have gone 
to that level, whether it be educationally, academically, or experience wise 
you're not going to tell some young or not necessarily young, but some 
new recruit that wants to be Robo Cop that, slow it down. Think with your 
emotions kind o f  thing. That's just it's ridiculous but to think back on, you
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know, what it was, the mentality was each — the war stories were the best 
in the academy from some o f  these officers andjust how to top it, how to 
top one thing over the other, Oh, I've seen guys' heads blown off. Then the 
next guy come and be like, I  saw a guy eat another guy's head and his 
head blew off. You know, kind o f  just like topping each other; however, 
earlier on in the training, because I  was attempting to go — not in the 
training, but once I  got out I  was a newer officer. I  remember doing 
hostage negotiation training where it was very important to appreciate the 
emotional aspect or the emotional climate o f  any given situation, which 
was I  mean, just a complete 180 from  what you remember in the academy. 
And I  vividly remember the one thing that sticks out, [an officer], who 
retired was talking — he taught the negotiators school, talked about 
negotiating with this individual who had his family held up there or trying 
to negotiate for hours and going in later hours, later after they cleared it 
with SOT or ERT or SWAT and the entire family had been killed. What 
really got to him was that had they gone in, they would have been able to 
save a couple o f them and it stuck with him and it resonated with him and 
he went into a great depression about it and it was such a refreshing, 
albeit, awkward, that's the first I  ever heard o f  something like that, 
because you don't know what you're going to feel until you fee l it, but it's 
like preparing for a sucker punch.
You can never really prepare for a sucker punch to a degree. You walk 
down the street every day at the same time at the same point in the street, 
someone comes out and, boom, hits you in the face with right or left side. 
Now, initially you're ju st so overwhelmed with it, you don't know. As it 
goes on, you become attuned to, All right, listen, I  don't know where it's 
coming from, but I'm going to be hit. I f  someone tells you this ahead o f  
time, the preparation that you do mentally doesn't wholly prepare you but 
lessens the impact o f  it.
Q. Okay. So you would say that's the first time you heard o f  anything?
A. That absolutely and it was so significant that I  remembered who told me.
1 remembered the story. I  remembered that the family was dead, the 
whole family. I  think four or five people. I  remember when they went in, 
which he reflected on, said he should have never gone on as the lead 
negotiator. He should have never gone in there, but he did and he regrets 
it, but at the same time, there's that regret, but the morbid curiosity, also 
the satisfaction o f not leaving it to, well, maybe it could have, maybe this, 
there was a definitive answer. You either come in earlier, you would have 
saved a life. Not his call but still affected him the same. Hands down, 
first time I  heard it really, really open to it and thought that something like 
that, that kind o f  experience needs to be sharedfrom a tough officer.
Q. Okay. So nothing like that, anything about issues in law enforcement with
divorce, alcoholism, suicide, any o f  those things?
A. I  tell you the big topics, women, i f  you're a male police officer, men, i f
you're a female police officer. Don't fuck with dispatchers because they'll 
get you fired. I  mean, this is like legitimate, like may not be on a syllabus,
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but that's what was said kind o f  very don't steal, listen, you know, you 
need to talk to somebody, but it's a tough job, you're going to see stuff. 
There was no — they throw out — they throw out statistics as i f  it were a 
badge o f honor.
You know, you're getting into a job  that 50 percent o f  the people get 
divorced. You know, listen, five years after you leave this place you're 
probably going to drop dead. They threw it out there as kind o f  like a 
bravado kind o f  like we’re doing this despite the inevitability o f  being 
miserable and, you know, stuff but they owned it. It was very like a 
machismo kind o f  thing, kind o f  puffing your chest out like we do a job that 
it's going to fuck us up, but we do it, you know, kind of.
One participant, in discussing the police culture, noted that the officer is 
“supposed to be everything to everyone when the truth is they're having a hard enough 
time just making it some days just being themselves.” From this perspective, it becomes 
easier to see how officers transform from eager, fresh-faced recruits into hardened, 
cynical officers (Gilmartin 2002). Several participants spoke to this experience, noting 
that they routinely struggle to avoid giving in to cynicism, with two specific examples 
provided below:
Q. All right. We got up to you choosing to go into the police department and
before we get into your academy experience, you said something that was 
really interested about over glamorized, you know, over-glamorized 
military. Did you have the same kind o f  approach to policing?
A. Oh, yeah, definitely, but I  didn’t realize it until later. And I'm not talking
about right away. I  would say — I  would say I  encountered a — I  
encountered a rape victim early on that really kind o f  stuck with me.
There was such --you couldjust — when you see somebody in just such 
despair and lost and o f  course you’re new, you want to get everything 
right, you don't want to mess any paperwork up, you know, ma'am, just 
Joe Friday kind o f  thing, you know, just the facts and blah, blah, blah, 
blah, but you see, I  saw the person very emotionally ju st distraught and 
vulnerable and in trying to — like i f  I  was in her position would I  be telling 
somebody and I  remember really thinking about it and going like, yeah, 
that’s not fun at all. I  didn't like that. I  started seeing the difference 
between — I  was able to and I  don't know i f  I  was different than anybody 
or maybe everybody did it, but I  saw a distinct difference between 
veterans, officers, and supervisors that had become callous, had become 
very course or ju st very easily separatedfrom what was going on to
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somebody from how it affected them and I  remembered there was that 
distinct — there’s a distinct difference between the younger guys and 
younger girls that were just go right through, you know, run into the 
burning building, run into, you know, the shots fired kind o f  call and the 
effects. Now, both would kind o f  run in. Some wouldn't on both sides o f  
them but how it affected each o f  them was so significantly different. You 
get back and, you know, you bullshit with the guys or the people on the 
platoon and the younger guys was like, Oh, that was awesome and then 
the older guys would be, you know, like salty dogs like, Oh, routine day in 
Norfolk You saw a dead guy, you ’re going to see hundreds o f them. We 
had more enthusiasm where they had been beaten down, but there's this 
fine area of, I  guess, when you make the transition from  being new and 
enthusiastic to maybe becoming exposed to it enough that you're 
not — you're not experiencing the known. You're addressing it the way 
you should but you've not yet become completely jaded. You've not yet 
become callous. You still reserve that and you’re in tune to how 
somebody's feeling. You're in tune to how you're feeling but it's a very 
brief moment and the way I  see it is we all pass that moment. We all go 
through it as officers. Some maybe never get to that point but we all go 
through it at some point in time... The further you are away from that, the 
harder it is to be in that zone to come back to that area... You know, you 
get all these things and it's kind o f  how you end, kind o f  go back andforth 
from enthusiasm to callous, to a great blend o f  not allowing the bullshit to 
bother you but still being enthusiastic about the job... Now, staying in that 
area is difficult fo r me and you'll shoot past it sometimes but shooting is a 
prime example o f being in that area, being in that zone, you know, 
understanding and then it just — you're thrust into that callous, this is 
bullshit. I  don't want to do this work. I'm done kind o f  stuff. Then 
gradually getting back to that.
...I don't know i f  [that is a] lasting impact. O f course, i f  I'm still thinking about it 
17 years later on some o f  them, yes, they had a lasting impact. But I'm glad they 
do, only because in law enforcement you can get soured or you can get 
stone-faced from things, from experiencing things, but I ’m glad they still affect me 
because I  wouldn't want to be non-feeling because I  think a lot o f  times we lose 
our emotions or try to lose our emotions so they don't effect us. So I'm okay with 
it. I'm okay with it coming back up.
While both participants above discuss the struggle to maintain their humanity and 
emotions, this flies in the face the typical emotionally detached cop stereotype often held 
up as a model for officers, with one participant referring to the expectation of being the
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“police robot.” However, another participant noted that, if you cannot handle what you 
see, if you become emotional, maybe you are not cut out to do this job, thus 
demonstrating the internalization and replication of culturally transmitted values. This 
participant was the only one who clearly “bought into” many of these culturally 
proscribed stereotypes, as was evidenced by numerous statements made during the 
interview process. Most other participants recognized that, in spite of the camaraderie 
and fun of the career, there is a negative side that can have tremendous impacts on an 
individual, as seen in the following excerpt:
A. Yeah, yeah, you're a police officer. You’re supposed to suck this up.
Q. It's a flesh wound, you 're okay.
A. Yeah, it's a flesh wound, put some dirt on it, get back out there. Here, put 
some dirt and a Band-Aid on it. Get back out there.
Q. Okay. So do you think that there's any way we can change that?
A. Yeah, a lot o f it is changing. The SOPs and doing the studies and look at 
the studies and, you know, police officers aren't dying, you know, from  
being involved in traffic stops or, you know, being involved in critical 
incidents. Police officers are dying by their own hand.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. You know, because they did not receive the support from that department 
or they didn't, you know, receive any type o f  training or, you know, some 
way to deal with this critical incident. So we have to look in to finding  
ways to support our police officers.
When specifically discussing the interaction between cultural expectations and 
officer-involved shootings, there were several interesting statements and observations 
made by the participants in the current study. In particular, there appears to be a sub­
culture within the larger police or agency culture that is comprised of officers that have 
been involved in shooting incidents. These officers, in particular, were vocal about the 
impact these culturally approved stereotypes can have on an officer who is involved in a 
critical incident. As one participant noted,
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Q. How many officers have you seen go through an officer-involved shooting
before yours?
A. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. Before the shooting,
seven.
Q. Okay. What do you remember from those experiences?
A. Adrenaline, just it sounds more horrible that it actually is. You’re kind o f
excited. This is the apex o f  what cops do. We're involved in shootings. 
Statistically you're really not but that is it. That is it. It's the — it's being 
involved in the last play o f my last sport — minute o f  a sporting event that 
determines the victory o f a championship kind o f thing. That's the Super 
Bowl. You feel exhilarated. This is — this is being involved. This is also 
showing up involved on a peripheral aspect, not actually shooting, 
actually shooting is a little bit different. There is a just. I'm a cop sense o f  
curiosity and wanting to be in the know because, you know, it's going to be 
on the news and you have a sense o f  you're watching the news later on 
and you're like, I  was there. Oh, there's my car. And interacting with 
some o f  the people that were involved in it. Some were distant and 
obviously hindsight after being involved in my own shooting, there's that 
initial numbness, the shock o f  the whole surrealness o f  it, which now I  
know that's what they were experiencing. Some weren't, but fo r  the most 
part they were and thinking I  had a comprehensive understanding o f  what 
they were going through because I  was in proximity to it, i f  that makes any 
sense...
Q. Okay. How many shootings — how many have you been exposed to after
yours?
A. After my shooting, one, two, three, four, five, I  almost forgot, six, seven.
Seven or eight.
Q. Okay. Have you noticed any difference?
A. Oh, yeah. Shit, yeah. Prior to my shooting I  was more concerned with
what occurred. After my shooting more concerned with how the officer is 
doing. I  mean, just that's a night and day difference. The facts o f  the case
are what they are. I  was more concerned with them prior to 
understanding what that experience is and then after that, understanding 
the emotional impact that it has on you and ju s t the where that — I  fe lt it 
almost in a sea ofpeople that were more fucking concerned about how 
many times you shot or what did the guy do, are you okay with what 
happened, as far as legally and all this, ju st I  felt like a ruined person, 
watching another individual go through the same bullshit that I  went 
through and where you say making that effort to go talk to them, making 
that effort to make sure that they're okay. To make sure that — to prepare 
them for the sucker punches that are coming down the road, to prepare 
them fo r the, you're going to feel like shit, to prepare them for, you're not 
going to sleep, to prepare for —you’re going to be a dick head to 
everybody that you come across and i f  not, there is that potential andjust 
really focusing on getting that out to them.
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Another participant discussed how fear, which is not supposed to impact the robot cop,
plays a central role following a shooting incident, stating:
...1 mean, for someone like a police officer who is living their life the right way, 
the things in the back o f your mind, I'm losing my house. I'm going to be 
unemployed. How am I  going to take care o f  my kids or my family, you know, 
that's the kind o f stuff you worry about. I f  I  was a dirt bag, I  don't have nothing to 
lose anyway so I  could care less, but for someone who is doing the right thing and 
you throw their legal rights in their face right after the incident, your heart is still 
pumping, your mind is running a thousand miles a minute. Tell me what 
happened. Well, I  ain't really processed what happened yet. Give me a couple 
days to calm down. Let me talk to somebody else who is not going to jam  me up 
so I  can help process this. Then I  can sit down and tell you what happened.
The participant above referred to “throwing...legal rights in their face,” which
also raised the interesting potential for role confusion or frustration. As police officers,
on a day-to-day basis, these officers enforce the law, make arrests and a part of that
camaraderie is related to the knowledge that we are the “good guys,” and they are the
“bad guys.” This us and them dichotomy serves to promote cohesive behavior and unites
officers by providing a common enemy. Yet, when an officer is involved in a shooting,
he or she will be put into the role of suspect unexpectedly. As one participant noted:
I  understand what they're saying, but evidentiary matter but as a person who you 
just prior to this incident you deemed as a colleague, to treat them now like 
they're, you know, a leper to the side, leave them alone, don't say nothing to them, 
they need that support and 1 don't think that — I  don't think that's a good policy.
The culture also impacts how officers think they should act in the wake of a shooting
incident, drawing particularly from those ideals o f  hegemonic masculinity addressed in
the previous section. As such, one participant discussed,
Q. So what about the police culture? Do you think there's an issue with that
when you talk about critical incidents?
A. I  mean, there's a bravado o f it, you know.
Q. Okay.
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A. It's a false bravado, you know. There ain't nothing cool about killing 
somebody, you know what I'm saying. Some people like to say they 
are — you know, they're fu ll o f it. They're lying. You know, I've had plenty 
o f chances on this job where I  could have shot and killed somebody and I  
didn't do it. I  don't feel bad that I  didn’t. I  most likely wouldn't have fe lt
bad i f  I  did. It's — for me it's just not that big o f a deal and it's ju st part o f
my job.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, I  don't look at it as it doesn't make you tough. It doesn't make you
bad because criminals kill people every day in this country and they 
don't — but there is a definite sense o f how you're supposed to be like after 
you get in a shooting.
This expectation for emotional detachment, or bravado, is a part of the “suck it up 
culture,” as one respondent called it, noting that this did not work for Chris. Chris also 
talks about how the police culture conditions coping and behavior following a shooting 
incident, as well as resistance to having someone who admits to the emotional 
vulnerabilities sharing their story with other officers and recruits, finding that
Q. [Talking] With [your psychologist] that's one thing. After you started
seeing him, did you have a hard time going back from that position to not?
A. No, because it's a culture that you're not supposed to talk about it. I  don't
think it was until a good year or two after when I started doing the 
academy on that, when they asked me. Because they initially didn't want 
me to do anything with the academy after that but I  started —you try to, 
especially for the people coming onto the department, you try to take that 
out o f  the equation, the whole, you got to be a touch guy all the time, but 
that was a good couple years before.
Q. Your first academy class when you decided to talk about it, was that
difficult?
A. Very, very.
Q. Tell me about it.
A. Rough in the sense that I  went over it a couple times so that I  knew which
portions were going to make me upset and I  would either move something 
around or eliminate like the parts coming up to it and it really doesn't take 
away from anything. They're getting what they need, but certain things 
were like, Oh, God. I  would say, like talking about the aftermath or 
getting ready — going through the whole shooting and getting to the end, 
because I remembered I  would always associate that with ju st a dump o f  
emotions and then I  would start — so I  would immediately jump from  the 
shooting was over to the aftermath, like you know, no sleep, stuff like that,
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take the chunk out inside o f  just saying, you know, that was a tough time 
afterwards, but you know, over the years it gets easier but that was rough.
Q. Did you notice any o f  the other symptoms coming back after you did your
first academy?
A. Oh, yeah. Oh, God, yeah...
The final element of the police culture that was emergent in the interviews 
conducted was the perceived distinction or separation between command personnel (also 
referred to as “brass”) and frontline or street personnel (Roberg, Novak and Cordner 
2009). This discrepancy in perspective was noted in how issues within the agency were 
identified and framed in discussions related to departmental responses and obligations, 
but several participants made statements to this effect, as well, including the examples 
below:
Q. So what about supervisors and support from supervisors?
A. Like the Narcotics guys were wonderful, even up to our captain and like I
say, I  say this because they were old school and they knew how it was 
supposed to be done. They gave us everything we needed. I  mean, our 
captain at the time, he got so mad at the news that he blasted them. He 
got transferred out because o f  what he said. I  mean, he was the best
captain I  ever worked for. He knew the job. He knew how to support his
people and he had our back 100 percent but outside o f  Narcotics, even the 
past shootings I've been in when your life was in danger, I've seen 
supervisors help because everyone had to go to a shooting review board. 
I've seen them telling us, You should have did this, you should have done 
this, why did you do this. You know, you acted recklessly. I  was being 
shot at. You know, I  mean, but they sitting back telling us what we should 
or shouldn’t do, and they haven't been on the street in ten years...And the 
higher they get up on the food chain -  the worse it gets.
Q. What about supervisors and administrators, any suggestions?
A. I  don't know. Fuck them.
...I talked to [a] Lieutenant. He's like, Are you ready to come back to work? I  
mean, you're all right. I'm like, No. I'm going to take off. I  hung up on him. I  
remember thinking, What a fucking dick head. He ju st — he ju st doesn't care. It 
wasn 't that he doesn't — he ju st doesn't care. I  remember thinking, What a 
complete scumbag.
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Yeah, because we stand behind that blue wall o f  silence so long. I  mean, 
sometimes the way the news portrays stuff is 99.9 percent wrong and it would be 
so helpful like when Riddick was up there spouting o ff  about all these white 
officers shooting these black kids, i f  somebody from the police department would 
have stood up and said, look, on the news, these officers were black. They put 
their life on the line doing their job  and these bad guys make a bad decision, 
nobody ever does that. So they say something which is totally wrong. Police 
department says nothing, feel like you're throwing the officer who was involved 
under the bus and then the citizens give the opinion that these guys are a bunch o f  
bad guys and they're running around shooting, like at what Riddick said. He's a 
councilman, he got to be right. He was dead wrong but nobody from  the police 
department stood up and said anything until [a] Captain said something and then 
they punish him fo r  saying it. So it's definitely bad police culture to me.
As should be evident from the discussion and the excerpts above, the police 
culture is neither a static nor a standalone theme. Officers are indoctrinated into their 
agency’s culture, which may include elements o f machismo, impression management, 
and stigma, and learn to operate within that culture. In the event of an officer involved 
shooting, the cultural stereotypes that officers are encouraged to adopt and replicate may 
be at odds with the experiences and feelings that emerge after being involved in a critical 
incident. As the officer feels the need to maintain appearances, he or she may engage in 
impression management and/or isolate themselves from their peers to avoid stigma. 
Further, as discussed elsewhere in this study, the response o f the police agency may 
appear to bolster these cultural ideals, demonstrating yet another way administrative 
response may contribute to the development of long-term symptoms of trauma.
Theme: Impact on Others
The fourth theme that emerged was related to how an officer-involved shooting 
impacts other individuals. In the literature, the focus is primarily placed upon the officer 
that pulls the trigger, and that particular focus is understandable for a variety of reasons.
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Despite contrary contentions from Simon and Garfunkel (2001), no officer is an island.
He or she is situated within their familial, professional and social networks, which means 
that those connected to this individual may also experience trauma through this 
relationship. As in Chapter 2, these impacts are divided into two sub-sections—impact 
on the family and impact on fellow officers—as there are different concerns and 
relationships involved that may condition both the experience of and response to trauma. 
These others, who are not only potentially traumatized, may be a part of the officer’s 
support system and may be required to act as a catalyst for or facilitate intervention 
efforts. As such, their experiences deserve more attention than is currently paid to this 
topic in the literature.
Sub Theme 1: Family
As discussed in Chapter 2, those surrounding the officer are often not given much 
attention in terms of their experience o f secondary trauma or how they interact with and 
respond to an officer who has been through a shooting incident. In the current study, the 
exploration of this impact was somewhat limited, as Chris acknolwdged that he isolated 
himself from his family and did not really discuss his shooting with them. However, 
speaking with his significant other provided insight and another perspective into how 
poor coping skills, critical incident stress and PTSD can impact an intimate partner. 
Further, several of the participants in the current study had been involved in previous 
shooting incidents, as discussed above, and disclosed how their own experiences had 
impacted their families, albeit only from their perspective.
At least two respondents addressed the general impacts of their career choice on 
their families. Both officers indicated that, while not completely to blame, their careers
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were a factor in the dissolution of their respective marriages, as seen in the excerpts 
below:
I  will tell you, you know, the reason my marriage failed, yeah, there's a lot o f  
reasons. There's always reasons. Marriage is hard to begin with. But when I  
look back on my responsibility or my part o f  why things went the way they did, my 
ex-wife looks at me today and says, Yeah, you are nothing like you were when you 
got out o f  the police academy. You are not the same person at all and I  haven't 
had to shoot anybody here. It's still that sense o f  — so the families are dealing 
with — they start out with Person A five years, ten years, 15 years down the road 
they're dealing with Person B they don't even know and they didn't ask fo r  it and 
they don't want it and they know they don't want it but they feel an obligation or 
loyalty to that person because they knew them back when they knew them when 
they were somebody different
A. ...Families, families need to understand that that person is no longer the
same. They will look the same. They will appear the same. They may 
even act the same in certain situations but they are not the same anymore 
and you need to understand that the person you married, the person that is 
your dad or your child, they are not the same.
Q. There's a quote, from  Ellen Kirschman that says it's not ju st the officer that
gets PTSD, it's the whole family.
A. Oh, I  believe it 100 percent, 100percent. I  know my kids. I  know my kids
have said they're scared o f  me.
Q. So how do we go about addressing that with families?
A. Families have to be incorporated more from the beginning. A t the
academy level where you have an ombudsman o f sorts that can go in and 
say, Okay, look, here's what your spouse is getting ready to take on. They 
still aren't going to really grasp it but at least when it happens they'll be 
able to recognize things so they won't think they’re crazy. They won't 
think their spouse is out cheating on them because they're completely 
different now. They won't think a lot o f things that naturally come to mind 
because hopefully they will have been educated enough where they can 
say, Yeah, they said this would happen. They said this would happen. 
Because a part o f  that, you know, it's been suggested and I  know a couple 
other jurisdictions do this, they do what's called a spouse academy where 
they go over not just the changes in the individual but the common issues, 
money, and part time and overextension and all o f these.
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Q. Okay. We've talked a little bit o f  stress. Did this put additional stress on
your relationship with your wife when you went through your [shooting]?
A. She would say no but I  would think yes.
Q. Okay. How so?
A. It ended up being she was a little more worried when I  would leave and I
think, like I  said, we're still such goodfriends and I  think that stress is 
kind o f what pushed us apart, you know what I'm saying.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Because it was nothing major that happened to say that you did this, I  did
that. 1 want to get a divorce. It was just like she had detached herself. So 
much worrying that eventually we just grew so far apart to the point 
where we just woke up and were like, It's not working, you know what I'm 
saying, but it was nothing that I  could say, you know, because knowing 
your dad unfortunately in Narcotics, there are a lot o f  long hours and days 
on days we 're stuck at work and it just pushed us so fa r  apart. I  guess she 
had to detach herself from me because she would have been worrying so 
much and then a year or so, two years, three years down the road fo r  
whatever reason, I'm not happy, and then we just decided to break, you 
know, but it was nothing like I  cheated on her, she cheated on me. I  hit 
you, you hit me. Nothing like that. We still broke up though. So she 
would say no but I  would say yes.
Although not expected or solicited, there were three participants that discussed 
how significant others received the notification of their loved one’s shooting. These 
notifications are likely quite traumatic for the wife or husband of the officer involved, 
especially as two of the three disclosures in this study involved officers who had 
themselves been shot. It should be noted that, with regards to the Chris’ girlfriend being 
notified of his shooting, as a participant in the current study, she was able to provide her 
perspective, whereas the other two notifications were relayed from the officer’s 
perspective. Additionally, Chris’ girlfriend acknowledges that, as a dual cop couple 
(Kirschman 2007), she had a better understanding of the process and could empathize 
with Chris more because she is a police officer herself.
Q. Okay. That makes sense. Do you remember how you found out about his
shooting?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Tell me about that.
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A. Yes. I  think it was a Sunday night.
Q. Okay.
A. Was it a Sunday? It was either a Saturday or Sunday. I  think it was a
Sunday because I  think I  had a three-day weekend where I  was working so 
he had been practicing fo r  the tattoo, pipe and drum, and he called me 
late like 9:30, 10:00 maybe, somewhere around there, 9:00ish, late, and 
he was like, What are you doing? I  was like, Well, I'm doing my 
homework. I  was sitting in my bedroom typing and he's like, Why don’t 
you come over? No, you come over. No, you come over. Like it was just 
back andforth and I  was like, I'm doing homework. Why don't you just 
come over here? And he was like, Fine, I  got to stop and get gas and 
smokes and then I'll come over. I  was like, Okay. Hung up, whatever, 
typing.
Maybe like an hour-and-a-half two hours go by. I'm like, Okay. You 
know, thinking maybe he got tied up or something. Then I  got a call, don’t 
know what time it was. I  don't know, 11:OOish. I  don't know, late. He’s 
like screaming, screaming into the phone, and I  remember ju st hearing his 
voice. I  mean, it was fear, screaming, excited, like I  think I  killed 
somebody, I  just shot somebody. I  think I  killed him. I  think — all I  can 
remember hearing is he got in a shooting, I  think I  killed somebody, I  shot 
somebody, blah, blah, blah. I  think he's dead. Again, not that calm 
screaming. All I  could say is, Okay. All right. Okay. Like I  don't know 
what mode I  got in, like okay, all right, like very calm, and I'll call you 
when I  get in and, boom. I'm kind o f  sitting there like, Oh, my God.
So Iran down the hallway and my friend was going through a divorce at 
the time and she was living with me and I  went and woke her up. I  was 
like, Oh, you've got to come here. Okay. Chris just got in a shooting and 
blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And so I  remember she and I  sat there 
and talked for a little bit and I  sat there in my room, turned on the TV, and 
waitedfor the 5:00 news, 5:00 in the morning news, saw it come on the 
news, saw his car inside the crime scene tape. I  saw the bullet holes in the 
glass at the Shell station.
So I  don't know, maybe 6: OOish in the morning, the following morning, he 
finally called me back and said he was going to his house... and then I  
remember driving over there early in the morning... being a police officer 
all I  could — and his girlfriend at the time all I  could do is try to calm him 
down... I  don't know, 9: OOish I'm still awake. I'm sitting there and I  have a 
remote and I'm watching this little TV again with the five  things that he 
took from his previous marriage in his room, one was a TV so I'm looking 
at TV and all o f  a sudden breaking news, blah, blah, blah, blah, shooting, 
mass shooting at Virginia Tech, and the volume is up and I'm like, Oh, my 
God, because I'm thinking he does not need to hear that right now. So I'm 
turning the volume down and I'm thinking, Oh, God, how — I'm thinking 
how can we keep him from  finding out about that. Impossible, but to me
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both o f  those, Virginia Tech is in my mind, that triggers Chris' shooting 
fo r  me.
My boss at the time, he’s a lieutenant now at the department, I  asked him to go 
pick [my wife] up. So he went himself to go get her and back in the day I  used to 
have a dark blue Impala with tinted windows and he had a black Impala with 
tinted windows. So when he came to the house, he knocked on the door and I  
remember her telling me when she looked out she saw the car, she thought it was 
me. I  just left my keys. So when she opened the door, she saw [the] Lieutenant. 
She was like, [he] is not here. He was like, I  know. I  got to tell you something 
andfrom his inflection o f his voice and the way he looked, she knew it was bad 
and she said — the next thing she said, she was like, Is he dead? And he said, I  
don't know but we got to hurry up and get to the hospital and so she ju st like lost 
it. So she kind o f  fainted and he picked her up and threw her in the car and he 
hauled it on down to Norfolk General... A t the time it was very stressful because 
she works in the courts so, you know, she's around the justice system. She knows 
how it goes and everything and when it firs t happened, they brought her to the 
hospital and that first night before I  went to surgery and it was definitely stressful 
to her. I  mean, she will tell you — I  mean, even though we're divorced, we’re still 
goodfriends, and she'll tell you, you know, it took ten years o ff her life when that 
happened, and it definitely affected her in a big way.
I  made a couple phone calls when they were loading me on to the bus. I  called 
my brother. I  called my best friend. I  called my best friend to tell him to go get 
my wife and have him meet me at the hospital. I  mean, I know I  had been shot in 
the thigh and it was when the paramedic cut my pants off, then I  realized I  had 
been shot the second time. So I  wasn't really sure how serious it was. I  mean, I  
knew I  could talk on the phone because I  grabbed the paramedics' phone and 
said, Man, I  got to use your phone. I  called my brother to have him go pick my 
mom up. But my brother screwed up and called my mom on the phone and she 
went spastic. She called my dad. He came and picked her up and he's going 
lights and sirens to the hospital. My buddy screwed up and called my wife's twin 
sister. So she had to tell her and she got to the hospital. She was — she was 
worried and I  was told that I  was sitting in the hospital bed telling jokes. I  don't 
really remember that, but I  was told that I  was telling jokes and she was upset 
with me because I  was in there telling jokes.
The notification process, as noted above, can be quite frightening and traumatic. 
Yet, after the shooting, when the officer begins to go through the symptoms of critical 
incident stress, or if he or she develops PTSD, this, too, may provoke a strong emotional
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response in the officer’s family members. This continued impact can be seen in the
discussion o f fear, which emerged in multiple interviews. Fears held by family members
ranged in intensity and severity, and often included a fear o f the officer returning to work
in the same unit, with participants finding that:
Q. Okay. What about were you ever afraid?
A. Of?
Q. With him harming you/himself in the middle o f  a nightmare, anything?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Because he was very close — he's always close to his gun anyway but he
was very — I got to have my gun.
Q. Any other times you were afraid?
A. I  was never afraid fo r  me. I  mean, I  never — the only thing I  was afraid
our relationship wasn't going to work out because o f the shooting and that 
kind o f  made me like sad.
But then it did work out so, you know what I  mean, I  was never afraid o f  
him. I  was afraid o f him becoming an alcoholic. I  was afraid o f  him not 
enjoying work anymore because I  knew him as a person who loved to 
work, loved, you know, everything about work. So I  was afraid he was 
going to lose his interest in police work.
Initially it was pretty rough, especially my youngest daughter. My youngest 
daughter and my middle daughter, we both had to take them to counseling. My 
wife and I  at the time had to take them to counseling, which went on fo r  a little 
over a year, and so when I  was recovering. When Ifirst got the okay to go back 
to work, my kids didn't want me to come back to Narcotics. So I  came back and I  
went to Homicide, but it was only fo r  like nine months, and I  was hating it at the 
time and my wife could see I  was upset. She was like, You want to go back to 
Narcotics, don't you? I  was like, Yeah. So after the girls went through their 
counseling we sat them down and I  talked to them and they fe lt  a little better 
about this. So I  was like, you know, Dad really wants to go back to Narcotics. 
They were like, Well, okay, I  guess we '11 be okay with it. So I  went back to 
Narcotics for another like seven years until I  came back over here to Homicide.
Q. Okay. So did she kind o f  have some concerns, you know, after you were
home and getting ready to go back to work?
A. Yeah, yeah, she had a lot o f  concerns o f  me going back to Narcotics. It's
funny because I  remember the day I  was transferred. I  was in the Vice 
Unit and I  was going to — I  got myself into trouble in the Vice Unit so they 
were moving me to Narcotics. That was my punishment.
Q. Yeah.
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A. Yeah, me going to Narcotics is where I  really wanted be and I  remember 
the day that I  came home and I  told her I  was going to Narcotics. She 
started crying. I  told her, No, Narcotics is the safest place you can be 
because you're going to always know who you're dealing with, you know, 
as opposed to a traffic stop or in uniform you respond to a domestic or 
anything. I  was like, No, no, it's always calculated. It's tactical. We're 
always going to know who we’re dealing with... When, you know, when I  
told her I  was going to go back, I  had to I  guess...Part o f  it was, you know, 
male bravado. You know, part o f it is, you know, my pride and the other 
part is Ijust really wanted to be there...
Chris described how his sleep disturbances impacted his significant other, stating 
that his wife “would be like, Holy shit, I thought you were going to hit me. Because I'd 
get up and just be manic and that was it for sleep. You weren't getting back to sleep for 
that day.” His wife also mentioned several times in her interview how tired she was in 
the aftermath of Chris’ shooting, making comments like,
Q. Okay. Wds there anything that you struggled with during the immediate 
aftermath and then the following months in particular?
A. I  was tired because he didn't sleep and o f  course he slept over and he
didn't sleep. I  didn't sleep. The nightmares he had, like he'd wake up after 
two hours o f  sleep. Sometimes he didn't sleep at all or he'd just drink and 
hoping that drink would make him go to sleep. So o f  course he's up, I'm 
up. So I  was tired a lot, dealing with his anger was kind o f  — but I'm kind 
o f  blunt, too, so I'm like, You're an ass. You're really being an ass. So I  
think he knew it but, you know, you hurt the ones you love, you know, you 
can be that way with the ones you love, and at least he was getting it out 
some way... I  remember just being tired. Because when something 
bothers me, I  don't sleep. Even to this day i f  something is on my mind, I  
don’t sleep
Another issue that impacted Chris’ wife was that he became extremely jealous. There is 
an incident, detailed in the section on anger, which provides a clear example of the strain 
this behavior put upon their relationship. However, as demonstrated in the excerpts 
below, this was not the only incident.
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He got very jealous, which was very difficult fo r  me.
(about Chris having given her an ultimatum to be friends with her ex-fiance or 
date him)... but it was just very jealous and I  can't say clingy, that he wanted to 
hold me all the time, but just very wanted to be around me, which is fine because I  
wanted to be around him, too, but I  never knew i f  it was the happy Chris, was it 
going to be the angry, the sad, you know, I  wanted to be there fo r  him.
... well, I  guess myself and I  didn't think that I  would put up with all that but our 
relationship — I  mean, obviously it made it through that so that's saying 
something. I  know this is going way back but I  never — I  wasn't really ever one to 
ever get married and I  think like three months into dating, [he says] let's get 
married. That's [a bit] much. He was like, Come be with me. No, we're — like he 
got mad at that, because I  said no. Why don't I  move in? No. Like it was one o f  
those — yeah, so our relationship but it made it.
Of additional concern was the idea that she never knew what Chris’ mood would be like, 
and so she felt like she had to constantly be on guard and had to judge his mood, as 
described below.
I  guess Ijudged his mood. I  would have to judge his mood daily... So based on his 
mood is, you know, how much I  would, you know, try to talk and I  always try to 
get him to talk about it and reassure him, you know, as a fellow police officer, you 
did nothing wrong. You did the right thing, you know, he put you in that situation. 
You were just stopping to get gas. That wasn't your fault. You know, and I'd try 
to turn it aroundfor him. You could have saved those people’s lives. You were 
put there for a reason and that could be it, you know...
Additional frustrations came from the fact that this was a new relationship, so she was
unsure how far to push certain issues. She also disclosed that she
... was frustrated because that's not how a new relationship should start.
I  was frustrated like, Come on, give me a break, but then you know, like I  said, I  
made like a decision that I  was going to be with him and I  was going to help him 
get through it and you know, again, I  knew him before so I  kept hanging onto that, 
that he was going to once again become that person again... because matter o f  
fact, one o f my girlfriends, she was like, You need to dump him. Like it was that 
bad. Like you need to dump him.
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Further, she noted that
I  thought whoever gave him a copy o f that audio, I  know it was one o f  the 
detectives, don't know who, I  was livid that that happened. Because I'm going to 
tell you what, that was Chris'favorite hit fo r  about two months. Every day he 
would sit there and listen to it and just you could see him getting in his funk every 
time and over and over and over. Whoever that was should have never given that 
to him. That person should have realized that wasn't the Chris Scallon that he 
was before that incident happened. He should have never had that, that 
early... I'm not saying he never should have heard it, but it shouldn't have 
been — maybe they should have let him come in and listen to it and they kept it, 
not give him a copy o f  it, my opinion.
Chris’ wife, even though it was a new relationship, acknowledged that, in terms how she
coped with this situation, which is a very optimistic and supportive stance to take.
I  just — I  mean, I  think — /  made a decision maybe like three months into it. I  was 
like, Okay. I'm there fo r  him. I'm caring about him, starting to love him, you 
know. I  could put myself in his shoes. What i f  it was me going through this and 
I'm sure he would be there for me, you know.
...it was super fun and I  — during that seminar and I've told other people, thank 
God I  knew him before because i f  I  hadn't have known him, I  would have 
obviously been his friend and helped him through anything as his friend because I  
was his friend before but i f  I  hadn't known him, I  don't know i f  our relationship 
would have lasted... It must have been meant to be because I  put up with a lot 
more than I  ever imagined I  would put up with in any other circumstance, and 
then o f  course we eventually got married so it was worth it. It was meant to be. 
Everything happens for a reason. People are put in your life fo r  a reason. That's 
my belief and I  think that at that time, that that February that Chris and I  were 
meant to run into each other where I  wasn't dating someone, he wasn't married. 
That was meant to happen.
However, when asked if there was a point where she drew a line in the sand, if there was
something beyond what she would tolerate, this was her response:
... Yeah, I  think — the line in the sand, I  think the most was you're going to take 
that medicine, like it was to that point, you've got to do something fo r  yourself 
besides drinking, like you will take this medicine. I  remember that being the line 
in the sand. Like i f  you're not willing to help yourself in there, but he did 
eventually take the medicine and stay with it. Like I  would check it. Like he kept
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it in the drawer and I'd be like, Okay, I'm making sure you’re taking your 
medicine. But again, I ’m not your mother, but I  was at that point that you've got 
to want to help yourself in this... Got to help yourself because I'U be here no 
matter what. I  don't care about side effects and medication. That wasn’t 
important to me. What was important to me was seeing him happy at some point.
In the course of her interview, she was concerned that, by talking about her
experiences with Chris in the aftermath of his shooting, that it would appear unduly
negative, acknowledging that he was good to her during this time period. Chris, on the
other hand, was quite aware of the impact his PTSD and related behaviors had on his
wife and their relationship, as well as his other relationships, stating:
Q. Greatest source o f support following the shooting and were you surprised
at the level o f support from certain people?
A. [Wife] took the brunt o f  it and shockingly — you know, not shockingly. I'll
say this for a fact, I'm surprised she stuck around, that she stuck 
around...those — the ones closest to me were supportive without being 
overly supportive kind of. I  don't need a shoulder to cry on but always 
available. I  mean, without a doubt, i f  I  needed to call any one o f  
them — we never discussed it. There's never like a — and I  may be 
completely o ff base with somebody. They might be like, Oh, I  got to call. 
I'd be like, Fuck you, but fo r me, I  fe lt and knowing that somebody was out 
there to help out was probably more important than having somebody 
helping me out.
Q. Okay.
A. That was it.
Q. How do you think this incident impacted those closest to you?
A. Scared some close to me, sobered some up as to the reality o f  the work
that I  do. There's a sense o f pride. There's also the sense — it runs a 
gamut, scared to death, some people lean  imagine would be maybe afraid 
fo r  me, which this turn, you know, making them upset, more closer with 
relationships, but I  don't know. I  think mostly it was me — people that 
knew me, it was a validation that they knew that i f  something went down, 
they knew they could count on me because I've done it. You don't know 
what you're going to do until it happens to you. Fortunately and 
unfortunately it happened to me as opposed to somebody else because I  
think it was a great outcome ultimately. So in that respect, having 
somebody feel a certain way is good, whether it's good or bad, the way 
they feel.
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Q. Okay. Do you think the impact was enough that anybody had to cope with
certain things or emotionally? You talked about [your wife] taking a 
brunt o f it.
A. [My wife] definitely, yeah, [my wife] sought counsel. She came to a
couple sessions. 1 think it changed the way — it's fleeting. I f  you're not 
involved, the initial shock o f  somebody, you know, being involved in 
something changes you for that moment and then it's, you know, a week or 
two later that you’re back to yourself. It's like driving and falling asleep 
and you realize you fa ll asleep and you wake up you're like, Holy shit.
Four seconds later you fall asleep again. It's kind o f  what it is, but fo r  me 
it's life-altering. For others I  think close to me was a significant event in 
their life, but fo r  me, it was life-altering and I  think maybe fo r  [my wife] it 
was almost life-altering. She was probably the most — because I  didn't 
talk to really anybody other than her initially.
From this section, it can be surmised that there is, indeed, a significant amount of
secondary trauma that can be visited upon an officer’s family in the wake of a shooting
incident, particularly spouses and children. These individuals are expected to support the
officer, to help him or her heal, but without knowledge as to what to expect and support
of their own, they are facing a very difficult task. Additionally, with minimal literature
addressing this topic available, there are few resources that assure them that many of
these symptoms are normal responses to trauma and that they are not the only people to
ever experience these traumas. Chris, when asked what advice he would give to the
significant other o f an officer who had been in a shooting, made the following statement,
which acknowledges that trauma can strengthen the relationship, but that the significant
other also has to be willing to protect him- or herself.
I  got to be brutally honest, got to be not really afraid to part ways i f  that's the way 
it goes and I  was —you know, i f  it needed to go, it needed to go, not maybe 
something I  wanted but for their benefit, but at the same time, that kind o f  shit, 
you know, going through that does really solidify a relationship, ju st kind o f  holds 
it together because really after that, there ain't much shit that we can't get 
through.
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Sub Theme 2: Fellow Officers and Friends
The literature often overlooks other officers who may be impacted by a shooting,
mentioning secondary trauma in passing. In fact, these officers are only mentioned in
passing in the IACP Model Policies (1998,2012a). As Paton (2005), Thomas (2011) and
Kirschman (2007) note, officers are vulnerable to secondary victimization upon
responding to a critical incident, particularly when the primary victim is and officer and
even more so when the officer responding knows the officer that is the primary victim.
Additionally, like the primary victim, secondary victimization can be conditioned by
personal and situational factors, such as previous traumatic experiences, severity, length
of exposure and coping strategies.
In this particular case, the potential for secondary victimization is increased for all
first responders because Chris, a fellow first responder, was a primary victim. Chris even
recognized the potential trauma for the first officer on scene, stating that
... the gun smoke, the ceiling had lowered because o f  all the — like it's like being 
in a fish  tank and smoking a cigarette. Eventually all the smoke — like in a club 
where all the smoke starts settling and I  remembered thinking, you know, when 
the officer got there that had to be scary, blood everywhere, smoke from the guns 
alone, just smoke from the guns andjust the smell o f  the gun smoke, the smell o f  
the store.
Another participant, recalling his own shooting and the much delayed debrief, also
observed how being on scene, even if the officer was not there during the shooting, can
be particularly difficult for responding officers:
Q. Okay. Did you notice any demeanor changes in other people that had 
been there the night o f  your shooting?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No, everybody held it in pretty well until the debrief and then the actual
real feelings came out because I  was there. I  was in it. I'm sure it's pretty
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tough to see one o f your fellow police officers, you know, laying on the 
curb, you know, bleeding.
Additionally, the first responding investigator qualified for both of the factors that 
increase vulnerability to secondary trauma: the primary victim was a fellow law 
enforcement officer that he knew. As this investigator noted,
A. ...And I  was responding out to the first robbery on Tidewater Drive at the
Shell station. I  responded to the first one, which was the two guys. They 
were actually taking turns on robbing the Shell stations and I  got to the 
first robbery shortly after it happened and I  was on scene when they put 
out the second robbery, which was the Shell station right there at Admiral 
Taussig where Chris was involved in the shooting. They put it out there 
there was an off-duty officer involved in a shooting or involved in the 
robbery. He was in a shooting so o f  course, you know, I  hauled ass in 
there because it wasn't that far from where I  was.
Q. So any other reactions kind o f going on for you as soon as you heard it
was an officer-involved? What goes through your head?
A. Well, 1 thought back to my own shooting and, you know, I  was really
hoping that whoever it was, he was okay and he wouldn't be shot.
Q. Okay. What about when you found out it was Chris?
A. Oh, when I  got there, well, crazy because when I  got there I  saw his car,
you know, right there at the gas pumps and you know, I  kind offreaked out 
like, Oh, shit. You know, that's Scallon's car there. I  was the first 
detective there and there was a couple uniformed guys there. When I  got 
there Iran  right in the place and the suspect was already down and some 
guys were in there handcuffing him and I  looked up and I  saw Chris and I  
ran up, you know, I  kind o f grabbed him up and I took him around there. I  
asked if he was okay, you know. It was pretty obvious what happened.
Well, the basics o f it, you know, he was in a gun battle with the guy and we 
talked for a couple minutes. I  remember he kept saying, I  can't believe I  
didn't get hit. He was patting himself, you know, saying, I  can't believe I  
didn't get hit because it's really weird how Chris, how our lives and your 
careers just crossed paths so much because the night [we] got shot Chris 
was out there... He was there so I  thought it was really weird, you know, 
he's involved in a shooting that I'm right there on scene fo r  him as he was 
out there for Jemal and I  and, you know, he kept saying that and you told 
him, you know, focus on the fact that you’re still here. Focus on the fact 
that you got the guy and he didn't get you.
In this case, it was found that potential secondary trauma was not limited to just 
those officers who were on scene. There were numerous opportunities for secondary
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victimization observed in the interviews with the participants in the current study. Two
of the participants in the current study were notified of Chris’ shooting through the police
information network. These officers received phone calls, late at night, while they were
at home. According to their testimony, both officers reacted immediately:
I  mean, initially I  was like first (inaudible) hoping he was okay, and the fresh  
information was coming in and I  was like, Well, let me know i f  he had been hit or 
what. You know what I  mean, trying to get as much information as I  could.
Where is he? You know, and they said he was here. I  was o ff but I  came here to 
try to get with him, but by the time we got here, they had already had him in an 
interview doing what they're doing, whatever. So I  couldn't get to him but we all 
waited here to see for him to get out, you know. So I  was definitely worried at 
first and hearing what was going on and we knew it was one other guy that got 
away and this and that, you know, so we were all worried.
Well, we were off. I  was at home in bed when I  received a phone call from a 
coworker who said, you know, not to worry but Chris had been involved in a 
shooting. So, you know, I  got up, took a shower, got dressed, went to work, seen 
him, made sure he was all right. You know, I  didn't want to bombard him with 
questions because I  knew everybody was. So I  ju st made sure everything was all 
right, gave him a hug, told him anything you need, I'm here fo r  you, blah, blah, 
blah, and that was pretty much it. 1 didn't really get into it too much because I  
didn't really feel it was any o f  my business.
Also overlooked in the literature is the potential for secondary victimization of
those officers investigating an officer-involved shooting, usually holding the rank of a
sergeant or higher. One participant in the current study has investigated numerous
officer-involved shootings and told the researcher that
Every case comes home with me. They all come home with you in one way or 
another. In one way or another they all come home with you, especially when 
they involve police officers. Any death investigation, any homicide comes home 
with you in some way, but when they involve colleagues and you are looking at 
those people became, you know, I  work with this guy, I  know this guy's kids, I  
know her from when I  did her polygraph when she came on the police 
department. I  know him from working together at some other place and I  know 
that i f  I  don't do a goodjob, i f  I  screw this up, potentially this person could end up
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on a docket somewhere because that's why we're there. We're there to investigate 
in a crime has happened, not did you have your gun clean at the time. So the 
pressure to get it perfect the firs t time is self-induced. I f  you care enough to do it 
right then you should care enough to do it perfectly and I  would put that pressure 
on myself... You can't live like that without it affecting you and every one o f  these 
cases you would see these guys and a lot o f  them kids and you would just go home 
and thank God nothing happened, you know, and then you start playing what i f  
this and what i f  that and what would I  have done differently or what could I  have 
done better to make this better fo r  him or her? What should I  do in the future to 
prevent these type o f situations from happening? They all come home.
Another point of potential secondary trauma occurred when one officer was asked to
review the 9-1-1 tape of Chris’ shooting, with this participant revealing that
... one day like towards the end o f  it he showed me a tape and he was like, 
Hey, it's my 911 tape. Do you want to listen to it and I  told him, I  said,
No, Chris, I'd rather not. And I  kind o f regretted saying it became I  didn't 
know if  he wanted me to listen to it, but I  wasn't prepared to listen to it.
Q. Okay. Why weren't you prepared to listen to it?
A. Because Iju st didn't want to hear it.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, I  mean, it was — it kind o f  gives me chills ju st thinking about it.
That was his thing... But I  kind o f  felt bad because I fe lt like he wanted me 
to and I  didn't, maybe he didn’t. Maybe he was just offering it but I  did 
think about that, like maybe I  should listen to it for him. Maybe he wanted 
me to listen to it but that's just how Ife lt at the time.
As cited in the literature, previous experiences of trauma, a theme previously
discussed in this chapter, can condition secondary trauma victimization, just as it does
primary victimization. In the discussion of previous traumatic experiences, it was
revealed that every officer that participated in the current study had experienced multiple
traumas in the course of their law enforcement careers. The following two excerpts show
the impact Chris’ shooting had on two of the participants, as they reference other
experienced traumas while discussing Chris’ shooting:
...No, it pretty much, you know, I  pretty much handled a lot o f  things and 
answered a lot o f  questions for him because he didn't want to. We had a
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conversation early on where, you know, he told me about it and I  mean, it 
was within the first couple days because I  think he was o ff a couple days 
and then he came back and, you know, he used to go — I  don't know i f  it 
was mandated or whatever, but I  used to take him to some appointments.
It was all the way in Portsmouth. So on the way we would talk so he 
basically told me that, you know, it's not something that he was 
comfortable with, taking a life.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, which I've never heard anybody — I  know people that have
killed people before: I  mean, it's not the response people say, whether it 
be the truth or not. I  just thought it was, you know — I  thought it was 
pretty honest, you know, for him to admit that he was having a problem 
processing and, you know, without getting involved in trying to, you know, 
put myself in his shoes and I  don't like to do that., fo r  me, I  think it was 
like a gut check. I  mean, back in the day we were all pretty wild, you 
know, it seemed to me like after that, Chris really kind o f  put things in 
perspective because it was right around that time that him and his now 
wife got real close and I  think he started to look at his life in the 
perspective o f — and I  can only assume this, I'm not speaking fo r  him, but 
holy shit, I  mean, I'm o ff duty buying a pack o f  cigarettes and I  could have 
lost my life in that gas station, and I  think it probably — you know, he 
re-evaluated how he was going to look at things.
Q. When Chris' shooting came up, did it bring anything up for you? Did you
have any —
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay. So what happened.
A. I  mean, when I  first heard about it and I  heard how many shots were fired,
it definitely made me think back to mine. Because during mine, four
people were shooting in a space smaller than this room, over here 70 
rounds fired. Like I  could put myself in Chris' shoes because I  could hear 
them bullets going past my head and even after the first time I  was shot, I  
stayed in the fight and going back out there thinking, don't let me get hit 
again, trying to stop this, and then I  got hit again. So I  can imagine how 
Chris felt, like it was never going to end, because that's how you feel, like 
even though in reality it's probably less than two minutes long, it feels like 
it's a day-and-a-half long, you know what I'm saying. So it definitely 
made me flashback and I  definitely could put myself in Chris' shoes then.
This section examines the impact a single shooting incident can have on other 
officers beyond the officer that fired his or her weapon, a topic not covered well in the 
literature. As Thomas (2011) suggested, secondary trauma extends beyond responding to
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the scene and the current study supports this contention. There were multiple 
opportunities for secondary and tertiary trauma disclosed by participants, and this was 
only a limited number of the individuals involved in this case. Further, each of the 
participants had experienced multiple traumas prior to (and in many cases since) Chris’ 
shooting. Also increasing the vulnerability of the participants in the current study were 
the severity o f both Chris’ shooting incident and the previous incidents experienced, as 
well as evidence of potential poor coping strategies, such as avoidance and alcohol use, 
as addressed earlier in this chapter.
Theme: Evidence of Theoretical Frame OR Goffman’s Work Manifested
The fifth and final theme was both emergent and tied to a grounded theory 
approach (Creswell 2007). The literature review and preliminary interviews conducted 
with Chris indicated that Goffman’s work (1959, 1963) may be applicable in the current 
study, but the researcher did not anticipate how well this theoretical approach would fit 
the data obtained. Indeed, evidence o f Goffman’s work is located throughout this 
chapter, interwoven with the other themes previously addressed. Two particular elements 
of Goffman’s work— impression management and stigma—were relevant and applicable 
to the current study. Most participants spoke specifically to these issues and, while these 
concepts are intermingled in the previous thematic analyses, the following analyses focus 
on the most clearly addressed elements of this theoretical approach that were observed in 
the current study.
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Sub Theme 1: Impression Management
To review, impression management occurs when we strive to present ourselves in 
the best light possible to others and hide what we consider to be our true selves during 
interactions (Goffman 1959). This is like a theatrical performance where the individual 
presents a particular role or character to the audience sitting in the theater, but is able to 
hide their true identity, which is expressed in the back stage area where theater patrons 
are not permitted to go; for an officer, backstage may consist of a more emotional, as 
opposed to tough and stoic, response to incidents. Impression management can be seen 
as a general mechanism for coping with daily life as a first responder, where there is 
often a cultural mandate that demands presenting a detached and unemotional 
professional face to citizens. However, as a participant identifies below, this public face 
is not limited to the public:
A. ... It's a false bravado, you know. There ain't nothing cool about killing
somebody, you know what I'm saying. Some people like to say they 
are — you know, they're fu ll o f it. They're lying. You know, I've had plenty 
o f chances on this job where I  could have shot and killed somebody and I  
didn't do it. I  don't feel bad that I  didn't. I  most likely wouldn't have fe lt 
bad i f  I  did. It's — for me it's just not that big o f a deal and it's just part o f  
my job.
Q. Okay.
A. I  mean, I  don't look at it as it doesn't make you tough. It doesn't make you
bad because criminals kill people every day in this country and they 
don't — but there is a definite sense o f  how you're supposed to be like after 
you get in a shooting... I  applauded Chris fo r  his honesty because I  have 
never heard it and I  don't know that it would come out o f  my mouth and I  
don't know how I  would have fe lt either i f  I  hadn't fe lt that way, you know, 
I'm a Catholic, you know, I  believe in God, you know, it's the way I  came 
up and, you know, I  don't think anybody wants to really take anybody's 
life. It's not a cool thing but you know, at the end o f  the day I  think a lot o f  
people just — they gave you — they show you on the outside what they 
believe you're supposed to be, tough.
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Oh, yeah, yeah, you've got to — you've got — we have certain ideas o f  what we 
think we should look like or how we should act or how we should do stuff. You 
don't ever want to be seen as weak on the street. Unfortunately that carries over 
into the station or whatever house, bureau. Not being weak on the street is an 
important aspect o f  this job. You're weak on the street you're going to get 
challenged and you're going to get targeted. So you put up a goodfront on the 
street but there should be a safe place, you know, the locker rooms.
Unfortunately acting tough on the street and then coming back and saying, Man, 
that guy really scared me, it's just — that doesn't happen. Being involved in 
something, coming back and seeking out people who you know (inaudible) the 
same thing, you're more likely to be, Hey, that was rough, and even still you’re 
not getting the whole truth. You're getting a very, you know, tempered with I ’m 
tough but, you know, little bit scary there, when in actuality maybe the individual 
was scared to death the entire time.
Not only does the officer tend to manage impressions with his or her fellow officers, in 
this case, Chris managed impressions with his family, as demonstrated in the following 
exchange:
Q. Do you remember telling your family [about your shooting]?
A. I  think I  waited like a day or so because I  probably wasn't in the right
frame o f mind. I  said, Hey, I  just want to tell you I'm all right. I  think I  
talked to my dad. I  said, I  just want to tell you I'm all right and really it 
was maybe once or twice. That was it.
Q. Okay. Do you remember talking to your mom at all after?
A. Briefly. I'm like, I'm all right. She's like, Oh, we're going to come. I  was
like, Don't worry about it. lsaid, I'm all right, everything is cool. I  don't 
think they realized the gravity. I  don't think they realized the degree o f it. 
I f  you're not hurt, you should be good to go, which is fine because that's 
what they needed to know.
As noted in the discussion of the police culture, the idea that officers fully commit 
to their police identity and membership in the law enforcement culture, often at the 
expense of their other roles, can impact coping with trauma. One participant made the 
following observation about the varying roles an officer holds and the need for balance, 
stating:
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...one o f the bad things about this job is that you respond to some pretty bad stuff, 
like a homicide scene, you know, where people have shot each other or somebody 
who has, you know, drowned, they've been in the water a few days and SIDS 
deaths and things like that. These are really traumatic incidents that unless they 
understand that they need to have an outlet, they can't go to work every day and 
see things like this without it having some effect on them, and you need to 
understand that and one o f the things I  always tell these families in these recruit 
classes is that you have some interest outside this job. This job  is important 
because it's how you make a living, but you know, I'm a — heck, I'm a police 
[officer], but that's my job. That's what I  do. That's how I  make my living, but 
over the years I've been a husband and a father and a grandfather and little 
league coach and a PTA member and a civic league member, and you know, I've 
got a lot o f  roles out there that are more important to me than this job  is and it's 
how I  identify myself and you need to have other interest, your family hobbies.
You need to have hobbies. You need to have things that are going to keep you 
interested and relieve that stress, you know, when you're not working.
Following a shooting incident, the post trauma reactions the officer experiences 
may be juxtaposed to his or her construction of what an officer is and how they behave, 
so he or she may continue to attempt to play this role in front of peers, supervisors and 
family members (Cullen and Agnew 2011, Jones 1989). As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
need for impression management may also underlie why Tucker (2011) found that 
officers do not take advantage of stress intervention services: they are afraid of appearing 
weak or less macho; they are afraid of negative career impacts, such as failure to 
promote, impeding ability to testify in court and/or job loss; and they are afraid they will 
be viewed as mentally unstable.
This need to maintain the tough officer fa?ade, to project the expected image, 
came up repeatedly in the interviews. Some of these instances were better illustrations of 
the other emergent themes, thus again demonstrating the interconnectedness o f the 
themes that emerged in the current study, and are presented elsewhere accordingly. Yet,
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there were several disclosures that spoke very clearly to Goffman’s (1959) concept of
impression management, as evidenced below:
(speaking about officers from shootings this participant has investigated)... I  
will tell you this: The guys all seem — they all display a demeanor that you would 
expect to see from police officers on duty, which is, I'm great. I'm okay. I'm 
great...
...So I  got so pissed o ff I  kicked the big soda thing over. I  was like, Damn it, and 
then I  looked back and I  see the clerks and I'm thinking to myself, kind o f  get 
yourself together...
Q. All right. So you go back to work. How is it interacting with other
people?
A. Oh, it's fucking miserable. Every four seconds someone is asking me
what's happening, what's happening. So much so that I  jum p in the car 
with [my partner] and we'd go take o ff somewhere. Because we were in 
the middle o f a big operation when it was all going down and [he] never 
asked me once about it. Never asked me once. So it was like a nice, like 
getaway but no sooner did he hit — hey, man, oh, what happened. Oh, my 
God, yo, that's crazy. I  was like, Oh, Iju st get so fucking tired. You don't 
want to be a dick so you kind o f the like, Oh, you know — getting gas and 
cigarettes, 1 went in there, and the guy starts shooting and I  shot back. I  
mean, literally it would be that quick.
A. (on anxiety attacks or flashbacks) No, no, and that's what — that's the
unnerving part o f  it, but it's not debilitating. Like it's happening in my 
head like, Oh, where as the other ones, I  mean, like you're physically, i f  
you're holding something, you're squeezing it or you're breaking a pen or 
doing something, trying to take your mind o ff o f  it kind o f  thing, but it's 
happening as I  speak but in the last year or two it's so infrequent and it 
happens, it’s all contained like you're stressing about it, but there's no 
outward — there's no outward display o f it.
Q. Before the last couple o f  years did anybody else ever notice any o f  this
going on?
A. Maybe once or twice people like, What the fuck are you thinking about?
Or what happened? Then I  was like, What? You know, like nothing, then 
let it go.
While some of the impression management appears to be either subconscious 
reactions or so normalized that it is an immediate response—particularly when dealing
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with the public—many other times participants disclosed how very deliberate this 
management of impressions is, due, in large part to the fear o f repercussion should 
anyone know the reality of their emotions and coping abilities.
Q. You talk about having a short fuse. Do you have any other examples these
angry outbursts, irritability?
Q. How long did that go on?
A. You know, until I  started taking Lexapro, I  wasn't stable at all, kind o f  up
and down.
Q. So give me a time frame. Were you still in Narcotics? Were now you now
in Homicide?
A. Probably like halfway through my time in Homicide but again, it's — it
diminishes. It wasn't like crazy all the way through. It eventually 
got — after that big one, oh, yeah, I  was like, Oh, I  need to watch myself, 
that I  go o ff the handle quick. Which I'm not like — prior to that, there 
was nothing anybody could say that would really piss me o ff or get me 
riled up.
A. Exaggerated startled response?
Q. Yep, tell me about it.
A. Again, the best one was the — the best one example is me pulling a gun on
the fucking car that ran over the thing (a soda bottle). That was scary as 
shit fo r me. I  literally thought I  was getting shot at.
Q. Okay. And so how long — did it take you ju st a split second or did you
process?
A. No, it took me a little bit to process it. Not a split second, a couple
seconds, but it was no means like, Oh, okay. It was an. Oh, shit, because I  
had my gun out. I  literally had to say, All right, put your gun back in your 
holster and get the fuck out o f here because this is — I  couldjust imagine a 
police officer driving by or a uniformed guy driving by and I'm pulling my 
gun at a car, plain clothes. Oh, let me put that back up.
Q. Did you realize when you were reacting?
A. No, no, not all the time.
Q. What about when you did?
A. That I  was being irritable?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I  think you were just at a constant — at that time it was a constant state o f
irritability, just trying to deal with everything that was coming in, but we 
ju st — it's like the ringing in my ear. It's always there, but because it's 
always there, sometimes I  zone it out, whether something's playing in the
background. So at times it will peak a little bit higher than what is normal
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is and you'll be like, Oh, I'm being irritable but you pay it no mind. I  paid  
it no mind.
Q. Did anybody call you on it?
A. Oh, yeah, sure. [My wife] called me on it. Maybe [my partner] called me
on it, couple folks at work, but it wasn't until I  had been back from my 
little hiatus from when I  took time o ff that they would start, I  guess, seeing 
me and initially they would treat it like, okay, you know, he's just in a 
mood because o f what happened. Then as it went on they realized that, 
well, he's still in a mood. We'll tolerate it, but i f  it gets to a point then 
we'll say something. You'd get a little bit but people were very cautious 
when talking about it.
Q. How did you feel when they would call you on it, did you get pissed off?
A. It depends. It depends on who and when and the times. Sometimes I
would get pissed o ff and then shut down andjust put on a goodfront.
Other times I'd be like, you know, you do this andjust kind o f  counterpoint 
kind o f thing.
Q. Did you feel that you had to maybe even further isolate at that point?
A. Oh, sure, yeah, you get — you're like, well, you don't want to be too
irritable. You don't want to make other people more uncomfortable. At 
the time I  was very perceptive, not perceptive, but very self-conscious 
about how I  made people feel or how I  was feeling, tried to hide it or 
maybe when I  fe lt like I  needed to show a certain emotion to something. 
For example, somebody was saying something, then it was humorous, 
everybody would laugh. I'm not really focused on a lot o f stu ff other than 
just maybe when everybody was laughing. So you kind o f  like maybe 
over compensate, like what, what, that was really funny, and then 
everybody was like, That's not really funny, but I  would be irritated and 
then become irritable because it was just you're constantly trying to 
measure how to react so that you would appear normal.
...you know, he'll never be the same guy he was before. I'll tell you, I  remember 
we had to go to the FOP one night because prior to the shooting he had already 
said he would be the MC and they were doing the Gong Show. So I  remember we 
had to go like shopping at the thrift store to find  him something to wear, blah, 
blah, blah. He got there and Ife lt so badfor him and I  don't know i f  anybody else 
saw it, but he was acting. I  mean, he was acting, trying to be the old Chris 
Scallon and while he was MCing that event. It was exhausting fo r  me to watch 
him trying to be okay. I  don't remember what month it was. I  just remember it 
wasn't too, too long after but maybe a couple months. Six months, I  don’t know. 
But I  just remember that was exhausting, to watch him faking being happy
In some instances, participants would state that they were not concerned or that 
they did not have a problem with a particular topic, but would simultaneously disclose
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incidents of impression management related to that topic, which presents interesting
dynamics as the question could be raised to or for whom are they managing these
impressions: coworkers, the researcher or, in part, themselves?
A. Sleep disturbances, yeah, obviously having to take an Ambien and stuff.
Q. Okay. How long were you on the Ambien?
A. Nine months maybe, maybe almost a year.
Q. Okay.
A. And I  wasn't prescribed it. I  kept on getting sample — I  looked like a
crackhead coming out o f  — I  got a paper bag with a bunch o f  sample 
packs o f the Ambien.
Q. Okay.
A. So I  was like, Okay.
Q. Were you afraid that anybody was going to fin d  out that you were on
medications?
A. No, I  don't think I  was afraid o f that. However, I  do remember several
times because I  take the — I ’d  take like all the Ambien, kind o f  like put 
them in a container so that they're all — so I'm not like popping all this 
shit open every time and I  kept — because Ilove just throwing shit in my 
car. I  remember one day walking out, it was in the POC, and I  opened up 
the back and I'm like, Oh, my God, there's like 100 packets o f  this Ambien 
thing or the Lexapro and Ambien and all that shit like so I  kind o f  was like 
putting it in a bag and put it back in my car and I  drove away and I  think I  
threw it out somewhere else like at a gas station, yeah.
One participant in particular, who voiced several commonly held cultural 
stereotypes during the interview process as well as suggested at other factors that 
potentially increase vulnerability to traumatic stress, made the following statement very 
early on:
I've never had a problem. I've been involved in shootouts, you know, I've been 
involved - - 1 seen a lot o f bad stuff. I've never had any issues with that. I've never 
had stress from that. I've never — it's never overwhelmed me. The most 
frustrating thing is just the politics o f  the police bureaucracy and how things 
work.
As suggested in the literature, the concepts o f roles and impression management 
are particularly important in addressing the psychological components of officer-involved
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shootings. Several participants spoke to this interaction, recognizing the impact that the
conflict between behavioral expectations and real experience, as well as the process of
impression management can have on officers, noting that:
...if  an introvert is involved in something that internalized something and then 
tries to maintain a front, this system will fa il catastrophically and it will fa il to the 
degree that the officer is either going to, A, take his life, take somebody else's life, 
going to be put into a situation where maybe an officer returns to work and shit 
doesn't need to be at work, that is just a single impact. Officer's significant other, 
spouse, officer's friends, officer's family, officer's coworkers, officer's immediate 
supervisors, officer's — I  mean, it's going to explode and ultimately we have 
nothing in place right now that will support an officer in crisis that will not be 
vocal about it or right now you got to hope that the officer gets physically ill in 
order to be evaluated or they hear about myself or somebody that's been dealing 
with this...
A. Yes, it does. It adds more stress to that officer.
Q. Yes.
A. So now he's dealing with what whatever critical incident he's been
involved in. You know, whether being de — focused on it or ju st being on
the outskirt on it, now he has to focus on that as far as now my fellow  
police officers don't trust me or they think I'm weak, they think I  can’t 
handle the job.
What may be worse is that, based on the responses from several participants,
other officers are aware of these attempts to manage impressions and can see through
them, yet, without policy and procedure in place (as discussed at various points in this
chapter, as well as in Chapter 7), as well as the fear of betraying a brother or sister in
blue, these struggles are overlooked without intervention:
... and don't self-medicate. You know, don't seclude yourself. Don't, you know, 
not talk to people, you know. Because everybody else knows that you're screwed 
up. You know you 're screwed up. You know you 're not fooling anybody, but you 
know, get yourself to that point where you just make that decision. Everybody 
says, no, I  would never do that. I've worked a lot o f  suicides. I've seen a lot o f  
people dead who would have told you the exact same thing. I  mean, I'm a firm  
believer after, you know, seeing some things that everybody — it maybe so fa r  way
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o ff that it never happens, but there's something that, you know, mentally, 
physically, I  don't know what happens, snaps in your brain that just tells you fuck  
it.
I'd seek help, counseling, peers or counsel from somebody. You know, I  can't tell 
you how many times I  went and talked to a pastor or priest or something o f  the 
same faith. To not be so worried about what other people think because that's a 
good percentage o f  it, that you're trying to get help. So you're not even trying to 
get help. You're worried about how to get help without having anybody know that 
you're getting help or so that's — it's exhausting, so not being afraid to do it.
There were two remaining points that emerged when discussing impression
management that were of note in the current study. First, there was the idea that
impression management was not limited to the officer that pulled the trigger. This idea is
illustrated in the discussions of the police culture and machismo, where officers on scene
are scolded for an emotional response. One participant disclosed that, as someone in an
investigative or supervisory capacity, the need for impression management also impacts
this group of personnel, stating that:
...I'm sitting here thinking in my head, I'm supposed to call somebody. Who — oh, 
I'm supposed to call the chief, the assistant chief, and the commanding officer o f  
the Detective Division, commanding officer o f  Professional Standards. I'm trying 
to go through these things in my head. So I'm trying to focus, too, keep my head 
in the game, and I  have this sensation. I  don't know what it was, but I  was 
walking across the floor, I had a sensation that I  was like walking on a sticky 
surface or something, you know. I  don't know why I  had that, but it was just a 
sensation that I  had. It's funny what goes through your head but you've got to 
force yourself to focus on what you're supposed to do. I  mean, I  don't care who 
you are, how much experience you have, how many times you've seen this, when 
you've got an event o f  this nature, you've got to bring yourself down to earth. You 
know, you've — perhaps that's something that we can teach people, that you've got 
to get your head in the game, you know. You realize that, you know, something 
really, really bad has happened here. There's plenty o f  time to deal with that 
later, you know, your personal feelings and your emotions. Right now you've got 
to deal with taking care o f the investigation, making sure there's nobody else here 
that's hurt, making sure that officers involved are safe. That's the most important 
thing fo r  us to do right now. Everything else comes later. Our personal feelings, 
we'll deal with those later.
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The final interesting observation was that, even though many participants 
acknowledged the deleterious effects of the police culture and the need to maintain the 
expected facade, several participants qualified their statements about expressing emotion 
or vulnerability, utilizing the same rhetoric they had just critiqued, making comments 
like:
No, because you know, there's two type o f  people in the world. You know, there's 
those that are genuine and then those who want to appear overly genuine... You 
know, so fo r  me, you know, when I  go to these funerals and s tu ff and people 
like — Iju st don't feel it, you know what I  mean? Maybe I'm ju s t real, but I'm like, 
I'm sorry but I  can't cry because I  don't even know the dude. I  mean, it sucks but 
you know what I  mean? So for me, I'm just like, you know, Are you all right?
Yeah, I'm all right. All right. Good. You know, I  don't know. I  mean, people 
seem to ham it up a lot to be quite honest with you, on those things. I've seen like 
deaths in the Marine Corps and stuff like that and some on the police department. 
Some people are just like, come on, man...
...At the same time, be very careful that you're not becoming overly like, Oh, woe, 
is me and using it in that aspect to gain something. It should be genuine.
there have been a couple situations lately where we've had officers who 
themselves have...[come to] Chris' personal attention. He saw it firsthand and 
attempted to intervene. Both o f these situations are incidents involving officers 
who have disciplinary problems and... I  think [one officer] tried to use Chris as a 
crutch to avoid having to deal with this other disciplinary issue... We've got to be 
very careful about this because we can't let people that are pending some type o f  
disciplinary action use their emotional trauma as a crutch to try to avoid, you 
know, departmental scrutiny.
...I get posttraumatic stress syndrome but I  think a lot ofpeople use it as a crutch. 
I  think a lot o f  people that, you know, I  mean, I'm not Gary Cooper, John Wayne, 
those were all, you know, the kid, movies. You look, the man is supposed to act 
this way and I'm not buying all that but what I'm saying is that cops, pretty soon 
you’re going to see a trend. They'll start using it. And PTSD is going to become a 
crutch and to be quite honest with you, with the stu ff cops see, how can you really 
argue with them? But I  think when it comes to shootings, you know, I  think that 
like you said, you know, how close are you to the incident and then what's your 
level of, you know, reaction and I  think that's when you see like a lot o f  the, you
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know, people that are just — they're characters, ju st weep from the get-go... you 
know what I  mean, you're always going to have like that 10, 20, some may say 
30 percent ofpeople who shouldn't even be freaking doing this job in today's day 
and age, not your father's day and age. It was must lower because people were 
doing this job. They wanted to do the job fo r  the career, you know, be a cop. You 
know, today a lot ofpeople, you know, 2004, 2005 got out o f college, couldn't fin d  
a job.
This section addresses the theoretical relevance o f Erving Goffman’s (1959) 
concept of impression management in officer-involved shooting incidents. This concept 
works through and in conjunction with many of the themes discussed in this chapter and 
is often a mechanism deployed to avoid stigma, to be discussed in the following section. 
Further, while it can be expected that the officer who pulled the trigger may feel the need 
to manage his or her impressions, particularly with colleagues and supervisors, it was 
apparent that there are multiple individuals managing impressions—to include family and 
friends who feel they have to gauge the officer’s mood, colleagues who may be suffering 
from secondary or tertiary trauma victimization, and supervisors who must remain a 
command presence and stifle their own reactions— and that these managed impressions 
are often occurring in the midst of interacting with each other. As such, it is easy to see 
how a shooting can be a dramaturgical production, with each player attempting to 
maintain a semi-scripted role while relegating their emotional responses and other 
contradictory responses to the backstage area. If these attempts to maintain the fafade of 
what should be, and if, as several participants suggest, these efforts are transparent, then 
there is the possibility that effective and swift intervention may be made for all parties 
suffering from trauma-related symptoms, provided there is adequate policy and procedure 
in place. This potential for intervention is particularly critical because, as noted in 
multiple locations in this study, the effects of stress and trauma can impact not only the
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officer’s coping in terms of drinking, but also interpersonal relationships and their 
behavior when interacting with citizens. Thus, intervention may decrease personal stress 
(Bartol and Bartol 2008) for the officer, but may also have the added benefit of 
preemptively avoiding negative or escalated interactions with citizens, possibly even 
future shooting incidents.
Sub Theme 2: Stigma
The second concept from GofFman (1963) that is particularly relevant to the
current study is stigma, defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified
from full social acceptance.” With stigma, there is a great reliance on perceptions of the
stereotype associated with the stigma, while the reality o f the individual may diverge
greatly from this depiction. While not necessarily related to the perception of the
stereotype associated with the stigma, perceptions did play a role in the discussions of
this topic, with participants stating that:
It's a funny thing about these things, but you have officers themselves like Chris 
who's involved in a shooting and it stays with him because he's the one that's 
involved in it, you know, you hear about it, and you're concerned, o f  course, but 
over in a very short period o f  time, everybody else moves on from  it, and you don't 
even think about it anymore. So you know, I  can sit here and probably name a 
few  people that themselves have been involved in shootings but fo r  the most part, 
you don't retain that. Everybody else kind o f  moves on with their lives and that's 
one o f  the things that kind o f  struck me about these types o f  incidents, that it 
really sticks with the person who was involved. Everybody else moves on. But it 
really sticks with those who are involved... Look, these things happen in this 
business, you know, what you're feeling is normal. You feel like when you're 
walking down the hallway everybody is looking at you thinking, yeah, he was the 
one involved in that shooting two weeks ago. That's true for about the first few  
days. They know you've been involved in a shooting but I'm here to tell you, after 
that nobody thinks about that anymore but you do because it involves you, but 
nobody even thinks about that anymore but that's what we try to really express to 
those that we're sitting down with, that you know, you're not going through
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anything that nobody else around here has gone through. Anybody who has ever
been involved in an incident like this are going to have the same feelings that you
do. It's absolutely normal.
Q. Do you feel that people reacted or responded to you differently after your
shooting?
A. Hands down, yes.
Q. Can you tell me about it?
A. Cautious, maybe overzealous. It depends on who they were before or they
knew — or i f  we knew each other before. Handful o f  recruits are 
comfortable in coming to me, a handful o f  officers that I  met as recruits 
are comfortable. I  think the stigma is less significant with them, whereas 
officers I  have known fo r  a while, I  had a recent officer who was in crisis, 
who knew me prior to my shooting. It was a little bit more awkward fo r  
that individual but ultimately everybody — some people treat me fine and 
some o f  those people that treat me fine I  may be thinking treat me 
different. So it's one o f  those — they may not and I  may think. So they may 
and I  may not think so, like a perception kind o f  thing.
A stigma can be based upon something that is physically visible, such as a 
physical handicap or deformity, or it can be based on something internalized that, once 
known by those with whom an individual is interacting, causes the recognized others to 
turn away from or have a different perception of the individual (Goffman 1963). In the 
case o f officer-involved shootings, unless the officer is physically injured and bears some 
visible manifestation of that injury, stigma is usually related to the invisible and the 
internalized. Stigma, although often associated with something negative, may also be 
positive. This duality of positive and negative stigma can be seen in the current study, 
with participants stating:
Q. Do you think there's a stigma associated with being involved in a
shooting?
A. No, there's a stigma in the reaction to it and the treatment o f  it. Being in a
shooting is actually very it's glorified.
Q. Okay. Because there can be positive and negative stigma?
A. Yeah, it's a positive like, Hey, that guy's, you know, man's man or police 
person or police person. He stood up. He handled business and
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depending on the situation or the incident, Oh, my God, that person 
shouldn't have been firing this and that. So again, it's dependent really. 
There's stigmas both ways.
Q. Okay.
A. Good and bad, with critical incidents. Now, being open about it, I  think
the greatest stigma is negative and where just suck it up really. To this 
day we're hearing people say that. I  had a supervisor when I  tried pulling 
when I  pulled somebody out o f a situation into an administrative position 
be like, What's the matter with this individual? He can't handle stress or 
anything? That's not the case. That's the supervisor who's inept o f  
unable to identify an individual in a legitimate crisis and because o f  that, 
he refers to or defaults to just man up. You know, so I  think that's the 
negative stigma and i f  you're identifying or you're claiming, hey, you know 
what, I'm having some problems, I  think it shows a weakness in a 
profession that capitalizes and thrives on somebody's ability to self 
moderate or to fight through the adverse positions. That's true fo r  a short 
period o f  time. We 're supposed to suck it up. I  don't want somebody 
breaking down in the middle o f a gunfight or the middle o f  a fight, but to 
expect the individual to keep that degree o f  you know, kind o f  manning 
up, fo r  lack o f a better term, for a long duration is insane, it's inhumane. 
We can't do that.
As fa r  as being treated differently by our peers, you know, they saw us as heroes.
I  don't necessarily think I  was a hero. I  was just doing my job...A ll that stuff in
the pajyer and all those awards and everything, you can keep all that crap. That's
not what I  got into this for.
Q. All right. Talk to me about the honors and awards you got from your
shooting.
A. Commonwealth Metal o f  Valor, Top Cop from  NAPO. I ’m sorry, it was a
Commonwealth something. The Commonwealth gave me something but 
then there was also the Commonwealth Public Safety Metal o f  Valor, 
which is by the Governor Top Cop, National Top Cop, I  think I  got officer 
o f the quarter and officer o f  the year.
Q. So how did you feel about receiving those awards?
A. Good and bad. It's a nice recognition but at the same time it's I  think I
explained it to somebody that they're more... they're more o f  a reminder o f  
the people that have gone because the higher the award, the likelier it was 
that you should have been dead, is the way I  look at it, but the awards are 
there to remind you that there's a hierarchy o f  (inaudible) o f  exposure and 
it’s a visual way to gauge it. Like I  always wear the awards. I  always do. 
I f  I  wear this uniform, I  do. I  think it's important. Some guys make jokes 
about it and it's funny because some guys tell it just to be funny because 
they know me and some guys say it and you can tell there's a little I  ain't 
got shit. I  ain't got recognized. In the same time, everybody that's worked 
fo r  me, everybody that's a supervisor, I've written up. In K-9,1 wrote
279
people that didn't even work for me in K-9, but everybody received awards 
whereas the mentality is that somebody shouldn't. Your job  is to do that. 
You know what your job is, to literally, is not get in trouble fo r  8, 10, 12 
hours, whatever shift you're working. That's it. When you start going out 
there and beating the bushes and doing above and beyond the minimum 
standards, you know what, you need to be recognizedfor it. It's just... it's 
a battling, you know, idea o f what's right, what's wrong, but good and bad 
at times to me, it's a reminder o f  the experiences and I  have these and 
(inaudible) with my military awards and I  just... it's a nice reminder. You 
want to forget, but at the same time, you don't want to forget, but it's a 
nice reminder. It's a happy reminder, but at times, having people ask you 
know what's, that sometimes, I  don't like that. Sometimes, Oh, it's fo r  a 
shooting, not 15 minutes, it was prolonged, an involved, ju st a shooting. 
You know, this one was for, you know, going in a burning building when 
somebody was holding somebody hostage, you know, I  got that fo r  
arresting somebody. So I'll play it down because, A, I  don't know the 
person. I  don't talk to them, or I  don't think it warrants getting into.
Q. So did you get any other awards with your shooting?
A. Yeah, I  got Virginia Department o f  Valor Award, couple others like Police
Chief Associate Awardfor Bravery, you know, for like the longest they just 
sat in boxes in my room, but then I  had a nice man room when I  was 
married to my wife, put them all up, but i f  it wasn't fo r  her hanging them 
up they probably would have still been in the box, but yeah, got a couple 
o f awards.
Q. Okay. How do you feel about those?
A. I  mean, don't get me wrong, I  appreciate them, but not that I  did anything
that I  would never expect them, you know, i f  they did it then that's good, 
but definitely don't do this for an accolades or the pats on the back.
Q. Because they're not always going to come.
A. No, ma'am.
It appears that the participant that suggested that positive stigma was associated 
the actual shooting and negative stigma tends to be associated with the reaction to the 
shooting voiced a rather perceptive understanding of the police culture. While the 
comments above note awards and being viewed as heroes (even if the officers did not 
internalize these positive stigma), the comments below reveal the negative stigma 
associated with being in a shooting and, the most damning o f all, needing help in the 
aftermath to cope with the emotions and behaviors experienced.
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I  think I  wish there was something like mandatory for him, like not him, but when 
he went through that, like mandatory, you have to go to this psychologist or you 
have to go talk to this person where it doesn't become a choice anymore. Like,
Oh, i f  I  go talk to a doctor, people are going to think that I'm crazy, and i f  you 
make it mandatory everybody has to do it while you might still be crazy, but 
everybody else has to do it, too, so just making somebody get help that's too proud 
to get it themselves and I  hope that you know that would come out o f  the work.
... That's just the alpha personality I  think to me because they figure i f  you ask fo r  
help then you're weak and then people start saying you're weak and they’ll say,
We can't trust [him]. He don’t have our back. It doesn't mean he don't have your 
back because you need some help with something, but most people will say that 
and they have not been doing anything but they're quick to say that, you know 
what I'm saying. Oh, he don't have our back no more. Your don't even know 
what it is to have our back. You haven't been what me and Chris been through, 
you know, but i f  I  ask fo r  help, you telling me I'm weak, now you can’t trust me.
So, yeah, that's something that should not be done.
...all critical incidents are different and all people deal with them in different 
ways but, you know, i f  it's officer involved shooting or an officer has gotten 
injured in a car accident or something, you've got to have somebody out there 
that's been through that. They can be out there and talk to the officer and you 
brought it up and also talk to the officers that are out there on scene, you know, to 
get everybody in the room and discuss what's happened, you know, and it's easier 
said than done because, you know, cops, cops don't like to, you know, put their 
feelings out there. Nobody wants to, you know, let the fellow officer know I'm a 
little disturbed about what happened. It makes you seem like you're weak.
Q. So do you think there's a stigma with that?
A. Oh, o f  course it is. Oh, yes, it is.
Q. Okay. So what happens i f  somebody appears weak?
A. I  think he's shunned by his fellow police officers.
Q. Which compounds the issue?
A. Yes, it does. It adds more stress to that officer.
...but there is a definite sense o f  how you're supposed to be like after you 
get in a shooting.
Q. So do you think that makes it a little bit more difficult i f  you are struggling 
with it, to kind o f  put it out there?
A. Yeah, I  mean, can I  speak bluntly?
Q. Yeah.
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A. Oh, yeah, because people are going to look at you like you're a pussy.
Q. Yeah.
A. And they're not going to think that you're i f  you become a blubbering
idiot, they're going to be like, I  don't want to work around that dude.
When things get tough he's going to go running.
Q. What about mandatory psychological evaluations?
A. Mandatory, I don't think so... .It should absolutely be made available fo r
somebody who feels that they want to reach out and talk to somebody, but 
mandatory, no, and there's two different, you know, like schools o f  
thought. One is some guys would ju st be like, I  don't need it, and they very 
well might not need it. Other guys are like, Whoa, shit, I  don't want them 
sending me, like I'm going to go see a shrink. Next thing you know they'll 
have me in the rubber gun squad, you know what I  mean. So people are 
also going to get, you know, he can't even handle it, you know, which is all 
fake. That's all like false bravado like, you know, some o f  the biggest 
tough guys run the other way when stuff happens, but that's just problems, 
you know, I  guess genetically within our society that we have to deal with.
One participant, upon discussing the obligation to act when an officer is off duty, made a
statement that implies that an officer may be stigmatized no matter what they do (as in
the current case) or do not do (not in the current case), as noted below.
For Chris there was nothing he could do. I  don't even know i f  he was like, You 
got to be fucking kidding me. This is the last thing that I  needed, but knowing 
Chris, he's going to do the right thing whether it cost him his life. That night he 
was going to go in and make sure the clerk was okay because he recognized it 
was a robbery. I f  Chris would have got in that car and drove away he would have 
been a fucking scum bag and you would never have had nothing to say to him.
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that stigma can manifest in the form of Locker
Room Shock (Jones 1989) and similar feelings of being different from other officers who
have not been involved in a shooting incident, leading to possibly deepened feelings of
isolation (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Tucker 2011). This was supported in the current
study, with participants making comments such as the following:
So I  know some called and checked on him and I  know some like, Yeah, good job, 
way to get him, and that bothered the shit out o f  him, too. So I  I  didn't want him
282
to be upset about something else so I  really didn't bring up the whole friend part.
I  just did my best to be there for him.
Q. Did you have because I  know Chris was really bothered by some o f  the
comments like, you know, way to go, killer, goodjob, you know?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you get any o f  those ?
A. Yeah.
Q. And did it bother you?
A. Yeah, because people say that and they're not in the situation. They don't
know. Because like my guy, like going through the incident, the one who 
shot me, the last shot we were like right in front o f each other, and I  
choose to shoot him in the chest, and they was like, You should have shot 
him in the fucking head, you know, like you know, what is that to say, you  
know what I'm saying, you should have just shot him in the head andjust 
killed him. You should have just emptied your clip in him. That's what 
people would say, and I  am thinking, You weren't there, you know what 
I'm saying. Why would you give this opinion, you know, so it definitely 
bothers you. I  know how Chris fe lt about that because everybody when 
they should have done what they would have done, but you don't know 
that... They should stop Monday morning quarterbacking and stop giving 
their suggestions, what they would have done, how they would have 
handled it, because you don't know. It's easy to talk the talk, but once the 
rubber hits the road, you're not going to know how you act until that 
happens.
...Absolutely, and there's plenty and I  forget who mentioned it. I'm almost 
going to say it was [my psychologist] because he had done, I  guess, a lot 
o f research on officer involved shootings and things o f  that nature, and he 
says, You've joined the ranks o f an elite group o f law enforcement. I  said, 
How so? He said, The majority o f  law enforcement that are involved in 
this are very minimal, like time wise. You were in a long, drawn out 
encounter. He goes, There's only a handful o f  people that understand that 
and when you constantly get in the, Oh, man, I  wish I  was there or good 
job or way to take that fucking scumbag out kind o f shit, you're just like, 
they don't understand and just distance myself. I  literally wouldn't and 
again, it was only a handful, maybe [an officer] and with [this officer] I  
was there when he was shot. I  was there when [another officer] was shot, 
maybe talked to them once or twice, nothing in depth and then you just 
feel like no one gets it. So you avoid people and we literally, i f  [my 
partner] had to pick me up from home and we went to work I'd, we'd drive 
around and we'd go get something to eat and drive around some more and 
he just kind o f did that because I  said, I ’m not sitting in that fucking office
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listening to people because they have no idea and I  hated walking down 
the hall to do whatever because they you knew they ju st didn't get it. 
There's a definite disconnect between me and everybody.
Most participants recognized the negative impacts that stigma has on an officer 
who has been involved in a shooting, particularly related to the officer’s willingness to 
admit to needing help, professional or otherwise. As one participant observed,
A. Talk to somebody. You have to talk to somebody.
Q. Okay.
A. Can't hold it in.
Q. Okay.
A. You can't. You can't do it. Forget, you know, what you've heard in the
past talking about your feelings makes you seem weak. No, it doesn't.
You can't bottle that s tu ff up. You got to get it out there or else it will eat 
you up inside... But like I  said, we've got to get away from  that, you know, 
get back on the horse, you know. So what, you got shot or so what, you 
killed a guy. Get back on the horse. I  need you back at work tomorrow, 
you know.
Q. Do you find  that there's any at least in your experience or anything, you
know, who has been through a critical incident that there's almost a 
facade that they put up, yeah, I'm great, I'm fine, I  got this, I'm good?
A. Some do, yeah, some do.
Q. And do you think that ties into both the police culture and the stigma?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So how do we break through with that?
A. Critical incident team properly trained and ready to go out to talk to these 
police officers and a lot o f  it is going to be the team convincing that officer 
that it's okay to talk about it. I t’s okay to show your true feelings and that 
it's not okay to bottle this up inside because it will lead you down the dark 
path and maybe, you know, eventually suicide.
Q. Or other some form —
A. Yeah, some other self-destruction, you know, type o f  thing.
Participants also acknowledged that efforts need to be made to reduce the stigma
associated with seeking help. This discussion often contained an element associated to
policy changes or veiled references to departmental politics, as seen in the quotes below.
... This is the damage we 're doing to our investment. By this time these 
officers — we've already invested $100,000 in these kids between salary, 
benefits, training, equipment, all this other stuff. We've invested all this 
money and now this kid is worthless. So we've just pissed away $100,000.
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Q. Uh-huh.
A. Or we could spend a little bit extra and let's revamp our mental health
processes here. Let's look at not ju st the guys that are involved in acute 
traumatic incidents but these guys that are in these chronic situations 
where day after day, year after year it's ju st little tiny layers 
building — you know, one snowflake doesn't hurt anything but a million o f  
them blowing 50 miles an hour becomes a blizzard. Well, it’s still a 
snowflake. It's just one at a time but now you've got all o f  them piled on at 
one time and eventually that — the weight o f  that cracks some people.
Those guys need to be addressed. Now, the stigma needs to be taken away 
from it, which is hard to do, but i f  you start early and continually repeat 
that message there's an opportunity to break through that barrier and say, 
Okay, this is part o f what we do. Part o f  what we do now is you have an 
annual physical evaluation to be f i t  fo r  duty. You have to go to it every 
year on your birthday month. Every year you have to go. What's the 
harm in hiring a professional to have a mental health evaluation as part o f  
your f i t  your duty letter? Hey, yeah, this guy is going to have some issues 
or this guy has been drinking has ass off. I f  nothing else, that should be a 
redflag for the people trying to protect themselves from  the liability 
issues.
Q. All right. How do you incorporate your experience into the training you 
provide to other officers, both formally and informally?
A. How do I  what?
Q. Incorporate your experience.
A. I'm honest.
Q. Okay.
A. I  think I  highlight the faults o f  it and I  highlight the pitfalls. I  don't do
that — well, you know, saying, Hey, I've made it through. I'm good.
That's — no one in the beginning or in the inception o f  their crisis is — they 
don't see that fa r  ahead. I  tell them I  drink. I  tell them I  didn't sleep. I  
tell them I  was upset emotionally. I  was scared. I  cried. I  was afraid. I  
was angry. I  tell them the stuff that is not cool to tell somebody and in 
doing so, I  think they — they start to see that we share some common 
themes here, that what I  initially thought what got me upset and what I  
thought was I  was by myself was actually not so much by myself, that it's, 
normal. But it's so abnormal in the culture so I  bring that into it and I  
make no holds barred. I  don't make myself out to be somebody that's 
great. I  highlight the fact that I  have fallen. But at the same time, I  did 
get up and I  wasn't by myself. It was through the help o f  my family, 
through the help o f my friends, through the help ofprofessional help 
despite the bravado, and the more I've gone through it, the more I've 
taught and the more I've counseled with people and ju st talked with them 
and stuff. The more I  see those individuals acting out and in one place the 
lieutenant at the time, who was a guy, Just suck it up and get back. He has
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no clue and he’s in charge. He's near a command level position and he 
has no concept o f  what's good. The funny thing is he is not one o f  those 
that is old enough to be one o f those, Oh, back in the day. I  was back in 
the day the same time you were. You're an idiot and he's very — and that’s 
just a lack o f exposure to anything. That was somebody that spent more 
time studying being promoted than he ever did doing anything.
As noted in the quote above, one potential way to reduce the stigma associated 
with officer-involved shootings is for officers to come forward with their stories in an 
effort to normalize the post-trauma symptoms, as Chris does. Another avenue, as 
suggested by Malmin (2012), for reducing stigma is for administrators to make a 
commitment to changing policy which should, over time, begin to impact the culture.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the five major themes, as well as their components, that 
emerged from the analysis of interview transcripts in the current study. These themes—  
the role of previous trauma, coping, cultural influences, the impact on others and 
application of Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work on impression management and stigma— 
were found to be interrelated and often were difficult to disentangle. Additionally, these 
themes allowed for a deep and rich exploration and understanding of a shooting incident 
from various perspectives, to include the officer who pulled the trigger, his partner, his 
spouse, supervisors, investigators and colleagues and friends. Some of the concepts and 
groups explored in this chapter are often overlooked in the literature and should be given 
attention in future research. The author found that Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work was 
quite applicable to the given research questions and data and provides a strong theoretical 
approach to understanding the current case. Additionally, the researcher has not 
previously seen Goffman applied as a theoretical lens through which to examine policing.
Goffman’s concepts of impression management and stigma. These concepts become key 
because, in anticipating the response of others to his or her stigma, the officer involved in 
a shooting may feel like they are perpetually on stage, hiding his or her true self and 
reactions from all persons. The concepts of impression management and stigma may also 
be intertwined in what can be considered the gendered nature of police work (Chan,
Doran and Marel 2010, Chan, Devery and Doran 2003, Martin and Jurik 1996/2006, 
Martin 1999, Morash and Haarr 2012, Prokos and Padavic 2002). If police work is 
indeed a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity (Prokos and Padavic 2002) and a means 
of doing gender (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr 2012), then appearing 
weak or giving into more “feminine” emotions would be unacceptable for an officer that 
has been involved in a critical incident. This desire to avoid the stigma of not being a 
tough, macho man may lead to efforts to manage impressions so that colleagues and 
supervisors are not aware of maladaptive coping strategies, impeding recognition of a 
problem and appropriate intervention efforts. Similarly, the more positive responses of 
stigmatized individuals, seeing the effect of being stigmatized as a secret blessing and 
leading to a change in perspective (Goffman 1963), may be related to Kirschman’s 
(2007) concept of posttraumatic growth. Utilizing both the themes that emerged, as well 
as this theoretical frame, this chapter provides a starting point to examine the topic of 
officer-involved shootings in a way that they have not been studied in the extant literature 
while also acknowledging that there are multiple individuals whose perspectives must be 
sought and integrated to gamer a truly holisitic understanding of these events.
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CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS: OTHER ANALYSES
Introduction: News Media, Policy and Participant Observation Analyses
The current study is a case study and, as such, a variety of sources o f data were 
utilized to achieve a full and rich understanding of the single officer-involved shooting at 
the heart of this research. In achieving that understanding, the current research 
incorporated a variety of analyses, some of which went beyond Chris’s shooting incident 
in the effort to contextually situate it within the broader political and psychological 
understandings of officer-involved shootings. The following chapter provides the 
remaining analyses, conducted on the various data sources in the current study, excluding 
the interviews conducted with study participants. This chapter will provide detailed 
accounts of significant events related to the researcher’s participation in the police culture 
as well as how those events influenced the current study, a news media analysis on all 
known articles related to Chris’s shooting, and finally a policy analysis to situate the 
PD’s current policies within the standards set by national and state accreditation 
commissions and best practice models.
Participant Observations
As outlined in the methodology for the current study (see Chapter 4), this study 
had a significant degree of positionality that had to be explicated, due to the researcher’s 
identity—her background as the child of a police officer and her position as a long term 
intern with the PD. These experiences influenced the current research because they not 
only aided in refining the research process as it evolved, but they also provided a deeper
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level o f interaction with the topic and understanding that would not have been possible if 
the researcher had merely been an “outsider” exploring this topic. Ho (1997) and Alpert 
and Fridell (1992) suggested that the lack of comprehensive research on officer-involved 
shootings may be due to the scarcity o f the opportunity to observe these incidents in the 
field. Yet, due to the researcher’s position as an intern, she has been able to observe both 
events that could have resulted in the application of lethal force, as well as the procedural 
and psychological aftermath of shooting incidents.
Further, as Hahn (2006) summarized, “you see, I am situated inside of me, I see, I 
hear, taste, smell, and think this from me. When I take me out to do fieldwork, me always 
tags along;” this is true in the current study. The researcher cannot be divorced from her 
role as an intern, her role as a friend and colleague, her role as a social scientist or her 
role as the child of a law enforcement officer, as they are some of the many facets that 
together comprise who the researcher is as an individual. Each of these roles feeds and 
informs each other, so that knowledge gained in the field provides insights that impact 
the research process and, in turn, the research influences the researcher’s behavior in and 
observations while in the field. Outlined below are some of the more salient experiences 
the researcher experienced while researching this topic; again, as noted in the 
methodology, the researcher was an active participant in these events, several of which 
involved highly emotional situations that impacted the researcher deeply.
The current study did not begin as a planned topic for a doctoral dissertation, 
rather, it was initially supposed to be a relatively small summer research project that 
would be interesting and yield a publication or two. Conversations between the 
researcher and Chris began during the Fall Semester of 2009, which was the researcher’s
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first semester in the doctoral program. After one or two conversations, it was quickly 
recognized by both Chris and the researcher that this would be a much larger endeavor 
than originally assumed and thus began the current study. The events outlined below 
provided the researcher with a variety of learning opportunities while, in some cases, also 
immersing her more deeply within the police culture, thus increasing her access to 
information and credibility among officers.
A Death in the Family
To situate this incident in time, relationships and impact, it is important to 
backtrack a bit. The researcher first began her internship with the PD in December 2007 
to complete a requisite field placement for her Masters degree. She was assigned to the 
Detective Bureau and spent the majority of her time with the Field Forensics Unit due to 
her background, interests and training. This field placement consisted of two weeks over 
the Christmas holidays and one week over the Easter break, working 40 hours each week. 
Initially, fitting in to this unit was difficult. Everyone was nice and polite, but distant. It 
was discovered after several days that the detectives only knew that the researcher was 
getting a graduate degree in psychology and that she had been placed as an intern by an 
Assistant Chief of Police; the assumption was that she was there to perform covert 
psychological evaluations of the detectives and report back to the Assistant Chief. Once 
that misperception was refuted, the researcher became quite close with her colleagues and 
her immediate supervisor. Indeed, the researcher is still quite close with several of the 
individuals that she encountered during that initial intern experience. The Sergeant in 
Field Forensics was open and welcoming, and over time, the researcher grew quite fond 
of him. During non-busy periods at work, the researcher and the Sergeant would have
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long discussions on a host of topics, ranging from personal lives—such as his marriage 
and health—to literature to politics to the state of the criminal justice system.
The researcher completed her field placement and her Masters degree, and spent a 
year working in private maritime security. After deciding to pursue her doctorate, the 
researcher was given special permission to return to the PD as an indefinite intern to 
maintain her practical experience. The researcher’s former Sergeant had been promoted 
and was now a Lieutenant in one of the precincts. However, he was still open and 
welcoming—always taking a few minutes to stop and chat with the researcher when they 
came into contact, even taking all of the forensics personnel— his old crew— out to eat in 
the wee hours of the morning on an overnight shift.
On the morning March 21, 2011, the researcher had several missed calls from one 
of the forensics detectives during a doctor’s appointment. The researcher’s mother, who 
had gone to the appointment with the researcher, also received text messages and missed 
calls from the same detective, asking if she was with the researcher. As many people 
would also assume, this was not considered to be an indicator of good news, and the 
researcher sent the detective a text, asking what was going on. She was immediately 
asked if she was sitting down and if someone was with her. After receiving an 
affirmative response, the detective called the researcher and told her that she wanted her 
to “hear from family” and not on the news, but their former Sergeant was dead. The 
researcher asked what had happened and was informed that both the Lieutenant and his 
wife were found in their home with fatal gunshot wounds after his wife failed to report to 
work. Immediately, the researcher asked if it had been a home invasion or if it was 
somehow work-related and the detective started to become emotional, revealing that it
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was an apparent murder-suicide. Immediately, the researcher was in disbelief, asking if 
the detective was certain.
The next few days were a blur for the researcher, talking to colleagues from the 
police department often. During one of those conversations, a colleague remarked that 
they were confused—very sad at one moment and angry at the Lieutenant the next.
These sentiments were echoed by the researcher. One memory that stood out during that 
time period involved the researcher becoming physically ill when viewing news media 
coverage of this incident, demonstrating the significant emotional and physiological toll 
this incident took on the researcher. Further, due to another traumatic incident that 
occurred within the researcher’s academic community just over two weeks prior to the 
Lieutenant’s suicide (which was also still impacting the researcher and her colleagues), 
the researcher did not disclose the tragedy to her academic peers or supervisors 
immediately. At one point, the researcher’s father confronted the researcher, stating that 
she needed to talk about these incidents. When she responded that she did not want to 
talk about it, her father, a career law enforcement officer with over thirty years of 
experience, told her that he did not want to see her “make his mistakes” by trying to 
maintain a tough fafade and bottling up her emotions and reactions. This moment, for 
the researcher, was a very needed reality check because, in that moment, she realized that 
she was tacitly accepting and replicating the very stereotypes and behavioral expectations 
that her research (still in its very early stages at that point) indicated were problematic 
and detrimental to officer well-being.
There was a great deal of confusion over how and why this had happened— no 
one had seen warning signs. It was known that the Lieutenant had a diagnosis o f PTSD,
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but that he was medically managed. He and his wife had not been having any marital
difficulties that anyone knew of—indeed were one of the happiest and most “in love”
couples ever seen— and had made plans to have construction work done on their home.
There was no excessive debt, no signs o f marital infidelity. The Lieutenant had not been
involved in any recent critical incidents and had not experienced any major stressors or
losses, as far as anyone could see. This confusion was underscored in an interview with
one participant in the current study who expressed his disbelief in the following words:
... we had an officer who -- a lieutenant who took his own life, killed his wife and 
took his own life... He was my goodfriend. I  knew him before he joined the police 
department. He was a young 16-year-old stock worker at the old Center Shops at 
Wards Corner. You know, he worked there as a stock clerk and some other 
officers and I  worked part time there and he came on the department about ten 
years later, after he spent some time in the Army, but just the type ofperson to 
this day, I  don't know what could have possibly happen in his life because I  never 
saw anybody that I  fe lt was more well-adjusted than him, just a good personality 
and a bright outlook all the time, never seen him angry and to this day that 
puzzles me. I  think something like that bothers me more than anything I've been 
involved in. What was going on in this guy's life, what was going on in his head, 
and we've all taken a great deal o f training involving police officer suicide and 
looking fo r  those signs that would point you in that direction to think this person 
has a possible — I  can see the danger signs here. There were no danger signs 
there. Nobody saw them.
It was later determined that the medications used to treat the Lieutenant’s PTSD 
had been changed and that he had told a colleague that he was having terrible nightmares 
on the new medications. The best hypothesis of the event involves the Lieutenant having 
a nightmare/night terror, firing his weapon (which he was known to keep close to his bed) 
and killing his wife. When he realized what he had done, it is assumed he turned his 
weapon on himself.
The researcher chose to attend the funeral services when many of her colleagues 
decided not to attend. There was also quite a bit o f discussion related to whether or not
this would be a “police” funeral or if the department should even send an announcement 
regarding planned services as an official e-mail, if officers could or should wear their 
uniforms, etc. To be quite honest, attending this funeral was one of the most difficult 
things the researcher had ever done, especially when a male sergeant who was quite close 
to both the Lieutenant (their wives worked together and his wife was the one who 
reported that the Lieutenant’s wife had not come into work) and the researcher, began 
crying when he saw the researcher. After a brief embrace where he continued to weep, 
the Sergeant pushed the researcher away and stated that he had held it together until he 
saw her and he needed to be strong right now because people—his wife included—  
expected him to be strong. When this incident was discussed well over a year later, the 
Sergeant stated that, for some reason, seeing the researcher at the funeral “broke” him 
and he recalled how emotional he became. He disclosed that, in some ways, he wished 
the researcher had not been there because her presence triggered such a strong and 
emotional reaction.
This event was horrific and had a significant impact on the current research.
When the current study began, it was an interesting topic, but was not a topic in which 
the researcher was highly invested. After the Lieutenant’s suicide, witnessing the way 
that PTSD and mental health issues were talked about in hushed whispers and officers 
were attempting to avoid discussing the event at all and conceal or suppress their grief, 
the current research became personally significant to the researcher. It was a moment of 
clarity about the police culture, stigma, and the far reaching impacts of critical incidents. 
Another clear memory involves discussing this insight with another colleague, where the 
researcher effectively stated that “enough was enough.” The researcher was unable to
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give her class the planned lecture on police suicide that semester without sobbing, but 
every semester since then, utilizing the model provided by the Police Benevolence 
Association (PAB) (see www.pbfi.orgj. the researcher starts her lecture on officer stress, 
survivability and resilience with a story that begins with “I wish you knew my old 
supervisor...”
As noted above, this incident made this research personal in a way that added 
significant depth and understanding to what PTSD can do to an officer, his or her family, 
and all officers that know that officer. By experiencing this trauma, sharing it with the 
police family, the researcher not only truly experienced this incident as “one of the 
family,” but further solidified her position within that family. That phone call in April 
2011 was the first notification where the researcher was called so that she would be 
informed of something before it was released to the media, but it certainly would not be 
the last; since then, the researcher has received numerous phone calls related to incidents 
such as the murder of an PD officer, officer-involved shootings, miscarriages and failed 
interpersonal relationships, arrests and PTSD/mental health incidents involving officers.
Working in the Aftermath o f Shooting Incidents
The researcher has had the opportunity to work in the immediate aftermath of two 
officer-involved shootings in the course of her internship. The first shooting occurred in 
the early morning hours of July 11, 2010. The researcher was scheduled to work the 
evening shift with the Field Forensics Unit (1330 to 2130). Upon arriving at the Police 
Operations Center, it was discovered that the forensics detective from the previous night 
shift (2130 to 0530) was still finishing up his paperwork in the office. Around the 
precinct, there was an expected amount of tension—everyone was asking who was
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involved, what had happened, etc. The most commonly heard response to those 
questions was that the officers involved were “new officers, just cut loose” assigned to 
the second precinct.
The researcher was told that this shooting had gone out as three separate calls that no 
one knew were related—a hit and run, shots fired and a fight. Officers responded to the 
hit and run and were getting a victim/witness statement when the citizen said that’s the 
car that hit ours driving down the street. A brief vehicle pursuit followed. The suspect 
exited his vehicle and officers noticed a weapon. A foot pursuit ensued. At some point 
the suspect made a furtive movement/turned and the police opened fire. This all occurred 
at the top of the “Hole” (a pejorative nickname for a crime ridden section of the city), and 
the shooting occurred in a grassy lot near Sewells Point Road and F Avenue. It was later 
discovered that this 18 year old man had had multiple violent felony warrants outstanding 
in several local jurisdictions, including Norfolk. This was not known to the officers at 
the time of the shooting.
The researcher and the forensics detective took pictures of the original hit and run 
vehicle when the victim brought it to the POC to complete the report. Later, upon seeing 
the suspect vehicle at the forensics garage bay, there were paint transfers of the 
appropriate color, but damage to both vehicles indicates that the offender was likely 
driving on the wrong side of the street. It was quite eerie and unsettling to see a patrol 
car in the forensics garage. During the shift, the researcher and the forensics detective 
drove past the shooting scene twice—a makeshift memorial had been erected in the field. 
There were many people out and about, glaring at the police vehicle. There were a few 
politically incorrect jokes made about the citizenry not trusting the “po-po” in the car and
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the detective was quite glad they were not openly displaying firearms. The researcher 
was instructed that, should she see a weapon, she needed to warn the detective, then get 
on the floorboard of the van and stay there. Needless to say, tension and discomfort were 
high, particularly when transiting or answering calls in the general vicinity of the 
shooting.
Around 2000 hours, a call went out regarding a female who had collapsed at a vigil 
for the suspect. The caller stated that EMS and police should be sent before 
disconnecting the call. Everyone the researcher spoke with was on edge as police 
responded—afraid this was a powder keg or that a potential situation might develop. 
Officers cleared the scene and reported that there were approximately 100 people at the 
vigil. By this point, media had already had the crying mother and friends of the suspect 
on TV stating that he had been “shot in the back,” “warning shots should have been 
fired,” “someone was going to pay for this,” and that the “police were covering stuff up.” 
The fatal shot was to the back, but the researcher was informed it was in an area 
consistent with turning. After the collapse call, approximately a half an hour later there 
was a call for four shots fired at Sewells Point Road and F Avenue—the same location of 
the officer-involved shooting the night before. Tension increased again and the 
researcher and several officers discussed the possibility that the police were being baited 
into the area (which has little to no cover) or if “they” were waiting for only one unit to 
respond to retaliate.
At the end of the shift, the researcher realized that extended period of anxiety and 
unrest pervades the police department, not just the community, in the aftermath of a 
shooting incident. This fear and tension post-shooting is a topic that may have
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potentially been raised in a participant interview, but it is equally likely that the 
researcher would not have been aware of this facet of a shooting event. This experience 
further informed the understanding of secondary and tertiary victimization of other 
officers, including those who may not have even been on duty, let alone on scene, when 
the shooting incident occurred. Additionally, this experience provided insight into coping 
mechanisms, such as humor, as well as the concerns regarding retaliatory violence from 
the community.
The second shooting incident occurred in December of 2010. The call began as a 
domestic incident where a woman was reported to have been chasing her husband with a 
sledgehammer. When the officer arrived on scene, the woman was in a car. She refused 
to comply with orders to turn off the vehicle and get out o f the car. The officer reached 
through the window to turn off the ignition and the woman bit down on his forearm and 
rolled up the driver’s side window, trapping the officer as she began to reverse into a 
busy street. The officer ordered the woman to stop and indicated he would shoot her.
She again did not comply and, fearing for his life, as he was being dragged, hanging 
predominantly outside of the car, he shot her twice in the chest.
This incident happened in the evening on a Saturday and the researcher received a 
phone call notifying her that the event had occurred while she was at a restaurant, having 
dinner with family. During the week prior to this shooting, the researcher and Chris had 
discussed how unsettled he was by the statistic that states he is at an increased risk to be 
involved in another shooting. When the researcher was notified that there had been an 
officer-involved shooting, the person who called her made some comment to the effect of 
“guess who was involved in another shooting.” Due to the conversation the week before,
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the researcher assumed that the officer involved was Chris and was immediately 
preparing to leave the restaurant. The officer on the phone realized the assumption and 
promptly apologized. The researcher did know the officer involved, but was told to be 
prepared to come into work early for day shift (0530 to 1330) the following day.
When the researcher arrived for work, she and the detective she was working with 
were sent to the shooting scene, which was still active, to provide “fresh eyes” in the 
search for one missing cartridge case from the officer’s weapon. Again, the researcher 
was able to observe firsthand the tension and gallows humor, as well as the need for 
perfection in the investigative process due to the intense media and public scrutiny in the 
aftermath of a shooting incident. The researcher also obtained firsthand experience of a 
different variety: the very real fear and threat o f retaliation by family members of victim 
and the community. Soon after arriving on scene, the researcher and the detective she 
was partnered with located the missing cartridge case. Another detective asked the 
researcher to stand with the evidence while they retrieved the necessary documentary and 
collection equipment from the van.
While the researcher was waiting near the evidence, which was outside o f the 
asphalt parking lot of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred, some of the 
victim’s family members returned to the complex. After a few moments in the residence, 
the family members got into their vehicles and prepared to leave. They were visibly and 
audibly upset. As they were leaving the complex, it appeared the family was potentially 
going to hit the researcher with their car. It was a serious enough threat that the 
researcher was tackled and thrown into some nearby bushes by a detective. Obviously, 
this incident brought the threat of retaliation from an abstract concept to a very stark
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reality in a matter of seconds, providing an understanding that few “outsiders” will ever 
achieve. This incident was also another favorable mark in the eyes of some of the 
officers on scene, further entrenching her status as more “us” than “them.”
Near Shootings— When “Nothing ” Happens
One of the most interesting observations that has come out of the recorded interviews, 
numerous informal conversations with multiple officers, and lived experiences is the 
impact of near traumas. Once the researcher had entree and other officers knew of her 
research interests, several officers offered to share their stories with her. Some 
informally disclosed details about shooting incidents, but many more discussed incidents 
that could very easily have ended as a shooting incident. These include a scenario where 
the officer came around a comer and an offender fired multiple shots at him; he returned 
fire but did not hit the suspect. In this particular instance, the officer, who has been 
involved in multiple shooting incidents, stated “the one that messed me up the most, man, 
that’s the one where no one actually got shot, but I came around the comer and he was 
shooting at me and the bullets went right by my head. Yeah, that one really messed with 
my head.”
In discussing these close calls with numerous officers, it is clear that these incidents 
do have a significant impact: many officers have vivid recall of these events and exhibit 
increased respiration, agitation and changes in their normal conversation pattern when 
relaying their stories. They can describe locking eyes with an armed suspect and 
preparing to pull the trigger, or being concerned about cross-fire issues. For example, the 
passage below is when a participant was discussing an altercation with a mentally ill, 
knife-wielding man:
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just kind o f  slowed down, waiting fo r  him and he knew — I  could tell he was like, I  
know, I  can only go so far i f  I  cross this threshold because I  wasn 't backing out. I  
was right in there — more in than I  was out. I  mean, maybe ten fee t at best. So the 
second he clears that, you're talking maybe like seven fee t and at that point it's fa ir  
game. So he knew that. 1 said, I f  you come over, I'm going to shoot you. The gun's 
out already. He, you know, trying to tempt you, like half go — I  said, [suspect’s 
name] I'm going to shoot you. By that time you hear cars pulling up. Everybody 
comes up. The second he hears somebody coming up he's like, I'm coming up behind 
you. I  said, It’s going to happen now... So as soon as somebody comes up I  move in 
and they act like going in, I  said, in the kitchen. So we turn and face him. He 
dropped the knife.
The officers who disclose near traumas often discuss the weight after the fact, when
“nothing happened,” of knowing that they nearly killed a person and would have killed
them, if necessary. They may also have to come to terms with a situation that highlighted
their mortality and/or vulnerability. In short, the officer could have died and is not an
invincible hypermasculine god of truth and justice. Another example comes from Chris,
discussing a search warrant where he was almost seriously injured:
A dog jumped up and I  stuck my gun in its mouth. So my whole gun was in its 
mouth, giant, giant dog, couldn't bite down because his back teeth etched the 
bottom o f  the gun on the Smith & Wesson, the steel ones. So I'm dragging him out 
and I  went to go shoot as [another investigator] runs behind the dog and I ’m 
thinking i f  I  shoot, because [a second investigator] wound up running back there, 
too, I  was like, it will probably go through the dog and kill them. So I  just pulled 
it back and the second I  pulled it back and I'm dragging him away from  the door 
one o f  the guys, I  thought one guy from SOT turned around and lit it up with a sub 
gun because I  heard (demonstrating) and the dog lets go and ju st kind o f  
collapsed there and rounds were hitting the raid van. Lieutenant was walking 
around as rounds were hitting the van and he goes back. Turns out like two, three 
people turned around andfired in succession. The first round hit the dog in the 
side, which released the gun. The second round, which was a .45 went through 
his face, which could have come through the top o f  my hand when they first got 
the .45s. So thankfully the first shot hit him in the side, released the gun and 
then — because I  wouldn't have let the gun go and let him run away with the 
gun... I  remember looking at the dog and thinking, Shit, that was it. I  almost lost 
my career because my hand would have been gone with that .45 round. I  was 
like, Jesus Christ, one o f  those like that almost went really bad.
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Yet, because “nothing happened” or “no one was injured,” these officers are expected 
to just go back to their normal routines and carry on. One of the best analogies presented 
by Chris on several occasions is that, if an officer sprains their ankle in the line of duty, 
they are sent immediately to get medical attention. Yet, if there is a shooting with no 
physical injuries, there is a pervasive mentality that you should simply do your 
paperwork and get back to work. This contributes to the mentality that unseen injuries do 
not count and that “real cops suck it up.”
In this arena, too, the researcher has been able to experience near trauma firsthand 
through her internship on at least three occasions, meaning that, where the literature 
states these events are hard to observe in the field, the researcher has seen situations 
unfold that could go badly in seconds. In two of these instances, the researcher was taken 
completely by surprise, assuming that she was not in any danger. The first incident 
occurred while the research was assisting with evidence documentation and collection in 
a house where a search warrant had been executed. The house had been secured; indeed, 
the police had been at this location for hours. The researcher was in the kitchen of the 
home, talking with a detective, when someone started to open the rear door of the home. 
The detective immediately began challenging whoever was opening the door, loudly 
stating, “Police! Who is coming in the door?” When the detective received no response, 
he drew his weapon, focused intently on the door. At this point, the researcher realized 
that she was between the detective and the door and, should this situation become violent, 
she was not in an enviable position. Simultaneously, she noticed the detective’s focus 
and was afraid to move, lest he be experiencing perceptual distortions and consider her to 
be a threat. In mere seconds, the incident was over; another detective had decided to
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come through the rear entrance instead of using the front door, like the other police 
personnel. The detective who had drawn his weapon was clearly not able to return to 
normal immediately and took a walk. The researcher was also not unaffected and had to 
take a few minutes o f down time before returning to her colleagues as if nothing out of 
the ordinary had occurred.
In another incident, the researcher had agreed to meet with a detective who was 
struggling with PTSD after being involved in multiple critical incidents as a patrol 
officer. The detective had reached out to the researcher, asking if she would talk with 
him, particularly about her experience at and assessment of the West Coast Posttrauma 
Retreat (WCPR). They met while the detective was on duty, on night shift after the 
researcher had had a full day at the university. Because there was another person present 
in the detective’s office for the first 45 minutes o f the shift, the researcher and the 
detective sat in an uncomfortable silence. When a call came in about a shooting into an 
occupied dwelling, the researcher quickly volunteered to ride with the detective (as she is 
cleared to do so through her internship), hoping that the detective would begin talking in 
the vehicle. He did and, because patrol found a man shot multiple times near the scene 
just as the detective and the researcher arrived, there was a great deal of down time 
waiting for a search warrant for the residence where the victim was shot. During the 
wait, the detective disclosed the details of each of his critical incidents, how he struggled 
with PTSD and anxiety, how he felt when fellow officers teased him or called him killer. 
He talked about the flaws he saw in the culture, the organization, and the policies 
governing shooting investigations. The researcher and the detective talked for hours and 
finally the search warrant arrived.
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The shooting occurred in a small townhouse in Section 8 housing. The victim had 
been shot in the living room. After forensics had processed the immediate scene in the 
living room, detectives began searching other rooms in the residence for a weapon and 
other relevant evidence. The precinct was short staffed that night; it was determined that 
the front door was locked and therefore there was no need to post an officer on the front 
door for security. There was an officer posted on the back door, but he had wandered 
away several times. As the detectives and the researcher were upstairs searching the 
bedrooms, someone downstairs yelled, “is there anyone here?” The researcher went to 
the top of the stairs and yelled back “Yeah, we’re upstairs,” assuming that it was another 
police officer. Immediately, the person yelled back “Who’s in my house?!?”
The researcher quickly moved away from the stairs and hugged the wall as the 
detective who had been through multiple critical incidents posted at the top of the stairs 
and drew his weapon. The researcher was again in a situation that “went bad” in a matter 
of seconds, when she least expected it. In field notes, she documented the thoughts that 
quickly passed through her mind and included sentiments like “I cannot believe this is 
happening,” “he cannot go through another shooting,” and, oddly enough, “no, no, no! I 
study officer-involved shootings—I do not need to be IN one!” Seconds later, the patrol 
officer stuck his head around the stairwell wall, laughing. His eyes got very large, seeing 
the detective posted at the top of the stairs, pointing a firearm at him. The officer put his 
hands up and said something to the effect of “Don’t shoot me, bro! I was just joking! I 
forgot who I was dealing with...” The surge of anger that overcame the researcher was 
intense and immediate—she was ready to do physical harm to the patrol officer—and 
tempered quickly upon looking at the detective, shaking and sweating profusely, trying to
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holster his weapon. Anger was quickly sublimated as concern for the detective became 
the primary focus. He was upset and several of the points that they had just discussed—  
the teasing, the lack of understanding displayed by his fellow officers, the fear of being in 
another incident—had just played out in stark reality before the researcher’s own eyes. 
Other concerns in the moment involved how to get the detective outside to get some air 
(a) without embarrassing him by calling attention to his reaction and (b) having minimal 
interaction with the various police personnel on scene.
The third near trauma entered in the researcher’s field notes that warrants attention 
involved a felony traffic stop. The researcher and a forensics detective were out, driving 
around between calls and talking, at approximately 0200 on a Sunday night. It had been 
an easy or a relaxed shift, not too busy and “cut off time” was just over three hours away. 
The detective noticed that the car in front of t em had a “wonky” rear license plate and 
decided to run it. As the detective was waiting for dispatch to provide the requested 
information, he explained that “wonky” license plates are an indicator of potentially 
stolen plates and/or stolen cars. The dispatcher responded, providing the vehicle 
description that was associated with the car in the system. That was not the vehicle being 
observed.
The detective called it in as a non-active pursuit, requesting assistance and indicating 
that he would not engage until backup had arrived. It must have been a slow night 
throughout the precinct, as over six units— including K-9— came alongside the forensics 
van and all vehicles activated their lights and sirens. The detective knew this was going 
to be more intense than a “typical” traffic stop and, as he was getting out of the van and 
drawing his weapon, instructed the researcher to “stay in the car and stay behind the
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engine block.” The officers all had their weapons drawn and were screaming instructions 
at the occupant. A rookie tried to reposition himself and almost created a crossfire 
scenario, until his field training officer literally grabbed him by the collar with one hand 
and shoved him behind him. The suspect complied and the scenario deescalated. What 
was interesting was watching the officers as they milled about, joking with each other, 
trying to wind down after experiencing such a surge in adrenaline. Other officers came 
by to see what had happened and to socialize. When the researcher was cleared to leave 
the vehicle, one of the veteran officers who had worked several cases with her, included 
her in the joking, stating that she had been doing this long enough that she “could at least 
help.. .you know, throw a clipboard at him if he ran or something.”
These incidents were not gratuitously included in this section, but were carefully 
chosen to illustrate real life lessons that do not appear in the literature often, if at all. The 
researcher realized how quickly a critical incident or potential critical incident can 
develop— often when it was least expected and taking those parties present by surprise. 
After the immediate threat was eliminated in each near critical incident, all personnel, 
including the researcher, were expected to return to business as usual seamlessly, as if 
nothing had happened. All personnel were balancing the need to maintain the image of 
the officer that they assumed they were supposed to project, often embodying stereotypes 
related to the “tough, stoic, nothing bothers me” police officer, while at the same time 
trying to process what just happened or almost happened and the resultant ramifications. 
Not only did these incidents provide the opportunity observe the variety o f coping 
mechanisms displayed by officers, as well as the struggle to maintain the expected tough 
police fafade, they gave the researcher firsthand experience of some of the physiological
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symptoms associated with a shooting incident, including shortness of breath, accelerated 
heart rate, and tunnel vision. Also, the researcher has noted that she exhibits some of the 
same behaviors as the officers who relayed their near traumas when she shares or recalls 
these events—particularly the near shooting over a patrol officer’s joke.
The researcher, who does not routinely wear a bulletproof vest and does not carry a 
firearm, was starkly aware of both her vulnerability in these situations and that she was 
being observed by the officers just as much, if not more so, than she was observing them. 
Each of the incidents, and there were several others not documented here, was an 
unintended test of sorts for the researcher, to see if she could “handle it.” Additionally, 
being present for these events deepened rapport with some officers and facilitated 
informal discussions that allowed for probing questions related to perceptions, coping 
mechanisms evidenced, and cultural expectations.
An Officer in Crisis Resigns
The detective referenced above that had been through numerous critical incidents 
continued to struggle with his PTSD, displaying symptoms such as hypervigilance, 
heightened levels of anxiety, sleep disturbances and difficulties in interpersonal 
relationships. The researcher and this detective developed a friendship and would chat 
through text messages, occasionally through phone calls, or when they were both at the 
police department. The detective had reached out to numerous individuals, o f varying 
ranks, indicating that he was not coping well. Around Thanksgiving, he went home to 
visit his family for two to three weeks. When he returned, he texted the researcher about 
a trivial work-related topic. When the researcher asked how his vacation had been, he 
disclosed that he was now separated from his wife; he had been betrayed by a friend; and
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was having active night terrors, to include an incident where his family witnessed him 
screaming, yelling and cursing. At that point, the detective stated that he would not be 
making any major decisions in the near future.
The researcher stayed in contact with the detective through the next few days, 
predominantly via text message. In mid-December, the detective told the researcher that 
he wanted to speak with her at shift change (he was coming off of night shift and she was 
working day shift), but the researcher unfortunately slept through her alarm and was late 
to work that morning. When the researcher texted the detective to apologize, he informed 
her that he was resigning from the police department and was coming in to turn in his 
resignation later to the sergeant. He was planning to move out of state and wanted to 
move within the week. The researcher was concerned that the detective was making rash 
decisions due to his recent personal crises and the resurgence of his PTSD symptoms, as 
these were the types of major decisions that he had stated he would avoid making less 
than two weeks prior. When the researcher spoke with him, she noted that she would 
support him in his decision—if that was what was best for him—but asked him to take 
some time to make the decision (to include taking sick leave) and to utilize services 
available. The researcher also asked if she could reach out to a trusted contact on the 
CISM team; the detective agreed to talk to the CISM team member, but emphatically 
stated that he would not change his mind. After the CISM team member talked to him, 
he indicated that he shared the researcher’s concerns regarding the detective’s ability to 
make logical, rational decisions in his current frame of mind. Further discussions with 
other members of the police department resulted in the CISM contact being told, short of 
involuntary commitment, there was nothing that could be done for this officer.
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A few days later, the researcher received two text messages from the detective in 
the morning. During the week prior to turning in his resignation, the detective had 
moved out of the home he shared with his estranged wife (a police officer from another 
jurisdiction) and had moved into a home with two of his fellow officers. The text 
messages received described a PTSD episode the detective had experienced the night 
before. During this episode, the detective woke up while he was screaming, cursing and 
punching the wall. In his words, he “scared the shit out o f [his] roommates. Epic fail, 
lol.” A second text stated that he needed a massage, a hot tub and a drink, indicating the 
use of some of the same coping mechanisms—specifically alcohol and 
avoidance/minimalization—that emerged during the thematic analysis, as seen in Chapter 
6. The researcher was concerned and that concern escalated when her texts and phone 
calls to the detective went unanswered and she was unable to make contact with her 
CISM team contact.
As noted in the researcher’s field notes, she was “quite upset because he has been 
failed at every level— including having our sergeants rush his paperwork through to ‘help 
him,’ when they needed to slow his ass down.” The researcher was finally able to talk to 
the detective and they discussed him attempting to at least get back in to see the 
psychologist he had seen previously before leaving town. The detective asked the 
researcher if she really thought he needed to go see his doctor and she indicated that yes, 
she did, because if his night terrors were that severe, he represented a danger to himself 
and others. The detective admitted that his sleep issues from his PTSD had never been 
ameliorated. The researcher and the detective discussed talking to his doctor about a 
medication that, when used in low doses in a patient with PTSD, has show positive
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results in stopping nightmares without stopping the ability to dream completely. This 
was less than two weeks before Christmas and due to the speed with which the 
detective’s resignation was being processed, he would lose his health insurance by 
January 1. The detective stated that he may contact his doctor to see if he could 
recommend a new doctor where he was moving. Even though she was quite frustrated, 
the researcher discussed that, given the holidays, it was highly unlikely that the detective 
would be able to get in to see a psychologist as a new patient prior to the termination of 
his insurance.
After they had spoken about medications, the detective texted the researcher again 
later that afternoon to follow up on their discussion from earlier in the day. He had 
researched the medication they had discussed and, while there were promising results 
documented, it had been noted that this medication, when used in conjunction with 
another medication for sleep issues commonly associated with PTSD that had been 
prescribed to the detective, could cause a lasting erection that would not go away. The 
detective jokingly asked what the researcher was trying to do to him. They jested about 
which was the lesser of the evils—the lasting erection (which the researcher stated would 
not matter if he was asleep) or the night terrors. The detective indicated he guessed the 
erections would be the lesser of the evils, unless he was staying at his grandmother’s 
house, which would be awkward. The detective was supposed to attend a Christmas 
party that the researcher was also attending later that evening, but he received word that 
there had been a death in the family. He packed up quickly and left the area the next 
morning. The detective, no longer a police officer, and the researcher have stayed in 
touch through Facebook and text messages. He seems to be doing well now, but he is no
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longer in law enforcement. He had considered pursuing employment with another police 
agency, but decided he could not go back into that kind o f stressful situation.
Through her involvement in this detective’s PTSD crisis, the researcher was able 
to observe both the symptoms of and impact of PTSD in an officer’s life, while also 
affording her the opportunity to observe the reactions of colleagues and the 
response/services available through the police department. It was an eye-opening 
experience, on multiple levels, for the researcher. From observing interactions and 
hearing conversations between colleagues, responses to this detective ranged from glad 
that he was getting out to apathy to confusion over the entire situation. It was clear that 
his fellow officers, for the most part and even including some of those working with him 
closely, were not educated on the signs and symptoms of PTSD nor were they aware of 
how these signs and symptoms impact relationships and decision-making processes. This 
also demonstrated how officers struggling with PTSD may try to minimize symptoms and 
may not be medication compliant (as this officer still had the medication prescribed for 
sleep because he did not take it as instructed). One colleague, another participant in the 
current study, was aware of the situation and commented on this detective’s leaving the 
PD, stating:
...He was hooked, immediately turned in his transfer letter, went to Forensics and 
had a successful career in Forensics until he eventually left but he was — he was 
publically and openly disturbed about the series o f  circumstances he had been 
involved in. He did not hide it. He did not try to hide it. He was just distraught.
I  don't think I  could — I  don't think I  could think o f a better word than that about 
everything... Yeah, [he] was a good boy. He was. He was a good officer. He was 
motivated. He was a good person and ju st the combination o f  all the things that 
happened one right after the other, the young woman that he shot out in Ocean 
View, you know, right, wrong, or indifferent he was trying to do his job  and our 
job investigating that was not to bust his chops on why were you in the car — why 
were you leaning in the car the first place, it was from  the criminal standpoint, 
what needs to be understood is from the criminal standpoint. It is was there a
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crime committed when this use o f  force was engaged. No. Great, goes to 
administration. Let OPS do the administrative side and say, All right, this was a 
violation o f this. This was a violation o f  that and handle that part. Okay. Then 
o f course the officer still has the civil issues that he's got to deal with, but that's 
down the road. After he's just getting over the criminal investigation where he's 
getting his ass whipped, then he goes into the administrative investigation and 
depending on who is handling that he takes another ass whipping and as soon as 
all o f  that starts dying down he's dealing with his own personal issues. Then it 
comes, the civil case. It's a scary thought and it really affected [him]. It really 
did.
Further, at least one individual in a command position attempted to tell the 
researcher that this particular officer “never reached out for help,” so there was nothing 
that could have been done to help him, which was not true. He represented one of what 
are likely many officers like him, struggling and failing to cope with critical incident 
and/or cumulative stress with minimal support and services available. Second, it became 
abundantly clear that the process, or lack thereof, in place is insufficient and there are no 
clearly articulated guidelines of what help is available. These issues will also be 
discussed in the policy analyses below. There is little duty of care or responsibility 
evident for these officers, even when they give of themselves to the breaking point to a 
department that is either unwilling or unable to provide a minimal level of assistance.
Teaching and Training
During the course of this research, the researcher has been invited to attend several 
training opportunities related to the topic at hand, to include two of Chris’ classes at the 
PD Academy on stress and survivability, Norcross’ lecture on survivability (2011) given 
at the 2011 Annual Virginia Gang Investigator’s Association Conference, the PBA’s 
Behind the Badge Training on officer stress and suicide (Rutledge and Sewell 2012), and 
the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat (2009a). Each of these opportunities not only
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provided increased understanding and awareness of issues germane to the current study, 
but allowed the researcher the opportunity to interact and discuss these issues with a 
variety of practitioners in the field, as well as observe the myriad of reactions and coping 
mechanisms displayed during these discussions and training sessions.
Observing Chris’ class on multiple occasions provided an opportunity to observe how 
he relayed his experience to police recruits and to see where, if at all, he struggled in 
telling his story. As Chris has admitted, the retelling becomes easier with practice and is 
almost cathartic for him, yet there are some details that he still rushes through because it 
is difficult for him to discuss those points. This also allowed the researcher to listen to 
Chris’s routine and rehearsed recounting of his shooting and its aftermath, which meant 
that she was more prepared to probe the nuances and push for deeper recall in their 
subsequent interview sessions (see Chapter 5 for additional details on the techniques 
utilized and the information retrieved). Observing these academy classes also permitted 
the researcher to observe the recruits’ reaction to the presentation. Unfortunately, as 
discussed with Chris, the recruits were likely exposed to his presentation and story too 
early in their academy experience, often before they had received firearms training and 
scenario training. This suggests that the information provided to them may not only be 
lost in the miasma of DCJS objectives and standards that must be memorized and met to 
complete their academy training, but that it also may not be “real” to young recruits who 
may not have even fired a gun yet. Upon hearing Chris’ description of his shooting and 
its aftermath, as well as listening to the 9-1-1 call from the clerk present during the 
shooting, recruits displayed a wide variety of reactions. Some became very quiet and 
introspective, some asked pointed questions about his interpersonal relationships or
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returning to “normal,” others fidgeted, others appeared to lose interest, and some 
responded in a manner consistent with locker room shock (Jones 1989), stating how they 
would have “blasted” the suspect and not felt bad at all.
These reactions contrasted sharply to those observed at both Norcross’ (2011) 
presentation about his shooting incident and Rutledge and Sewell’s (2012) presentations 
at the PBA training on stress and survivability. It is likely that the VGIA members, many 
of whom had likely been in potentially dangerous scenarios given their assignments, 
could relate to Norcross and the horror of not only being shot in the line o f duty, but 
losing a sibling who was also a brother in blue in the same incident. Similarly, Rutledge 
and Sewell presented a mix of “book” and “street” knowledge to a group of 
predominantly experienced officers who had chosen to attend their course. 
Representatives from a variety of local agencies were present, meaning that not only were 
there universal understandings that transcended idiosyncratic cultures of individual 
agencies, but that this training illuminated a common problem and provided an 
opportunity to discuss and work towards shared solutions. O f particular note were the 
reactions of officers during breaks, discussing their own incidents or experiences, and the 
private confessions to colleagues that the information presented “hit a bit close to home,” 
especially concerning stress, depression and suicide ideation. Of course, officers who 
disclosed that another officer had stated these insights were often unwilling to reach out 
to either supervisors or the officer in question regarding support service available to 
combat depression.
One of the most significant learning experiences in the research process involved the 
researcher spending a week at the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat, acting as a member of
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the clinician team. With permission of the clinical director, the researcher was able to 
attend one of the five day inpatient retreats, interacting with peer support staff, clinical 
staff and clients, as well as participating in and observing therapeutic sessions and staff 
meetings, in a picturesque location in the mountains near Tomales Bay, California. This 
experience also had a profound impact on the current research and upon the researcher.
To respect the confidentiality of the participants, specific details of this experience will 
not be disclosed here, however, the transformation that was observed in the clients was 
remarkable— some almost seemed like different people and one client, who reminded the 
researcher of her father, smiled for the first time in years, as far as he could remember. 
The unique approach utilized at this retreat combines the best aspects of peer support, 
matching clients with peer support from previous clients who have been through similar 
situations, with world class QMHP, and high impact therapeutic techniques, such as 
EMDR.
Clients are educated about medications, recognizing triggers, coping mechanisms, 
and rebuilding interpersonal relationships that may have been damaged during their 
struggles with stress related disorders. The camaraderie and trust that are fostered during 
these five days are beyond amazing—with clients disclosing alcoholism, sexual and 
physical abuse they suffered as children, details o f  their critical incidents, details o f their 
intimate lives, well developed suicide plans, and many other “secrets.” Though there 
were many serious moments, these moments were tempered by humor and 
understanding. This experience, much like the other field experiences the researcher has 
been privy to, helped guide and shape the current study by providing intimate insight into 
how trauma reactions can manifest, the array of coping mechanisms utilized, and those
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topics so private and personal that they are rarely noted in the literature. This retreat also 
helped the researcher pull out her own experiences and confront them, allowing her to 
talk about things that she did not previously like to talk about and to become more aware 
of her biases and predispositions in the current research. This process, in conjunction 
with the other field experiences mentioned in this chapter, forced reflexivity, in a sense, 
and highlighted why the back and forth—the researcher going into the field, reflecting on 
what has been learned and locating herself within the observations— is so critical to this 
research and analysis. A final point of interest was discovered during the course of this 
research. At WCPR, it was discovered that several officers had macabre mementos or 
souvenirs of their critical incident—in the form of photos, reports, etc., that they keep.
The case at the heart of the current analyses also involved critical incident memorabilia 
because Chris disclosed the following information:
Q. How did you feel when you got your gun back?
A. Good, super good. I  was asking all the time, Can I  get my gun back?
Almost like not a security blanket but there was a very significant, I  hate 
to say this, but like a memorabilia kind o f  thing. And I've kept all the guns 
that have been involved in like serious — and I  think I've used every single 
one, every gun that I've had that first 6906 with the dog, the second one 
during the search warrant, and obviously the nine millimeter that we got, 
that one. So every gun that I've had, I  kept it and it sounds horrible, as a 
momento, but it's not in a bad way, kind o f  like this was there that day, like 
the clothes, the jersey. I  still have that. That doesn’t bother me. That 
doesn't concern me as much as having that gun. Like i f  I lo s t the jersey 
that would suck but no big deal.
Chris also has a copy of the 9-1-1 recording which, when he received it, he listened to it 
repeatedly. The presence of macabre memorabilia is not a topic that was found in the 
literature related to officer-involved shootings and stress responses. If QMHPs ask
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clients about these behaviors, they may gain insight into the client’s particular struggles 
and may be able to alter treatment approaches accordingly.
In short, the five days provided much insight and introspection, strengthening 
multiple facets o f the current study while also strengthening the researcher as a colleague 
and as a person.
The Highs and Lows o f Becoming a Public Criminologist
FOIA requests were submitted to the PD at two separate points in the current study, in 
December 2009 and again in October 2011. Materials related to these requests can be 
found in Appendix G and Appendix H. The response to the initial request stated that 
such statistics did not exist and that the PD was not required to create such statistics 
pursuant to a FOIA request. This lack o f statistics is surprising for two reasons, the 
second of which is discussed in more detail below in the policy analyses: first, this 
would indicate that the PD does not report justifiable homicides by law enforcement to 
the VState Police, who, in turn, report to the UCR; second, given the requisite forms an 
officer must complete any time a firearm is discharged, as well as where and how this 
data is housed, it is improbable that basic frequencies of officer-involved shootings do 
not exist. The second request was much more specific in terms of documents requested, 
time frame of consideration, and situational factors to be included. From this request, the 
researcher received fifteen highly redacted, partial IBRs, which accounts for only 35% of 
the shooting incidents discovered during the preliminary study conducted to contextualize 
the current study (see Chapter 3).
Soon after the first FOIA request was made to the PD, a request for information was 
also made to the State Police (SP), the CDC’s Vital Statistics, and the FBI’s UCR
317
program. The SP was happy to provide information regarding LEOKA data, but when 
asked for data relevant to officer-involved shooting, particularly disaggregated data for 
the seven cities in the region being considered, the SP also initially claimed that the 
requested data did not exist. After several conversations, the information available was 
sent to the researcher, but it was encoded and of limited use, as discussed in Chapter 3.
As for requests made to the CDC and the FBI via their websites, the CDC responded that 
individualized assistance cannot be provided to researchers (although the researcher was 
told where to look for state level statistics) and the FBI never provided a response.
Throughout the research process, as mentioned previously, both the researcher and 
Chris have attempted to not only be transparent with the PD, but to also invite the PD to 
be an active collaborator in the research process as a department striving to improve itself 
and take better care of its personnel. Initial approaches, under previous administrations, 
were met with the blue wall of silence; the previous chiefs had no interest in even 
considering the current research. The current administration was willing to at least 
discuss participation with the researcher. The researcher and Chris were afforded an 
opportunity to meet with the Chief and then the researcher was asked to present this 
research proposal to the Senior Staff of the PD. At the initial meeting, it was 
acknowledged that the researcher could not be barred from talking to people, provided 
they had they had the right to refuse to participate in the current research.
When presenting to the Senior Staff, the researcher provided information not only 
about the current study and the benefits it would provide to the PD, but also related to the 
costs associated with officer-involved shootings, evidence based policy and the statistics 
suggesting that violent confrontations between police and citizens are increasing. While
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one assistant chief openly supported the research, another was clearly against the 
research, stating that the researcher should not need to see SOPs or other department 
documents. The researcher explained that, to evaluate policy or strive for best practice, 
current practice and policy had to be examined. This is consistent with the varied 
administrative responses to officer survivability and resilience noted in the policy 
analyses.
Two things happened the day that the researcher presented to the Senior Staff: first, 
the researcher received an e-mail from the PD stating that they had decided to support the 
current research and that she needed to provide a wishlist of documents, and second, 
there was an officer involved shooting that afternoon. While this marked progress where 
previous administrations had refused to even consider the current research, there would 
be many hurdles, including a lack of access, superficial support and circuitous routes to 
gain certain pieces of information.
The researcher has participated in several meetings with various members of upper 
management about different components of this study, many of whom vocally support 
the current research. However, the researcher must admit a certain degree of naivete in 
the earliest o f these meetings, as she genuinely believed these individuals wanted this 
research to do well and that the agency wanted to be proactive and confront the issues 
identified. The researcher believes that there is an acknowledgement that this is an array 
of issues that can be problematic, but for what is likely multiple reasons— these include, 
but are certainly not limited to egos, the police culture, perceived liability, fear and 
discomfort, and financial concerns—support for the current study has often been 
superficial. For example, in lieu of official requests that could be denied by the
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administration or the City Attorney, on several occasions, the researcher was directed by
one or more command staff to utilize more informal means to access certain materials,
providing plausible deniability for the PD and its command staff.
Other meetings related to the formation of policy and/or services within the PD were
attended, which were met with mixed reactions. Often, the researcher and Chris were
informed that there was no money to do anything and were told the EAP was sufficient.
This highlights the tension between verbal support or interest and committed action,
indicating that this is a systematic issue. Change in the culture needs to be preceded by a
change in the policy and attention/respect from the upper management levels (Malmin
2012). These conversations and the resultant frustrations can be summed up through the
words of one participant, who noted that,
It's not the fault o f  the current administration; however, it's not yet the fault o f  the 
administration. Each administration to come in has that ability to shift and make the 
change to pull from the other people that are experts or that have experienced but 
until that happens, they're just doing a great injustice... It's like some baby animal 
awkwardly trying to figure out how to walk, kind o f has it, but doesn't. The biggest 
issue being that we don't learn from our mistakes, we have yet to learn from  our 
mistakes. Then we learn from our mistakes and we have such a short memory that we 
forget a minute later and that's the problem... Listen, people are going to 
self-medicate. They're going to do whatever they can. We can have the greatest 
system in the world, there's still going to be people that are going to fa ll through the 
cracks. It's just going to happen. It's just a matter o f  time before it really blows up. I  
think it's not that we have a bunch o f  people. I  think you're going to have a 
significant incident. One individual may be alone that either takes his life or takes 
somebody else's and then his own or her own and then it’s going to be in such a light 
that they have to address it. My biggest fear is that they're not going to be proactive 
about it. That they're going to be reactive no matter what, as long as it gets 
something done. I f  that's the way that it's going to change, then unfortunately as 
calm as it may seem, something bad needs to happen sooner than later, which is 
crazy.
320
Another participant also acknowledged the need to evaluate current policies and take a
proactive stance, stating that,
yeah, you can look at line o f  duty death policies all day long and again, that is the 
legally correct response. We have a line o f  duty death policy. That's great. We 
have policy for everything. I  have a policy fo r  how I'm supposed to wear my shirt. 
That's great, but at some point we have to go beyond that. We have to go outside 
o f  these boundaries and do things and innovate and think beyond, okay, well, the 
policy says this so we must do this or wait fo r  these circumstances to happen.
Well, why in the fuck are we waiting for something to happen i f  we know it's 
going to come? We know it's going to happen. It's going to happen. Another 
officer is going to be involved in a shooting in this city. Another officer is God 
forbid going to die in the line o f  duty. It's going to happen. So why do we wait 
fo r  something to happen before we make a change when we know it's coming?
The researcher, in her field notes, documented this contradiction, stating, “I am
beginning to think that the PD would rather treat this as an issue of broken people, rather
than a broken system or process. Then it is a problem with the individual, not the
department, and there is no perceived obligation to act/intervene/change.” A participant
also echoed some of these same statements, articulating that,
... it continuously gets buried and i f  not fo r  a select few o f  us who continue to vocalize 
and have an audience with the right people, this is not — despite our best efforts, the 
agency and the department is doing everything it can to passively ignore this or 
passively resist it, which is amazing... I've essentially predicted the future. You're 
going to have officers in crisis. We don't have policies. We've made it known. I ’ve 
definitely made it known to the chiefs. It's out there. You can't unring that.
This was also evidenced in the flurry of concern after an incident or in situations of 
management by crisis, yet the concept of planning and establishing process and 
procedure to handle crises of a similar nature (as detailed later) were not a priority when 
the media was not watching and there was not an immediate impetus to act. This was 
evidenced on multiple occasions where the researcher or Chris would provide 
information related to policies (LACP Model Policies or example policies from other
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jurisdictions) or when training opportunities were presented. Certain instances where the 
tension between verbal support and willingness to act were particularly disheartening 
because, not only did it illuminate the perceived inaction on the part of certain segments 
of the PD has to these issues, but it projects a poor image of the PD in the larger 
community while also having the potential to be detrimental to the researcher and Chris’s 
professional relationships outside of the PD.
Other Notable Moments in the Field
The participant observation component, as detailed previously, was an integral part of 
the researcher gaining not only the requisite academic knowledge, but the depth of 
understanding and acceptance that was necessary to speak with authority on the topic of 
officer-involved shootings and their varied impacts. In short, without these lived 
experiences and challenges, it is unlikely that the current study would have been as 
multifaceted and the researcher may have fallen short of achieving her holistic vision. 
Some experiences or interactions were purposeful, in that the researcher chose to attend a 
training or scheduled a meeting with the express intention of discussing a given topic, 
others were more organic in nature, evolving during normal conversation or interactions. 
Many o f these organic interactions occurred after the researcher had “proven” herself to 
the officers she worked with, allowing her the freedom to participate in discussions that 
would traditionally be reserved for police officers only.
For example, one evening the researcher was standing on the back porch of the Police 
Operations Center (POC) with several officers. Someone engaged in the conversation 
mentioned either that the researcher was studying critical incidents or working with 
Chris. After much of the group had left, another Sergeant began a conversation with the
researcher about the current study. This Sergeant discussed the nature of police work and 
the police culture generally, discussing how it had negatively impacted his family, his 
friends, his intimate relationships and his ability to be a participating member of his faith 
community. As a result of failed relationships that were, in part, undermined by his 
career, the Sergeant disclosed depression, alcohol abuse and suicide ideation. This 
Sergeant stated that “[we need] something for families., .we’re killing our families and no 
one tells us how to make that side of things work, how to help them.. This disclosure 
underscores the multifaceted nature of being a first responder and that those varying 
commitments and relationships that can become attenuated by normal or chronic stress 
from the officer’s career can be overwhelmed or strained to breaking in the aftermath o f a 
critical incident. In another casual conversation, an officer who had been in a shooting 
incident told the researcher that at one point he had been scared that he would freeze and 
not be able to fire his weapon should he need to do so. When asked how that fear could 
have been mitigated or addressed, he provided a startlingly simple and practical response: 
he stated that he believes all officers who have fired their weapons on duty should be 
offered an hour alone at the pistol range, working one-on-one with the range master, to 
re-familiarize him- or herself with their weapon, muscle memory and the mechanics of 
aiming and firing. This is not a policy suggestion that the researcher would have ever 
generated alone, yet, it makes sense and may be an appropriate suggestion to pursue.
Due to the nature of the current study and the relationship between Chris and the 
researcher, there have been times that the researcher has been informally consulted when 
officers are in crisis. Chris handles a large number of the requests for peer support 
because officers either seek him out directly or are referred to him through informal
mechanisms. As such, it is easy to see the pressure this could create for Chris, what with 
limited, and sometimes ineffective, policies in place and a lack of resources available 
from which to work. At one point, when he had been involved with over five officers in 
crisis in a one month period, Chris admitted to the researcher and the Chief o f Police that 
these incidents and the related frustrations and constraints were taking a psychological 
toll. He stated that he may need to return to therapy if he continues to be involved in 
these matters and, to the researcher, he admitted increased alcohol consumption that 
concerned his wife. In two of these incidents, officers displayed high potential for self- 
harm, including one of which Chris brought into his own home as a protective 
mechanism. Chris also took an officer suffering from multiple compounded traumas to 
the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for help and that officer was reportedly told to 
“take a Benadryl and come back in a few days.” Not only is this response wholly 
inappropriate and negligent, but it is further evidence of the need for culturally competent 
professionals (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter 
et al. 2011) who understand not only the police culture, but the development and impact 
of critical incident stress and PTSD within this community and the need to act swiftly 
when help is sought due to the courage it takes to come forward in spite o f perceived 
risks (Tucker 2011).
In short, this is a potential situation of damned if they do, damned if they do not, for 
the PD. Yet, given the costs associated with a shooting incident outlined earlier in this 
study, and with the costs associated with civil liability, departments can no longer afford 
to choose inaction. There is a grave concern related to liability, likely one o f the reasons 
this area of concern is treated as a small scale problem impacting only a small number of
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individuals rather than a widespread cultural issue, yet, should an officer who has either 
reached out for help and been told to “go take a Benadryl” or who has been exhibiting 
clear signs of poor coping, then the PD may have the risk of increased liability if the 
officer harms him- or herself or someone else after a problem has been recognized.
News Media Analyses
There were only a limited number of news articles related to the current case, 
largely due to the fact that another event superseded the coverage of Chris’s shooting. In 
some ways, as Chris has noted, he was spared intense media scrutiny because his 
shooting occurred the evening before the Virginia Tech mass shooting incident. The 
news paper articles ranged in tone from predominantly factual (Benn 2007, Washington 
2007a, Washington 2007c) to portraying Chris in a favorable light (2007, 2008a, 
Washington 2007b), calling him a hero and commending him for his actions. Several 
articles detailed the awards and honors bestowed upon Chris for his actions (2008a, 
2008b, Online 2008, Thomas 2008, Warren 2008, Washington 2008a). One article did 
have a potential negative slant, opening with the sentence “a Norfolk police officer will 
not face charges for an incident in which he fatally shot a Newport News man in a 
gunfight during an alleged robbery,” (Holtzclaw 2007). The comments sections found 
below the online versions of the news articles (Roy 2007, Washington 2007b), however, 
provided a mixture of comments related to the shooting and the police in general, with 
the commentary providing a potential secondary source of something akin locker room 
shock for officers that have been involved in a shooting incident (Jones 1989), being 
congratulated by citizens for killing someone and calling the suspect a “thug” and a 
“scumbag.” As Chris noted, when asked about the comments about his shooting that
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appeared in the news media, “I didn't like some of them. I didn't like the majority of 
them. Most were nice but there was a handful o f them that were just — you would think it 
would be nice and you would think I would interpret them as nice but it really didn't sit 
well for me, but that was just my view of it.” One comment that, in future studies, may 
bear more exploration appeared at the end of Washington’s (2007b); it was titled “Chris, 
am proud of you,” and stated “Chris, I was on the other side of the radio that night, right 
there with you. Congrats, C.” This suggests that these critical incidents impact the 
dispatchers who are “on the other side of the radio,” indicating that they, too, may be 
victims of secondary trauma.
In this case, three of the most intriguing articles were written by Washington 
(2007b, 2008b, 2008c), focusing on the impact o f  the shooting on Chris. Due to previous 
interactions with Chris, they knew each other this reporter may have been more attuned 
or inclined to cover the psychological and physiological manifestations o f critical 
incident stress and PTSD. However, one article notes that Scallon had “done everything 
[he could] and he’s still coming,” and that he struggled with killing another individual 
(Washington 2007b). The other two articles detailed the impacts of critical incident 
stress—the weight loss, isolation, and hypervigilence (Washington 2008b); in fact, 
Washington (2008c) states that “Scallon’s unusual testimony dramatizes the personal 
costs for the officers. It is all the more reason to give them respect for the choices they 
are prepared to make on our behalf.” This type o f coverage, humanizing the officer and 
articulating the painful aftermath of the shooting, is not consistent with the typical news 
articles published on officer-involved shootings (see Chapter 3 for details of the 
newspaper content analysis conducted as a preliminary study).
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The way this case has also brought positive publicity to the PD. Chris has been 
able to participate in multiple media enquiries into his shooting incident that were 
approved by the PD. These stories portrayed the PD and Chris favorably in practitioner- 
oriented outlets (such as Scoville 2011), giving only brief mention to Chris’s struggles in 
the aftermath and noting that he has overcome these issues. Indeed, this coverage is 
superficial and is considered “good press” for the police department.
Policy Analyses
In the course of conducting this study, it became apparent that this shooting 
incident and the experiences of the various participants needed to be situated within 
multiple contexts, one of which is current policies of the Police Department and how that 
policy compares to current policy trends. As a component o f the current study, the 
relevant general orders were reviewed; to include a draft proposed general order for the 
CISM team, as well as standard operating procedures (SOPs) for a numerous divisions. 
These reviews were supplemented by meetings with upper management. These policies 
were read for mentions of use of force, particularly officer involved shootings, to 
determine if and where an official protocol for these events was outlined, as well as to 
determine what support services are available and where those services are delineated, for 
the officer who pulls the trigger, for his or her co-workers, and for his or her family.
One of the more informative components to situating these analyses was an 
informal policy education session that was provided by one of the participants in this 
study. The police department is organized into Bureaus (meaning that there is an 
Assistant Chief of Police in charge of that segment of the PD, example: Investigative 
Services), Divisions (meaning that there is a Captain in charge of that segment of the PD,
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example: Vice and Narcotics), Units (meaning that there is a  Lieutenant in charge of that 
segment o f the PD, example: K-9 or Criminal Intelligence), and Squads or Sections 
(meaning that there is a Sergeant in charge of that segment o f the PD, example: a 
particular patrol platoon unit or Homicide). Appendix I depicts the current organizational 
arrangement o f the PD, as presented in the 2012 Annual Report (NPD 2012).
The author was provided a visual diagram of the sources of PD policy and how 
those sources work and interact. A modified copy of that diagram is provided below in 
Figure 3. One of the concerns that arose when compiling data for this portion of the 
analysis was that multiple individuals were unable to locate SOPs for the Personnel and 
Strategic Management Divisions of the PD. According to an anonymous source, this area 
of the PD must have an SOP because it is a Division, meaning that an SOP is required. 
This absence was of further significance because the Personnel Division is where 
information and points of contact to access the wellness programs and services offered to 
personnel should be outlined, as well as how to effectively manage an employee in crisis, 
and the Strategic Management Division is where policies and procedures are housed and 
cataloged. In short, as one anonymous source said in jest, “yeah, not so ‘transparent,’ are 
we?” Another source also suggested that information pertinent to the current study may 
be found in PD Memos and Special Orders, references to these documents were also 
found in the introduction of the Office o f Professional Standards SOP (2013a), but these 
documents are not publicly available and are not indexed by topic. Instead, Memos and 
Special Orders are indexed by year and a manual search of each document must be 
conducted to determine the content and/or topic. A source searched again for the
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“missing” SOPs and for relevant Special Orders and Memos. This source did not find 
any additional materials.
City Policy:
A pplies to A LI. city  
em ployees
Unit Specific SOPs:
Som e specialized units have their
Police Department:
Policies pertaining only to 
employ ees o f  the N PD
Police Officer’s Manual:
Provided in the Academy and 
covers ALL SWORN  
em ployees
General Orders (GOs):
Apply to AI L SW ORN  
personnel; Must be  
approved by the City  
A ttom cv’s O ffice
Memos:
Issued as needed:
H tTective i mtnedi a tely: 
Usually only applies to a 
very limited time frame 
(typically --: 1 month) and 
m ay only apply to 
specific D ivisions, Units. 
Squads or em ployees
Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs): 
Written and updated as 
needed: Must be 
approved by O fficer in 
Charge. Accreditation  
Manager, and C h ief o f  
Police; A pplies only to 
personnel assigned to 
that D ivision
Special Orders (SOs):
Issued as needed: fffce tiv e  
immediately; A pplies to  
AI L SW ORN personnel: 
Some do not have 
expiration, if  there is an 
expiration attached is often  
approximately 12 months; 
General intent is that these 
issues are serious enough  
that they will  be integrated 
into General Orders 
through the official, but 
time intensive, process
own SOPs to outline their duties 
and responsibilities. I his includes 
units such as K-9. SOT, the Bomb  
Squad, etc.
Figure 3: Policy Sources and Specifications for the PD
After reviewing PD policies, an effort was made to situate their policies within a 
larger context and to get a sense of policy trends occurring in a broader scope, to include 
state and national levels, as well as compare the PD’s policies to three other law 
enforcement agencies that graciously provided copies o f their investigative protocols and 
personnel support policies. In terms of situating the PD policies within a broader context, 
they were compared to two national standards—the model policies posted by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (LACP) and the standards for law 
enforcement agencies provided by the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Ipc. (CALEA) (2006)— and at the state level with the standards 
presented in the Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission’s 
(VLEPSC) Accreditation Program Manual (2012). The VLEPSC and CALEA standards 
were chosen because those are the standards most applicable to the PD. As of September 
2012, the PD was re-accredited through VLEPSC (Virginia Law Enforcement 
Professional Standards Commission 2012) and is working towards CALEA accreditation 
(CALEA 2006); in fact, the SOPs from the PD reference which VLEPSC and, in the most 
recently updated SOPs, CALEA standards are reflected within those documents. The 
PD’s VLEPSC accreditation is valid through 2016 (NPD 2012).
LACP Model Policies were included in this analysis because these model polices 
are generally considered to be acceptable practices in law enforcement. With regards to 
the comparison policies, these were achieved through convenience sampling—by simply 
asking colleagues in various jurisdictions to provide copies of their policies and using 
those that were submitted. Luckily, both agencies represent different arrangements, 
policy approaches, and are influenced by contextual variables, such as size, organization
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and type of jurisdiction. Agency A is a very large, urban department from the West 
Coast of the United States of America and Agency B is a medium sized Midwestern 
consolidated jurisdiction that represents multiple smaller townships.
The General Orders listed in Table 8 were reviewed as the first step of the policy 
analysis, followed by the SOPs. As noted in Chapter 2, the General Orders provide 
definitions that were utilized throughout the current study. In terms of the use of force, 
officers may use physical force—the amount of which is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate police function—to effect an arrest, prevent an escape, overcome 
resistance, or to defend themselves or a third party from injury or death (Norfolk 2009b). 
OPR-120 also outlines who is responsible for what portions o f a use o f force 
investigation, when an officer is placed on administrative duties, when medical treatment 
should be provided, notifications that must be made within the command structure, 
guidelines for weapons other than firearms, and when and how investigative documents 
should be retained. Of particular interest in OPR-120 is §III.C(Norfolk 2009b), which 
states that “the commanding officer will refer the officer, as soon as is practical, for 
critical incident debriefing via the department’s designated clinician and, if necessary, 
psychological counseling and/or treatment.” While, superficially, this appears to be in 
line with the other findings o f the current study, the application or reality o f this standard 
is far from ideal. According to the interviews conducted in this study, critical incident 
debriefs are not always provided and, if  one is provided, there is no official psychologist 
contracted with the PD. Thus, this task often falls to clinicians through Community 
Mental Health or the EAP program, who are not always qualified mental health providers 
(QMHP) in accordance with IACP Model Policies (IACP 2012a, LACP 2012b). While
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there is no universal definition o f what exactly cultural competence entails, the IACP 
(2012a) defines a qualified mental health professional (QMHP) as “any individual who is 
licensed as a mental health professional and has an in-depth understanding of the law 
enforcement culture.” Perhaps police departments can also determine if a local mental 
health professional is a member o f the both the APA’s Division 18 (Psychologists in 
Public Service) and Division 56 (Trauma Psychology) as a starting point to find 
culturally competent clinicians.
The EAP is another area o f great interest to the current study, and, as such was 
included in the policy analyses. Additional focus was placed upon the EAP because, in a 
meeting with command staff, it was suggested that there was an EAP in place and this 
should be sufficient for dealing with critical incident stress and PTSD. When asked 
about General Orders or SOPs that outlined EAP services, none could be found. Indeed, 
when asked about support services for families of an officer involved in a critical 
incident, the researcher was referred to the Line o f Duty Death Policy (Norfolk 2009a); 
this is the only mention o f support services for families identified in existing policies.
There is a limited amount of information available at the city level on the EAP 
and mental health services; the EAP is available to all city employees and their 
dependents and employees are referred to a two page brochure on the EAP for additional 
information (n.d.). As advertised in this brochure, the EAP offers assistance with issues 
such as “job stress, depression, marital distress, grief and loss, alcohol/drugs, legal 
concerns, family distress and financial concerns.” This is a broad range of issues that 
may impact any employee in the city, but noticeably absent were mentions of critical 
incident stress services or any culturally competent services for first responders (Best,
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Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011). In fact, 
as detailed through the participant observations above, the City’s EAP appears to be 
lacking the training that is essential to recognizing the unique issues that apply to first 
responders and therefore may not be able to provide optimal care to PD personnel. 
Officers’ lack of confidence in the EAP was reflected in the statements o f participants, 
finding that,
EAP is sort o f  one o f those free services that are offered. As fa r  as the level o f  
expertise that counselors have, I  don't have a lot o f  faith personally in the type o f  
counselors that are offered to us. These are people under contract through Bon 
Secours. It's provided through our medical provider, which is Nowcare and that 
contract continues with our EAP program and these people are under contract. 
They're the low bidders, you know, and they don't necessarily have the type o f  
expertise to deal with police-related problems so it's there. I  think to me it's more 
like family problems, you know, marital problems, things like that, maybe 
substance abuse possibly, but as fa r  as any type o f  law enforcement related 
trauma, I  ju st don't think so...
The City also provides a handbook on employee wellness available to city 
personnel, but its predominant focus on physical wellness and the prevention of chronic 
illness; there is a brief section on meditation (Carter and Vogel n.d.). CALEA, in 
standard 22.2.6, states that minimally an EAP for a police agency must include: a written 
directive describing program services; procedures for obtaining said services; 
confidential, appropriate and timely problem assessment services; referrals for 
appropriate diagnosis, treatment and follow-up; written procedures and guidelines for 
referral to and/or mandatory participation; and training for supervisory personnel. As 
such, the current minimal documentation, combined with the “take a Benadryl and come 
back later” mentality and lack of training for supervisors, suggests that the EAP program 
in place is likely not sufficient to meet CALEA standards and may not be able to provide
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optimal service for the first responders in the city. In fact, another participant in the
current study discussed the EAP in the city, noting that:
The City itself, the City... itself has what is called an employee assistance 
program, an EAP. EAP is thought o f  as the source o f  mental health counseling 
fo r  people with issues. Unfortunately what EAP really is, is it is a triage and I  
use that term very generously. It's a triage for officers where an officer says, I'm 
having an issue with this, and they say, Okay, well, you should probably call 
somebody or if you're having trouble sleeping maybe you should take some 
Benadryl before you go to bed at night and get some rest because that's what you 
need to sleep. You're right. What the guy does need is sleep, but he doesn't need 
to take Benadryl, and i f  that’s the best advice you have, maybe we should 
probably consider sending this kid somewhere else. That's not the fault o f  the 
people in EAP. The people that answer the phones, the people that these officers 
come in to, i f  they haven't been police officers they don't really know a lot o f  the 
stu ff this guy is going through or this lady is going through.
It is the responsibility o f  the City to know that. It is the responsibility o f  the 
government, the municipal government to understand that, Hey, we work in a city 
that is violent... So I  understand no city wants to recognize that it has a higher 
crime rate than other cities. That's not something anybody wants to talk about, 
but it is there and it needs to be handled and is it not better to get out in front o f  it 
and say, This is what we're doing to be proactive. Yeah, we recognize and we 
accept that we have these challenges but pu t a spin on it, do something with it but 
don't leave the officers hanging out there because you say, Well, we don't have a 
gang problem. We don't have a drug problem. We don't have this problem...
You know, that's the reality that we deal with. And the City is not privy to that. 
They don't have that understanding but they have their employees who do.
So that consideration needs to be given that, you know, this is — I'm ju st talking 
from the police officer. I'm sure we've got paramedics out here, you go down to 
Station 2, that's called the gut bucket for a  reason. Okay? You've got 
Huntersville, Park Place, all the, you know, NRHA parks over there that they 
respond to, gunshots, stabbings, domestic.
While the EAP alone is not sufficient, the development of a CISM team that can 
funnel personnel to EAP as needed is a positive step. Literature on the topic suggests that 
EAPs may be losing their stigma within law enforcement agencies (Albrecht 2011), but a 
hybrid model involving an internal peer support team and an external EAP seems to be a 
more promising avenue for law enforcement (Goldstein 2006, Huguley 2000). In a 
hybrid model, peer support functions as the first response and triage, involving the
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external EAP when professional help or other external assistance is required. It should be
noted that, although positive, the CISM team at the PD is still in its infancy, as evidenced
by the fact that this research references a draft General Order. Several of the participants
in the current study also discussed the CISM team during their interviews, making the
following comments:
CISM is nothing more than a name given to an untrained group o f  individuals 
who've expressed the intent to be available in the event somebody wants to talk. 
It's not proactive. It doesn't gauge anything other than the only qualifying 
standard is that you have been involved in a critical incident, whether you're 
healthy afterwards, according to their unwritten standard, i f  you're involved in a 
critical incident today, you are automatically a member o f the team and 
available... i f  you were to really say who's involved in it, there's maybe three or 
four people... Three or four people consistently talking to these individuals.
There's people on the CISM team. They don't even know they're on the CISM  
team but there was some training that they gave it and then everybody was there 
and it's really — it's not formal and it needs to be.
A. Well, we have a loosely organized group o f  people that participate in that
but there is no formal structure. I  know I've been to individual CISM  
training and that was probably 2005.
Q. So you feel it can be improved?
A. It can 7 go anywhere but up.
Q. Okay.
A. I'll tell you this, i f  it wasn't fo r  Chris Scallon and now by slight extension, I
do mean slight extension, me, but more Chris who has taken the lead on 
that, there isn’t a CISM.
I  think after hearing how they kind o f dropped the ball on [our] shooting, 
they attempted to put a team together with officers that had been involved in 
critical incidents and we were receiving some training. I  thought it was going 
pretty well. You know, I  don't really know what happened to it. It kind o f  fell 
apart, but I  know I  was — you know, I  was on the team and I  was really inspired 
but that and I  know every since, every chance I  got I  would go out to speak to 
officers
... we've gone as fa r  with our program as we can take it and I've got to tell you, I  
don't feel that right now we're in a position where we'd be capable o f dealing with 
a large scale traumatic situation like a police officer killed in a line o f duty... We 
would do our best, but I  wish we had better training, more exposure to the types
335
o f things that we need to do... It's more than just counseling with one individual or 
a group o f  individuals. It may take the form  o f a lot o f  different times o f  
intervention-type sessions where you're dealing with different people who have 
different relationships. You might have an officer killed and the officer that 
usually works that district car had taken o ff that night and stayed home and then 
comes back the next day andfeels guilty because he feels i f  I  had been here last 
night, this wouldn't have happened. It can go in a lot o f different directions and I  
just fee l like we need more intense training in that type o f situation.
To date, there is no officially recognized CISM team operating within the PD, as 
is clearly articulated by multiple participants above; the reality is that a small number of 
officers who have been through a critical incident of their own that have received 
minimal to no training volunteer to assist other officers in crisis and the PD does not 
appear to have a psychologist and/or psychiatrist on retainer, culturally competent or not. 
As this is a draft General Order, and not current policy, further analysis is not possible at 
this time.
In reviewing the General Orders and SOPs, it was determined that, with the 
exception o f General Order OPR-410: Deadly Force Incidents (Norfolk 2009c), most of 
the written policies treat the topic of officer-involved shootings in a cursory fashion. 
Other than noting when it is appropriate to use a firearm (Norfolk 2009b, Norfolk 2009d) 
and that an officer will need to explain and/or justify his or her decisions before the 
Firearms Review Panel (Norfolk 2009d), most SOPs identify general command 
responsibilities and notification chains (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2013a). The 
Forensics Unit SOP (found as an Appendix in the Detective Division SOP) provides 
more specific instructions related to collecting weapons, scene rechecks during daylight 
hours, and completion of scene diagrams (2012c).
OPR-410, however, outlines how deadly force incidents should be handled. This 
General Order includes policies such as providing a companion officer to the officer 
involved in the shooting until Homicide Supervisors arrive on scene, mandatory drug and 
alcohol screenings of involved officers, and how to notify the family of an officer injured 
or killed in a shooting incident. The investigative steps provided are rather generic, but 
this is reflective of the phrase utilized by command staff on numerous occasions: an 
officer-involved shooting is just like any other shooting or homicide investigation and the 
officer is treated similarly to any other suspect. One interesting point found in OPR-410 
was that, in §X.A.2.c, it indicates that an officer must complete a critical incident debrief 
before being returned to full duty (Norfolk 2009c). While this is likely a change from 
when Chris, as well as several other participants in the current study, was involved in a 
shooting, there is no description provided regarding how this debrief will be completed, 
what constitutes successful completion, who conducts the debrief, etc. This is 
particularly troubling as there is specialized training involved in conducting a critical 
incident debrief and also speaks again to potential issues related to cultural competency 
(Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011).
The IACP has a model policy for Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations (IACP 
1998), suggesting that best practice involves recognizing that these incidents are not like 
every other shooting or homicide and that officers are not like every other suspect. 
Additionally, the IACP clearly details not only investigative steps, mentions post­
shooting trauma more than once, providing a companion officer to both the officer 
involved and second companion officer to his or her family and also advises that the 
officer’s gun be taken discretely and arrangements should be made to provide another
337
firearm to the officer (IACP 1998). This model policy was effective as of November 
1998, which means that these practice guidelines are not new or extremely progressive 
and, as such, it is highlights the ongoing and persistent nature of this issue in modem 
policing, since it is still being discussed almost 16 years later. The PD does mention 
providing the officer a companion officer until the Homicide Supervisors arrive and 
mandating critical incident debriefs, but beyond that the existing policy appears to be 
unclear and in need of review. In January 2012, the current IACP Model Policy on Post- 
Shooting Personnel Support became effective, outlining best practices for addressing the 
professional and psychological needs of officers involved in a shooting incident (IACP 
2012a). This policy, rather than just stating that a debrief must occur, outlines the roles 
of the peer support or CISM team, the investigative team and qualified mental health 
professionals in this process, from simply explaining what will happen to the officer 
following the incident to the services provided by CISM team members acting as 
companion officers to the officer and their family. VLEPSC (Virginia Law Enforcement 
Professional Standards Commission 2012), in Standard ADM.05.03, also mentions 
debriefing and counseling, although, like the PD, this process is not articulated or 
defined, but VLEPSC does acknowledge that the officer’s family may also need to be 
included in the debrief or counseling process.
This model policy also reflects the delayed manifestation of some adverse 
psychological symptoms (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011) and advocates regular 
training on post-trauma reactions and behaviors, and their recognition, to both officers 
and supervisors (IACP 2012a). The wording of this model policy suggests that a single 
four hour block of stress and survivability training is not sufficient to prepare officers.
Supervisors not only need to be able to recognize and address stress-related symptoms in 
their subordinates, but they are also “responsible for making available to their unit 
members information about the agency’s peer support, chaplains, and mental health 
services” (IACP 2012a). This is similar to CALEA’s commentary on Standard 1.3.8, 
which discusses personnel and family support, as well as training, as well as Standards 
22.2.3, 22.2.4, and 22.2.6, as well as related commentary (CALEA 2006). These 
standards document that require written descriptions o f benefits and support services be 
available to personnel in a variety of circumstances, particularly those who are injured, 
those who are killed in the line of duty and those who need to access the EAP. As noted 
above, written explanations of the services available to the men and women of the PD 
appear to be missing, incomplete or vague. As such, this suggests that the agency fails to 
meet both the CALEA standards and best practice as outlined by the IACP.
In terms of comparing the PD to Agencies A and B, Agency B also fails to 
consider and/or mention post-shooting trauma and makes statements, such as “law 
enforcement employees have the same rights and privileges as citizens, including the 
right to consult with legal counsel prior to the interview and the right to have their lawyer 
present during the interview.” This suggests that this agency also adopts a “same as 
every other shooting or homicide” approach to officer-involved shootings. This is a 
double-edged sword, in that the agency cannot show favoritism, and therefore must treat 
an officer-involved shooting as they would any other shooting, but due to the potential 
costs associated with these incidents, they must find the delicate balance between legal 
obligations and serving the community at large, and caring for an officer that has 
experienced a critical incident. Agency B differs from the PD in providing a very
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detailed protocol of how the investigation must proceed and what steps must be followed.
This level of detail may, however, be an artifact o f the agency being a consolidation of
multiple smaller jurisdictions.
Agency A did not provide guidelines for the investigation of an officer-involved
shooting, but did provide documents and General Orders related to their Behavioral
Science Unit (BSU). This agency, according to the programs and resources outlined in
the BSU, has an EAP, a Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT), a Peer Support
Program, a Catastrophic Illness Program, a Psychological Professional Group of
Clinicians (Police Specialty Providers), Confidential Mental Health Counseling, a Stress
Unit (dealing with alcohol and chemical dependency) and Police Chaplains. In
particular, their CIRT team is available 24 hours and can provide “debriefing for officers,
dispatchers, family members and others as appropriate.” All Peer Support Team
members have been through at least 24 hours of training and are able to utilize active
listening, problem solving, assessment and can refer officers to other resources. This
agency also maintains a list of QMHP, licensed therapists and mental health professionals
that this agency has vetted to be culturally competent. This issue of cultural competence
also arose in the interviews conducted in the current study, with multiple participants
citing the need for mental health professionals that “understand” police officers in
various, but similar ways:
For seeking help? I  think it's important that not only within the first couple days 
you be offered the opportunity to speak to somebody, it's got to be the right 
person. It's got to be something that is not going out o f your way. I  had to drive 
to [another jurisdiction], living in [a city] — or actually living in... I  had to drive 
to Virginia Beach. There was nobody closer that could have talked to me. I  think 
proximity to it, I  mean, maybe finding somebody, maybe determining whether or 
not I  have already seen somebody who I  would fee l comfortable with or who 
somebody else has experienced something with. For me, anybody that I  come in
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contact with that's been involved in any kind o f  shooting or any type o f  situation 
where police-related, police-significant I'd  send to [a specific psychologist] and I  
only do that because 1 know how effective he was and I  only trusted him on a 
couple different levels because [another officer] went, I  was friends with [that 
officer], and i f  he would go and he trusted him and he hadfaith in him, then I  had 
all the faith in him. So I  think it's got to be peer recommended. I  don't think it's 
ju st some arbitrary person. I  think they really need to be vetted. And rather than 
ju st saying, Hey, we need a psychologist, boom, well, insert psychologist, I  think 
there needs to be a process o f  selection and I  think there needs to be fo r  the 
liability reasons, just effectiveness, the department needs to look into or assign 
somebody with a vested interest, not somebody that says we need to make this 
happen and it can't be at the level o f  captain and above. It needs to be lower 
because it needs to be more frontline-oriented.
To know officers before one walks through that door, to have somebody that's 
willing to come into our culture and to be competent to a certain degree before 
treating. Now, there's nothing to say they can't effectively treat somebody without 
having any understanding o f it, but just the mental issue but we're a culture that is 
inherently distressful. So I  think i f  there's somebody that's able to talk to 
somebody, that I'd say, hey, this guy has talked to cops before and not in a bad 
way like, hey, anybody talks to him, they wind up fucking leaving, there's got to be 
that and it's got to be put out there, who it is.
A. ... Some people need it and some people don't. Some people it works good 
for. It wouldn't work goodfor me.
Q. Okay.
A. Because there’s no amount o f books. You could tell me everything the
book says, but unless you're out there and seen what I've seen and done 
what I've done, you know, I  mean I'm obviously going to, you know, say 
your opinion. It's relevant; however, for me, I  don't think it should be 
mandatory.
Q. Okay. So what would you say because like you know the textbooks don't
tell you everything. There are several clinicians, not a lot in this area, 
who are former police officers who did go and get advanced degreed so 
that they can be —
A. Well, then they — I  would say they would be at the top o f  the list to go see,
and i f  I fe lt like I  needed to go see somebody, I  definitely would want to go 
see somebody that would be able to relate on a personal level the things, 
you know, that I'm trying to convey.
...to specialize in public safety because the level o f  credibility ju st isn't there for  
people that haven't done it. Now, i f  you come from a cop family, you've been 
around cops all your life, you have been a cop, you ’re married to a cop, you 
know, you're involved. But, you know, i f  you are one and you're sitting across
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from  someone who is involved in a situation and they're having issues you can say 
with a straight face, I  know where you've been. I've been there. I've done it. That 
lends itself that seme o f  creditability and I  just don’t think there's enough people 
out there that understand that police officers are expected to uphold each 
semblance o f  order and security that people think they can come up with in their 
mind.
Agency A ’s Stress Unit not only provides counseling on substance abuse, but 
assists with treatment and recovery, to include a 28-day residential recovery program and 
AA meetings. In the General Order related to the Peer Support Team, Agency A is very 
clear that this group of trained volunteers is a preventative resource, meant to assist 
fellow officers with any issues before they grow into something larger.
The CIRT, as outlined in a relevant General Order, will respond to any incident 
where a citizen dies during a police incident and it is mandatory that all affected 
personnel participate in the debriefing by a qualified professional that must occur within 
24-72 hours of the incident and all affected personnel will be provided information 
regarding reactions to critical incidents and the resources available to them. Agency A 
also states that “CIRT should be notified when it is determined that an incident may 
adversely impact the psychological well-beling of the member or members involved. 
Members include first responders as well as back-up units and Communications 
personnel working the channel at the time of the incident.” Finally, while police recruits 
in the academy, Agency A provides all personnel with a laminated card that says “You 
have just been involved in an officer involved shooting.” This card outlines what will 
happen in the next few hours and days—administratively, psychologically and 
physiologically—for the officer. The back of the card provides the relevant contact 
information, including the BSU contact information, and provides common stress
reactions. The card also informs personnel that the BSU will be contacting them 
periodically throughout the next year to perform follow up care. As can be seen, Agency 
A’s approach to officer survivability and wellness is vastly different to those evidenced 
by the PD and Agency B. This agency was not included to show how policy and 
procedure should look, as this is an extremely progressive jurisdiction and the same 
response cannot be expected in all agencies, but to show the range of responses to these 
issues that have been developed. The PD is not alone in being slow to change policy to 
address issues of officer survivability and resilience, as evidenced by Agency B’s 
policies, yet given the IACP Model Policies, CALEA and VLESPC accreditation 
standards, and policy examples from Agency A, there are many alterations that could be 
made to existing policies to better address these incidents and issues.
In addition to the policy issues addressed above, a very interesting fact came to 
light during this analysis: in spite o f claims that data on police shootings does not exist 
(see Chapter 3, page 24): officers are required to complete a Special Incident Report (PD 
539 Form) for a variety o f situations, to include use of force incidents and discharge of a 
firearm, and copies will be retained by multiple commands and will be help for at least 
three years until purging of records may be considered(2009b). When a firearm is 
discharged, a Firearm Use Report (PD 529 Form) must also be completed (2009b). Use 
of force reports, discharge of firearms, discharge o f firearms that resulted in injury, and 
discharge of firearms that resulted in death are all outlined as incidents that would be 
entered into the Office of Professional Standards’ (OoPS, or Internal Affairs) Records 
Management Software (RMS) (2013a). Further, the OoPS SOP also outlines that hard 
copies of Special Incident Reports must be filed alphabetically by officer name and
chronologically by date when multiple incidents exist (2013a). Given these provisions, it 
is unlikely that statistics on use of force and officer-involved shootings do not exist. 
Indeed, given the specifications that non-injurious, injurious and fatal discharges of 
firearms be entered into the OoPS RMS, it is possible that PD could provide data that 
would align with the analysis called for by Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al (2009), and White 
(2006). Additionally, CALEA (§52.1.5) (2006) mandates that police agencies should 
compile annual statistical summaries that are drawn from the records o f internal affairs 
investigations and that these reports should be available to agency personnel and the 
public. This annual report could be merged with the overall annual report required by 
VLEPSC (§ADM.20.02) (2012), a standard with which the PD already complies (NPD 
2012).
Conclusion
This chapter provides an analytical approach to the data related to the current 
study, mostly with the exception of the interview data addressed in chapter six. These 
analyses address multiple components of this research, to include reflexivity and 
positionality, academic versus practical sources o f information, how officer-involved 
shootings are portrayed in the media (and how this case was atypical in that aspect) and 
how policy and practice are related to officer survivability and resilience. This last 
section of analysis in particular places the case at the heart o f this study in a larger 
context, exploring best practice and accreditation standards, as well as showing policy 
variations from other jurisdictions. This chapter provides a platform for numerous future 
studies, looking at comparative analyses that highlight issues germane to many police
Another interesting aspect revealed in the analyses in the current chapter are two 
findings that do not appear in the literature. The first is this issue of near traumas and the 
impact they have on officers. This could be significant because, if these incidents do 
have a marked impact on the officer, then these may function similarly towards previous 
exposure to or experience of trauma and may contribute to later development of PTSD, 
should the officer be involved in a critical incident. The second key finding is that, as 
discussed in the policy analysis and as mentioned previously in this study, cultural 
competency may play a strong role in the ability o f trained professionals to relate to and 
treat officers who have been involved in a critical incident. However, cultural 
competency appears to extend beyond QMHPs, and may also apply equally to 
researchers. The participant observations, documented above, provided insight that could 
not have been gained in a classroom or from a textbook. Not only was the researcher 
able to see and experience situations from a perspective similar to those of the officers 
involved in the study, she was able to explore topics or ideas that were raised that are 
either not presented frequently or at all in the extant literature. Further, due to those 
participant observations, entree was granted and rapport with interviewees was 
strengthened. This is suggested by one participant statement, although this does not 
identify the researcher as culturally competent:
Q. Okay. How do you feel about participating in this research?
A. I  don’t mind. Chris asked me to do it.
Q. I f  Chris hadn't said anything would you have been like, No, I'm not going
to talk to you?
A. I  might have talked to you, just because I  know, you know, who your
family is... And I ’ve seen you around. I f  I  didn't know you I  wouldn't never 
talk to you.
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This indicates that the officers themselves, possibly latently or overtly, recognize the 
need for cultural competence or that, at the very least, the absence or presence of this trait 
in the researcher may impact a given study’s access and outcome. In all, the analyses in 
the current study provided a more complete understanding of the varying dynamics 
involved in studying such complex incidents, as well as provided several avenues for 
potential future studies. Although it is a long excerpt, one participant identified not only 
why researchers need to be culturally competent, but why academics and practitioners 
need to collaborate upon the topics similar to those addressed in the current study:
Q. Has anything about this research process surprised you?
A. How far removed the academic is from the practical aspect o f  it. It
literally is so far removed. I  envisioned a mad scientist with a magnifying 
glass looking at little people, you know what I  mean, and be like, Oh, he's 
doing that because o f  this, you know, and there was no — I  can study 
behavior all day long but there's — you're removed when you haven't 
experienced. I'm not saying you have to be in a shooting but you have to 
understand the culture that it's in and you can read all the books in the 
world you want, but unless you know what it's like to be next to somebody 
or to know somebody who puts their life on the line, you have no idea. 
You're losing that aspect o f  it, that legitimacy o f it. And I  think especially 
coming to some o f these places andjust seeing how obtuse these people 
are is just fucking phenomenal. I  never realized how very educated and 
smart. You can't take that away from them, the learned people they are, 
but they're fucking retarded when it comes to the fucking everyday things 
and I  think they really do at times look down their nose and it shows and it 
comes across that way. Some have a genuine concern and some have a 
genuine, you know, drive to, you know, understand it and some are just 
associated with it so they know but some are just fucking out there.
Q. Have you learned anything?
A. You know, just the research and how people respond and more identifying
than normal reactions to adverse situations and it's kind o f  I  used any way 
I  fe lt and what I  went through and kind o f  like, yeah, I  get that difference 
between someone telling you that, hey, you're going to fee l nauseous after 
a shooting and actually, yeah, I  remember feeling nauseous as opposed to 
just reliving it...
Q. So do you see academic and practitioner collaborations as a venue for
progress?
A. It's the only way ...Literally you have to have a combination. You have to
have the right combination. At certain times you need to be academic
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more than the practical and certain times you need the practitioners or the 
subjects more than the academics, sometimes, but it's that balance. When 
you go to present something, it has to be academic and it has to be — you 
know, it has to be presented in a way that will be received and respected, 
but at the same time, you can dress up a turd all day long and it's still a 
dressed up turd. That's why you need the genuine — you need the people 
that have experienced it to bolster the academics, so it’s hand in hand.
One can't — academics shouldn’t be just as successful as the practical stuff 
does or the practical people can, but together it’s like a synergy that will 
blow through the roof.
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Introduction: Reaching the end to discover the beginning?
The current study began as an effort to answer two basic questions related to the 
discussion of officer-involved shootings: the first is how do these incidents impact the 
multiple parties involved, and the second is what are we missing and what are we not 
discussing in the literature that might contribute to explanations of why officers are 
leaving this profession after an incident that is often given a positive connotation among 
peers. The answer to these questions was less simplistic. In short, there are small 
pockets of the literature that address portions of the question at hand, but there is little 
that takes a holistic view of the shooting incident and considers all o f the parties impacted 
when there is an officer-involved shooting. What are we missing? The missing 
component is two-fold: there are those impacted by secondary or tertiary trauma that are 
frequently overlooked in the literature, particularly those investigating these cases, and 
the other missing piece is the interconnected nature of the facets impacting officer 
survivability and resilience post critical incident. What this means is that, for example, 
while the literature may reference the police culture or machismo, too often those 
references are mutually exclusive, failing to identify and explore the conditioning link 
between the two areas of inquiry. Table 9, below, depicts how the pre-event, event and 
post-event factors are related, although there are thematic influences, particularly those of 
stigma, impression management and coping mechanisms, that influence each of these 
facets.
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Table 9: Summary o f  Pre-Event, Event, and Post-Event Factors in Current Case Study
Pre-Event Factors Event Factors Post-Event Factors
•  Personal stressors • O ff duty— Unexpected • Critical Incident Stress 
symptoms
•  Investment in police • Length o f  the event— • Interpersonal difficulties
culture and image atypical
•  Established coping • Perceptual • Personality/demeanor
mechanisms— Alcohol Distortions— visual, changes
and Avoidance auditory and time
•  Experience o f Trauma • Dissociation • Lack o f  available
and Violence (Child and resources
adult, completed and
near)
• Differences between • PTSD symptoms
reality and expectations • Impression management
• Impact o f  investigative and stigma
process •
•
•
Poor coping mechanisms 
Seeking help 
Post-traumatic 
growth/resilience
Further, the researcher did not find previous work on this topic that addressed the 
role Goffinan’s (1959,1963) concepts of impression management and stigma. Utilizing 
this theoretical lens to explore the emergent themes—from multiple perspectives— in the 
current study allowed for the flexibility to examine how larger cultural gender 
stereotypes, particularly those related to hegemonic masculinity, are embedded and often 
times exaggerated within the police culture. As a result o f these facets, combined with 
poor or inadequate coping mechanisms, officers experiencing the symptoms of critical 
incident stress or post-traumatic stress may fear being perceived as weak or “feminine,” 
and thus preemptively try to manage impressions, and do not seek help, to avoid the 
negative stigma such behaviors and actions would gamer. The current study provided the 
opportunity to explore these interactions, as well as policy and news media, as they are 
perceived by the officer who used his firearm (the typical focus of this genre of research), 
as well as his spouse, his partner at work, his co-workers and friends, command
personnel and homicide supervisors that run these investigations. This multifaceted 
approach permitted reflexivity and theoretical consideration to determine what was 
consistent with the extant literature, what emergent ideas were divergent or missing from 
the literature, as well as which views were similar across participants and where there 
were differences of opinion. Additionally, the current study uncovered two topics that 
were not discussed in the literature at all: the role of near trauma and the perceived need 
for cultural competency in researchers and others seeking to explore this issue. This idea 
of cultural competence was particularly surprising as it emerged, as it impacts 
researchers, clinicians, the EAP, supervisors and a host o f others who may be called upon 
to interact with officers involved in or others traumatized by an officer-involved 
shooting. The concept of near-trauma also was unexpected, but also quite salient to the 
current topic, especially when considered in conjunction with the experience of 
cumulative trauma, critical incident stress and the certainty that officers will experience 
trauma on the job, all of which can and often do combine to create a toxic level of stress.
The introduction to this final chapter is titled “reaching the end to find the 
beginning” because there were many more questions raised as this study unfolded. The 
answer to those questions, often involving further exploration of how trauma impacts 
people in various roles and relationships, what policy solutions should be considered and 
how to achieve best practice, and so on, were considered, but were not the central focus 
of the current study and were not answered to their fullest extent. So, in brief, by 
addressing the two questions at the heart of the current study, a host of other tangential 
questions were raised, leading to a beginning of sort by calling attention to the paucity of 
literature that combines multiple perspectives and the mutually conditioning relationships
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that influence coping, survivability and resilience. As we seek to answer these questions, 
there are very real policy questions that may be answered and better policies— ones that 
balance the needs of the community, the police agency and the officer that may also 
address prevention and fiscal concerns—may be developed.
Pulling It All Together
By using a case study methodology, complemented by elements o f feminist 
research methodology and epistemology, the current study enabled the amalgamation of 
numerous strands of the literature to inform the research process and additionally allowed 
for various analyses of differing types of data sources. There are elements o f various 
disciplines represented in the current study, to include criminal justice, criminology, 
sociology, and psychology. This interdisciplinary approach was a strength of the current 
study. This approach allowed the researcher to identify and discuss the varying 
constellations of symptoms of critical incident stress and PTSD (Jones 1989, Kirschman 
2007)(as seen in Table 2) in a thick and rich description that not only detailed the 
psychological symptoms, but how those symptoms made the officer and those around 
him feel and react, thus integrating the interactionist tradition from which Goffman 
hailed. This is also a departure from much of the literature, save select examples, such as 
that seen in Klinger’s (2004) work, in that these experiences were not catalogued and 
reported in detached, clinical terms, but were presented in the participants’ own words. 
These words have an emotive power that facilitates understanding, both as an academic, 
but also in the establishment of a human-to-human connection with the reader that does 
not rely on familiarity with the literature. This connection is important, not only so that 
the reader is exposed to the rich description and reality o f what the experience entails, but
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also because, in terms of arguing that there is a clear need to address officer-involved 
shootings and their after effects more comprehensively, likely starting with policy change 
and implementation, these connections allow even a lay person to become aware of 
problems with the current approach and mechanisms in place.
These interactions were also conditioned by peer group expectations, social 
expectations, and occupational expectations that do not easily permit the expression of 
“weak” or softer emotions, leading to both the exploration of the concepts of impression 
management (Goffman 1959) and stigma (Goffman 1963) and the impact that the agency 
administration and policy has on these types of incidents. As suggested by Malmin 
(2012), the administration and the policies they craflrand enact may be the key to 
beginning to diminish the stigma associated with mental health concerns in the police 
culture. Further, there are many people who fall outside of not only the practices of the 
PD, but also outside of the best practice models with regards to stress and its impacts. To 
state it simply, the literature and the participants in the current study agree that there is 
ample evidence that the police culture needs to change because the negative 
psychological and physiological impacts of adhereing to these cultural standards and 
maintaining this requisite image are doing a great amount of harm— in many cases 
unnecessarily—to our officers. Police suicide, as well as other self-destructive coping 
mechanisms, are beginning to gain more attention (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, 
Kirschman 2012a, Kirschman 2012b, Rutledge and Sewell 2012, Territo and Sewell 
2013), but the sweeping culture shift necessary to significantly mitigate or ameliorate 
these issues appears to still be quite far off.
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Policy Recommendations
While there was a policy analysis component of the current study, the aim was not 
to develop a holistic best practice model, as there are still many unanswered questions to 
be explored before that point may be reached. However, the current study did contain 
two components that allow the researcher to provide preliminary policy 
recommendations. First, the researcher discussed with each participant how they feel the 
PD responds to officer-involved shootings and how they felt this response or process 
might be improved. The second component involved the researcher becoming quite 
familiar with what other agencies (at federal, state and municipal levels) are doing in 
terms of training and policy modifications in this area, partially due to requests to provide 
more information on these opportunities to various personnel from the PD and partially 
due to participation in opportunities that were presented throughout the research process 
(to include attending WCPR, meeting and discussing this topic with personnel from the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), etc.)
Participant Policy Suggestions
Most participants indicated that they believed that the PD handles these incidents 
poorly and that there are not adequate policies in place. Some of these sentiments are 
supported in the policy analysis section found in chapter seven. However, while it is 
acknowledged that there were reported deficiencies in the existing policies, this is not 
meant to be a sweeping incrimination of the agency and administration. It is hoped that 
these suggestions, as several participants articulated, are seen as an impetus for positive 
growth and development and a move away from the traditional “but we have always done
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it that way” mentality. The most favorable assessment of the current policies in place, 
stated in terms of how the department handles these incidents, is provided below.
Q. So in terms o f  how the department as a whole handles these incidents, how 
would you rate them, how would you grade the department?
A. As a whole?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Well, I'd give the department a 70 or 75 in that they're concerned about
these things. They put it into the hands o f  people that I  think they have
faith in, comfortable that matters are being handled, but we're still sort o f  
subject to budgetary constraints as far as the additional training resources 
that we need to do this.
With regards to policy suggestions, the participants provided a variety of 
responses. Many of these responses related to the services available and training for 
various personnel in the department. In terms of services available, participants indicated 
they would like to see increased family support available—to possibly include counseling 
for significant others and children, the provision of a liaison or companion officer/spouse, 
establishing a spouse support network ideally headed by the chief or one of the assistant 
chiefs wives, and establishing a spouse academy to discuss the common issues that are 
problematic (finances and part-time, becoming cynical, communication, stress, trauma, 
etc); providing a liaison or some form of guidance for the workers’ compensation 
process; and providing better access to qualified mental health professionals—to include 
having a psychologist and/or psychiatrist on retainer. Various training opportunities were 
suggested by participants as potential mechanisms for improving response. Many 
participants suggested training supervisors about critical incident stress and PTSD so that 
they can recognize the symptoms, if present, in their personnel and make an appropriate 
intervention. Other participants suggested generalized training for all officers in the hope 
of developing a “see something, say something” mentality. Yet other participants felt
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that the CISM team desperately needs more organization and that each team member 
needs to go through a formalized training program. One participant suggested that the 
homicide supervisors and investigators, specifically, need to be trained in critical incident 
stress and the spectrum of behaviors that can indicate an individual has been traumatized. 
This training, in particular, would facilitate acknowledgement that the interview may 
have issues due to shock or other mental health concerns, as well as increase compassion 
when interacting with fellow law enforcement officers who have been through a shooting 
incident.
Participants also suggested altering existing investigative and administrative
policies related to how these investigations are handled by the PD. One participant
acknowledged that formulating policy in this area is difficult, not impossible, noting that
policy evaluation and refinement is needed:
...My point was always what we need to do is have a real discussion about are we 
doing things the right way that provide a balance because I  do understand the 
agency has an obligation to protect itself and there's a liability issue with the 
government, with the City. I  understand that. Where do we strike a balance 
between the rights o f the officer, the rights o f anybody that's involved in some type 
o f deadly force incident and, you know, the liability and protection issues that the 
City and the agency need? Where do we find  that crossroad and then let's write a 
protocol. Let's write a standard operating procedure that supports that protocol 
conceptually, not just specific events. It's got to be — because none o f these 
situations are the same except that somebody fired  a gun.
Some of the suggested changes involve drafting and implementing an official 
CISM SOP, as well as an SOP developed specifically for officer-involved shooting 
incidents. One participant suggested that, in terms of prevention and being financially 
responsible, the implementation of an early warning system to identify problematic 
behavior and intervene may be an optimal solution. While participants could not agree
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on how long the officer needs to be at home following the shooting incident, participants 
were universal in their agreement that three days was not sufficient time to begin to 
“come down” and process the shooting before returning to work, even to modified or 
administrative duties. The SOPs available suggest that a critical incident debrief is 
required for the officers involved in a shooting incident; one participant suggested that 
the debrief process be expanded or that a separate debrief be mandated for the 
investigative team.
There were two points of contention in the policy suggestions where there was
polarity of participant responses observed: whether or not to delay the full interview with
the officer who fired their weapon and whether or not mandatory individual psychiatric
evaluations should be required after a shooting incident. Several felt that mandating a
counseling session would remove the stigma and one participant suggested mandating
more than one session so that symptoms that develop later can be addressed. But there
were two participants who feel that, while the option for counseling should be available,
it should not be forced upon the officer. There were several participants who felt that
intensive interviews with officers (note that this does not preclude conducting a walk
through or giving a brief statement on scene to investigators) should be delayed at least
24 to 72 hours to allow the initial physiological symptoms to dissipate and for the officer
to begin to process what he or she experienced. Some of the commentary related to these
suggestions is provided below:
... That's how they do it. They don't listen to nobody. I  understand you saying we 
don't give a murder suspect, but this murder suspect you will hope kill somebody 
without cause. A police officer hopefully would not kill somebody without cause. 
So because he had to do something, give him a cool down time, let him talk to a 
counselor, get his thoughts together so when he say something you all 
can't — because the biggest thing is that when LAD come, they're going to hem
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him up fo r  no reason and try to hammer him and that's a big fear fo r  somebody 
who just went through something like that. They do need a cool down time.
... Not at all, you know, like I  said, the studies have shown three days, you've got 
to give three days to give that officer time to, you know, realize what's 
happened... You know, time to, you know, go over the scenario in his head so 
when he does give that statement it's a correct statement with as much as he can 
remember because putting that guy in the office, trying to get his statement shortly 
after it happened, this guy has been traumatized and it's so much he's trying to, 
you know, figure out, you know, and take in everything that's happened. You have 
to give him that time to, you know, think about it. Let him calm down so he does 
give the accurate statement because you don't want your statement that you give, 
it doesn't match the forensic evidence and then it looks like you're lying when, in 
fact, the guy could not be lying. He just doesn't remember a lot o f  things that 
happened. I  know they kept asking me, How many times did you fire? All I  could 
say was this was months after it happened and I  still don't — in my mind I  said 
two, is what I  gave him and I  think it was like four or five times that I  shot. I  don't 
remember that.
I  believe that — the decompression time you have to have. I  know there's a 
(inaudible) policy and I  know there's certain policies that indicate that's good. I  
have not read those policies. I  will tell you that i f  you would have given me the 
time to collect my thoughts, it would have saved me a lot o f grief and I  would have 
probably been a little bit better at how I  was able to express it. I  did my interview 
almost six hours after the incident, maybe four, between four and six hours. That 
is just when you're realizing all the shitty part o f it. You're really realizing, Oh, 
shit. That needs to pass. That needs to come down. Now, I  understand the need 
to kind o f walk through everything, but to be quite honest, i f  I  went in there and 
said this is when we're going to do a walkthrough, I  want my attorney. I'm 
entitled to it. I  think it would scare them to death. They wouldn't know what to 
do. Are they going to charge me?
While most participants felt that delaying the interview would be better for the officers,
one participant felt the opposite, as noted below. Thus, the participants mirrored the
arguments made by Alpert, Rivera and Lott (2012) and Noble and Alpert (2013).
... My responsibility in the police department is to handle police-involved 
shootings. However, I  don't interview the officer. That is something the 
supervisor does. It's our job to interview the witnesses, take the — you know, take 
the evidence, do all that stuff. I  would say that the Homicide Squad who did it 
back then and you know, the Cold Case Squad, which has the responsibility today, 
you know, we do a goodjob. I  mean, it's kind o f  hard because on one side o f it
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you want to be comforting and, you know, let people know that everything is 
going to be okay, but the second part and what a lot ofpeople don't get, is that 
these things are under huge scrutiny and that things have to be done to the letter 
to show that there is no impropriety that the general public could ever use to say 
that we covered up a police shooting, that the police protected their own. So 
that's a hard part o f having to talk to the officers about it because, you know, 
nobody wants — I'm not Internal Affairs but I  think they do a pretty good job .. .1 
mean, I  can see the advantages to that and I  can see the disadvantages to that.
The advantages are somebody can decompress, they're not in a stressful situation, 
they've had time to kind o f put everything together. You know, the downside to 
that is — and it's unfortunate but it's the reality, but i f  I  had the possibility to 
give — I  would not give a murder suspect 48 hours because I  would want to get 
the freshest closest recollection to what happened closest to the event because I  
believe that it gives the most raw and you know, honest account o f  what 
happened. You're going to miss some details because they're going to be blocked 
out, but those are usually not details o f any great consequence. They're usually 
little things that you can fill the gaps in. You give 48 hours to somebody that's 
done a police shooting it's not good, they're going to come up with a story to 
come back in and tell you, which is going to contradict the evidence, but still you 
know, at that point it becomes interview versus really interrogation.
Several suggestions were also directed towards administrators and largely 
indicated that participants felt that the administration is scared of negative press and is 
more concerned with politics than personnel. One participant stated that administrators 
need to recognize that this is someone’s life and they need to stand up for that person. 
Another respondent noted that they expect more than just a cursory appearance, that that 
is not support. Yet another participant stated “[the department treats them] poorly 
because they're all worried about press and how it's going to make them look. So they 
pretty much throw the officer under the bus.” This statement reflects how these 
appearances can decrease morale, widen the gap between street and command personnel, 
and, effectively, lead the officer to feel abandoned by the police department, which Jones
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(1989) and the IACP (2012b) suggest may contribute to the development of long term 
post trauma symptoms.
Other Policy Recommendations
Many of the participants made logical policy solutions that reflected suggestions 
in either the literature or existing model policies. One of the most insightful statements 
made by a participant related to policy was that “ .. .we don’t have to write the book here. 
All we need to do is look around and find out what type of programs some of the more 
progressive cities in this country have and what they're doing right now. We can model 
our program after them.” This is quite true, the PD can adopt the IACP model policies, 
could model themselves on Agency A (see Chapter 7), or could find another agency 
whose policy conforms to their idea of best practice, should they choose to evaluate and 
revise their policies to address reported oversights mentioned by participants in the 
current study.
That said, there are other policy recommendations that are equally relevant. First 
and foremost, the PD should formalize the CISM team by approving a version of General 
Order ADM-435 (Norfolk n.d.), creating an SOP, and seek training for CISM team 
members, as this would lay the foundation for creating the hybrid model supported in the 
literature (Doka et al. 2008, Goldstein 2006. While training may require a financial 
outlay (FRSN and WCPR 2009, VALEAP n.d.-a), this is a long term investment and 
there are programs that are tuition-free for law enforcement personnel (FLETC n.d.-a, 
FLETC n.d.-b, FLETC n.d.-c). Other training opportunities exist for law enforcement 
agencies (BJA 2014, Cops Alive 2014) and there are resources available to help guide an 
agency that is looking to develop or bolster programs that address officer safety, 
survivability and resilience (IACP n.d.). Once the CISM team is trained, not only can
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they begin to serve the PD in a more efficient, professional manner, but their presence, 
provided EAP services are refined, means that the PD can implement fully functioning 
hybrid peer support-EAP model that may be more effective than simply having one or the 
other (Doka et al. 2008, Goldstein 2006).
CISM team members are not the only ones on the department that would benefit 
from training. As several participants suggested, others on the department, such as 
supervisors, homicide investigators or even officers in general, would benefit from 
attending trainings related to stress, survivability and resilience. Hosting these training 
events, in conjunction with positive policy changes, may begin to reduce the negative 
stigma surrounding this topic. The PD may also want to consider other outreach 
opportunities that would reduce stigma and bolster support and morale, such as hosting 
family academies and workshops, establishing a family support team, or hosting a 
screening of Heroes Behind the Badge (NLEOMF 2014).
The final component of strengthening their policy should involve bolstering 
resources for officers who have been involved in a shooting. This includes, ideally, 
having at least one qualified mental health professional on retainer. In the process of the 
current research, at least three clinicians—a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and a therapist 
specializing in EMDR—have indicated an interest in working with the PD to build their 
survivability and resilience programs, with at least two of them indicating to the 
researcher and others that they would consider providing their services pro bono. Efforts 
should also be made to ensure that the city’s EAP program is able to provide the 
necessary specialized services that first responders might need. As the EAP is a city level 
program, not an agency level program, this may unfortunately be beyond the scope of the
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PD’s ability to change. Finally, and again this may require financial outlays, the PD 
needs to consider establishing more formalized relationships with the advocacy groups 
and support programs that offer services to officers who struggle with their post-trauma 
reactions (including secondary and tertiary victimization) (C.O.P.S. 2014, FRSN and 
WCPR 2009, VALEAP n.d.-b), and their families (C.O.P.S. 2014, FRSN and WCPR 
2009, VALEAP n.d.-b, Wives Behind the Badge 2013). Once the PD begins developing 
a program, they can begin considering applying for program grants to further develop and 
support these efforts. Once the program is running, should the PD partner with a research 
entity (such as a university), they may also be eligible for research grants and program 
evaluation grants. This means that, although the PD may have to contribute financial 
contributions to establish the program, there is the potential to seek external funding once 
a foundation for a program has been established.
Again, as stated previously, this is not meant to be an incrimination of an 
individual agency. As suggested in the policy analyses conducted in chapter seven, there 
are a variety of responses available, and each agency will need to tailor their policy and 
procedures to their unique needs and situation. It is anticipated that even the most 
progressive, trend-setting agency may have deficiencies and in highlighting existing 
flaws or oversights in any given agency, the intent is not to embarrass or shame the 
agency, but to provide opportunities for organizational growth and development. With 
regards to the topic of officer resilience in particular, police departments cannot afford to 
adopt a position of deliberate indifference in the most literal sense. Initial financial 
outlays to establish services, provide training and construct infrastructure may appear 
overwhelming and unnecessary, but when weighed against the costs associated with a
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shooting incident—to include the investigations, media management, workers’ 
compensation, litigation, decreased productivity, and the potential loss o f an employee— 
those initial outlays will likely prove to be a profitable investment paid out in controlled, 
and planned, amounts; in other words, addressing the issues raised in the current study 
should be viewed as a form of risk management or risk mitigation to reduce or prevent 
future liability and incidents, rather than as an unnecessary expense.
Limitations
As an exploratory case study, it must be acknowledged that there were limitations 
to the current research. First, this study explored a single case in detail. Although 
qualitative research does not place the same emphasis on generalizability, this is a 
limitation that must be considered. While it is likely that there are commonalities across 
most shooting incidents, there are also likely elements that are unique to this case. For 
example, the average officer-involved shooting lasts approximately three seconds 
(Klinger 2004, Tracy 2010), but Chris’ shooting lasted for approximately 15 minutes. 
This means that there may be significant qualitative differences between Chris’ shooting 
incident and another officer’s, simply because his shooting was 300 times longer than the 
average. Additionally, because Chris was eager to participate and the research was 
approved without the requirement to anonymize the case, he may be qualitatively 
different from other officers who may be hesitant to or refuse to discuss their shooting 
incidents.
In terms of policy development, as Berg (2007) notes, the academy rarely accepts 
any single study—quantitative or qualitative—as generalizabile. The same expectations 
would apply with regards to this research, even if the intention to develop policy was
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limited to only the PD. The results of this study would need to be replicated to increase 
the likelihood of generalizability, even within the PD.
Additionally, there were limitations involving complete access to materials related 
to this case. The PD would not permit the researcher to examine any investigative 
materials. Also, as noted in Chapter 7, there were SOPs that could not be located in the 
current study. Finally, as noted in Chapter 5, there were several participants that were 
expected to participate in the current study who, for a variety reasons, did not complete 
interviews in the current study. These individuals may be different— be it in terms of 
information they could contribute, their perspective, or their relationship with Chris— 
from those participants that consented to an interview or interviews.
Suggestions for Future Research
As it was acknowledged in the introduction to this chapter, this study does not 
simply provide one or two potential areas for future research. Rather, the current study is 
more like a spring board for an entire research agenda. The first avenue for future 
research would consider obtaining the missing information from this case, particularly 
focusing on Chris’ relatives and/or non-law enforcement friends, as well as 
administrative and investigative personnel. Future research will also use the thematic 
documents to work with practitioners to gain insight and find a mid-range perspective to 
contribute to the analysis and policy suggestions that combines the concerns of street 
officers and administration. Additionally, the formation of a working group, consisting 
of practitioners, academics, and clinicians, would also be an avenue to consider in 
continuing this research.
Another way to build the current study would be to collect additional cases, 
possibly from just the PD or from other jurisdictions, to conduct a more 
phenomenological study that would be more generalizable. One topic that also became 
apparent was the roles that QMHP play, or should play, in these cases and a qualitative 
study with recognized QMHP to determine areas for additional research and to explore 
policy and practice would be beneficial. Another way to incorporate QMHP, would be to 
coordinate with WCPR to gain access to their data and see if the results from the current 
study are supported through a mixed methods approach. Just as QMHP may add a 
different perspective to the topic at hand, the limited interviews in the current study 
suggested that there are differences in the responses, particularly related to policy and 
practice, between command staff and street level officers. While this was not a complete 
surprise, the gravity of the situation means that this gap must be bridged. Future research 
may continue to probe these differences to determine how they influence working 
relationships and the way that these cases play out, as well as seeking common ground in 
an effort to reconcile the management and staff perspectives in order to best address 
fiscal, political, and legal considerations associated with officer-involved shootings.
As noted above, this study indicated that near trauma may be just as significant as 
experienced trauma. This finding should be explored in future research. Likewise, as the 
extant literature does not provide many resources discussing secondary and tertiary 
victimization, these topics need to be explicated, as the current study found that, indeed, 
trauma is not limited to pulling the trigger or being on scene. Finally, as more agencies 
address the issues of stress, survivability and resilience, the policies they generate and 
implement will need to be evaluated so that, as an overall profession, we can move
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Conclusion
The current study represents a five year journey that was undertaken by the entire 
research team. This journey consisted, as any research does, of highs and lows, 
particularly because the researcher, as a public criminologist, eschewed the clinical 
detachment demanded by a more traditional, positivistic approach. Unfortunately, the 
use o f deadly force is a highly controversial topic that will continue to remain at the 
forefront o f modem policing, meaning that officers, in addition to the cumulative traumas 
they experience as a component o f their career, will continue to be exposed to acute and 
critical incident trauma.
Another commonality among the majority o f the participants in the current study, 
one that was shared by the researcher, was that one goal o f  this research is to begin a 
discussion about topics that, in many circles, are considered sensitive or controversial. 
The hope is that, by digging deep into this case, and bringing the human stories 
associated with it, to the light o f theoretical and academic inquiry, there is the potential to 
reduce the stigma associated with stress responses and mental health issues in the police 
community. Additionally, many participants stated that they hoped their participation in 
the current study would help others in a similar situation understand that the PTSD 
symptoms are normal and that they are not alone. Finally, a shared hope is that research 
o f this nature will bring about changes in practice that recognize the emotional and 
mental health needs o f those serving their communities as first responders.
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Appendix A: Number o f Fatal Police Shootings by Agency or Data Source, 1990-2010
F B I  C D C  D e a th
Ju s tif ia b le  b y  L eg a l
C D C  D e a th  
b y  L e g a l
H o m ic id e  In te rv e n tio n  In te rv e n tio n -
BJS
A rre s t-
R e la te d
B JS  A rre s t-  V S P
R e la ted  J u s tif ia b le
H o m ic id e s—  H o m ic id e
b y  L E O V irg in ia  O n ly  H o m ic id e s V irg in ia
O nly
by
LEO—
H a m p to n
R o a d s
P re l im in a ry  
S tu d y —  
H a m p to n  
R o a d s
area
Total
Source
Average 373 .89 390.21 12.11 418.71 14.75 3.5 2 .9
Appendix B
Appendix B: Descriptive Information for the Hampton Roads Region Compared to the State, Collectedfrom the 
Virginia State Police's Crime in Virginia Reports and Averaged for the Years 1990-2010, as well as the
Standardized Police Shootings Rate, Calculated from Preliminary Study Data and VSP Population Estimate
State Chesapeake Hampton Newport News Norfolk Portsmouth Suffolk Virginia Beach
Population 7337026 193851 140865 178922 239281 100044 66422 421943
Total Sworn 
Personnel
-- 324 251 361 716 231 136 721
Crime Rate (per 
100,000)
3983.14 5521.58 6749.98 8665.55 9457.29 10885.35 7068.54 6132.56
Number of 
Murders
434.9 9.8 10.5 22.1 47.2 20.4 6.57 17.85
Murder Rate (per 
100,000)
6.28 4.93 7.33 12.54 20.08 20.71 11.35 4.32
Police Shooting 
Rate (per 
100,000)
11.35 2.13 2.79 18.81 10 1.5 8.29
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No.: 13-065
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW NOTIFICATION FORM
TO: Elizabeth Monk-Turner
Responsible Project Investigator
DATE: May 16, 2013
1KB Decision D ate
Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: A Case Study
Name o f  Project
Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional 
Review Board. Your research protocol is:
Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make 
ANY change to your research protocol.
The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress 
Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond 
that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects 
to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).
* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of
the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the
Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.
* In the Progress R eport
• Under 8a, erase the circled “Yes”, and leave that blank.
• # 1 0  should be revised to succinctly reflect actvity that addresses what
has taken place in the study over the past year. Remove the 
references to what research has been reported in the field or what the 
training session consisted of.
• Under # 1 1 , Dr. Monk -Turner and Ms. Farrell need to provide current 
renewal CITI training certificates.
In the In fo rm ed C onsent
_ Approved 
_  Tabled/Disapproved
X_ Approved, (Progress Report) contingent on making the changes below*
QjjlB Chairperson's S ign a tu re/
May 16, 2013
date
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• In the sixth paragraph of the letter, remove the sentence that states,
“ If you request confidentiality..." Confidentially is already described as 
being provided to the subects in other sentences in this document.
• Remove the second signature line for the participants found at the end 
of the document. Agreement to participate in the study need only be 
obtained once. If subjects wish to withdraw their participation they may 
do so at any time during the interview w ithout penalty.
As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made 
the above changes. Research may begin.
A ttes ta t ion
LZ May 16, 2013
dateIRB Chairperson ’s i g n a t u r e
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No.: 12-057
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW  NOTIFICATION FORM
TO: Elizabeth Monk-Tumer
Responsible Project Investigator
DATE: April 19,2012
JRB Decision D ate
Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: an Elaborated Case Study
Name o f  Project
Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional 
Review Board. Your research protocol is:
 Approved
 Tabled/Disapproved
_X Approved, contingent on making the changes below*
Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make 
ANY change to your research protocol.
The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress 
Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond 
that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects 
to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).
* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of 
the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the 
Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.
In the  Informed Consent
•  Remove th e  additional signature and d a te  lines a t t h e  en d  of th e  docum ent so th a t  
th e re  is only one signature and d a te  box/line.
As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made 
the above changes. Research may begin.
IRB Chairrf^rion ‘s  Signature
April 19,2012
dale
A ttestation
IRB C hairperson‘s  Signature
May 8,2012
date
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No.: 11-016
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW  NOTIFICATION FO RM
TO: Elizabeth Monk-Tumer
Responsible Project Investigator
DATE: February 17,2011
IRB Decision Date
RE: Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: an Elaborated Case
Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional 
Review Board. Your research protocol is:
Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make 
ANY change to your research protocol.
The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress 
Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond 
that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects 
to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).
* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of 
the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the 
Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.
* Dr. Monk-Turner needs to take the CITI Human Subjects Protection on-line 
training and provide an updated certificate of completion since the previous NIH 
certificate has lapsed ( over 1 y e a r).
As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made 
the above changes. Research may begin.
Study
N am e o f  Project
_  Approved 
_  Tabled/Disapproved
X_ Approved, (Progress Report) contingent on making the changes below*
Chairperson's S ig n a tu re /
February 17,2011
Attestation
Chairperson 's'Signatltre
Vis February 18, 2011
date
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No.: 1 0 - 0 0 9
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW  NOTIFICATION FORM
T O: Elizabeth Monk-T umer
Responsible Project Investigator
DATE: February 18, 2010
IRB Decision D ate
RE: Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: An Elaborated Case
Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional 
Review Board. Your research protocol is:
 Approved
 Tabled/Disapproved
X Approved, contingent on making the changes below*
Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make 
ANY change to your research protocol.
The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress 
Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond 
that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects 
to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).
* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of 
the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the 
Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.
* In the Application
• Under # 9, the role o f Sgt. Scallon should be clarified as a person who 
would only make an introduction to  prospective interviewees; informing 
them of his endorsement of the study. It should be noted that he would 
not be present or have access to the individual interview tapes/transcripts.
• Under #11, it should state that there is no direct benefit to individuals who 
participate. An in-depth discussion ensued addressing the issue that Dr. 
Dwayne, Sgt. S ca llon 's  psychiatrist, has not yet supplied a letter of 
endorsement relating to the study or of Sgt. Scallon’s ability to participate 
in the study. The committee determined that we may provide approval of
Study
Name o f  Project
rRB Chairperson's Sign c/lure
February 18, 2010
date
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the study pending the receipt o f this letter to the investigators. The 
investigators are instructed to provide the IRB Chairperson with the 
approval letter from Dr. Dwayne before they may commence the 
interviews.
• Committee members discussed the letter from the Chief of Police from the 
Norfolk Department o f Police and its limited nature in terms of release of 
information and approval for interviews. Ms. Farrell, the co-investigator o f 
the proposed study, stated that the research team will continue to  work 
with the Police Department closely to establish the relationship necessary 
for successful completion of the research and will honor any 
restrictions/limitations imposed on the investigators related to obtaining 
information from the Police Department.
• Under # 1 3 -  Informed Consent, the IRB committee recommends that the 
investigators change the procedures that w ill be used to obtain informed 
consent so that potential subjects initially sign after the investigators 
explain the research and present the informed consent, and then after the 
interview ha been conducted, transcribed, and reviewed by the subjects 
for content and veracity.
• Under #16 , the investigators need to explain the procedures for assuring 
subjects’ confidentiality and how Sgt. Scallon’s participation in the analysis 
section of the study w ill only take place when the information is presented 
in the aggregate form. The investigators are directed to use the verbiage 
outlined in # 11 in the description of protecting confidentiality. The 
investigators are directed to assign a number to each subject and inform 
the subjects that their signed informed consent document will not be kept 
in the same place, or linked to, the transcript o f their interview. The 
transcript will therefore only reflect the assigned numbers o f the various 
subjects.
In the Informed Consent
• An unsigned copy of the informed consent letter to Sgt. Scallon needs to 
be submitted to the IRB chairperson for approval.
• The investigators should review the informed consent letter that is 
addressed, Dear Sir o r Madam. The investigators should not demonstrate 
persuasion/coercion in the verbiage or bias in their own role in the 
research. On the second page of the letter the 4th paragraph that starts, 
"As a member of a law enforcement fam ily ..." should be removed. The 
third paragraph that describes the purpose of the study should be moved 
to the first paragraph and simplified into a shorter description which does 
not inform the subjects as to the expected results o f the study. In the 
second paragraph, the investigator should clearly articulate that the study 
will be a two step process in term s of analysis, where Sgt Scallon will not 
have access to the interview tapes or transcripts, but in the second stage 
will assist the investigator in identifying themes from the aggregate 
material that has been collected.
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• Dr. Monk-Turner’s name and signature also needs to be included at the 
end of the letter. Remove the third subject signature line and date.
In the Letter from Sgt. Scallon to the prospective participants, committee 
members recommend re-wording the letter to include the phrase that Sgt Scallon 
encourages or endorses the participation of the subjects in the study in addition 
to introducing Ms. Turner to them
As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made 
the above changes. Research may begin.
Attestation
April 27,2010
date
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Amanda L. Farrell
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor 
Department o f  Sociology and Criminal Justice 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529
June 11, 2013 
Chris
Police Department 
Central Records Division 
Police Operations Center
Dear Chris:
Subsequent to previous informal discussions, I, in collaboration with Dr. Elizabeth 
Monk-Tumer (the Responsible Project Investigator) and Dr. Mona J. E. Danner, have 
expressed an interest in describing and understanding pre-event, event and post-event 
factors in officer-involved shootings, with an aim of improving officer survivability, 
using your experience as a case study. This study will involve in-depth interviews 
(recorded and transcribed with your permission) with you that cover both biographical 
and topical elements of your story. Additionally, interviews with others involved in this 
incident may be requested. Understandably, these issues can be considered sensitive and, 
as such, you have the right to not only voluntarily agree to this project, or decline to 
participate, but to also withdraw from it at any point without concern or fear o f 
repercussions. It is possible that interviews will be transcribed by Ms. — . Although
M s . is a transcriptionist for the Police Department, her role in this research will be as
a privately hired transcriptionist and she will sign a letter o f  confidentiality prior to 
commencing transcription. I f  this arrangement is o f concern to you, for any reason, 
please inform the researcher and other arrangements for transcription will be made.
You will also have the right to review all materials resulting from these interviews to 
ensure accuracy and clarity o f meaning; you will have the right to request that certain 
issues or conversations be kept off the record, confidential, or revisited for further 
discussion. You will also have the right to decline to pursue certain avenues o f 
conversation. Any and all information you choose to share is voluntary and will help in 
creating a more complete picture o f this event. The researchers will take reasonable steps 
to keep private information, such as your involvement and responses, confidential. While 
efforts will be made to protect your confidentiality, because we are not anonymizing this 
particular case and you have agreed, to date, to be openly involved in this research, there 
is a heightened risk o f breach o f confidentiality. There is also a risk o f breach o f 
confidentiality for other participants, and this risk may be heightened for individuals who 
have very specific relationships with you or who played particular roles in this case. The 
researchers will make all reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality; however, we are 
obligated to advise all participants o f this increased risk o f breach o f  confidentiality.
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Data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet prior to its processing, as well as in 
encrypted and secured computer files after transcription and analysis. The results o f  this 
study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications; but the researcher will not 
identify you, i f  you so request. O f course, your records may be subpoenaed by court 
order or inspected by government bodies with oversight authority.
If  any information comes to light during the course o f research that may impact your 
decision to consent to participate, you will be notified immediately. You will not receive 
any form of monetary compensation for your participation in this research.
As previously discussed, to ensure that there are no adverse effects o f this research, great 
care will be taken to ensure that any potential areas o f concern are mitigated, to the best 
o f our ability, in advance. O f particular note, we will be consulting with your therapists, 
prior to beginning this research to ensure that they are aware of your participation in the 
proposed research, what that participation will entail, and that they are willing to support 
this effort. Additionally, you must agree to notify both myself and your therapists 
immediately should you notice any adverse effects. Research will be promptly halted 
upon presentation o f adverse effects. Also, to ensure that there are no adverse 
professional effects o f this research, we will be coordinating with the Police Department 
(PD), asking that the PD to acknowledge that they are aware this research is taking place, 
that we are requesting access to certain materials and documents, and that the PD has no 
significant issues with this research. Due to liability concerns, the PD cannot issue a 
blanket letter o f  support, meaning that their involvement and correspondence regarding 
the status and progress o f this project will likely be ongoing.
If you say YES, then your consent in this document does not waive any o f your legal 
rights. However, in the event o f  harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion 
University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free 
medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer 
injury as a result o f participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible 
principal investigator or investigators at the provided phone numbers or e-mail, or Dr. 
George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, 
who will be glad to review the matter with you.
I have also previously indicated to you that I would like to take your role and 
participation in this research a step beyond the collaborative interviewee or 
conversational partner seen in most qualitative research; I would like this to be a co- 
authorship situation, if  that is agreeable to you. This allows you the opportunity to help 
define and frame significant emerging themes and make recommendations based on both 
your personal experience and your membership in the law enforcement community. 
Further, this research provides you the opportunity to co-author professional papers and 
co-present on this information at professional conferences. Also, as previously noted, 
should my dissertation stem from this research, that aspect o f  the project will be 
singularly authored by me, to meet with university requirements. I f  this research does 
extend to interviewing others involved, you will be consulted on who is approached for 
interviews and may be required to facilitate these interviews. As a matter o f  ethical care,
406
especially in light o f  the fact that you may be acting as both a researcher and an 
interviewee, you will not have unlimited access to other interviewees’ responses, in order 
to protect their rights and facilitate their honesty and candor in responding. You will be 
given access to, and asked to participate in, the second stage of data analysis, which will 
involve exploring emergent themes or ideas to address potential meanings, 
classifications, and implications of these themes. My resume and references, as well as 
samples of my previous work, have been provided to you, should you wish to verify my 
background or reliability as a researcher.
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read 
this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, 
the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any 
questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then 
die researchers should be able to answer them:
Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD E-mail: etumer@odu.edu
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc E-mail: afarrell@odu.edu
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if  you have any questions about your 
rights or this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 
757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office o f Research, at 757-683-3460.
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. A copy o f this letter will be provided to you for your records.
Sincerely,
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor Professor o f Sociology and Criminal Justice
Co-Investigator Responsible Project Investigator
I ,________________________, have read and understood the contents o f this letter. I
understand that my participation in this research is voluntary kid that I can withdraw 
from the research at any time, without concern or fear o f  repercussions.
Name (Printed) Signature Date
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Old Dominion University,
College: Arts and Letters 
Department: Sociology and Criminal Justice 
Batten Arts and Letters Building, 6th Floor 
Norfolk, Virginia 23529
To whom it may concern,
In speaking with Amanda Farrell, on several occasions, we have discussed analyzing 
officer involved shootings. Having been involved in a  shooting, I am intimately fam iliar with 
the resulting emotional and professional consequences. In an effort to fully understand the 
short and long term effects, and aid in the survivability o f  myself and other officers; I would 
like to fully participate in a case study, with Amanda Farrell.
Expressing my interest, I have spoken with Amanda Farrell at length. I completely 
understand the in-depth nature o f this type o f case study, and look forward to all it involves. 
Furthermore, I am absolutely aware that at anytime, I will be able to withdraw from the study.
Respectfully,
Chris
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Amanda L. Farrell
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor 
Department o f Sociology and Criminal Justice 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529
June 11, 2013 
Dear Sir or Madam:
You have been asked to consent to being interviewed in relation to your experience 
related to the shooting that Chris was involved in on April 15,2007. The aim o f this 
research is to gain a more broad understanding of police shootings by thoroughly 
exploring one case, approaching the incident from the following three dimensions: 
personal, professional, and organizational/systemic. Chris is not only aware o f this 
research and consenting to be interviewed; he is also a collaborating researcher, as is 
evidenced by the attached letter o f support. In addition to Chris, Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, 
PhD (Responsible Project Investigator); Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc; and Mona J. E. 
Danner, PhD, will be involved in this research.
Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, as well as 
their friends, family and colleagues; the departments to which they belong; and the 
community at large—yet these events are rarely discussed. Your involvement in this 
research will aid in potentially assisting other officers, other police departments, other 
friends and family, and any other individuals who have experienced a similar event 
understand their situation. It is hoped that this research is able to identify possible areas 
o f  best practice, with the aim o f  providing the appropriate response and support in these 
cases, with an emphasis on officer survivability. This study seeks to approach the issues 
involved with police shootings holistically, looking at precipitating factors/influences, the 
event itself and post-event factors, across several dimensions, as opposed to a narrow 
approach only examining one dimension in regard to one stage o f the event.
Your role in this study will involve in-depth interviews (recorded, with your permission, 
and transcribed) with you that cover both biographical and topical elements o f  your 
involvement in this case. The time required to conduct and complete these interviews 
will vary, but all interviews will be scheduled at a time and location convenient and 
comfortable to you. Understandably, the issues to be discussed can be considered 
sensitive and, as such, you have the right to not only voluntarily agree to this project, or 
decline to participate, but to also withdraw from it at any point without concern or fear o f 
repercussions. If any information comes to light during the course o f  research that may 
impact your decision to consent to participate, you will be notified immediately. You 
will not receive any form o f monetary compensation for your participation in this 
research.
You will also have the right to review all materials resulting from these interviews to 
ensure accuracy and clarity of meaning; you will have the right to request that certain
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issues or conversations be kept off the record, confidential, or revisited for further 
discussion. You will also have the right to decline to pursue certain avenues o f 
conversation. Any and all information you choose to share is voluntary and will help in 
creating a more complete picture of this event. It is possible that interviews will be
transcribed by — . Although M s. is a transcriptionist for the Police Department, her
role in this research will be as a privately hired transcriptionist and she will sign a letter 
o f confidentiality prior to commencing transcription. If  this arrangement is o f concern to 
you, for any reason, please inform the researcher and other arrangements for transcription 
will be made.
Chris will not have direct access to your recorded interview responses or the transcripts 
o f your interviews. To clarify, both the data collection and data analysis will involve 
two steps. The data collection will begin with a  series o f interviews with Chris, followed 
by interviews with various individuals involved in this case. The data analysis will 
involve an open coding process, where dominant themes will be extracted from the 
interview transcripts and, where appropriate, bolstered by evidence from other sources, 
such as court transcripts. Your informed consent documents will be kept separate from 
the transcripts, which will be assigned random numbers to enhance confidentiality. Only 
Dr. Monk-Tumer and Ms. Farrell will have access to the informed consent documents 
and full transcripts. The second step o f the data analysis will involve discussing the 
emergent themes (in the forms of aggregate groupings o f unidentified quotes o f a similar 
nature or topic) with the research team, to address potential meanings, classifications, and 
implications o f  these themes. Additionally, emergent themes may generate additional or 
follow-up questions for Chris or other interviewees.
This means that, should you request any topic be kept off the record, your initial 
statements will only be available to Dr. Monk-Tumer and Ms. Farrell. The researchers 
will take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as your involvement and 
responses, confidential. Data will be stored in a  locked filing cabinet prior to its 
processing, as well as in encrypted and secured computer files after transcription and 
analysis. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and 
publications; but the researcher will not identify you, if  you so request. O f course, your 
records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with 
oversight authority. While efforts will be made to protect your confidentiality, because 
we are not anonymizing this particular case and Chris is openly involved in this research, 
there is a heightened risk of breach o f confidentiality. This risk may be greater for 
individuals who have very specific relationships with Chris or who played particular roles 
in this case. The researchers will make all reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality; 
however, we are obligated to advise participants o f this increased risk o f  breach o f 
confidentiality.
As researchers, we must strive to mitigate any risks, potential or real, that might be 
associated with participation in this research. To protect current members o f the Police 
Department, the administration has been advised o f this research and has provided a letter 
attesting to that notification and the position o f the department. This letter can be viewed 
upon request. Due to the nature o f this topic, it can lead to heightened emotions. You 
have the right to decline to talk about certain topics and, if  there is any evidence of
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emotional distress, the interview will be halted. If  any other negative affects arise from 
participation in this research, whether they are emotional, psychological, physical or 
professional, please notify us immediately so that we can work to remedy the situation.
If you say YES, then your consent in this document does not waive any o f your legal 
rights. However, in the event o f harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion 
University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free 
medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer 
injury as a result of participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible 
principal investigator or investigators at the provided phone numbers or e-mail, or Dr. 
George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, 
who will be glad to review the matter with you.
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read 
this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, 
the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any 
questions you may have had about the research. If  you have any questions later on, then 
the researchers should be able to answer them:
Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD E-mail: etumer@odu.edu
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc E-mail: afarrell@odu.edu
If  at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if  you have any questions about your 
rights or this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 
757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office o f Research, at 757-683-3460.
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. A copy o f this letter will be provided to you for your records.
Sincerely,
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice
Co-Investigator Responsible Project Investigator
I , ________________________, have read and understood the contents o f  this letter. I
understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I can withdraw 
from the research at any time, without concern or fear o f  repercussions.
N a m e  ( P r in te d ) S ig n a tu r e Date
Appendix E
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Sample Questions fo r Interviews Regarding Police Shooting Case Study
Sample Questions for Chris
• Basic Demographics: DOB/AGE.. .Ethnicity.. .How long been a police officer? 
Religious orientation?
•  Please describe and explain your background. Where did you grow up? What 
was your childhood like? Did you do well in school? What did you want to be 
when you grew up? Did you play sports? What was your family like? Your 
friends?
• What are your first memories? What do you remember about living in Colombia? 
What do your remember about moving to the US? Can you describe that 
experience?
•  Ask about dad’s incident.. .memories, coping mechanisms, who was there, what 
was said, thoughts, feelings, what did the adults around you do/how behave?
• Ask about brother’s incident... memories, coping mechanisms, who was there, 
what was said, thoughts, feelings, what did the adults around you do/how behave?
• Ask about mom’s remarriage...and relationship with mom...feel like you had to 
take care o f her/be the man?
• First marriage
• Second Marriage
• Meeting wife
• What jobs did you have before becoming a  police officer? How did you end up in 
the area? Are you married/divorced/separated? What is your educational 
background?
• Why did you decide to become a police officer? What factors or events in your 
childhood or early adulthood do you think influenced your career decision? In 
turn, how has your career as a police officer influenced other aspects o f  your life?
•  Please describe your formal and informal training regarding use o f force in 
general, and use o f deadly force in particular. What about stress and coping 
mechanisms?
•  How many officers have you seen go through an officer involved shooting, both 
before and after your own? What do you remember from their experiences?
What “lessons” did you learn? Has this changed since you have been through 
your own shooting incident? Do you think your educational background now 
influences your understanding o f  critical incidents and gives you insight into your 
own behavior?
•  What are your typical reactions when you are under stress? Have these changed 
since before the shooting?
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•  Had you been involved in use o f force incidents prior to this incident? Deadly or 
otherwise? Please discuss those incidents. What did you feel? How did you 
react? Is there anything that sticks with you about those incidents
• Please tell me about the events o f April 15, 2007. I would like to use focused 
retrieval (closing eyes) and emotional context reinstatement (remembering how 
you felt). Please start from waking up that day and walk me through that day in 
as much detail as possible from the time you woke up—how were you feeling, 
was there anything that made you happy/sad/angry throughout the day, what the 
weather was like— any detail, no matter how seemingly small or insignificant 
should be left out. Do not censor yourself. We’ll take it slow and, if  at any point 
you start to feel anxious or upset, we can take a break. If you wish to discontinue 
this conversation at any point, that is perfectly acceptable.
o Please discuss/describe the physiological, emotional, etc. alterations you 
experienced from the time you pulled into the gas station parking lot until 
you returned home the next morning, 
o You use the Cooper Color Code in the training you conduct. Please go 
through this event in terms o f this code. Also, please discuss how this 
color code manifested in the weeks following the event.
•  O f course, hindsight is perfect, but is there anything you would have done 
differently that night? In the following days and weeks?
•  Can you provide context for the events that occurred on April 15, 2007? What 
was going on in your personal life? Had there been any big cases or events in the 
department that you were aware ofThad been part of? What was going on in your 
professional life? Were there any current events that had impacted you?
• Please explain and describe what happened in the days and weeks following the 
shooting.
o What were your thoughts and feelings? 
o Did you notice any behavioral or attitudinal changes? 
o Were there any changes to your relationships with friends, families, co­
workers, supervisors, etc.? 
o You’ve noted that you didn’t  talk to anyone for a week. Why? What were 
you thinking or were you trying to  escape from what had happened—if  
you didn’t talk about it, it would go away? 
o You’ve also mentioned that you were quick to fly off the handle and an 
asshole to be around, in general. How did this impact your closest 
relationships? Can you discuss this behavior and, if  possible, why you 
would react or behave in this manner? Did anyone call you on this and, if 
so, did it matter, help or further anger or isolate you? 
o What was the most challenging or difficult aspect faced? Were there 
multiple difficulties?
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• Please describe the investigation o f the shooting incident and its outcome, 
o What was your reaction when your firearm was taken? 
o Did you feel isolated as a  result o f  the no communication policy? How do 
you think this issue might be better addressed? 
o How did you feel being interviewed? How long were you on 
administrative leave? Were you on leave pending administrative 
clearance? Do you think this time off is sufficient? What about the 
mandatory psychiatric consultation— is this procedure/policy adequate?
What changes would you suggest be made? The written policy i s  ,
is that what is done in reality? 
o You’ve mentioned the advent o f CSEM. Please describe the role this 
group plays in these types o f incidents. While this is an excellent form of 
support, do you think it could potentially serve to isolate officers already 
struggling even more from their non-police support system? 
o Did you feel that people reacted or responded to you differently? 
o Do you feel that your case was exploited in any way? 
o How did you react to the editorial comments you were reading. Did you 
closely follow the press coverage at the time, or did you compile the 
articles later? How did you react when your name was released to the 
media?
o Were your needs met, based on the current policies and procedures
following an officer-involved shooting? Do you feel that your needs were 
overshadowed by either organizational concerns or other events that were 
occurring/had occurred? 
o Professionally, did you have any fears or concerns during the 
investigation? Following the investigation, did you struggle with 
returning to work? Upon returning to full duty, did you feel ready? Had 
you received any counseling or preparation to return to duty? Please 
describe and explain, 
o Emotionally, do you feel that the policies and procedures set forth by the 
department met your needs? Is counseling mandatory? Is there a 
psychologist employed by the department? Did you go through a fitness 
for duty evaluation after the shooting? How soon after? How does the PD 
address the emotional needs o f officers who are placed in a  use o f  force 
situation? In a use o f deadly force situation? With anyone officially 
connected to the department, did you feel that you could be honest about 
what you were experiencing? Do you feel that you have regained 
emotional stability following this incident? I f  yes, how long did it take 
you to feel that something akin to “normalcy” had been regained?
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o Spirituality, which does differ from religiosity, can be impacted by an 
incident, such as you experienced. How would you describe your 
spirituality and religious beliefs prior to the shooting? After? What has 
changed? You have mentioned that you were raised as a Catholic. How 
did this aspect o f  your upbringing impact your experience? What have 
you struggled with the most in relation to the conflict, i f  any, you 
experienced between your faith and the situation you found yourself in? 
Did religion play a role in the healing process? 
o What, if  any, were your greatest concerns, in general, during this period?
•  Do you believe that better training for and response to these types o f  incidents can 
be developed? What are your procedural and policy suggestions?
•  How do you incorporate your experience into the training you provide to other 
officers, both formally and informally?
•  Do you have a professional mentor or role model? Why is this person a role 
model? How do you think they would have reacted in your situation? Has this 
person been a source o f support after the shooting?
• What is your favorite/least favorite aspect o f  the job? Has this incident impacted 
that and/or how you do your job?
• What are your career/professional plans? What role has this incident played in 
shaping those plans?
• Have you been involved in other use o f force incidents? If yes, how many? What 
about use o f deadly force? If yes, how many? Can you explain the difference—  
not just between use o f non-lethal and lethal force, but also between use o f  deadly 
force situations? If you were involved in any incidents prior to this shooting, how 
were they different? I f  you were involved in any incidents following this 
shooting, how were they different? How has this shooting impacted your 
approach to different situations? Your reaction and thought processes?
• You have received several prestigious honors and awards following this incident. 
A t the time, how did you feel about receiving these awards? Now? Did you have 
any mixed feelings?
•  What were your greatest sources o f  support following the shooting? Were you 
surprised at the support, or lack thereof, you received? Were there any 
experiences that could have been more supportive/constructive?
• How do you think this incident impacted those closest to you? Your family?
Your friends? Your co-workers? How did they cope, to your knowledge? Did 
any o f their reactions surprise you?
o You stated you did not want your parents to come here. Was that an 
attempt to protect them or protect yourself emotionally? How did they 
react?
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• Would you describe and explain the coping strategies you used—the good and the 
bad? How did you identify which ones were negative? Were you taught these 
coping techniques? Do you still use any o f  these techniques on a regular basis?
• May we discuss the therapy sessions that followed the shooting? How did you 
end up working with Dr. Dwayne? Did you seek therapy, or was it mandatory? 
What made you choose CPA? Can you describe your first appointment/visit? 
Were you initially receptive to the idea o f  therapy, or were you just going because 
it seemed like you had to? Or did you just want medication? How long were you 
in therapy? What surprised you the most about the therapy process? What, if  
anything, was the most helpful? Have you engaged in any other types o f therapy 
or any other attempts to help yourself “recover” from this incident?
o You’ve mentioned sleep and appetite disruptions. Did you have 
nightmares or flashbacks? As for the hyper vigilance following the 
shooting, how did that impact your mental and physical well being? What 
medications were you prescribed? Were there any side effects— adverse 
or otherwise—emotional, physical/sexual, etc? How did you handle these 
side effects on top o f the other issues you were dealing with? How did 
they make you feel? Did they help, hurt or did you not notice a 
difference? Did you struggle with the fact that you had to see someone, to 
get psychological and medical help, to cope/recover from this?
•  Some people might say that your willingness to talk about this incident is not only 
contrary to the typical to the response expected from a member o f the law 
enforcement subculture, but also an atypical gender response. How would you 
respond to that assumption? What are the factors that influence your decision to 
openly discuss this incident and its impact on you? Would you advise that all 
officers involved in a shooting incident be as candid? Do you seek to mentor or 
counsel other officers who have been involved in shootings?
• How has this incident changed you?
• How often do you think about this incident? If  there was one thing that you 
would like other officers to know about this incident, what would it be?
•  What advice/suggestions would you give to others handling a similar incident?
o The officers involved
o Their partners
o Other officers
o Their family, friends, children, and other intimates
o Those investigating the case
o Supervisors
o Administrators
o Therapists
o Community members
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Sample Questions for Family and Friends
•  How did you meet Chris? What was the nature o f your relationship? How long 
had you known each other?
•  Would you please describe your relationship with Chris prior to the shooting? 
What was his personality/demeanor like?
•  How did you react to the news o f  the shooting? Can you explain and describe 
your response— emotionally, verbally, physically?
•  How soon after the incident were you able to interact with Chris?
•  What immediate changes did you notice in Chris following the incident?
•  Was there anything that you struggled with? How did you cope? Were you 
unsure o f how to act or what to say? Were you ever frustrated?
•  How has this incident impacted you?
•  What was your role in his healing process? Also, how did you work to heal from 
this event?
•  Have you noticed any permanent changes in his personality/demeanor? Can you 
describe your relationship after the shooting?
Sample Questions for the Investigators
•  How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you 
provide some background on your career? How many use o f deadly force 
investigations have you been involved in— both before and since this incident?
•  What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type o f 
investigation? Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How 
do they impact the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your 
ability to conduct the investigation?
• Please describe and explain the pressures— both formal and informal— o f being 
involved in this type of investigation.
• Did you have any interactions/a relationship— both personal and/or 
professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? I f  yes, please explain and 
describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
•  Please describe and explain your involvement in this investigation. What were 
your observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
•  Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your investigation, or was it a 
source o f strain/stress?
•  Investigating an officer-involved shooting must hit a little close to home. How 
did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In turn, how did those 
personal feelings impact your investigation? Your attitudes and approach to the 
job? How did you cope?
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•  How did your involvement in this investigation impact your relationship, personal 
and/or professional, with Chris, if at all? Did it impact your relationship, personal 
and/or professional, with anyone else?
•  Has this experience changed how you think of Chris?
•  What changes did you notice in Chris during and following the investigation? In 
yourself? In anyone else?
•  Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in this 
investigation?
•  What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a similar situation?
o To the investigators
o To supervisors
o To administrators
o To other officers
o To family and friends
o To the officer being investigated
Sample Questions for Supervisors
•  How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you 
provide some background on your career? How many use o f deadly force 
incidents have you been involved in— both before and since this incident?
•  What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type o f incident? 
Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How do they impact 
the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your ability to be an 
effective supervisor?
•  Please describe and explain the pressures— both formal and informal— of being 
involved in this type of incident as a  supervisor.
•  Did you have any interactions/a relationship—both personal and/or 
professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? I f  yes, please explain and 
describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
•  How long had you supervised Chris?
•  Please describe and explain your involvement in this incident. What were your 
observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
•  Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your involvement, or was it a 
source o f strain/stress?
•  Being involved in an officer-involved shooting, even peripherally, must hit a little 
close to home. How did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In 
turn, how did those personal feelings impact your investigation? Your attitudes 
and approach to the job? How did you cope?
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•  How did your involvement in this incident impact your relationship, personal 
and/or professional, with Chris, if  at all? Did it impact your relationship, 
personal and/or professional, with anyone else?
•  What impact did this incident have on Chris’s work? Did you alter your 
expectations or thoughts o f him based on this experience? What changes in Chris 
did you observe following the shooting? In yourself?
•  How did you offer support to Chris throughout this process? Were other officers 
shaken and, if so, what support was offered to them? Were other officers 
encouraged to support Chris?
• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in handling this 
incident?
• What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a similar situation?
o To the investigators
o To supervisors
o To administrators
o To other officers
o To family and friends
o To the officer being investigated
Sample Questions for Administrators
• How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you 
provide some background on your career? How many use o f deadly force 
incidents have you been involved in—both before and since this incident? What 
was your rank and position at the time this incident occurred? Did you have any 
direct involvement in this incident?
• What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type o f incident? 
Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How do they impact 
the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your ability to be an 
effective administrator? Are the policies and procedures routinely evaluated to 
ensure that they are as effective as possible?
• Please describe and explain the pressures— both formal and informal— o f being 
involved in this type o f incident as an administrator. Is there a hierarchical 
ordering o f concerns? I f  yes, what are those concerns and how are they ranked? 
What is your role, in your current position, in these types o f  incidents? What 
impact does this involvement have on you, both personally and professionally?
Do you feel distanced from these events?
• How do you balance the needs o f the community, the needs o f the officer 
involved in the incident, the needs o f other officers, and the needs o f  the 
department in these situations? How is the chain o f  information structured?
420
•  Did you have any interactions/a relationship—both personal and/or 
professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? I f  yes, please explain and 
describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
• Please describe and explain your involvement, even peripherally, in this incident. 
What were your observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
• Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your involvement, or was it a 
source o f strain/stress?
• Being involved in an officer-involved shooting, even peripherally, must hit a little 
close to home. How did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In 
turn, how did those personal feelings impact your involvement? Your attitudes 
and approach to the job? How did you cope?
• How did your involvement in this incident impact your relationship, personal 
and/or professional, with Chris, if  at all? Did it impact your relationship, 
personal and/or professional, with anyone else?
• What impact did this incident have on Chris’s work? Did you alter your 
expectations or thoughts o f him based on this experience? What changes in Chris 
did you observe following the shooting? In yourself?
• How did you offer support to Chris throughout this process? Were other officers 
shaken and, if  so, what support was offered to them? Were other officers 
encouraged to support Chris? I f  so, how? What processes, if  any, are in place to 
promote officer support and survivability in the aftermath o f such incidents? Are 
these options offered consistently, or is there only a certain time frame in which 
they are available? How do you combat the machismo and code o f silence 
mentalities that may inhibit officers from reaching out for assistance?
• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in handling this 
incident?
• What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a  similar situation?
o To the investigators 
o To supervisors
o To administrators
o To other officers
o To family and friends
o To the officer being investigated
•  Do you have any policy or procedural changes you would like to see 
implemented? Do you believe there is a “best practice” in handling this type o f 
incidents that can be developed and implemented? Are there other incidents that 
you believe would benefit from a similar analysis, or from a similar approach, as 
far as some policies and procedures go? Please describe and explain.
Appendix F
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SOUTHERN STATES 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.
Legal Services
2 155 Highway 42 S 
M cDonough, GA 30252-7636  
(770) 389-5391 • (800) 233-3506  
Fax: (770) 389-3829  • (866) 915-3425  
www.sspba.org • e-mail: legal@ sspba.org
M s . A m a n d a  L . F a r r e l l ,  M A
O ld  D o m in io n  U n i v e r s i t y  C o l le g e  o f  A r t s  a n d  L e t te r s  
D e p a r tm e n t  o f  S o c io lo g y  a n d  C r im in a l  J u s t i c e  B A L  6  
N o r f o lk ,  V A  2 3 5 2 9
D e a r  M s .  F a r r e l l :
T h a n k  y o u  f o r  c o n ta c t in g  u s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  y o u r  r e s e a r c h  c o n c e r n in g  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  s h o o t in g s .  
A s  y o u  m ig h t  im a g in e ,  t h i s  i s  a n  i s s u e  o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  o u r  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  w h i c h  i s  c o m p o s e d  
o f  o v e r  2 8 ,0 0 0  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  a n d  s u p p o r t  p e r s o n n e l  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  S o u th e a s t .  A t  a n y  t im e ,  d a y  
o r  n ig h t ,  w e  a r e  o n  c a l l  t o  h e lp  o u r  o f f i c e r  m e m b e r s  w h o  m ig h t  f i n d  th e m s e lv e s  i n v o lv e d  i n  a  d u ty -  
r e la te d  s h o o t in g  o r  o t h e r  c r i t i c a l  in c id e n t .
W e  h a v e  l e a r n e d  o v e r  th e  y e a r s  t h a t  o f f i c e r - in v o l v e d  s h o o t in g s  m a y  h a v e  m a n y  lo n g -  
l a s t in g  e f f e c ts  o n  t h e  o f f i c e r s  i n v o lv e d ,  t h e i r  d e p a r tm e n t  a n d  c o - w o r k e r s ,  a n d  t h e  s u p p o r t  s y s te m  
a r o u n d  th e m .  O n c e  a n  o f f i c e r  f i r e s  h i s  w e a p o n ,  h e  h a s  j u s t i f i e d  c o n c e r n s  r e g a r d i n g  h i s  
e m p lo y m e n t ,  h i s  f i n a n c e s  a n d  e v e n  h i s  f r e e d o m .  I t  is  o u r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  p r o v i d e  o f f i c e r s  w i th  
th e  le g a l  r e p r e s e n ta t i o n  t h e y  n e e d  to  a d d r e s s  s u c h  c o n c e r n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  to  t h o s e  p r a c t i c a l  
c o n c e r n s ,  m a n y  o f f i c e r s  fe e l  g u i l t  a n d  p o s t - t r a u m a t i c  s t r e s s  t h a t  m a y  f o l lo w  t h e m  f o r  y e a r s .  I n  
f a c t ,  th e  P o l i c e  B e n e v o le n t  F o u n d a t i o n - o u r  5 0 1 ( c ) ( 3 )  s u p p o r t i n g  f o u n d a t i o n - c o n d u c t s  
P T S D /s u ic id e  p r e v e n t io n  s e m in a r s  to  h e lp  o f f i c e r s  g e t  t h e  h e l p  th e y  n e e d  a f te r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s u c h  
l i f e - a l t e r in g  e v e n ts .
W e  s u p p o r t  y o u r  e f f o r t s  to  r e s e a r c h  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  im p a c t  t h a t  d u t y - r e l a t e d  s h o o t in g s  
h a v e  o n  p o l ic e  o f f i c e r s  a n d  o th e r s .  I f  t h e r e  i s  a n y th in g  f u r t h e r  w e  c a n  d o  to  a s s i s t ,  p l e a s e  l e t  m e  
k n o w .
S in c e r e ly ,
J o n i  J . F l e t c h e r  
D i r e c to r  o f  L e g a l  S e r v i c e s
JJF/jjp
F i le
SOUTHERN STATES
The Voice of Law Enforcement Officers
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5 3 0 7  E V i r g i n i a  B e a c h  
B o u l e v a r d  
S u i t e  1 32  
N o r f o l k ,  V A  2 3 5 0 2
p h o n e :  ( 7 5 7 )  4 5 9 - 2 2 3 2  
fax :  (7 5 7 )  4 5 9 - 2 2 3 2
International Brotherhood of Police Officers
---------------------------------- A DIVISION O F  T H E  NATIONAL A SSO C IA TIO N  O F GO V ERN M EN T E M P L O Y E E S  ______
To W hom It May C oncern,
We have been asked to review  the research proposal for 
Ms. A m anda Farrell's d issertation research  on  officer-involved 
shooting and officer survivability . After a com prehensive review, 
it has been determ ined this research proposal em braces the goals o f 
the International B rotherhood o f  Police O fficers. The 1BPO seeks 
to protect the men and w om en in the law  enforcem ent community 
with regards to w orking conditions, benefits and other such 
concerns. It appears this research will positively im pact the 
w orking environm ent o f  these officers, particularly  in how  these 
incidents are m anaged and the consideration  given to officers in 
their aftermath.
It is agreed that this research p resen ts the opportunity  for 
the Norfolk Police D epartm ent and its affiliated organizations to 
enforce their progressive and proactive stance with regards to 
addressing officer survivability , as well as em brace evidence-based 
policies related to officer-involved shootings. As such, the 
International Brotherhood o f  Police O fficers. Local 412. is happy 
to support this research. It is our opinion that this research, 
especially as it represents a true collaboration  betw een an active 
law enforcem ent o fficer and a local academ ic, supports the goals 
and beliefs o f  the 1BPO and w e can clearly  see its potential value 
to our current and future m em bership.
Sincerely. 
Randolph E. Brann
w w w  i b p o  o r g
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Commodore Lodge #3, Norfolk VA
T o  W h o m  It  M a y  C o n c e rn ,
T h e  F ra te rn a l  O rd e r  o f  P o l ic e  h a s  a  s t r o n g  h is to ry  o f  p o l ic e  o f f i c e r s  re p re s e n t in g  a n d  s u p p o r t in g  
o u r  b ro th e r  a n d  s i s te r s  in  p o l ic in g  a n d  s e e k s  to  p ro v id e  a  v o ic e  to  a c t iv e  a n d  re tire d  o f f ic e rs .  W e  
a c k n o w le d g e  th a t  o f f ic e r  in v o lv e d  s h o o tin g s  c a n  h a v e  la s t in g  im p a c ts  o n  n o t  o n ly  th e  o f f ic e r ,  b u t  th e i r  
fa m il ie s ,  th e ir  d e p a r tm e n t a n d  th e  c o m m u n it ie s  th e y  se rv e . A n  o f f ic e r  in v o lv e d  s h o o t in g  is  l ik e ly  o n e  o f  
th e  m o s t  c r it ic a l  a d v e rs i t ie s  a n  o f f ic e r  w il l  f a c e  in  h is  o r  h e r  c a re e r .
A s a  re su lt  o f  th is  u n iq u e  p o s i t io n  in  th e  p o l ic e  c o m m u n i ty  w e  h a v e  b e en  a s k e d  to  r e v ie w  th e  
re s e a rc h  p ro p o sa l  fo r  M s. A m a n d a  F a r re l l’s  d o c to r a l  d i s s e r ta t io n  r e s e a r c h  o n  o ff ic e r  in v o lv e d  s h o o t in g s  
a n d  o f f ic e r  su rv iv a b il i ty .  T h is  r e q u e s t  w a s  n o t  t a k e n  l ig h t ly .  O u r  r e v ie w  h a s  d e te rm in e d  th a t ,  in  h e r  
a p p ro a c h  to  th is  re se a rc h , p a r tn e r in g  w ith  S e r g e a n t  S c a llo n  to  e x p lo re  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d  h is  p a r t ic u la r  
s h o o t in g  in c id e n t, M s . F a rre ll  is  a d d re s s in g  a  c o n te m p o ra r y  is s u e  th a t  i s  o f  e x tre m e  im p o r ta n c e  to  th e  
F ra te rn a l  O rd e r  o f  P o lic e , o u r  A u x i l ia r ie s ,  o th e r  p o l ic e  o f f ic e r s  a n d  th e  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t f a m i ly  in  
g e n e ra l.
W e  a g re e  th a t  th is  r e s e a r c h  p re s e n ts  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  fo r  th e  N o r f o lk  P o lice  D e p a r tm e n t  a n d  its  
a f f i l ia te d  o rg a n iz a t io n s  to  fu r th e r  its  r e p u ta t io n  p r o g r e s s iv e  a n d  p r o a c t iv e  a p p ro a c h e s  to  m o d e m  is s u e s  
fa c in g  th e  p o l ic in g  c o m m u n ity ,  p a y in g  p a r t i c u la r  a tte n tio n  to  a d d re s s in g  o f f ic e r  s u rv iv a b il i ty ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
s e e k in g  to  e m b ra c e  e v id e n c e -b a s e d  p o l ic ie s  r e la te d  to  o f f ic e r - in v o lv e d  sh o o tin g s . T h e  F ra te rn a l  O rd e r  
o f  P o l ic e ,  C o m m o d o re  L o d g e  # 3 , h a s  c h o s e n  to  s u p p o r t  th is  r e s e a rc h  e n d e a v o r .  W e  b e l ie v e  it 
c o m p le m e n ts  th e  g o a ls  o f  o u r  o rg a n iz a t io n  a n d  w i l l  a lm o s t  c e r ta in ly  b e n e f i t  c u rre n t a n d  f u tu r e  m e m b e rs ,  
p o l ic e  o f f ic e rs , th e ir  d e p a r tm e n ts ,  a n d  th e i r  f a m i l ie s  a n d  c o m m u n it ie s .
S in c e re ly ,
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'Norfolk 
C r t u o f
January 2, 2013
To Whom It May Concern:
As coordinator o f  the Norfolk Police Department's Critical Incident Stress Management 
(CISM) Team, I have been asked to review the research proposal for Ms. Amanda 
Farrell's dissertation research regarding officer-involved shootings, and officer 
survivability. After a comprehensive review, I have determined that this research 
proposal embraces the goals o f  this department. The CISM Team seeks to address the 
emotional needs o f the men and women of the Norfolk Police Department who may 
become involved in a duly-related traumatic critical incident. Ms. Farrell's research has 
the potential to positively impact the working environment of these officers, particularly 
in how these incidents are managed, and the consideration given to officers in the 
aftermath of a traumatic event.
It is my belief that this research presents an opportunity for the Norfolk Police 
Department, and affiliated organizations, to enhance our response to the emotional 
survivability o f  officers who may become involved in a traumatic critical incident, 
specifically officer-involved shootings. I am pleased to support this research, especially 
since it represents a true collaboration between law enforcement and a local academic. I 
can clearly see the potential value to our current and future officers/employees.
Sincerely.
Captain W. R. Driskell 
Commanding Officer 
Personnel Division 
Norfolk Police Department
V
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Ff Jenco  V tjcatno, M D.*
G  try L. Sctrkcv, M D .“
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S h a ijtj  A s lw .M .P .*
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Cheryl I umhjud, FNP-C 
W illiam  j.  Duane, P h D .
M irk  G  Berger. Ph D.
R i-K n  M. G eraile, Ph.D.
Norbcrt L. NewficJd, Ph D 
Arm D. M m gien t, Ph.D.
R .n ie lT . W alter. Psy. D. 
O -rtfK ipher T  H uim nrl, Psy. D 
Je.aine IW&rr, E JD ., LPC *, LM FT
K«-nneth t.ahniky, 1 O iW  
Greg O n  it in, LC 5W  
Be verly 11. Bullock, LC S W  
D rnnis F’a tre ro n , LCSW  
K..«vn M iKmlvy, P,v.D„ LCSW , 1.1 
K.rtstyn K. N ciJerm e\er, LCSW  
R icharJ Jaylowski, LCSW  
N.tiwy E. G rjJJy . LCSW  
U n a  T  W illiams, LCSW  
G luuia V' Jmieji, LC^SW 
R..*crrurie Cam pbell, RN. L R .' 
R h c n J a R  Frank, LPC. l.M F T 
lam ara M cDaniel, LPC 
C  -.rut T ^ ffe , RN, MSN
• i hpbnnate,
American B o ztd  L>f 
Ps' chivry & Neurnl/'jy
** IhpLnruiv;,
American Board ( 'rj 
Psychuitrv f f  S:l h Tology,
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Ar-urncan Acai*rrt> <)?
Pair. M arujc-rum
M a rc h  I ,  2010
A m a n d a  L . F a rre ll, M A , M S c  
FA X : 4 1 0 -3 5 7 4
D e a r M s. Farrell:
I a m  w ritin g  to  c o n firm  th a t  I h av e  re v ie w e d  y o u r  p ro p o sa l fo r  d is se r ta tio n  
re sea rc h  fo cu sin g  o n  p o lic e  sh o o tin g  in c id e n ts  w ith  a  sp ec ific  fo c u s  on  
S e rg e a n t S c a llo n ’s sh o o tin g  in c id e n t o n  A p ril  1 5 ,2 0 0 7 .
I  t re a te d  S e rg e a n t S c a llo n  fo r P o s t-T ra u m a tic  S tre ss  D iso rd er sy m p to m s  
fo llo w in g  th is sh o o tin g , a n d  I h av e  n o  re se rv a tio n s  a b o u t h is p a r tic ip a tio n  in  
an  “ e lab o ra ted  c a s e  s tu d y ”  o f  th is  p a r tic u la r  in c id e n t. Further, sh o u ld  th e  
n e ed  a rise , I w ill c o n tin u e  to  o ffe r  fo llo w -u p  se rv ic e s  to  S e rg ean t S c a llo n  at 
h is  req u est.
R e sp ec tfu lly ,
■MFT ^  r% P.
W illia m  J . D u a n e , P h .D .'
L ic e n se d  C lin ica l P sy c h o lo g is t
Academy Crossing Medical Plaia, 3300 Academy Avenue, Portsmouth, Virginia 23703-3203 
757-483-6404/Fax 757-483-0737
rooo nooogj xvj co :so oioc ro to
Appendix G
C i t u o fNorfolk
D e p a r tm e n t  o f  L aw
December 31, 2 009
Ms. Amanda Farrell
Old Dominion University
College of Arts and Letters
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice 
Batten Arts and Letters 6th Floor 
Norfolk, Virginia 23529
BERNAROA. P IS H k O  
— . City A tto rn ey  —— —  
JOHN Y. R IC H A R D S O N , )R 
WAYNE RINGER 
MARY L. NEXSEN 
MARTHA C .  RO LLINS 
NATHANIEL BEAM AN (V 
MARTHA ? . M c C A N N  
CYNTHIA B. H A l l  
CHARLES S. PRENTACE 
|ACK f -  C L O U D  
|O A N  E. M A H O N C Y  
DEREK A . M U N G O  
TAMELE YVETTE H O B S O N  
NADA N . K A W W ASS 
ADAM D . MELITA 
TASHA O . SC O TT 
ANDREW  R. FO X  
HEATHER L. KELLEY 
BRIAN A. T H O M A S S O N
Re: FOIA request
Our File No. 09-136693-WR
Dear Mr. F a r r e l l :
Your letter dated December 22, 2009, and add ressed to Senior 
Assistant Chief of Police Chamberlin, together with the attached 
Research Proposal, has been forwarded to me  with respect to your 
request for various materials. We are obl iged under law to treat 
these requests for materials as requests made under the Virginia 
Freedom of Information Act.
The requested General Orders and polic ie s you request will 
be produced. Personnel are gathering those. Depending on the 
volume of them, there may be a copying charge, and we will let 
you know what that is.
Your request for access to the "complete case file" is 
denied. The Department declines to produce the case file, 
because it is a criminal investigation file exempt from 
production pursuant to Virginia Code § 2 . 2 - 3 7 0 6 (F)(1), and your 
request may also include material that is cons idered a 
confidential administrative investigation, which is exempt under 
Virginia Code § 2 . 2 - 3 7 0 6 (G) (3) .
You request for statistics (expanded in the bo dy of the 
Research Proposal to "statistics and demographics") cannot be 
satisfied for a number of reasons. The Department does not 
maintain such statistics. The Department's response is that the 
statistical records requested do not exist. Virg in ia Code §2.2- 
3704 (B) (4). Moreover, the Freedom of Information Act does r.ot
8 1 0  U nion  Street, 900  City H all Building, N orfolk, Virginia 2 3 5 1 0  
(757) 6 6 4 -4 5 2 9  /  Fax: (757) 664 -4201
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Ms. Amanda Farrell 
December 31, 2009
Page 2
require the public agency to create records, and in this 
instance, does not require the compilation of statistics.
Virginia Code §2.2-3104(0). If we were requi re d t o  compile 
statistics, we do not believe your request compl ies  with Virginia 
Code § 2 . 2 - 3 7 0 4 (B), in that it does not ident ify  the record, or 
the desired statistics, with "reasonable sp e c i f i c i t y . "  You have 
not described specifically what statistics you want.
Sincerely yours.
Chief Deputy City Attor ney
W R :tbn
V
Department of Police
J a n u a ry  25 , 2 0 1 0
Ms. A m an d a  Farreil
Old D om inion U niversity
C o llege  of A rts a n d  L etters
D e p a r tm e n t of S ocio logy  a n d  Crim inal ju s tic e
B a tten  A rts an d  L e tte rs  6*’ Floor
Norfolk, V irginia 2 3 5 2 9
D e a r M s. Farrell:
W e h a v e  rev iew ed  your D e c e m b e r 22, 20 0 9 , r e q u e s t  for a  le tte r in su p p o r t o f your r e s e a rc h  
p ro p o sa l for Exploring Police S h o o tin g s  a n d  O fficer Survivability , a s  s u p p le m e n te d  by y ou r 
le tte r d a te d  Ja n u a ry  4, 2009 , a n d  w e h a v e  rev iew ed  th e  R e s e a r c h  P ro p o s a l itself. W e  su p p o rt 
a ca d e m ic  r e s e a rc h  a n d  be lieve  s tu d y  th a t w ould benefit po lice  o fficers  in h o w  they c o p e  with 
th e  a f te rm a th  of sh oo ting  a  c itizen  w ould b e  sa lu ta ry .
H ow ever, th e  D e p a r tm e n t's  ability, in fac t, to  su p p o rt your e ffo rts  is c o n s tr a in e d  by a  n u m b e r  of 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  touch ing  on  confidentiality  a n d  o n  co m m u n ic a tio n s  by, from  a n d  of the  
D e p artm en t. In pa rt, th e  confidentiality  c o n s id e ra tio n s  a re  re c o g n iz ed  by  th e  e x em p tio n s  from 
th e  V irginia F ree d o m  of Inform ation A ct a s  d e sc r ib e d  to  you  in Mr. R in g e r 's  le tte r of D e c e m b e r 
31, 2009 . S e v e ra l top ics w hich you  in d ica te  a n  in ten tion  to  e x p lo re  n e c e s s a r i ly  would in v ad e  
m a tte rs  w hich th e  D ep artm en t h o ld s  in stric t co n fid en ce , including ad m in is tra tiv e  in ternal 
in v estig a tio n s  a n d  ev a lu a tio n s  of ju s tifica tio n s  fo r a n  o ffice r's  a c tio n s , a n d  a ls o  including 
c o m m e n ts  on  p e rso n n e l m a tte rs , a s  w ou ld  b e  likely to a r is e  in in te rv iew s o f su p erv iso rs . As 
you point ou t, it will b e  im possib le  for an o n y m ity  to b e  p ro te c te d .
Also, it is th e  D e p a r tm e n t's  policy th a t in fo rm ation  re la ting  to  th e  D e p a r tm e n t o r its o p e ra tio n s  
shall b e  re le a s e d  only by th e  C h ie f o f P o lice  o r h is  d e s ig n e e .  W e  c a n n o t g iv e  blanket ap p ro v a l 
to your free ly  interview ing p e rso n n e l of th e  D e p a r tm e n t a b o u t this c a s e ,  pa rtly  b e c a u s e  s o m e  
of th e  p e rs o n n e l m ay  b e  involved in th o s e  m a tte rs  w hich vvc c o n s id e r  con fiden tia l, a n d  partly 
b e c a u s e  s o m e  ju d g m e n t m ay n e e d  to b e  m a d e  a b o u t w h o  is  a  p ro p e r  s p o k e s p e rs o n  with 
re g a rd  to  p a rticu la r inform ation a n d  is s u e s .
W e  s ta n d  re a d y  to  p ro d u c e  any inform ation  req u ired  by a n d  no t e x e m p t from  th e  V irginia 
F ree d o m  o f Inform ation Act, b u t th e  A ct r e a c h e s  only re c o rd s ,  an d  c o n ta in s  n o  re q u ire m en t 
th a t w e g ra n t in terv iew s. With re s p e c t to  y ou r in terv iew ing D e p a r tm e n ta l p e rso n n e l, w e  will 
c o n s id e r  o n  a n  individual b a s is  a n y  r e q u e s t  you  m ak e  to in terv iew  a  p a rtic u la r  p e rso n  a b o u t a  
particu lar su b jec t. I h o p e  th is  le tte r  will a d e q u a te ly  s e rv e  y o u r n e e d s  in light o f the conflicting 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  involved.
B ru ce  P . M arquii 
C hief o f P o lice
Post O ffice  Box 35 8  » N orfolk, V irginia 23501
Division of Communications & Public Information
O c to b e r  31. 2011
Ms. A m a n d a  Farrell 
Old Dom inion University 
BAL 6000 
Norfolk. VA 23529
Re: F reed om  o f Inform ation A ct R eq u est by A m a n d a  Farrell for
IBR reports a n d  sp e c ia l in c id en t reports for b o th  NPD officers  
a n d  la w  e n fo r c e m e n t  officers o th er  th an  NPD officers a n d  
SOP’s regard in g  d isch a rg in g  of w e a p o n s  a n d  o fficer-involved  
sh ootin gs. Our files 2011-1037, 2011-1038 a n d  2011-1039
D ear Ms. Farrell:
E nclosed  p le a s e  find th e  inform ation you  r e q u e s te d  reg a rd in g  the a b o v e ­
c a p t io n e d  m atter.
If I c a n  b e  o f  further a ss is ta n c e  or a n sw er a n y  q u estio n s y o u  m ay  h a v e ,  
p le a se  fee l free to  g iv e  m e  a  ca ll.
Sincerely,
M ary E. K eou gh  
Program  Supervisor
Enclosures
D ivision o f C o m m unications  & Public  Inform ation 
810  U nion Street, R oom  302 , City H all B u ild in g / .Norfolk, V irginia 23510  
i7 5 7 j 6 6 4 -4 2 6 6  • Fax: (757) 6 6 4 -4 0 0 6  
wvvw. norfo I k . gov
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (I-OIA)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2,2-3700, C ode  o f  Virginia
i . DATE OF REQUEST: D d r o h & j r  \ b  2 . o t l
2. IN D iV IDUA L REQ U ESTIN G  IN FO R M A TIO N
Fell Name: - P arrel!
Com pany (if  applicable): D i d  " d o m i n i o n  U n i V i e ( 2 l K (
Address: T d R L  U ( J Z ) 0  __________________________________________________
City: K b r f e l L ___________  State: V lQ  ZIP: 3  ^ > 5 ^ ?
Telephone: (Hom e) ~? 5 7 '5 * 4 ~ 7 -  (W ork) 7  5 ] 1 3 3 8 ' M 3 T 1 <=f_
3. R EC O R D S REQUESTED (Provide as m uch detail as available): 
D a te (s)/T im e (s)  o f  record(s) (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p.m.) y 
Detailed Description o f  Request:
At-
V i n u a q  I f f iQ - T f c s m l
ImdmiL&pods rclol
Ini | foiA C f t - f o r c officejTS gtingrdVxUn WPb gfficcGS 
dhfrP t o t  ocDinrd mrtinMlne (2rHj of Mof-fclld pucfack of
ledime, ptri s L o f
4. PU R SU A N T TO  V IR G IN IA  C O D E §2 .2-3704(F), IT  W ILL B E  N E C E SSA R Y  FO R  YOU T O  
R EIM B U R SE TH E CITY FO R  A LL C O STS IN C U R R ED  IN T H E  PR O D U C  TION OF TH E SE
RECORDS.
SIG N A TU R E OF R EQ U ESTER :
O FFIC E  U SE  ONLY
Request D elivered to Office c f  C ity A ttorney:
Date: T im e: By:
G.O. ADM-455: Freedom o f  Info Act Attachment A Date of Issue: t) I 12 II
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FREEDOM  O r INFORMATION ACT (FGIA)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2.2-370C, Code o f  Virginia
I DATK OF REQUEST: Qdtpbex IZ , 9-0] \___
2. IN D IVIDUA L R E Q U E ST IN G  IN FO R M A TIO N
Full N am e: k m curia. L- P& r r c l l   
Com pany ( i f  applicable):
Address: ______________________________
City: f v l n r f r ) !    State: V A _  ZIP: ^  5 5 ^ ________
Telephone: (H om e) ~ ? 5 1  ^  5 H 1  -  (W ork) ' l 3 1 ; 3 3 3 l
3. R EC O R D S R EQ U E ST E D  (Provide as m uch detail as available):
Datc(s) /T im e (s )  o f  record(s) (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p .m .) v W i u o i i j  I f f i Q - T f c s a n l  
Dclailed D escrip tion  o f  Request: f p p i e s  o f  o i l  I B R  r c p p r - t e  a n d  S o c i a l
I n o i f k r t ^ p o r - K  f d q - t e d  ( j i s C h a t y ^ ^ r o a n n s , ,  h e j
M h f 4 V i i t T b l i 6 c  i p Q J u f l i m  o n -  a n r i  o f f i - d u h j  m c i d e n f e
O r u d  i n v / o t v / i n ^ j  e i i h ^ r d x d r j  u r a p o  r \ s  o r  f A h a r  u j c a p . o t i t ^ .  
o u .- t '& id e  o f  Q j jd h o n f r x l .  d r a i n  A \ m e
p u r io r l  o d  T -h m u a n ] 1} W O  - f e  p r ^ s m f  d l c r b - ______
4. PU R SU A N T  TO V IR G IN IA  C O D E §2.2-3704(F), IT W ILL BE N E C E SSA R Y  FO R  YOU TO  
R E IM B U R SE  T H E C IT Y  FOR ALL COSTS IN C U R R ED  rN T H E  PR O D U C T IO N  OF T H E SE  
REC O R D S.
SIG N A T U R E  O F REQUESTE.
OFFICE U SE  ON LY 
R equest D elivered to Office c f  C ity  A ttorney:
Date: __________________    T im e:   B y ;
(i .O .  ADM-455: Freedom o f  Info Act Attachment A Date o f lssue :  0 1 I 2UI
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FO! A)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2.2-3700, Code o f  Virginia
I DATE OF REQUEST: O d r a ?3 o i l
2. IN D IV ID U A L R EQ U ESTIN G  IN FO R M A TIO N
Full Nam e: A  m O J O d f ?  L  P O - f T t  I 1
Com pany ( if  applicable): -bM 'bcrninion
Address: __________________________________________________
City: K l p r P o l l ___________________  State: _ Y £ L  ZIP: < * * 3 5 ^ 9
felcphone: (Hom e) T n - w q y i f e (W ork) J 5 1 z .3 & 'd 3 3 f L
3. R EC O R D S R EQ U ESTED  (Provide as m uch detail as available):
Date(s) /  T im c(s) o frcc o rd (s)  (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p.m.)_ N / P
Detailed D escription o f  Request: I /QplC m S
„  -iV o m  b f u H n T h c  j r b m i r A ' b W i S i o r t  
/if-j-ht  Slor-folKHlt'ce hfm-inmnts hjrt.au and
dnp klnr&ltlblice s  Qpfic.t pfffofe&iom j Afandad)
irqarciin^ police, officers dtscV*a*qj\n3 zSreannns 
n r A  / T f f i G g r - j n v o W e d  s h o g f r i n y  ^ ....    _
4. PU R SU A N T  TO V IR G IN IA  COD E §2.2-3704(1-), IT W ILL BE N E C E SSA R Y  F O R  YOU T O  
R E IM B U R SE  1HE C IT Y  FO R ALL C O STS IN C U R R ED  IN T H E  PR O D U C T IO N  OF T H E SE  
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